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Chapter 1
Animals in Our Midst: An Introduction
Jozef Keulartz and Bernice Bovenkerk
Abstract In this introduction we describe how the world has changed for animals
in the Anthropocene—the current age, in which human activities have influenced
the planet on a scale never seen before. In this era, we find many different types
of animals in our midst: some—in particular livestock—are both victims of and
unwittingly complicit in causing the Anthropocene. Others are forced to respond
to new environmental conditions. Think of animals that due to climate change can
no longer survive in their native habitats or wild animals that in response to habitat
loss and fragmentation are forced to live in urban areas. Some animals are being
domesticated or in contrast de-domesticated, and yet others are going extinct or in
contrast are being resurrected. These changing conditions have led to new tensions
between humans and other animals.Howcanwe shape our relationshipswith all these
different animals in a rapidly changing world in such a way that both animal welfare
and species diversity are not further affected? We describe how animal ethics is
changing in these trying times and illustrate the impacts of Anthropocene conditions
on animals by zooming in on one country where many problems, such as biodiversity
loss and landscape degradation, converge, the Netherlands. We conclude by giving
an overview of the different chapters in this volume, which are organised into five
parts: animal agents, domesticated animals, urban animals, wild animals and animal
artefacts.
Other contributions in this volume in which the Netherlands will function as a textbook example
are the chapters of Hidde Boersma, Susan Ophorst and Bernice Bovenkerk, Eva Meijer and Martin
Drenthen.
J. Keulartz (B) · B. Bovenkerk
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1.1 Introduction
As we are preparing this book for the publication, the world is in the grips of Covid-
19, the corona virus. Scientists have traced the virus back to bats and some argue that
the bats become particularly infectious when they are stressed. This stress is caused
amongst other things by waking them up prematurely from their hibernation or by
keeping them in captivity.1 This virus does not only have implications for humans,
but also for other animals. Some have also been infected, most famously a tiger in
the Bronx zoo in New York.2 Others are being used as animal models in medical
experiments to find a vaccine for Covid-19. In a number of European countries,
infections of mink have been met by a massive culling of all animals on mink farms
in order to prevent them becoming a reservoir for COVID-19. This was done after a
comparison of viral DNA that suggested that mink had infected a small number of
employees (Oreshkova et al. 2020). In the Netherlands, the corona crisis has led to
a debate, spurred on by the Party for the Animals, about the intensive way in which
production animals are kept, with virologists stating that the Netherlands is ‘full of
potential hosts that can transmit a virus’.3 Globalization has certainly been a driver
of the massive outbreak of this disease, and as we will argue in the introduction has
had major implications for animals and for the human-animal relationship.
In the (Australian) summer of 2019/2020, large parts of Australia are on fire.
So far, the devastating bushfires killed 26 people and over a billion animals.4 In
particular one of Australia’s main symbolic animal species, the koala, is hit hard
by the fires, as its strategy is to move further up the tree in case of danger. With
the fires still blazing, the Australian government is denying its own contribution
to climate change and downplaying the link between climate change and the bush
fires.5 Australia ranked last in the Climate Change Performance Index out of the 57
countries that are responsible for the lion’s share of greenhouse gas emissions.6
In 2015, a dentist fromMinnesota killed famous lion Cecil just outside of Hwange
National Park in Zimbabwe. The hunt was legal, but nevertheless caused a public
outcry against trophy hunting.7 This case raises difficult ethical questions, such as
‘should we allow trophy hunting and even support game farms in order to raise
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attitude of humans towards other animals.A recent study suggests that people increas-
ingly attribute human-like characteristics to wild animals, and that this anthropomor-
phism results in changing strategies for wildlife management. The researchers of this
study notice ‘a shift in values from domination, in which wildlife are for human uses,
tomutualism inwhichwildlife are seen as part of one’s social community’ (Manfredo
et al. 2019, 1).
In Cincinnati, two police officers sitting in a car, were approached by a goose, who
started tapping on the police car’s door. The goose did not respond to the food offered
her, but kept on tapping, walking off, and tapping on the door again, as if asking for
help. When the police officers followed her, they found her baby goose tangled up
in string, and rescued the baby goose, under the watchful eye of his mother.8 This
case raises interesting questions about animals’ cognitive capacities and capacity
for self-willed action, or agency. The goose clearly went up to the human beings
planning to ask for help, expecting them to be able to afford help. Does this mean
the goose is capable of intentional action? And does intentional action presuppose
second-order thought? Could she even be said to possess Theory of Mind?
These and many other recent cases exemplify the changing and ambivalent rela-
tionships we have with the diverse animals that live in our midst in the Anthropocene.
The term Anthropocene, which was introduced in 2000 by chemist and Nobel Prize
laureate Paul Crutzen and biologist Eugene Stroemer, refers to the current age, in
which human activities are so omnipresent that humanity itself has developed into
a global geophysical force, at least as influential as natural forces. Even though the
term would suggest otherwise, nonhuman animals in fact play an important role in
the Anthropocene, not only as victims of our treatment, but also as actors in their
own right. Some—in particular farm animals—unwittingly are driving forces of the
Anthropocene, others are forced to respond to new environmental conditions. Think
of animals who due to climate change can no longer survive in their native habi-
tats or wild animals that in response to habitat loss and fragmentation are forced
to live in urban areas. Other types of animals in our midst are (extreme breeds of)
companion and sports animals, previously domesticated animals that are becoming
de-domesticated, exotic and invasive species, animal species faced with extinc-
tion, and vice versa, extinct animals faced with resurrection. We witness changing
relationships between these different groups of non-human animals and between
human and non-human animals.9 Our integration with many of these animals has
become stronger, leading to problems such as zoonotic diseases, invasions of exotic
species, andhuman-wildlife conflicts.At the same time, our knowledge about animals
and their (mental) capacities is increasing and this raises new questions about our




9For simplicity’s sake we will mostly refer to non-human animals as animals and human animals
as humans in this chapter.
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1.2 Animal Ethics in the Anthropocene
In the Anthropocene we face a tension in our dealings with nonhuman animals. On
the one hand current research shows that animals are capable of ‘self-willed action’—
in other words that they possess agency (Irvine 2004). Characteristics that used to
be seen as human-specific have been discovered in certain other animal species,
including language use, morality, a sense of justice, altruism, complicated hierar-
chies, and cognition (Meijer 2019; Bekoff and Pierce 2009; Brosnan and de Waal
2012;O’Neill andHastings 2007;Wasserman andZentall 2012). This calls into ques-
tion the sharp division between human and animal minds onwhich human exception-
alism rests—the view that humans are essentially (rather than just in degree) different
from and superior to other animals (De Waal 2016; Lurz 2009; Gruen 2011). On the
other hand, despite this heightened awareness of animals and their capacities, animals
are increasingly limited in their agency. So even though theAnthropocene has shaped
the knowledge and technology for us to realize that animals have more agency than
has been assumed, ironically it is also an epoch where animal agency is increasingly
curtailed. In theAnthropocene,most (vertebrate) animals live in captivity as livestock
or companion animals, where humans control their movements and genetic make-
up. Domesticated animals such as cows, pigs, and chickens often live in ‘simple,
predictable and monotonous environments’, where they are hardly challenged and
their agency is not stimulated (Špinka and Wemelsfelder 2011, 27). In the wild,
through habitat loss and fragmentation, urban sprawl, and climate change, animal
agency is also curtailed, as animals have less room to maneuver in environments
suitable to their species. Due to the detrimental impact of livestock production on
the environment, humans are forced to seek alternative means of producing proteins,
such as cultured meat. In the Anthropocene, technology increasingly mediates our
interactionswith animals—frommilking robots to gene editing andcloning—and this
also has implications for the human-animal relationship and for animals’ capability
to exert their agency.
Whereas human–nature relationships figure prominently in discussions about the
Anthropocene (Rolston 2012), human–animal relationships remain underdeveloped
(except for Bovenkerk and Keulartz 2016; Tønnessen et al. 2016). Animal ethicists
have criticized human exceptionalism (Gruen 2011), but have not yet formulated a
coherent response to the specific and urgent challenges of this new epoch. The animal
ethics field arose as a response to ill treatment of farm and laboratory animals,
explaining its focus on individual domesticated animals, overlooking dilemmas
occurring on the level of species (Bovenkerk 2016). Traditional animal ethicists
(Singer 1975; Regan 1983) perceived animals as passive victims of our treatment,
rather than active agents with whom we need to negotiate our common lifeworld.
These theories have insufficiently thought through what it means for human–animal
relationships when we take animal agency more seriously. Moreover, they could
not have anticipated the variety of human-animal relationships and corresponding
challenges we would be facing in this new epoch.
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In this edited volume, we have brought together authors from a range of disci-
plines—philosophy and ethics, ecology, communication science, linguistics, cultural
geography, animal welfare science, history and law—to shed light on the changing
human-animal relationships in the Anthropocene. The reader will encounter starving
polar bears, greeting cows, stray cats, pedigree dogs, backyard rats, laughing chimps
and roaming wolves. The question throughout is how we can give shape to new rela-
tionshipswith these animals. Canwe find consolation in philosophywhen confronted
with discomforting wildlife? How do we know what is the right dog to take into our
homes? Should we feed polar bears who are victim to changing climatic conditions?
How can we conserve the biodiversity of animal species? Should we resurrect extinct
species? These and many other questions need to be raised in our efforts to create
new meaningful relationships with the animals in our midst.
This volume is divided into five parts: animal agents, domesticated animals, urban
animals, wild animals, and animal artefacts. Each part is followed by a commentary.
With this division we base ourselves in part on the categories of animals proposed
by influential animal philosophers Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka. In Zoopolis
(2011) they plead for a political turn in animal ethics and suggest that we grant
different types of political rights to three groups of animals: domesticated, liminal,
andwild animals.All animals have universal rights, such as the right not to be killed or
unnecessarily harmed, but different groups of animals have differentiated additional
rights. Domesticated animals are full members of our political communities and
should be treated as such. We have more specific duties towards them than towards
for example wild animals, because they are already part of our community; we have
made decisions about the way they live and even about whether or not they live
and about what their genetic composition is. They work alongside humans and fulfil
important functions in our societies. According to Donaldson and Kymlicka, justice
requires that we grant them citizenship rights. In their view, animals that have not
been domesticated, but that live among humans, such as urban wildlife, should be
termed ‘liminal animals’. Think of the squirrels in our parks and the rats in our
backyards. We are witnessing an increasing ‘liminalisation’ of wild animals, raising
the question of whether this might be a precursor to their elimination (Donaldson and
Kymlicka 2016, 226). In order to prevent their elimination, we will need to develop
a way of cohabitation with them that protects their basic rights but that also gives
us opportunities to combat the nuisance they are sometimes causing. We owe these
animals similar duties as we owe to tourists who are visiting our country; they have
residency without citizenship rights and are so-called denizens. Finally, wild animals
have an interest in being able to live their lives as unimpeded by human interference as
possible. Justice between human communities andwild animal communities could be
compared to justice between countries. Wild animals should be granted sovereignty
rights; the right to autonomy over their own territories. Many of the chapters in this
book relate to Donaldson and Kymlicka’s views in one way or another. For example,
in his search for meaningful co-existence with wolves in the Netherlands, Martin
Drenthen draws on their model and argues that we should see wolves as members of
a sovereign community. Eva Meijer uses the concept of liminal animals to analyse
the question of how we should deal with stray cats in the city. Susan Ophorst and
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Bernice Bovenkerk discuss what the notion of citizenship rights for dogs tells us
about what the right choice is when obtaining a dog.
In the remainder of this introduction, we will sketch the terrain in more detail.
What impacts do Anthropocene conditions such as climate change and biodiversity
loss have on animals? What different groups of animals are impacted and in what
ways? We will illustrate these developments by zooming in on one country where
many problems, such as biodiversity loss and landscape degradation, converge, the
Netherlands.
1.3 The Netherlands as Mirror of Biodiversity Problems
This is by no means an arbitrary choice. In the Netherlands only about 15% of the
original biodiversity remains. This means that the loss of biodiversity is considerably
greater than elsewhere in Europe and the world.
Almost two-thirds of the Dutch territory is used for agriculture, and two-thirds
of that is used for cattle breeding. The Dutch landscape is therefore increasingly
dominated by monocultures of drained rye-grass, a uniform green billiard cloth that
has taken the place of flowery meadows full of birds. Landscape degradation is not
only caused by intensive livestock farming, but also by the enormous number of
distribution centers. The Netherlands is a distribution country par excellence. At the
beginning of 2017, the country had 1760 distribution centers with a total surface area
of 28million square meters. This proliferation of distribution centers is accompanied
by a substantial expansion of the transport infrastructure, making the Netherlands
the most fragmented region in the whole of Europe, with disastrous consequences
for the diversity of species in the Netherlands.10
Finally, there is a danger that the remaining natural landscape will be completely
transformed into a recreational landscape. As a result of the increase in prosperity and
mobility and the decline in leisure time,we are living inwhat sociologists have termed
an ‘experience society’. Themore nature becomes an attraction, completewithmoun-
tain bike routes, pancake restaurants, souvenir shops, campsites and holiday homes,
the more biodiversity will be lost.
The Netherlands, then, scores very poorly on all kinds of nature rankings. By
taking a closer look at this country, one gets a sharper picture of the biodiversity
problems that people and animals elsewhere also have to contend with. This is done
in this introduction, in which a group portrait is sketched of the many species of
animals currently found in the Netherlands, whereby we sometimes make trips to
other parts of the world.
10A study from 2016 calculated that half of the European territory is situated within the critical
distance of 1.5 km from (rail) roads. Within this area, the number of birds decreases by a quarter
and the number of mammals even halves. In the Netherlands, where the distance to transport
infrastructure is much smaller than the European average, we have to expect a much greater loss of
biodiversity (Torres et al. 2016).
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1.3.1 The Recovery of Wildlife
We start this group portrait with a phenomenon that gives rise to some optimism.
There is currently a spectacular comeback of wildlife, not only in Europe, but also in
North America. The conditions for the recovery of wild populations were created by
the large-scale reforestation and revegetation that took place more or less simultane-
ously on both continents as a result of rural depopulation. The European Common
Agricultural Policy (CAP), established in 1962, has led to a far-reaching intensifi-
cation of agriculture and the associated depopulation of low-productive farmland,
particularly in mountain areas. Thus, while intensive agriculture leads to an impov-
erishment of the landscape and species diversity, it has ironically led to the return of
wild animals at the same time. Another important driving force behind the return of
wild populations was the emergence of the environmental movement in the 1970s,
which created support for European legislation for the protection of species and
habitats.11
As a result of these changes in agricultural and nature policy, the number of large
grazers increased sharply. This was a prerequisite for the recovery of the popula-
tions of large predators, which were almost completely extinct in the course of the
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. A recent study, based on data from all Euro-
pean countries (with the exception of Russia and Belarus) for the period 2012–2016,
comes to the following estimate: wolves are the most abundant with 17,000 individ-
uals; second is the brown bear with between 15,000 and 16,000 individuals; next is
the lynx with between 8000 and 9000 individuals; last is the wolverine with between
1000 and 1250 individuals (Linnell and Cretois 2018).
Also in the Netherlands many species have returned or have recovered consider-
ably. Some species have returned spontaneously, such as the eagle owl, the crane,
the white-tailed eagle and the wild cat, and also the wolf has settled here by now (see
also the chapters by Jansman and by Drenthen in this Volume). Other species have
been helped by reintroduction, such as the raven, the stork, the beaver, the otter, the
badger, and quite recently, the bison.
1.3.2 Exotic Species and Climate Refugees
There is another category of wild animals that is increasinglymaking its presence felt
in the Netherlands. These are not native species that return here after a long absence,
but exotic species, that do not originally belong here, such as the muskrat, the collar
parakeet and Japanese knotweed. In fact, migrating plants and animals are nothing
new, but since globalization has taken off, more plants and animals have turned into
‘globetrotters’ than ever before. As traffic and transport, trade and tourism grow,
the significance of boundaries is diminishing, and at the same time vulnerability to
11Such as the 1982 Berne Convention of the Council of Europe and the 1979 and 1992 Birds and
Habitats Directives of the European Union respectively.
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the massive arrival of exotic species is increasing enormously everywhere. In this
context, there is even talk of a ‘mass migration’.
The number of registered exotic species in the Netherlands is almost 2400, an
extremely conservative estimate because we do not have sufficient information for
a number of species groups. With this high figure, the Netherlands is European
champion of exotic species, and has the dubious honour of even being among the
world’s top. This is the ecological downside of international trade and the transit of
goods and raw materials to the European hinterland (Leuven 2017).
Apart from globalisation, there is another important cause for the influx of exotic
species, namely climate change.While cold-loving speciesmigrate northwards, heat-
loving species come our way from the south. Among these newcomers are a number
of pest species that can cause a lot of nuisance and also serious public health prob-
lems. One of these species that made the headlines in the spring of 2019 is the
oak processionary caterpillar. This moth caterpillar, whose numbers has tripled in
the Netherlands since 2018, causes complaints such as itching, rash, and irritation
to the eyes or respiratory tract. The pine processionary caterpillar, which has even
more burning hairs than the oak processionary caterpillar, has already moved into
the Belgian Ardennes. Other species that threaten to settle here are the Asian Tiger
Mosquito, which can transmit tropical diseases such as chikunguna, dengue and
zika, and the Hyalomatick, a giant tick that can transmit the dangerous Crimean
Congovirus.
While thermophilic species are advancing, cold-loving species are increasingly
getting into trouble. This is especially true for plants that can only move very slowly
to colder areas because they can only move by spreading their seeds. It also applies
to cold-blooded animals, such as insects, fish, reptiles and amphibians, whose body
temperature depends on the ambient temperature andwho are therefore very sensitive
to climate change. These animals all too often encounter obstacles that are difficult
to overcome in the form of natural barriers, such as mountains and rivers, or in the
form of infrastructural works, such as motorways, railways and viaducts. In order
to save these animals from extinction, wildlife managers sometimes resort to what
is known as assisted migration or assisted colonisation: the deliberate relocation of
these ‘climate refugees’ to new habitats that they cannot reach on their own (see
Larson and Barr 2016).
1.3.3 The Sixth Mass Extinction
All in all, a lot of wild animals, spontaneously or otherwise, have returned to the
Netherlands or emigrated here. But let’s not get too excited yet: in the Anthropocene,
the age of humans, we are confronted with a worldwide extinction wave. We must
therefore assess the recent increase in wild populations in the light of dramatic
historical declines: most of the populations of species in the process of comeback
are still far from reaching a genetically and demographically sustainable size, while
many species are still declining in size. In fact, we are in the midst of a new mass
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extinction. Mass extinction occurs when the earth loses more than three-quarters of
its species. This has only happened five times in the course of Earth’s history, the
last time 65 million years ago when the dinosaurs disappeared from the face of the
earth. Experts estimate that the current rate of species extinction is 100–1000 times
higher than the so-called background extinction rate.
In order to be able to assess the situation properly, we need to pay attention
not only to the extinction of species but also to the decline in the number and size
of populations. WWF’s latest Living Planet Report (2018) shows that the size of
vertebrate populations fell by no less than 60% between 1970 and 2014.12 When we
realise that population extinction should be seen as a prelude to species extinction,
it becomes clear that “the window for effective action is very short, probably two or
three decades at most” (Ceballos et al. 2017).
When we now turn our gaze to Dutch nature, we see a rather dramatic picture.
This is evident from the Living Planet Report: Nature in the Netherlands, a report
published byWWF at the end of 2015, in collaboration with a large number of nature
organisations. According to the report, animal populations in nature reserves have
declined by an average of 30% since 1990. The most recent State of Nature in the
EU, a report published by the European Environment Agency in 2015, shows that
the Netherlands, with no less than 96% of nature areas in an unfavourable condition,
is at the very bottom of the list of all 26 EU member states.
1.3.4 Rewilding and De-extinction
It is a widespread misunderstanding that the extinction crisis only began during the
era of the great discoveries, from the end of the fifteenth century until the eighteenth
century. This crisis began as early as the transition from Pleistocene to Holocene,
around the end of the last Ice Age, some 11,000 years ago. The main victims were
the megafauna species, a group of mammals considerably larger than the current
mammals, such as mammoths, mastodons, sabre-toothed tigers, ground sloths, cave
bears, giant wolves and giant deer.13
To explain this tremendous loss of mega-fauna species, four hypotheses have
been put forward, known tongue-in-cheek as ‘overkill’, ‘overchill’, ‘overill’ and
‘overgrill’. The ‘overkill’ hypothesis blames the extinction of megafauna species on
the spread of modern humans (Homo sapiens). The ‘overchill’ hypothesis puts the
blame on climate change at the end of the Pleistocene, the ‘overill’ hypothesis on
some ‘hyper disease’, and the ‘overgrill’ on a comet impact or shock wave above
NorthAmerica (Wolverton 2010). Because there is hardly any support for the last two
hypotheses (‘overill’ and ‘overgrill’), the research has mainly focused on the role of
climate change and the role of the hominids. The outcome of this research is that the
12Invertebrate populations are also in a precarious situation; their size has decreased by 45% over
the last 4 decades (Dirzo et al. 2014).
13The term megafauna refers to large mammals weighing more than 45 kg.
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extinction of megafauna species is strongly related to the prehistoric geographical
distribution of hominins and only weakly related to interglacial climate changes.
There is a significant difference in the magnitude of megafauna extinctions
between sub-Saharan Africa, where hominins and megafauna have long coexisted,
and Australia and America, where Homo sapiens were the first hominin species to
arrive.Whilemegafauna extinctionswere universally low in sub-SaharanAfrica, they
were exceptionally high in Australia and the Americas. Eurasia, where megafauna
came into contact with hominins long before the arrival of Homo sapiens, falls
between these extremes. It has been suggested that these differences stem from the
‘naivety’ of prey animals that had not (yet) learned how to defend themselves against
a new predator with advanced hunting techniques (Sandom et al. 2014).
The great loss of megafauna species is ecologically disastrous. Large carnivores,
who are at the top of the food pyramid, exert a strong influence on the animal and
plant populations that are at a lower level of the food pyramid and therefore play
a key role in the regulation of ecosystems. They regulate the size and behaviour of
prey populations, the small and medium-sized herbivores and the so-called ‘meso-
predators’ that hunt smaller animals. Large herbivores, which are largely resistant to
predation, also have an important influence on ecosystems, especially on the structure
and composition of their vegetation (Terborgh et al. 2010; Svenning et al. 2016).
To compensate for the dramatic loss of megafauna, rewilders use a multitude of
methods and techniques. In the case of globally extinct species one can try tomake use
of ecological substitutes for these species. Under the title of ‘Pleistocene rewilding’,
American restoration biologists are considering using the megafauna still present in
Africa and Asia, such as cheetahs, lions, camels and elephants, as replacements for
the extinct American species.
More recently, a number of new technologies have been developed that make
it possible to revitalise extinct species, a practice known as de-extinction. Two
methods from synthetic biology are currently in vogue to bring back extinct species:
Cloning via somatic cell core transplantation (SCNT) and genetic modification using
CRISPR/Cas technology. The most spectacular de-extinction project using the latter
technology aims to bring the woolly mammoth back to life.14
In addition to cloning and genetic modification, there is a third, less controver-
sial method of de-extinction, namely back breeding: the crossing and selection of
domesticated breeds with the aim of bringing back the traits of the wild extinct ances-
tors of these breeds. Such semi-wild breeds played an important role in Dutch nature
policy. In 1983, 32 Heck cattle were introduced to the ‘new nature area’ Oostvaarder-
splassen. The cattle were named after the brothers Heinz and Lutz Heck, who in the
1920s and 1930s tried to breed back the aurochs (Bos primigenius), that went extinct
in 1627, by means of crossbreeding with primitive breeds such as the Camargue
cattle, the Hungarian Steppenrund and the Scottish Highlander. One year later, 20
konik horses followed; they are the result of attempts by the Polish agronomist and
biologist Tadeasz Vetulai of the University of Poznań to breed back the wild tarpan
horse (Equus ferus ferus), which became extinct in 1887.
14See https://reviverestore.org/projects/woolly-mammoth/.
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1.3.5 Intensive Livestock Farming15
The extent to which wild animals have become oppressed worldwide is abundantly
clear from the fact that the biomass of all people on earth is ten times greater than that
of all wild land mammals combined, while the biomass of domestic animals—farm
animals and companion animals—is as much as 35 times greater than that of all wild
land mammals combined. Among the vertebrates, Homo sapiens and Bos Taurus
have become by far the most dominant species on earth.
Based on Vaclav Smil (2011) 
In the Netherlands those proportions are even a lot more unbalanced. With 502
inhabitants per km2 our country ranks fourth among the most densely populated
countries in the world (after Bangladesh, Taiwan and South Korea) but at the same
time it is also the second largest exporter of agricultural products in the world (after
the US).16 In terms of livestock density, the Netherlands is even at the top of the
world’s rankings. The number of farm animals in 2016 was more than 126 million.
The largest group is made up of 105 million chickens, followed by 12 million pigs
and 4 million cattle. However, the share of livestock farming in the Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) is only a mere 0.6%.17
The large amount of land taken up by livestock farming is causing serious biodi-
versity problems. If we do not include the production forests, only 13% is currently
left for nature, half of which consists of large inland waters such as the Wadden
15We would like to thank Joost van Herten for his critical reading of and comments to this section.
16This ranking does not take into account small city-states and small islands or island groups with
very high population densities.
17This is despite strong productivity growth as a result of the processes of intensification and
economies of scale, the contribution of agriculture to GDP fell from 15 to 1.5% in the period 1950–
2015, less than half of which is accounted for by livestock farming. http://www.clo.nl/indicatoren/
nl2125-productiewaarde-landbouw.
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Sea and lake IJsselmeer. The size of our livestock population causes biodiversity
problems outside of the Netherlands as well. Our livestock is so large that it can only
be partially fed on fodder grown here. The Netherlands is the world’s second largest
importer of soy after China. Although two-thirds of the soy is exported to the Euro-
pean hinterland, with what remains behind, the Netherlands is still the fifth largest
soy user in Europe. To grow the soy that we import annually for our livestock, we
need an area as large as three-quarters of the Netherlands. A lot of tropical rainforest
is deforested, with disastrous consequences for the richness of local species.
The high density of livestock not only compromises the space for nature, but
also leads to major environmental problems that affect the quality of nature. The
Netherlands has the highest nitrogen and phosphate surpluses of all EU member
states.18 Nitrogen ends up in the air in the form of ammonia, either directly from
the stables or after fertilising the land. The very high ammonia emissions lead to
acidification and eutrophication of nature areas and thus have a very detrimental
effect on biodiversity and also on the quality of ground and surfacewater.19 Livestock
farming is also responsible for the emission of large quantities of carbon dioxide,
methane and nitrous oxide.
The high livestock density causes not only biodiversity problems but also all kinds
of animal welfare problems. The lack of room to move of the tightly housed farm
animals leads to aggressive behaviour of the animals, which in turn necessitates
controversial interventions such as the dehorning of cows and calves, the docking of
pig tails to prevent tail biting, and the cutting of chicken beaks to prevent cannibalism.
In addition, the high density of livestock regularly leads to outbreaks of animal
diseases such as foot andmouthdisease (FMD), and swine fever.Mainly for economic
reasons, animals are usually ‘culled’, i.e. slaughtered on a large scale in order to
make the herd disease-free again. And then there are the many barn fires in which
sometimes more than two hundred thousand animals are burnt alive in one year.
Finally, the high density of livestock also causes public health problems. Some
animal diseases, so-called ‘zoonoses’, such as Q-fever and bird flu, are transmissible
to humans. The excessive use of antibiotics in animal husbandry also has harmful
consequences for public health.20 It can lead to bacterial resistance and thus to a
decrease in the efficacy of antibiotics that are also used in human health care. Finally,
livestock farming, through the emission of ammonia which is converted into particu-
late matter in the air, increases the risk of respiratory problems for people living near
18Our country does not even manage to meet the conditions of the so-called ‘derogation’, which
allows Dutch livestock farmers to use 250 instead of 170 kilos of nitrogen from animal manure per
hectare of land, in derogation of the European Nitrates Directive.
19In recent years fertilisation has led to environmental standards being exceeded in 86 of the 220
drinking water wells in the Netherlands.
20Fortunately, due to stricter regulations, the use of antibiotics in animal husbandry has decreased
by 63.8% since 2009 in the Netherlands. See https://cdn.i-pulse.nl/autoriteitdiergeneesmiddelen/
userfiles/sda%20jaarrapporten%20ab-gebruik/AB-rapport%202018/sda-rapportage-2018-def-err.
pdf. In the whole of Europe it has decreased by 32% between 2011 and 2017. See https://www.
ema.europa.eu/en/veterinary-regulatory/overview/antimicrobial-resistance/european-surveillance-
veterinary-antimicrobial-consumption-esvac.
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animal farms. The conclusion seems inescapable: what is needed first and foremost
to create space for wild animals is a substantial shrinkage of the herd.
1.3.6 The Ecological Impact of Large-Scale Hunting
However, more space for nature is not only a matter of the number of hectares, but
above all concerns the management of nature areas. This management must provide
space for wild animals to fulfil their ecological role, thereby giving natural processes
that are essential for the much-needed restoration of biodiversity a chance again. In
current wildlife management, however, that space is severely restricted because of
the central position of large-scale hunting. Take the fox, which is currently hunted
in order to protect meadow birds. Bird numbers have fallen sharply since the varied,
flowery grasslands, on which the meadow birds depend for food, mating and nesting,
gave way to monocultures of drained English rye-grass lands, from which all life
has disappeared. It seems unfair and disproportional to punish foxes for the birds’
demise.
Besides the fox,many otherwild animals are hunted. For decades, theNetherlands
has had a ‘zero tolerance’ policy for large game, such as fallow deer, red deer andwild
boar. The animals are only tolerated in a very limited number of nature reserves. If
they leave these areas, they will be shot. But even within these areas, large numbers
of deer and boars are shot. By far the most important justification for large-scale
hunting is the prevention of damage to agricultural crops and of injuries as a result of
traffic accidents. As damage increases with the number of animals present in an area,
the density of game populations is hunted down to a level acceptable to farmers,
foresters, private landowners and other interest groups. This is also referred to as
‘societal carrying capacity’.
The socially determined target densities are extremely low: for red deer and wild
boar, target densities of 2–3 animals per 100 ha are by no means unusual. In order
to achieve these low targets, huge numbers of large ungulates have to be shot every
year. Shooting percentages of 60–70% for red deer and 80–90% for wild boar occur
regularly. As a result, the animals can hardly have any influence on their habitat and
are in fact ecologically eliminated. Some animal species that were locally extinct,
such as the beaver, have been reintroduced with a lot of publicity (and subsidy) as
an asset to Dutch nature, but then declared outlawed when the success of this action
started causing us discomfort.
1.3.7 Companion Animals
Besides farm animals, people also keep large numbers of pets in the Netherlands.
North America is the world’s leading country in pet-keeping; the country has over
300 million pets, which is four times the number of children. In the Netherlands
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no less than 60% of households have a pet. In total, about 35 million animals are
involved. The list is led by fish, carrier pigeons and singing and ornamental birds,
followed by cats and dogs. In addition, rabbits, other rodents and reptiles are also
kept in large numbers.
Many of our pets suffer from serious health and welfare problems. This is espe-
cially true for pedigree dogs, which make up about a quarter of the two million dogs
in the Netherlands. They are condemned to an inadequate and unhealthy existence
by breeding for extreme external characteristics and breeding with a gene pool that
is too small. Just think of the English Bulldog, who suffers from shortness of breath
because of his characteristic large head with a flat snout; the German Shepherd Dog,
who has a very high risk of hip dysplasia and wear and tear of the dorsal vertebrae
because of his sharply sloping hip; the Shar-Pei, who suffers from all kinds of aller-
gies and skin infections due to his exaggerated folds; the Shih Tzu, who suffers from
respiratory problems due to his flat snout and also has a risk of corneal inflammation
due to his protruding eyes, and the list goes on.
The discussion on the issue of rearing pedigree dogs should not only address the
complaints and ailments which these animals face, but also the underlying question
of whether we should be allowed to control the genetic composition of animals to
such an extent that we actually create human artefacts (Bovenkerk andNijland 2017).
But pets do not only have problems, they also cause problems themselves. This
applies to dogs, who can be involved in biting incidents and the transfer of zoonoses
(see also Ophorst and Bovenkerk in this volume) but also for example to cats, who
pose a serious threat to biodiversity in our country. In their bookCat wars: The devas-
tating consequences of a cuddly killer, published in 2016, PeterMarra, director of the
Smithsonian Migratory Bird Center, and journalist Chris Santella defend the propo-
sition that cats cause serious ecological damage worldwide. These cuddly animals
are in fact super-predators that threaten many endemic species with extinction, a
problem that is particularly acute on isolated islands. In the United States, cats are
said to devour 1.3–4 billion birds and 6.3–22.3 billion mammals annually, with stray
cats accounting for 70%and domestic cats for the rest. In theUnited States, according
toMarra and Santella, “more birds andmammals die in cats’ mouths than from pesti-
cides and toxins, from collisions with wind turbines, cars and skyscrapers, and from
all other anthropogenic causes combined” (Marra and Santella 2016, 69). Three to
four million domestic cats live in the Netherlands and the number of stray cats is
estimated at 135,000–1.2 million (for a discussion on how to co-exist with stray cats,
see EvaMeijer in this volume). According to a rather conservative estimate, we must
assume that domestic and stray cats kill 100 million and 50 million prey annually
respectively, mainly birds, but also mammals, reptiles and amphibians, including
endangered species (Knol 2015).21
21Given the ecological impact of cats, Marra and Santella argue for house cats to be kept indoors
and obliged to be chipped, registered and sterilised, and for stray cats to be offered for adoption.
This appears to be a declaration of war to cat lovers for whom these animals are sacred. Marra now
receives death threats and is portrayed as a Josef Mengele propagating the mass extermination of
cats. The Huffington Post even suggested that he would call for cats to be clubbed to death and shot.
In the Netherlands, recently two legal scholars have called for a duty to keep cats on a leash when
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1.3.8 The ‘Liminalisation’ of Wildlife
One of the most important consequences of the scaling up and intensification of
agriculture is themigration ofmanywild animals to villages and towns. One example
is the oystercatcher, which had already gone through a transition from coastal bird
to meadow bird and is now seeking refuge in the city, on the roof of hardware stores
and schools. Another example of the migration to the built and inhabited world is
the stone marten. The disappearance of small-scale agriculture is to blame for its
relocation. Particularly because modern stables are no longer suitable as a place to
rest and sleep, the stone marten has moved to villages and cities where, in addition
to sufficient food, it can also find a warm shelter.
There are many other examples of wildlife advancing to urban areas. With many
thousands of boars, Berlin has now been proclaimed the ‘capital of the wild boar’.
When it comes to foxes, London is undoubtedly the first city to qualify for such a
title. In the Netherlands there is similarly a steady increase in city foxes and boar,
and also city deer, just think of the fallow deer that roam in a number of coastal cities,
such as Zandvoort.
As a result of the forced migration to urban areas due to a growing lack of
space, more and more wild animals acquire the status of liminal animals (Donaldson
and Kymlicka 2011). Although liminal animals are our co-inhabitants, according to
Donaldson and Kymlicka we should not treat them as fellow citizens, as we should
do with domesticated animals. Since deportation (to the wilderness) or domestica-
tion (to farm or pet) are not real options for the majority of liminal animals, we must
accept their presence; we must give liminal animals a certain right of residence and
not treat them as pariahs and make their lives unnecessarily difficult or completely
impossible. On the other hand, they are not entitled to full citizenship rights. We
must exercise extreme restraint in our contacts with liminal animals; we must not
feed them or make friendly relations with them. This only leads to conflicts of which
the animals themselves are the victims. We must develop forms of co-existence in
which the right of residence of liminal animals is protected but in which we can also
combat the nuisance these animals may cause, for example by reducing populations
through contraceptive methods, or by restricting access to buildings by means of
fences and grids (see also Drenthen in this Volume).
1.3.9 The Struggle for Nature Between People
As we hope to have made clear, the growing presence of animals in our midst raises
many questions to which we often do not have the answer. How to deal with the
outside (Trouwborst and Somsen 2019). This was also met with fierce criticism. As Eva Meijer
convincingly argues in Chapter 16, stray cats have agency which should be taken into account.
However, there is a clear tension with the agency of their prey animals and this tension at least
should be the topic of public debate in our view.
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environmental and welfare problems in the increasingly intensive livestock farming?
What about the many millions of companion animals that inhabit our country? How
to live together with wild animals such as geese and wild boar? Should we help the
climate refugees among the animals through assisted migration? How do we treat
foxes, peregrine falcons and other wild animals that are currently moving into our
cities? How to deal with the many exotic species that come to us in large numbers
throughworld trade andmass tourism?Andwhat about the animals that are in danger
of disappearing from our midst due to extinction? In short: how can we shape our
relationships with all these different animals in a rapidly changing world in such a
way that both animal welfare and species diversity are not further affected?
The answers to these questions vary strongly. The fight for the animals is mainly
a battle between people, also between people who personally care about the animals
and/or are professionally involved in the policy and management of animals. All too
often animal protectionists are at oddswith nature conservationists. But even between
conservationists it is not always easy, as there are often fundamental differences.
Conflicts between animal protectionists and conservationists are mainly about
the contrast between individualism and holism. Animal protectionists generally give
priority to the welfare and rights of individual animals and tend to downplay the
importance of species conservation and the prevention of biodiversity loss. Nature
conservationists oppose this individualistic approach; they embrace a more holistic
view in which individual organisms are seen as part of a larger whole, such as
communities, species or ecosystems, and tend to subordinate animal welfare and
rights to the importance of species conservation.
Conflicts between conservationists are mainly about the contrast between the
separation and the interweaving of nature and culture. This contrast is central to the
discord between the primitive and the pastoral representation of the ideal—Arca-
dian—landscape. While primitive Arcadia is inhabited by people who behave like
wildebeests, all dangerous creatures (such as the lion and the snake) have been
banished from pastoral Arcadia and the ideal animals (such as the cow and the bee)
behave like dutiful and industrious citizens. Because both imaginations of the ideal
landscape are at odds, there is a constant struggle between them, which, according to
the British historian Schama (1995), even extends into debates within nature conser-
vation and the environmental movement, ‘between the brighter and paler shades of
green’.
This thesis also holds true for Dutch nature policy, which for decades has been
torn between the pastoral and the primitive representation of the ideal landscape.
The Dutch model of the pastoral imagination par excellence is formed by the pre-
industrial landscape of yesteryear, which can only be maintained by old agricultural
techniques. The primitive imagination is not about maintaining patterns that have
arisen in the course of the history of human habitation and exploitation, but about
striving to keep natural processes as undisturbed as possible. To achieve this, human
intervention must be kept to a minimum: ‘hands off’ is the motto.While the pastorals
advocate an integration of culture and nature, the primitives are in favor of a strict
separation between the two. In other words, the pastorals have a human-inclusive
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vision of nature and cherish an interventionist management of nature, while the
primitives have a human-exclusive vision and are explicitly non-interventionist.
The contrast between separation and integration also plays a role in the debate
between the established, traditional conservationists and the so-called ecomod-
ernists. The ecomodernists distance themselves from the doom and gloom of the old
nature movement, which the Anthropocene sees exclusively as a potential ecological
disaster. Instead, they welcome this era as a new step in the progress of mankind.
In their view, man is not a pest species, as some traditional conservationists seem
to think, but a ‘God species’. The techno-phobia of the traditional nature movement
is giving way to a pronounced techno-triumphalism among the ecomodernists. And
ecomodernists see industry not so much as a culprit but rather as an ally (see Keulartz
and Bovenkerk 2016).
Whereas the traditional nature movement generally advocates nature-inclusive
forms of agriculture, such as organic or ecological agriculture, ecomodernists want
to ‘decouple’ man and nature and save space for nature by further intensifying agri-
culture. Here the contrast between separation and integration returns, in the form of
the duo land sparing and land sharing.
1.4 Overview of the Volume
Besides the land sparing versus land sharing tension, a number of other tensions are
thematised—implicitly or explicitly—in this book. Firstly, we find the aforemen-
tioned tension between our awareness of animal agency and the efforts of humans
to curtail this agency. How can we do research into animals’ agency if these animals
are raised in conditions that impoverish their capacities for expressing their agency?
How can we take animal agency seriously, while at the same time dealing with poten-
tial harmful expressions of this agency (such as in the case of stray cats)? Should
we emphasize the differences or rather the similarities between humans and other
animals?
Secondly, there is the aforementioned tension between those focussing on indi-
vidual animals who tend to view all animals as domestic animals that we need to
take care of and those focussing on wild animals, who tend to have a laissez-faire
attitude. Do we allow wild zoo animals to exhibit behaviours that are not considered
wild, but that do appear conducive to their welfare? How to deal with wild animals
that due to climate change can only survive if they are fed by humans, such as polar
bears, if this means they lose part of their wild status?
Thirdly, we find a tension between different responses to the Anthropocene,
including the role of technology. Traditional conservationists call for a modest atti-
tude towards other animals and nature. They emphasize the negative consequences
of human actions and look for ways of righting the wrongs we have committed in the
past. Ecomodernists on the other hand, welcome the Anthropocene as an opportunity
to increase human welfare worldwide through careful governing and management of
nature: because of modern technology, we no longer need to worry about planetary
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boundaries, but can simply redesign Earth for our own benefit. With their exclusive
focus on humans, ecomodernists may ignore animal agency. Some plead for inten-
sification of agriculture, including livestock farming. However, because livestock
farming is driven by efficiency, it increasingly upscales to ever larger facilities and
becomes more technology dependent. Such circumstances increasingly limit animal
agency. Other ecomodernists, however, such as Hidde Boersma in this volume, argue
for a decrease in meat consumption and the development of cultured meat. Tech-
nology does not necessarily curtail animal agency, but could potentially be used to
augment it aswell. Is amiddle roadpossible between technology-shy conservationists
and technology optimistic ecomodernists, like Cor van der Weele argues?
This volume is divided into five parts, on the basis of different types of animal:
animal agents, domesticated animals, urban animals,wild animals, andfinally, animal
artefacts. After this introduction we have included a second introduction, written by
Hugh Jansman from a wildlife-ecological perspective. The purpose of this chapter
is to give the reader some theoretical and empirical background to the conservation
issues that form the backdrop of many of the chapters in this volume. Jansman
argues, again taking the Netherlands as an example, that our conservation efforts
should focus more on the level of viable ecosystems. He proposes a strategic plan to
do so, which is called Cores, Corridors and Carnivores. This involves setting aside
more space for nature and natural processes, including top-down forcing by apex
consumers (in particular large predators) and finding a way of coexistence with our
fellow creatures. He discussed the cases of red deer and wolves in the Netherlands
by way of illustration and concludes with a vision of what the Netherlands could
look like a hundred years from now.
1.4.1 Part 1: Animal Agents
The first part of this volume deals with the capacities of animals and what they mean
for our treatment of them. Many discussions about animal welfare betray a limited
understanding of animals. For example, only the way animals’ lives are ended are
regarded as problematic. This seems based on a narrow understanding of animal
welfare as one of being free from pain, hunger and thirst. Meijer and Bovenkerk
present a broader vision of animals as agents. In their chapter, they defend a relational
approach to animal ethics, viewing other animals as subjects capable of co-shaping
relations. Charlotte Blattner examines how animal agency is dealt with in the law
and encounters deep-seated anthropocentric biases. The authors of both chapters
call for new forms of research that take animal agency seriously. The following three
chapters each deal with foundational issues in animal ethics that have an influence on
how we regard animal agency. Nathan Kowalsky argues that the common strategy in
animal ethics to base moral consideration on the similarities humans share with non-
human animals is really a disguised form of anthropocentrism. He proposes an ethic
of animal difference that does justice to animals’ otherness without being imperialist.
Jozef Keulartz analyses a problem that has been at the heart of animal ethics ever
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since animal rights were proposed: the predation problem. If we take animal agency
seriously, we should grant predators the opportunity to manage their own affairs and
refrain from protecting prey animals against them. Perhaps counter-intuitively, he
argues firstly, that if we want to take prey animals’ agency seriously we should also
allow predation and secondly, that this is only possible in the Anthropocene if we
manage wild populations. The latter raises a tension for animal agency: conservation
may necessitate keeping wild animals in zoos, but this could interfere with their
wild animal agency. John Basl and Ronald Sandler revisit the central discussion
in animal ethics about what entities should be attributed moral status. They defend
the view that species partiality in consideration and treatment of animals is possible
without the need to adopt a species-membership or human-privilege view on moral
status. Finally, Michiel Korthals places the discussion about animal agency in a
broader context. Focussing on the complexity of relationships between different
living organisms he highlights the ways in which organisms select and value specific
items in their network of living and non-living entities. In his comment to this part,
Joost Leuven calls attention to the societal and moral urgency of more research into
animal agency, in a human-dominated Anthropocene.
1.4.2 Part 2: Domesticated Animals
Part two focuses on domesticated animals. Intensive livestock farming in particular
is greatly implicated in creating the Anthropocene, and current farming systems are
organised in such away that animals’ agency is hardly taken into account, influencing
the relationship between humans and farmed animals. Plant-based meat substitutes
and in vitro meat and milk are increasingly pursued, but technological solutions
to improve intensive farming systems are also sought. How can we reshape our
relationship with the animals we have domesticated, be it for companion or for their
products? Hidde Boersma sets the scene of this part by zooming in on the production
and consumption of animal protein and its detrimental impact on the planet. He gives
the reader insight into the ecomodernist mindset and proposes a diverse strategy: on
the consumption side he argues for a move from beef to chicken and pork, a reduced
consumption of meat and the consumption of lab grownmeat. On the production side
he argues for intensification of the production process through the closing of global
yield gaps between the best and the worst performers and through the development
of novel integrated indoor systems like agroparks. Drawing on a combination of
ethnographic fieldwork and critical theoretical inquiry, Leonie Cornips and Louis
van den Hengel examine how dairy cows, whose freedom is profoundly restricted by
bars and fences, nevertheless enact social and linguistic agency. The chapter thereby
reflects on the role of language in changing human-animal relationships. The third
chapter in this section that focuses on the conditions of animal protein production
is written by renowned agricultural and food ethics professor Paul Thompson. He
calls on philosophers to not simply reject intensive livestock farming, but to engage
with producers and scientists in order to improve animal welfare standards. Andrea
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De Paula Vieira and Raymond Anthony focus on a neglected topic in animal ethics:
how to prepare for emergencies and disasters that not only affect humans, but also
non-human animals? What happens to animals when disaster strikes? The authors
present six ethical stewardship caretaking aims for emergency preparedness and
response and a number of recommendations for reasonable decision-making the
face of emergencies. The final chapter of this section, by Susan Ophorst and Bernice
Bovenkerk deals with the quintessential companion animal: the dog. They point out
several problems related to dog-keeping, such as aggression, zoonosis, health-and
welfare problems due to exaggerated breeding standards. As dogs were domesticated
so long ago these problems might be a precursor to problems other human-animal
relationships may face in the Anthropocene. In their view, many of these problems
can be traced back to one moment: the decision-moment of wannabe dog keepers. In
his comment, ErnoEskens focuses on the opposition between animal rights defenders
on the one hand and ‘non-ideal animal ethicists’ on the other. The latter are of the
opinion that we can improve animal welfare gradually by appealing to standards of
human decency. Eskens is rather sceptical of this position, because it might in fact
move us in the opposite direction of an ideal situation. Yet, he acknowledges no-one
has a clear vision of what such an ideal situation actually is.
1.4.3 Part 3: Urban Animals
In part three urban animals are central. One of the most important consequences
of upscaling and intensification of agriculture, in combination with management of
wild animals, and habitat fragmentation is the colonization of urban areas by wild
animals. So, although wildlife becomes extinct in many places, it magically appears
in the midst of urban life—in zoos, nature parks, and popular culture. How can we
defend ourselves against the nuisance these animals may cause while taking into
account their interests and agency as well? Possible examples could be reducing
out of control populations with birth control or limiting access to buildings with
fences and screens. But how far are we allowed to go with these measures? What
meaningful ways of cohabitation can we develop? Besides liminal animals, we find
another category of urban animals: wild animals living in captivity, most notably in
zoos. The justification of keeping animals in zoos is increasingly up for discussion
and at the same time zoos are keeping up with the times by changing their raison
d’être, their designs and management practices, focussing more on conservation and
more closely mimicking natural habitats. Is it justified to take away animals’ liberty?
Are we allowed to ‘sacrifice’ the individual animal for the sake of its species? How
can zoos take into account animals’ agency better? In her chapter, EvaMeijer narrates
the story the Amsterdam Stray Cat Foundation, who in their practices and views they
challenge common assumptions about cat subjectivity and agency, the cats’ right
to a habitat and social relations, as well as the idea that there is a strict difference
between cats and humans. Joachim Nieuwland and Franck Meijboom deal with
liminal animals that are even less wanted in cities: rats. They consider the question
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in what way the aversion people feel towards rats affects moral deliberation about
pest management and about animal political theory in general. Next, we turn to zoos.
YuliaKisora andClemensDriessen examine narratives about two orangutans in zoos:
Jinga, who has become famous on Youtube for laughing at a magic trick, and Jacky,
whose video where he plays ‘catch the banana’ with a zoo visitor has gone viral on
Youtube as well. Their interpretation of the comments underneath the videos shows
that such virtual interactions between humans and zoo animals can serve to cast
doubt on the division between the human and the animal. It also shows the ethical
potential of these interactions to either reinforce or question common practices of
dealing with wild animals. Animal welfare specialists Sabrina Brando and Elizabeth
Herrelko in their chapter give the reader a look behind the scenes of zoos and ask the
question what role zoos can play in connecting people with nature. They discuss a
number of dilemmas that modern zoos face. For example: how to give zoo animals
sufficient choice and control over their environment and activities? How to deal with
animals who choose to engage in behaviour that does contribute to their welfare,
but that appears to undermine their wild status? And how can we make sure that
the conservation message still comes across even if zoo animals are perceived as
less wild? In her comment to this section, Lauren van Patter ponders the challenges
different types of animals face due to urbanisation. Asking how animals can make
a living within the city is both a spatial question, involving human judgments about
who belongs where, who is wanted and who is a pest, and an ethical question about
what rights animals have to the city.
1.4.4 Part 4: Wild Animals
Part four deals with our relationship to wild animals. Habitat fragmentation, urban
sprawl and species invasions resulting from globalisation have curtailed animals’
freedom of movement, but at the same time our interactions with ‘wild’ animals have
becomemore numerous.Many people rejoice about the return ofwild animals such as
the wolf and sea eagle, while having doubts about how to co-exist with these animals.
Modern (bio) technologies are employed to deal with species loss and to enable co-
existencewith animals, raisingmoral questions.We can discern two opposing trends:
On the one hand, nature conservation efforts, intensification of agriculture—leading
to an exodus out of rural areas—and global traffic, trade and tourism—bringing
in exotic species—have led to a comeback and proliferation of wild animals in
Europe and North-America. On the other hand, we are witnessing the sixth mass
extinction of species. How can we help wild animals to cope with challenges posed
by theAnthropocene: climate change, habitat loss, and biodiversity loss?Howcanwe
adapt animals and their lifeworld in a responsible manner so that they can survive in a
world dominated by humans? Should we engage in assisted migration or intervening
in wild populations by supplementary feeding or giving veterinary care? The latter
question is addressed by well-known animal ethicist Clare Palmer, who looks into
the plight of polar bears. How should we respond to the suffering of individual polar
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bears due to the effects of climate change? Would aid to the bears result in park-like
management of some bear populations and the associated loss of wildness? Ned
Hettinger in his chapter defends the preference for native species against criticism
of being, amongst others, incoherent and xenophobic. What are the implications
of such a preference for non-native, sentient animals? Both Martin Drenthen and
Mateusz Tokarski in their chapters discuss the recolonisation and repopulation of
wild animals, in particular wolves, into humanized cultural landscapes. What does
such recolonisation mean and how can we learn to co-exist with these animals?
Drenthen, drawing onDonaldson andKymlicka, argues that we should regardwolves
as sovereign beings belonging to a sovereign community. In his view, fences should
be regarded as communicative devices that help parallel sovereignties arrive at a
common understanding. Tokarski suggests that environmental philosophy can offer
consolation for the discomfort that we will undoubtedly experience as a result of co-
existence with wild and sometimes dangerous animals. Finally, veterinarian, legal
scholar, ethicist and former hunter Charles Foster examines intuitions about the
human enjoyment of killing and eating animals, from a philosophical but primarily
from a personal perspective. This chapter has a different character than the other
chapters, as it builds not on academic arguments, but rather on anecdotal knowledge.
Hereby it aims to give the reader an experiential account of what goes on in the
mind of a (former) hunter. Commentator Sjaak Swart recounts the broad range of
implications of the Anthropocene for wild animals. As the cases in this section show,
for some animals Anthropocene conditions are threatening, while for others theymay
be favourable. Can the traditional view in animal and environmental ethics that we
should leave wild animals alone as much as possible be upheld when wild animals
are increasingly affected by our actions? Moreover, can the categories of wild versus
domesticated animals be maintained with the increasing presence of wild animals in
‘human’ cultural landscapes?
1.4.5 Part 5: Animal Artefacts
The final part focuses on ‘animal artefacts’: animals whose genetic make-up is
changed by humans, raising the question of whether they are at least in part human
artefact. Different responses are possible to the mass extinction of species we are
facing in the Anthropocene. While conservationists may focus on saving species
from extinction, ecomodernists want to call in the aid of technology, for example
by engaging in resurrection ecology. Bringing back extinct species with the aid of
technologies, such as gene drives, raises a host of moral and philosophical questions
about for example dealing with risks, about human control, and about our view of
nature.Whatwould be themoral status of such ‘animal artefacts’?Of course, biotech-
nologies are employed in other areas as well, such as reproductive technologies in
livestock, and cloning in equestrian sports. How does the employment of such tech-
nologies impact human-animal relationships? Are biotechnological interventions in
animal genomes instances of animal enhancement or rather animal disenhancement?
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Christopher Preston, author of The Synthetic Age, takes another look at the concept
of agency, albeit on the level of the genome. Focussing on the technologies of gene
sequencing, gene synthesis, and genome editing, that make possible practices such
as gene drives and de-extinction, Preston critically examines the promises that such
technologies hold in store for us.He argues that ‘speculative ethics’ around these tech-
nologies overlook their problems, caused by reductive and non-relational thinking
and by a neglect of non-human agency. JenniferWelchmann takes a closer look at the
practice of de-extinction, illustrated by the case of the Heath Hen. Can it be coher-
ently argued that we owe it to species we have driven to extinction to bring them
back?AdamShriver revisits a number of famous thought experiments around genetic
modification of animals, such as the football bird, blind chickens, and painless pigs, in
order to critique the way in which the concepts of enhancement and disenhancement
have been demarcated. He defends a welfarist definition of disenhancement, which
implies that some cases that are often regarded as disenhancement, such as painless
livestock, should instead be regarded as enhancement. In her chapter, Cor van der
Weele comes back to the opposition between techno optimists, such as ecomod-
ernists, and techno sceptics, or in the words of an influential book by Charles Mann:
thewizards and the prophets. Illustrating her argumentwith the case of culturedmeat,
she aims to break through this opposition and to find constructive ways of dealing
with dualisms and ambivalence. Ecomodernism is also the red thread of Henk van
den Belt’s comment. Each of the technological practices discussed in this section
forms an instance of rewriting the biosphere and engages one way or another with
the techno-optimism of ecomodernists.
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Chapter 2
Animal Conservation in the Twenty-First
Century
Hugh A. H. Jansman
Abstract Biodiversity on Earth is rapidly decreasing and the situation in the Nether-
lands is in that perspective a textbook example. The main causes for species extinc-
tion are habitat loss, landscape degradation and overuse. Conservation efforts should
focus more on the level of viable ecosystems. A strategic plan to do so is called
Cores, Corridors and Carnivores (rewilding’s three C’s). This requires strong Cores
of nature, mutually connected via robust Corridors. Based on island biogeography
theory it can be calculated that if we want to conserve roughly 85% of the current
biodiversity, 50% of the Earth’s surface needs to be protected, ‘Nature needs half’.
For healthy ecosystems we need to get top-down forcing by apex consumers back in
ecosystems. These apex consumers are mainly large Carnivores, and bringing them
back asks for coexistence. If we want to keep our living conditions on planet Earth
healthy we have to change our unsustainable way of living and change our way of
thinking with respect to nature, natural processes and our relation with other species.
The loss of biodiversity can only be halted or reversed if we save more space for
nature and natural processes including top-down forcing and last but not least, find
a way of coexistence with our fellow creatures.
2.1 Introduction
Conditions for life as we know it are exceptionally favourable on Earth compared to
other known planets in the universe. In billions of years, evolution has created a very
rich biodiversity. Biodiversity includes biological variation, whether it is at a genetic,
species, population or community level, or even at their ecosystem-level interactions
(Wilson 1992). Yet, the biodiversity that happens to coexist with us humans being,
the dominant life form in the so-called Anthropocene, faces the 6th mass extinction
(see Bovenkerk and Keulartz in this Volume). World Wildlife Fund (WWF) reported
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that population sizes of wild animals on average have been reduced with 60% since
1970 (WWF living planet report 2018). Main cause is the rapid growth of the human
population in the last centuries, in combination with an unsustainable way of living
by humans, especially in ‘Western’ societies. Since human population growth is still
continuing and developing countries rapidly adoptWestern consumption patterns, the
living conditions formany species on planet Earth are gradually decreasing (Intergov-
ernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services; IPBES
report 2019). Humans dominate the global ecosystem in three ways: by land use, the
nitrogen cycle and the atmospheric carbon cycle (Primack and Sher 2016). Firstly,
human land use, mainly for agriculture, and our need for resources, especially forest
products, have transformed as much as half of the Earth’s ice-free land surface from
natural to cultural lands. Regionally this can be more than 90%. Secondly, each year
human activities release more nitrogen into terrestrial systems than natural biolog-
ical and physical processes, for instance by cultivating nitrogen-fixing crops, using
nitrogen fertilizers and burning fossil fuels. And thirdly, human use of fossil fuels
and the unsustainable cutting down of forests will result in a significant increase of
the concentration of carbon dioxide in the Earth’s atmosphere. Scientists have deter-
mined ten planetary boundaries that should not to be exceeded if we want to keep the
living conditions on earth favourable for us and many other species. Three of those
boundaries are already exceeded: biodiversity loss, climate change and the nitrogen
cycle (Fig. 2.1). It is no surprise that within ecosystems those boundaries are all
Fig. 2.1 Estimate of quantitative evolution of control variables for seven planetary boundaries from
pre-industrial levels to the present (from Rockström et al. 2009)
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interconnected. They are different faces of the same central challenge: the increas-
ingly dangerous impact of our choices on the health of our natural environment.
2.2 Viable Populations
Themain causes for species extinction are habitat loss (destruction), habitat degrada-
tion (e.g. by pollution, fragmentation or invasive species) and overuse (unsustainable
hunting, fishing, logging etc.). Due to the destruction of large parts of their habitat,
many populations of wildlife have decreased in size. Besides the demographic risk
of being more prone to extinction by occasional drops in numbers due to dramatic
events (e.g. disease or wildfire), such small populations will also gradually loose
genetic variation. Reduced mating choice, and therefore a higher risk of inbreeding,
will further reduce diversity and potentially result in reduced viability and/or repro-
ductive capacity (i.e. inbreeding depression). Furthermore, the loss of genetic vari-
ation limits a population’s adaptability to change, while gradually moving along
with changing climate zones is for many species impossible due to barriers in the
landscape. Not to mention that climate change is currently going much faster than
the speed in which most species can change their distribution area. Finally, barriers
for dispersal between fragmented habitat patches also limit the natural restoration of
local diversity by (re)immigration (Frankham et al. 2010).
At the end of the 1970s, the rapid increase of species extinctions gave rise to
a new field of science: conservation biology. This young discipline deals with the
management of nature and of earth’s biodiversity with the aim of protecting species,
their habitats and ecosystems, from excessive rates of extinction and the erosion
of biotic interactions. It is an interdisciplinary research area drawing not only on
natural but on social sciences as well, and also on the practice of natural resource
management.
Conservation biologists conduct monitoring programmes to evaluate the status of
populations and ecosystems. They label species that have significantly been reduced
in number and/or distribution area as threatened. Depending on specific criteria, these
species are listed on a conservation priority list, the Red List. This list of threatened
specieswas established by the InternationalUnion for Conservation ofNature (IUCN
1964) and has evolved to become theworld’smost comprehensive information source
on the global conservation status of species.What followed were international agree-
ments for biodiversity conservation, such as the Convention on International Trade in
Endangered Species (CITES 1973), the Bern Convention (1982), and the Convention
on Biological Diversity (Earth summit; Rio de Janeiro, 1992).
These agreements strive to protect the most endangered species. The popula-
tions of endangered species are frequently divided in small subpopulations due to
habitat fragmentation. As a result conservation is in most cases focussed on impor-
tant subpopulations and not the whole population. If conservation of a threatened
species is intensified, a four step approach of restoration is launched in an attempt to
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get a red listed species viable again. Step 1 is to secure the area in which a threatened
(sub)population is living; its distribution area. Step 2 is to find out which specific
factors are negatively influencing the population, and mitigate them. Step 3 is to
enlarge the current distribution area with additional suitable habitat for the species.
Step 4 is the connection of the isolated subpopulation with a corridor to another
subpopulation, allowing for natural dispersal and gene flow. To some extend this
4-step approach is adopted in (inter)national nature policies. Europe’s Natura 2000
directive, as implemented in itsmember states, focuses on the protection of remaining
habitat and strives to reconnect them via e.g. fauna passages and corridors.
2.3 Sufficiently Large Numbers and the Amount of Area
They Require
One of the biggest questions in conservation biology is which qualities populations
must have in order to be able to survive in the long term. How many individuals are
needed for a population to reduce the risk of extinction to a bare minimum? And
furthermore, what size of habitat is required to sustain such a population?
The term Minimum Viable Population Size (MVP) was first introduced by Shaffer
(1987) and defined by him as “the smallest isolated population having a 99% chance
of surviving for 1000 years despite the foreseeable effects of demographic, environ-
mental, and genetic stochasticity, and natural catastrophes”. Variation in the size of
a population depends on those factors. They all may have a temporary or perma-
nent negative impact on the population size. Chance events play a strong role here
(Shaffer 1987). A natural catastrophe may lead to abnormally high mortality rates,
climate conditions may fluctuate and genetic variation may be lost as a result of
chance effects in the presence of particular gene variants (genetic drift; Nei 2005). In
addition, negative demographic, environmental and genetic influences may produce
a synergistic effect which in extreme cases may result in ever increasing contraction:
the extinction spiral (Blomqvist et al. 2010). A viable population must therefore
be sufficiently large to avoid finding itself in such a spiral as a result of chance
events. Unsustainable use, invasive species, pollution or bad luck are otherwise easy
executioners.
Ideally, genetic-, demographic- and environmental factors will be taken into
account in an estimate of the MVP, through what is known as a Population Viability
Analysis (PVA). As part of the analysis, the likelihood of a population becoming
extinct within a certain number of years is calculated on the basis of context-specific
assumptions, like the mating system of the species, sex-ratio in the local population
and population dynamics. Since a greater number of potential risks are taken into
consideration, MVP estimates based all factors usually result in higher numbers than
estimates based on genetic risks alone (Ottburg and van Swaay 2014). Traill et al.
(2007) compared as many published MVP estimates as possible from the previous
30 years, based both on PVA analyses and on population-genetic models, and found
2 Animal Conservation in the Twenty-First Century 31
major differences between species and also between populations of the same species.
They therefore concluded that context is of overriding importance in practice. Never-
theless they provided average values for each species group. For mammals the safe
threshold for a minimum population size was set at ~2.900 individuals; for birds,
reptiles and amphibians, and fish the threshold was set at respectively ~3.300, ~4.000
and ~500.000 individuals. With the estimated safe threshold of ~2.900 individuals of
a mammal species one can imagine that huge areas are needed to provide sufficient
habitat for these species.
Animals need sufficient food and shelter in their habitat, so densities of species
depend on the quality of an area. Habitat with poor soil conditions, harsh climate
conditions and little cover carry lower densities of species then rich habitats. The
threshold numbers mentioned above are relatively easily met for small rodents that
need small areas, but for populations of for example deer there are not many areas
in Europe large enough to sustain such a large population, not to mention viable
populations of carnivores like bears and wolves. This explains why so many species
have difficulty surviving, specifically the ones requiring large areas.
So what is the relation between the size of a nature reserve and biodiversity?
MacArthur and Wilson (1967) studied the distribution of biodiversity on islands.
What they found is that the larger an island, the richer the biodiversity. Theydeveloped
a formula for the species-area relationship, the so-called island biogeography model.
It predicts that islands of 10, 100, 1000 and 10,000 km2 in size would have 2, 3, 6,
and 10 species respectively. Each tenfold increase of the size of an area increases
the number of species by a factor of approximately 2. But the opposite is true as
well. Reduce the area of an ecosystem to one tenth and you lose roughly half of
your biodiversity. Since humans transformed huge areas in a way that ecosystems
are highly degraded and fragmented, one can speak of islands of nature in a sea of
human dominated landscapes. Therefore the island biogeography model can to a
large extent be applied to nature areas on the mainland. However, the extent to which
the suboptimal landscape surrounding a patch of key habitat is in fact still used by a
species is not always exactly known, and may be underestimated.
What is also important is the level of population fragmentation. If the distribu-
tion area of a population is fragmented, we talk about multiple subpopulations. A
subpopulation can be isolated, meaning there is no dispersal to surrounding subpop-
ulations, or it can be connected via corridors allowing for exchange of individuals.
This exchange is important for survival since it counters stochastic effects in subpop-
ulations and prevents genetic degradation. A cluster of subpopulations with mutual
exchange we call a ‘metapopulation’. It is clear that many of today’s fragmented
nature conservation areas provide inadequate resources for self-sustaining popula-
tions of thousands of individuals. The solution lies in preventing or ending isolation:
creating corridors between nature areas. The above mentioned definitions of MVP’s
are all based on a self-sustaining, isolated population (Shaffer 1987; Franklin 1980).
However, when several populations are combined to form a larger population or
metapopulation in which regular dispersal takes place, the variation lost in a subpop-
ulationmay be restored by immigration from another subpopulation (Frankham et al.
2010). A criterion of one migrant per generation is often applied to avert the negative
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consequences of inbreeding and genetic drift (Mills and Allendorf 1996). In short,
where there is a regional metapopulation and each subpopulation receives a migrant
which contributes to reproduction at least once a generation, the aforementioned
genetic guidelines for an MVP will apply to that regional metapopulation as a whole
(Mergeay 2012).
The way we manage wildlife can have its effect on the viability of a popula-
tion and the integrity of a species as well. For instance management of ungulates is
mostly done by a random cull of a large proportion of the population each year. In
the Netherlands roughly 50% of the red deer and 75% of the wild boar population
is randomly shot each year in order to reduce the conflict with human interests like
traffic mortality and crop damage (Faunabeheereenheid Gelderland 2019). We can
only guess at the consequences of reducing such large numbers for population struc-
ture, vitality, genetic variability, adaptation and behaviour. In those heavily managed
populations almost all females participate in reproduction.Whereas in an unmanaged
population, only the best animals reproduce due to mutual competition for resources.
The mechanism of evolution is based on the principle that within a population, indi-
viduals have different characteristics. Some of those characteristics are inheritable
and some of those characteristics might result in better survival and/or reproductivity.
This results in selection and adaptation, survival of the fittest. Recently this process
was illustrated in a wild red deer population on the isle of Rhum, Scotland. In this
wild population the average parturition date has advanced by nearly 2 weeks in 4
decades in a response to climate change (Bonnet et al. 2019). Is this driving force of
life still possible in populations that are predominantly managed by us?
And what about management of populations by ‘removing’ the individuals that
cause trouble? For instance, a bear that learns to associate humans with food might
start to eat from trash cans, or feral horses that are being fed by tourist might become
pushy. These individuals are often removed from the area, because they showcase
behaviour that is unwanted by the public or managers. By doing so we probably
select for characteristics that we humans prefer, resulting in a kind of taming or
domestication of wild species and therefore interfere with the process of natural
selection (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2016).
In my opinion this is where we stand: scientists have a fairly accurate estimation
of how many individuals a viable populations should contain and we can estimate
how large suitable areas should be to hold those populations. But for more and more
species that is hard to achieve, if human demands for land and resources are not
reduced. This results not only in dwindling species, but in an increase of conflict
potential between nature and humans, since we penetrate more and more into the last
remaining nature areas (see the chapters of Drenthen and Tokarski in this Volume).
2.4 Challenges
The focus of conservation is relatively more on individual threatened species rather
than on healthy ecosystems, partially due to international agreements. Measures
taken for one species can be detrimental for another. As a result species conservation
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becomes kind of similar to gardening. Per nature reserve we pick a few target species
to conserve or, in fact, manage. While even if those target species are carefully
selected to represent key functions or habitat needs, this undervalues a system’s
complexity. Some species, like ungulates and so called pest animals, are managed
by culling in order to control their numbers and therefore avoid conflicts with human
interests.Disease transmission, naturally occurring inwildlife andpotentially spilling
over to humans and our livestock (specifically zoonoses like Covid-19) is a topic that
gets more and more attention. These management decisions are predominately taken
from the perspective of human interest and less so in the interest of nature.
Altogether, while awareness of the need for biodiversity conservation is on the
rise, realizing it in practice is very difficult (IPBES 2019), even more so since the
pressure of humans and human activities on planet Earth is still increasing. There
seems to be a constant and growing conflict between humans and wildlife combined
with less than optimal species conservation since the needs of viable biodiversity are
not met. As a result extinctions are ongoing. A similar example are efforts to mitigate
climate change: while this is a topic that most people are nowadays well aware of,
the political and societal will to take preventive measures is meeting resistance, as
such measures may directly impact our current life style.
2.5 Trophic Downgrading: “When the Cat Is Away,
the Mice Will Play”
Up to now I’ve mainly discussed the conservation of species. But more and more
scientists are becoming aware how important interactions are between organisms in
an ecosystem. Erosion of ecosystems rapidly continues to this date, especially due to
nature policy often ignoring the fact that ecosystems consist of complex interactions
between species. When a species becomes extinct a much more insidious kind of
extinction occurs as well: the extinction of ecological interactions (Estes et al. 2011).
If the link between all species in the system is weakened, or even gone if species
became extinct, resilience of the entire system is affected. This might for instance
lead to an overabundance of deer if predators like wolves are absent, or exotic species
easily becoming invasive in eroded ecosystems. On a broader scale the reduction in
megafauna on earth has severely constrained the flow of nutrients across continents
and between the oceans, freshwaters and land (Jepson and Blythe 2020)
Estes et al. (2011) states that one of humankind’s most pervasive influences on
nature is probably the eradication of species at the top of the food chain. These so-
called apex consumers were ubiquitous across the globe for millions of years. Apex
consumers are mainly large carnivores, but can be megaherbivores as well, like
elephants and rhinos whose adults are largely immune to predation. Recently scien-
tists have become aware how extensive the cascading effects of their disappearance
are in marine, terrestrial and freshwater ecosystems worldwide. Miller et al. (2001)
explain the importance of large carnivores for healthy ecosystems. The absence of
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top-down forcing in ecosystems by apex consumers is called trophic downgrading.
Ecosystems may be shaped by apex consumers, their impacts spreading downwards
through the food webs (Estes et al. 2011; Keulartz 2018). An example is the influ-
ence of apex consumers like wolves in supressing herbivory. Regarding biodiversity
Estes et al. (2011) mention the fact that most protected nature areas don’t func-
tion as intended due to the absence of large apex consumers. This may result in
species from lower trophic levels spinning out of control, although our current under-
standing is too limited to predict such effects in detail. As a result, our society may
be confronted with ecological surprises, such as pandemics, population collapses of
valued species, population eruptionof specieswedislike, shifts in ecosystemstate and
loss of ecosystem services. According to Estes et al. (2011) top-down forcing must
be included in conceptual overviews if there is to be any real hope of understanding
and managing the workings of nature.
2.6 Conservation in Twenty-First Century: ‘Cores,
Corridors and Carnivores’ Meets ‘Nature Needs Half’
If we want to conserve our biodiversity we should focus on robust and complete
ecosystems, including the presence of large apex consumers. We should change
the conservation focus from mainly species oriented management to self-supporting
sustainable ecosystems.A strategic plan to do so is calledCores, Corridors andCarni-
vores (rewilding’s three C’s; Soulé and Noss 1998). For sustainable conservation,
ecosystems require large units of nature (Cores), mutually well connected (Corri-
dors) and the presence of Carnivores for their top-down forcing as apex consumer.
For the Netherlands a similar concept was already invented as the three E’s of nature
development: Ecological core areas, Ecological corridors, and Ecological networks
(Baerselman and Vera 1989). For many nature reserves this means that their size
should increase, robust corridors should be created allowing for sufficient dispersal
potential and gene flow, and apex consumers are returned. This approach is named
restoration ecology or rewilding, which overlap. Restoration ecology is the practise
of restoring the species, landscapes and ecosystems that occupied a site at some
point in the past, but were damaged or destroyed. It normally follows the four step
approach mentioned earlier, but frequently with the addition of reintroducing orig-
inal species as well (www.ser.org). Rewilding, or trophic rewilding, aims at main-
taining or even increasing biodiversity through the restoration of ecological and
evolutionary processes using extant keystone species or ecological replacements of
extinct keystone species that drive these processes (Svenning 2016; Keulartz 2018).
Whereas restoration has typically focused on the recovery of plant communities,
rewilding often involves animals, particularly large carnivores and large herbivores.
Whereas restoration aims to return an ecosystem back to some historical condition,
rewilding is forward-looking rather than backward-looking: it examines the past
not so much to recreate it, but to learn from the past how to activate and maintain
2 Animal Conservation in the Twenty-First Century 35
the natural processes that are crucial for biodiversity conservation (Keulartz 2018;
Jepson andBlythe 2020). Restoration ecology and rewilding both use reintroductions
in their conservation approach (Box 2.1).
Box 2.1 Examples of Reintroductions
(1) Reinforcements, involving the release of an organism into an existing
population of conspecifics to enhance population viability.
(2) Reintroductions, where the intent is to re-establish a population in an area
after local extinction, or, more from the rewilding perspective, has the
intent to restore ecological and evolutionary processes.
(3) Assisted colonization, the intentional movement of an organism outside
its indigenous range to avoid extinction of populations due to current or
future threats.
(4) Inter situ-conservation, the so called One Plan approach which was
launched in 2012 by the IUCN. This approach stimulates the interac-
tive exchange of animals between in situ populations (in nature) and ex
situ populations (in captivity) to increase the viability of the species.
(5) Ecological replacement, (more from the rewilding perspective) the release
of an appropriate substitute species to re-establish an ecological function
lost through extinction. Examples are back breeding, taxon substitution
and de-extinction, all subject to scientific controversy.
It is clear that the realisation of sustainable ecosystems requires huge areas. Co-
inventor of the island biogeography model (before mentioned) and one of the
founding fathers of nature conservation E.O. Wilson started the half-earth project.
His goal: “With science at its core and our transcendent moral obligation to the rest of
life at its heart, the Half-Earth Project is working to conserve half the land and sea to
safeguard the bulk of biodiversity, including ourselves” (www.half-earthproject.org).
According toWilson (2016) and based on IUCN data, there are now roughly 160.000
nature reserves on land and 65.000 in sea areas, covering 15% of the continents and
2.8% of the oceans. The island biogeography model is still relevant since more and
more nature reserves now function as islands due to isolation. Wilson states that a
90% reduction of the size of nature areas is currently the case in many locations all
over the world. This size reduction results in only 50% of the current existing species
being able to maintain viable in the long term, a reduction of biodiversity in time
with another 50% on top of what’s already lost. The opposite can be done as well.
Wilson calculated that in order to conserve roughly 85% of the current biodiversity,
50% of the earth surface needs to be protected: therefore the program’s name: ‘nature
needs half’. So the aim is to reserve roughly 50% of the earth’s surface for nature
in order to prevent further loss of biodiversity and sustainable living conditions for
biodiversity and us humans as well. The focus is on biodiversity hotspots around the
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equator, but all ecosystems should be conserved. According to these figures, nature
reserves on earth have to be enlarged with roughly 35% and in seas with 47.2%.
2.7 Viable Ecosystems with Red Deer and Wolf
in the Netherlands
The Netherlands is a relative small country with a high human density and an even
higher livestock density. It is considered to be the second largest exporting country
in the world regarding agricultural products (see Bovenkerk and Keulartz in this
Volume). As a consequence there are many environmental problems like nitrogen
deposition and pesticides. Still there is wildlife left in the Netherlands, although
management is quite intensive and many populations suffer from habitat destruction,
fragmentation and high traffic mortality. I will discuss two species in detail, red deer
(Cervus elaphus) and wolf (Canis lupus), as examples of what a future desirable
arrangement of the Netherlands would have to look like to hold viable populations of
wildlife with self-serving ecosystems including top-down forcing by large ungulates
(megafauna) and carnivores, and less conflict potential with human interests.
2.7.1 Current Population of Red Deer in the Netherlands
There are two Dutch nature reserves where large populations of red deer are allowed;
the Veluwe (circa 1000 km2; of which 912 km2 is a Natura 2000-area) and the
Oostvaardersplassen (a Natura 2000-area of circa 56 km2, of which 20 km2 is used
by herbivores for grazing); see Fig. 2.2. Both areas are more or less fenced in, so
they are closed populations.
The Veluwe is a relatively poor soil forest-heather ecosystem. Although it appears
from a birds perspective to be one large area, it is fragmented due to many fences.
Ecoducts have been built to allow dispersal and to stimulate themixing of the subpop-
ulations of red deer. However, genetic research shows that these ecoducts do not
function fully yet. Genetic research shows that the populations do not mix optimally,
probably as a result of these (partial) migration barriers (De Groot et al. 2016). The
population of red deer is about 2500 individuals (Groot Bruinderink 2016). Manage-
ment cull is about 50% of the annual population size in order to prevent crop damage
and traffic collisions which leads to conflict with human interest. Forestry and forest
rejuvenation is another reason to keep the herbivore density low (Den Ouden et al.
2020). Therefore the population density is much lower than the carrying capacity of
the area and as a result mutual competition amongst the deer is low, resulting in all
hinds having a calf each year.
The Oostvaardersplassen is very rich in minerals with abundant growth of vege-
tation. The population of red deer was not managed since there was no conflict with
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Fig. 2.2 Themap of the Netherlands in 2020 (insert) and the vision for the future in the Netherlands
in 2120 (Baptist et al. 2019), with some additional corridors added by H. Jansman, illustrating better
connection between cores of nature areas: Oostvaardersplassen (OVP), Veluwe (VL) and Utrechtse
Heuvelrug (UH)
human interest due to the absence of public infrastructure and agricultural lands in
the area. Natural processes were the main driver of the ecosystem. Therefor the Oost-
vaardersplassen is, together with Yellowstone National Park, seen as one of the most
illustrative examples of rewilding (Jepson and Blythe 2020; Flannery 2018). If I refer
in this chapter to the Oostvaardersplassen I refer to the period before 2018 in which
natural processes were dominating the development in the ecosystem. Since 2018
management has changed from reactive management (only shooting animals that are
in a very poor condition and no longer capable of surviving the week) to proactive
38 H. A. H. Jansman
management (culling of deer in prime condition), similar to the management at the
Veluwe. The change in management was based on a management advice by Van
Geel et al. (2018). The commission concluded there was a lack of public support
due to the high number of starving animals in winter, and conflict with Natura 2000
goals due to overgrazing by the large number of ungulates. As a result of the changed
management, that winter more than 1700 red deer were shot to reduce the population
size. In November 2019 a court decision stated that the shooting of red deer had to
stop. The court ruled that the management was not sufficiently motivated and that the
management advice report by Van Geel et al. (2018) was ecologically inadequately
substantiated (Schreuder and Bontjes 2019). Until 2018 numbers fluctuated around
the carrying capacity, which was roughly between 2.500 and 4.000 individuals and
mortality mainly due to starvation was on average ca. 25% per year. This winter
mortality depended on competition with other grazing species in the reserve and
climate conditions. Reproduction was affected by this competition as well, resulting
for instance in not all hinds having a calf each year.
2.7.2 Current Population of Wolf in the Netherlands
In January 2019 the first wolf settled in the Netherlands after an absence of about
150 years. Conflict with humans and human interest had led to its eradication. Due to
better protection within the European Union, conservation programs as Natura 2000
and abandonment of rural areas, wildlife, including wolves, are recolonizing former
habitat. In 2000 the first pack of wolves was a fact in Germany, close to the Polish
border. In 2018 there were approximately 100 packs and pairs of wolves in Germany
and the distribution area was nearing the Dutch border (www.nabu.de). Since 2015
already more than 23 wolves have been visiting the Netherlands (www.wageninge
nur.nl/wolven), mainly from the Central European population, but 1 from the Alpine
population as well. Some of them settled at the Veluwe and in 2019 and 2020 pups
were born, forming the first Dutch pack.
Depending on habitat quality and prey density, wolf packs need about 150–
400 km2 for a territory. Currently most wolves in Central Europe find their territories
in robust nature areas and less in human dominated agricultural areas. The reason
for that is probably the potential conflict between wolves and humans and livestock.
Due to long term persecution wolves probably have learned to keep a safe distance to
humans. Although wolves are strictly protected within the European Union, illegal
poaching is still a common cause of death for wolves (Liberg et al. 2012). If a wolf
forms a serious threat to humans or specializes on livestock and frequently kills well
protected livestock, dispensation might be given to remove that wolf by killing it
(IPO 2019).
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2.7.3 Predator-Prey Relation Between Wolf and Red Deer
Large ungulates like deer are the most prominent food item for wolves. Wolves
and deer have evolved together which resulted in behavioural and morphological
modifications. Although predation of deer by wolves seems at first glance the most
dominant impact of wolves on deer, this is not the case. The presence of wolves
results in a change in behaviour by deer. Deer can change the group size and avoid
certain areas to reduce the risk of predation. This is called the landscape of fear
(Van Ginkel et al. 2019; Jepson and Blythe 2020). As a result there is more structure
in grazing density which is good for diversity and vegetation growth. Wolves can
also influence the number of mesopredators like coyotes or jackals, which might
be beneficial for species that are eaten by coyotes or jackals. Altogether carnivores
like wolves have a dominant top down regulation impact, which results in more
stable and healthy ecosystems (Atkins et al. 2019). This has been well studied in
Yellowstone national park, were wolves were introduced since 1995. Before the
return of the wolf, deer numbers had increased enormously, resulting in overgrazing
of the landscape. After the return of wolves, the deer population was predated on by
wolves and as a result deer avoided dangerous areas. This led to a lean and mean
deer population. Although ecosystem processes are very complex and many aspects
have to be taken into account, like climate change, forest fires, increase of bears and
decrease of coyotes, the positive effect of the return of wolves to this ecosystem
and its biodiversity seems impressive (Smith et al. 2016). Since wolves are fiercely
territorial and claim large areas, overhunting of their prey populations in natural
conditions never takes place.
For a single large nature area the MVP for red deer was calculated to be around
4.000 individuals. For subpopulations with sufficient mutual dispersal and gene flow
this was 400 individuals (Van derGrift et al. 2018). Thus it can be concluded that even
the largest nature areas in the Netherlands doesn’t hold a population large enough for
long term survival. The genetic diversity was studied as well and found the popula-
tion in the Oostvaardersplassen to be more diverse than the Veluwe population (De
Groot et al. 2016). In deer from the Veluwe, parts of the genome showed hardly any
variation, which is a sign of genetic drift or inbreeding (de Jong 2018). This could
be the result of both historic management choices like introductions and restocking,
but it could also be caused by current management strategies (proactive versus reac-
tive), since these strategies differ largely. At the Oostvaardersplassen randommating
is much easier, due to the absence of barriers in the reserve. With not all females
having a calf each year, it is likely that only the most fit animals participate in repro-
duction which is a strong evolutionary driver for selection and adaptation. At the
Veluwe there is still some level of habitat fragmentation. Also, by randomly culling
approximately 50% of the population each year, it is questionable if random mating
is still possible. Fact is that the population is kept much lower than the carrying
capacity, so there is hardly any mutual competition for resources. As a result, all
hinds participate in reproduction so there is no clear selection on fitness from that
perspective. Therefore it is questionable if adaptation to for instance climate change,
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as recently shown in the red deer population on Rhum island, is possible in intensely
managed populations like the one at the Veluwe.
Stokland (2016) mentions that a MVP for wolves should be 800 individuals in a
closed population or 200 in a subpopulation with mutual exchange of individuals.
As a small country, it’s not likely that the Netherlands will have the capacity to hold
800 wolves. Even 200 wolves is a challenge. Wolf populations are a good example
of a species that needs large areas and therefore are expected to cross borders. The
Dutch wolves will always be part of the Central European population and they rely
on dispersal for the long term viability. Compared to deer, wolves are more agile and
a simple fence does not easily stop their migration. Wolves might include human
cultivated areas in their territories. So it is less easy to avoid human-wolf conflict
than it is to do so for human-deer conflict which can be averted with fences.
2.8 The Netherlands in 2120
The solution for viable ecosystems in the Netherlands and vital populations of red
deer and wolf is the Core, Corridor and Carnivore approach in combination with
more room for nature. Currently about 13% of the Dutch territory is protected as
nature, more than half of which consists of large waterbodies like IJsselmeer and
Markermeer. If the Netherlands wants to meet the Aichi biodiversity targets (2010)
then it should protect 17% of its land area and 10% of its water area as nature reserves
before 2020. Technically this means a doubling of the current size of terrestrial
nature areas. If the Dutch landscape is rearranged in a smart way, then it is possible
to enlarge the current nature reserves, forming more robust cores of nature. Next,
those cores need to be connected via corridors, not only nationally but internationally
as well, allowing for transboundary migration of species. If around these cores and
corridors buffer zones are createdwhich are extensivelymanaged, for instance nature-
inclusive agriculture, or forest for the use of CO2 buffering or wood production, then
conflicts between nature and human interest are less prone in comparison to intensive
agriculture situated next to nature reserves. Certain species, such as meadow birds,
might even benefit from an extensive level of management like nature-inclusive
agriculture. If recreational activities and gamemanagement are concentrated in these
buffer zones rather than in nature reserves, animals will be much more disturbed by
humans in the buffer zone and therefore perceive this zone as scary andprobably avoid
it more. By doing so, recreation and hunting mimics predator behaviour, resulting in
a landscape of fear. The areas with industry and intensive agricultural management
as factory farming should best be positioned in areas with less biodiversity value
and not neighbouring nature reserves. Finally there should be a good system to
provide preventive measures to avoid conflict with wildlife. If that is not sufficient,
there should be funding for unforeseen damage by wildlife. This is of importance
if we want to coexist with (large) animals that due to their long distance travel
potential might show up in areas with intensive human use (Bekoff 2014). In the
cores natural processes will be the dominant driver. On the edges with intensive
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human use, mitigation and management focussed on conflict avoidance will be more
dominant.
Avision of how theNetherlands could look like in the future ifwe allowmore room
for nature and natural processes was recently created byBaptist et al. (2019; Fig. 2.2).
According to the authors, this map illustrates a version of the Netherlands in 2120.
The vision is based on a number of criteria: for example, it had to deliver an optimal
outcome for the biodiversity, because only then can the country fundamentally thrive.
And they had to work as much as possible with solutions in which there is a big
role for natural processes. The result is a map of what is possible, i.e. feasible and
realistic when future choices on the use and lay-out of the Netherlands are based on
understanding natural systems and processes. In order to better connect three major
nature areas in the centre of The Netherland, I added two corridors to this map. A
corridor connecting the Oostvaardersplassen with the Veluwe and one connecting
the Utrechtse Heuvelrug with the Veluwe.
This approach allows for healthy populations of red deer, due to more space and
better (seasonal-)migrationbetween cores. Furthermore, their numbers donot need to
bemanaged dominantly bymanagement culling, allowing formore natural processes
in the population. Wolves will be able to easily move nationally and internationally
via the corridors, allowing for sufficient dispersal and gene flow in their population.
The top-down forcing effect of wolves in the nature reserves allows for more stable
ecosystems.
2.9 Change
In order to achieve this vision, we really need to change. Change our unsustainable
way of living and change ourway of thinkingwith respect to nature, natural processes
and our position in relation to other species. In my opinion we humans are not supe-
rior, just different from other species. Human-wildlife conflict is in fact most of the
time a conflict between opposing human values: what do you consider nature? What
is the position of humans in relation to nature? Etc. We need a value-reorientation.
Western societies have alienated from what nature is, natural processes (for instance
seasons of food scarcity, mortality, only the fittest individuals participating in repro-
duction), and the feeling that we are part of nature and therefore depend on a stable
ecosystem on planet earth. Rewilding not only nature, but our minds as well, is in
my opinion a necessity. Albert Einstein already said: “We cannot solve our problems
with the same thinking we used when we created them”. In my view, our problems,
addressed in the first paragraph, are great and therefore there is an urgency for sustain-
able leadership. We know what is good for us and for biodiversity. But the human
mind never needed to evolve in dealing with these challenges, since during most of
the history of our species, we were only a minor player in the ecosystem. Nowadays,
however, the human population growth curve of the last centuries shows an expo-
nential growth and therefore corresponds very well with that of a plague species.
Furthermore, our footprint is still increasing. Currently there is a large imbalance
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between how fast we consume resources and generate waste, and how fast nature
can absorb our waste and generate new resources. The food system is also a major
problem. The cost of ecological degradation is not considered in the price we pay
for food, yet we are still subsidizing unsustainable fisheries and agriculture. From an
ecological point of view, the key solution is managing our human population number
and our livestock numbers. But that is quite a taboo topic and difficult to achieve in
the short term. We at least need to adapt to a sustainable way of living and co-exist.
How can we live in harmony with our fellow species on planet earth?
2.10 Further Reading
In this chapter I have presented many topics and addressed them briefly. In this book,
some of these topics are discussed in more detail. Firstly, regarding saving more
space for nature one can think of many options like land sparing (for instance by
factory farming) versus land sharing (for instance by nature-inclusive agriculture);
see the chapter by Hidde Boersma. Another interesting take on this issue regards
the switchover from large scale livestock farming and meat consumption to cultured
meat as described in the chapter by Cor van der Weele. Secondly, with regard to
bringing back top-down forcing in ecosystems, one of the more controversial options
is ecological replacement like back breeding, taxon substitution and de-extinction.
Christopher Preston in his chapter discusses the speculative ethics’ that has arisen
around these technologies as gene reading, gene synthesis, and gene editing. Further
it is often argued that we “owe it” to species driven to extinction “to bring them
back.” Jennifer Welchmann discusses whether justice can really require us to make
restitution for anthropogenic extinctions. Thirdly, coexistence, in particularly with
large carnivores like wolves can be a challenge. The chapter by Martin Drenthen
discusses the dualistic idea that culture and nature are two strictly separated realms
of reality, and how to learn and negotiate that the landscape as a space that is inter-
preted and inhabited by many different beings with whom we are always already
communicating, even if we are not always aware of it. Mateusz Tokarski explains
that environmental philosophy can provide conceptual tools easing the difficulties of
cohabitation.Hepresents practical remarks regardinghowenvironmental consolation
could be practiced today in the context of difficult cohabitation with wildlife.
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Taking Animal Perspectives into Account
in Animal Ethics
Eva Meijer and Bernice Bovenkerk
Abstract Recent years have seen an explosion of interest in nonhuman animal
agency in different fields. In biology and ethology, new studies about animal
languages, cultures, cognition and emotion are published weekly. In the broad field
of animal studies, the symbolic and ontological human-animal distinction is chal-
lenged and other animals are presented as actors. These studies challenge existing
approaches to animal ethics. Animals are no longer creatures to simply think about:
they have their own perspectives on life, and humans can in some instances commu-
nicate with them about that. Animal ethics long determined individual moral rights
and duties on the basis of nonhuman animal capacities, but this often measures them
to human standards and does not take into account that nonhuman animals are a
heterogeneous group in terms of capabilities as well as social relations to humans.
The questions of whether animals have agency, and how we should morally evaluate
their agency, are especially urgent because we live in an age in which humans domi-
nate the lives of large numbers of other animals. The Anthropocene has shaped the
knowledge and technology for humans to realize that animals have more agency than
has been assumed, but ironically it is also an epoch where animal agency is increas-
ingly curtailed. This leads to new conflicts and problems of justice. How should
animal ethics deal with the new knowledge and challenges generated in the Anthro-
pocene? In this chapter we defend a relational approach to animal ethics, viewing
other animals as subjects capable of co-shaping relations.
E. Meijer (B) · B. Bovenkerk
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3.1 Introduction
Prairie dogs, a species of ground squirrel who live in tunnels under the ground, have
developed a complex communication system.When an intruder enters their territory,
they do not only tell each other whether it’s a human, a dog or someone from another
species, they also describe this intruder in detail. In the case of a human, they for
example mention their height, the colour of their hair and T-shirt, and whether or not
they carry an object, such as for example an umbrella or a gun (Slobodchikoff et al.
2009). Prairie dogs are not the only nonhuman animals who have more elaborate
systems of communication than humans have always thought. What is exceptional
is that their language has been studied in this much detail.
For a long time, nonhuman animal capacities were mostly studied to better under-
stand humans (Meijer 2019). This is changing. Recent years have seen a turn towards
studying nonhuman animals’ languages, cultures, emotional lives, cognitive capac-
ities and even politics (Meijer 2019; Bekoff and Pierce 2009; Brosnan and De Waal
2012; O’Neill and Hastings 2007;Wasserman and Zentall 2012). These studies show
their inner lives are more complex than previously assumed, and that interspecies
communication about many issues is possible, raising questions about the relation-
ships between humans and other animals. Humans can no longer assume they know
best—other animals have perspectives on their lives, and on their relations with
humans, too—or treat nonhuman animals only as objects of study. In order to formu-
late what is just, ethically or politically, we therefore need to engage differently with
them. The first step in this process is to recognize that their agency matters. Similar
to humans, other animals have an interest in shaping their own lives. The second step
is to get a better understanding of how different animals express themselves, their
desires and views, in order to be able to build new, and better, relations with them.
Taking into account animal agency in ethics and politics is however not easy.
Current views about nonhuman animals and their agency are shaped by stereo-
typical or anthropocentric ideas about their capacities, that were formed within a
behaviouristic framework. If we believe that we cannot get to know anything about
what goes on in nonhumananimals’minds fromwatching their behaviour or engaging
with them, it will be difficult to recognize animal agency in the first place. Further-
more, human treatment of other animals is often focused on curtailing their agency.
In farming practices this not only means using fences and other material devices to
limit their freedom of movement, but also modifications of their bodies (such as the
cutting of beaks and tails) and even genetic interventions. Our stereotypical views
on animals and the curtailing of their agency limit our understanding of animals’
capacity for agency. Both these aspects imply that humans currently should practice
epistemic humility—there is much we do not know about other animals, and much
of what we think we do know is formed by stereotypical views. Much scientific
knowledge about nonhuman animal capacities reflects this. Our questions determine
the answers other animals can give, and we long asked the wrong questions (Despret
2016). For example, ifwewant to knowwhether animals canmake conscious choices,
this will be difficult to find out when the animals are kept in a setting that is devoid of
3 Taking Animal Perspectives into Account in Animal Ethics 51
possibilities for making choices. Getting to know more about animals thus requires
a critical investigation of existing concepts and knowledge, aimed at decentring the
human, and new forms of animal research.
However, we also cannot refrain from considering the question of animal agency
when thinking about ethics. We currently live in an epoch in which human actions
curtail the agency of animals, and the ways they can shape their own lives, more
than ever before. We cannot simply let them be, human and animal lives are thor-
oughly intertwined. Due to human impact on ecosystems, nonhuman animals and
the planet, our current age has been named the Anthropocene: the age of the human.
The Anthropocene has shaped the knowledge and technology for humans to realize
that animals have more agency than has been assumed, but ironically it is also an
epoch where animal agency is increasingly curtailed. Captive animals, for example,
are curtailed in their agency when their enclosure is too small or they cannot go
out to look for new experiences. This means they cannot express their ‘inquisitive
exploration’ and when they are solitarily housed they cannot ‘engage in social play’
(Špinka and Wemelsfelder 2011, 36). They will not acquire certain competences
and their level of interaction and self-expression will be limited. In contrast, in the
wild they are confronted more often with novel challenges for which they have to
seek a solution and this stimulates their agency, as well as opportunities for building
social relations and moving around. Animals in the wild, however, are increasingly
curtailed in their agency as well, due to habitat loss and fragmentation and changing
climatic conditions. These conditions lead to new conflicts between humans and
other animals, and problems of justice.
In this chapter we explore the questions of animal ethics and animal agency
in tandem, because they are interconnected: taking seriously animal agency has
ethical consequences and animal ethics should take into account animal agency.
Furthermore, as the concept agency currently is used in many different ways in
different fields,we also aim to shed light on the concept itself, focusing on itsmeaning
in philosophy. Our focus of inquiry is not animals’ moral agency, which we see as
part of the larger spectrum of agency; some animals may well be moral agents and
others perhaps not.We instead focus on the ethical consequences of the fact that other
animals are actors with their own perspective on life, and on relations. Moreover,
we do not take animal agency as an ‘entry ticket’ for the moral community, or as
synonymous with moral status. We assume that all animals that have subjective
experiences should be attributed moral status and our point is that it is in the interest
of all beings with moral status to have their agency taken seriously, to the extent that
they have agency.
We begin by reviewing existing approaches to animal agency, and discuss their
shortcomings and strengths, formulating a working definition of agency. We then
argue for a relational model of ethics that takes animal agency seriously at the micro-
andmacro level.We end by discussing initial steps towards formulating new relations
with other animals. As we do not know the precise scope of animal agency yet, given
that humans have so long ignored it, and even oppressed it in so many ways, we
do not aim to write a final statement, but we rather see this as an investigation into
developing a new, relational, animal ethics for the Anthropocene.
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3.2 Conceptualizing Animal Agency: Two Models
Animal agency is currently used as an umbrella term for ways in which animals
act and influence the world around them in various directions of study, and the
meaning varies between different fields. In this chapter we focus on its philosophical
meaning. More specifically, in this section we review two models of conceptualizing
agency in relation to animal ethics. The models can be seen as two opposites on a
spectrum of approaches. The first we will call propositional agency, following Sebo
(2017), in which a specific form of human rationality takes centre stage, leading to
anthropocentrism.The secondmodel argues agency is found in everything that has the
capacity to move something else, leading to problems for ethical and political theory
(Bennett 2010). These twoextrememodels obviously donot provide a comprehensive
overview of all theories on (animal) agency. However, they do bring to light some
of the key questions in thinking about nonhuman and human agency, and they show
how views of morality have been linked to views about agency in the philosophical
tradition.
3.2.1 Propositional Agency
The concept agency has in philosophy traditionally been reserved for intentional
human action and is linked to the capacity for propositional thought (Sebo 2017, see
also Bermúdez 2007). In an insightful article about agency and moral status, Sebo
(2017) calls this conception of agency ‘propositional agency’. Propositional agency
starts from the common sense idea that there is a difference between action and mere
behaviour. This difference is in the philosophical tradition often interpreted narrowly:
as the difference between intentional action and mere behaviour. Intentional action is
specified as acting on ‘judgments aboutwhatwe have reason to believe, desire, and/or
do’ (Sebo 2017, 14). Being capable of intentional action thus formulated presupposes
cognitive capacities that other animals were long thought not to possess, such as for
example second order thoughts.
Many animal philosophers today challenge this interpretation of agency, together
with the underlying view of animal subjectivity (Sebo 2017). They argue that at least
some nonhuman animal species possess (some of) these capacities and that differ-
ences between humans and other animals in this regard are a matter of degree, and
not kind (see for example Gennaro 2009). Furthermore, humans often act habitually
(Sebo 2017, Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011) and an image of the human as primarily
a rational being relies on an idealized view of humans. Introducing agency as inten-
tional agency in the narrow description above does not do justice to other animals
and exaggerates the gap between humans and other animals.
In addition to these problems, propositional agency is also based on specific forms
of human reasoning, and values these more than other forms of reasoning. While
recent research finds that certain other animals are perhaps capable of these forms
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of reasoning, this does not do justice to the fact that different species have different
forms of agency. Dog agency should be understood as dog agency, not as lesser-
than-human agency. Current anthropocentric conceptions of agency can function as
a starting point for evaluating others and interpreting relations, but they cannot be an
end point. For assessing their epistemic value in multispecies contexts, we need to
investigate the power relations that led to current formulations, take into account new
empirical research about other animals (including insights from narrative ethology
and case studies), and engage with them differently in order to foster their agency
instead of constraining it (see Blattner et al. (2020) for a longer discussion, see also
Calarco 2018). More generally, new multispecies definitions of concepts—such as
agency—should not be based on how much the other animals resemble humans, but
include respect for their forms of expression and knowledge formation.
3.2.2 Materialist Agency
On the complete other side of the spectrum of propositional agency, we find object-
oriented theories. One of their proponents, Jane Bennett, formulates a political
ecology, in which nonhumans exercise agency on a spectrum with humans. She
argues for a ‘vital materialism’ (2010, 23) in which objects possess power, and
agency is located in ‘assemblages’: ad hoc groupings of diverse elements that can
consist of human and non-human bodies. Bodies are always part of larger networks,
which Bennett envisions as webs, or ‘knotted worlds’ of vibrant matter (2010, 13).
Objects, or non-humans, the terms are used interchangeably, are interconnected with
human bodies, which are themselves made of matter and influenced by pressure
from the outside world. To conceptualize the pressure different bodies exercise—or,
in other words: their agency—Bennett uses Spinoza’s term ‘conatus’, which means a
trending tendency to persist. According to Bennett and Spinoza, non-human bodies
share this conative nature with human bodies. Bennett sees these bodies as associa-
tive, or even social (2010, 21), in the sense that each body by nature continuously
affects and is affected by other bodies.
While Bennett rightly recognizes that agency can be exercised by different beings
in different ways, and that specific forms of agency come into being in and through
relations, this approach makes normative judgments difficult. Subjective agency
dissolves when we are all just bodies moving, and intentions do not seem to matter
anymore, which is counterintuitive. Furthermore, the category ‘nonhuman’ runs the
risk of reinforcing stereotypical ideas about nonhumananimals,whoare groupedwith
things, and as ever contrasted with human (as in the word ‘nonhuman’). Agency and
subjectivity are highly problematic and exclusionary concepts in the philosophical
tradition, but reformulating them in this way does not get to the root of the problem,
and creates new problems for thinking about nonhuman animal agency. These prob-
lems also matter with regard to human responsibility. In an age in which humans
dominate the lives of animals of so many other species, taking responsibility is an
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ethical priority. While Bennett argues that her work is meant to promote this type of
responsibility (2010, Introduction), from within the theory it seems hard to realize.
3.2.3 A Working Definition of Agency
Both the propositional and the materialist approach fail to adequately take into
account nonhuman animals’ perspectives. The first because human forms of ratio-
nality and agency are taken as the standard, which excludes many other animals
(and some humans) beforehand, and the second because it fails to offer a framework
in which we can make normative or political judgments about others, and does not
explicate new forms of engagement with nonhuman animals, instead grouping them
with things. How then, should we understand (animal) agency? We do not want
to give a fully developed definition from the outset, as we think an understanding
of animal agency should come about in the diverse practices of human-nonhuman
animal relationships, and more research needs to be done into such relationships.
However, we need a loose working definition of agency in order to give our search
some direction.
Irvine (2004) defines agency as ‘the capacity for self-willed action’. Entities
capable of self-willed action should be described as subjects, in the sense that
they experience their own world subjectively. We agree with the materialist agency
approach that an important aspect of agency is that by the action the subject exerts
an influence on the world around her. However, for an action to be more than mere
behaviour, it seems that a desire or will should be behind the action. Note that an
action that exerts influence and that expresses a desire or will does not presuppose the
presence of intentionality, at least not intentionality in the strict second-order thought
sense of the word. Consider the following example: a (human or non-human) animal
can see a piece of food, say an apple, desire to eat that apple and then move to grab
it. This involves the intention to eat the apple, but does not necessarily entail that
the animal reflects on his or her own desire for the apple before acting to grab it.
An agent can express her will or desires and influence the world around her without
necessarily having the capacity to think about how the action will impact on others.
Our working definition, which is inspired by Blattner, Donaldson andWilcox (2020)
and Sebo’s idea of perceptual agency starts from the idea that agency is the capa-
bility of a subject to influence the world in a way that expresses her desires and will.
This capability springs from the phenomenology of the individual in question—her
genetic make up, capacities, physicality and so on. In addition, and here we add a
different layer to Sebo’s view of perceptual agency, it is important to realise that
desires and wills do not come about in a vacuum. In the constitution of desires and
wills, and thus also in agency, relationships—on the individual level, but also social,
political and cultural structures—form an important role. In other words, there is
always an interaction between agency and an animal’s environment. Social, political
and cultural structures can limit animals’ capability of agency. While they might
have the capacity for having agency, animals might be limited in their expression
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of this agency. Think of a zoo animal that is limited in her ability to roam freely.
The animal, say a deer, may still have the capacity for running long distances, but in
the zoo environment cannot exercise that capacity. On the other hand, zoo animals
may develop new forms of agency in this limited environment, that they did not have
before. The capacity for agency, can therefore be developed or hindered in inter-
action with the animal’s environment.1 In this sense, Anthropocene conditions will
also influence animal agency. In our view, in order to do justice to animal agency in
our moral deliberations, we need a relational model that takes animals’ perspectives
into account, as well as the social-historical context, and that does not measure other
animals to a human standard.
3.3 Taking into Account Relational Agency in Animal
Ethics on the Micro- and Macro Level
Acknowledging that animal agency matters and that we need to make space for their
perspectives should lead to a relational, situated approach to ethics, in which not the
human subject is the standard, but that focuses on the other. Drawing on insights
developed by ecofeminists such as Carol Adams and Lori Gruen, we aim to move
the question of how we should take agency into account ethically, past assessing the
content of animals’ minds and building a judgment on that, to assessing the social
context in which agency is curtailed or fostered. While we need more empirical
research into animals’ minds (cognition and emotion) and cultures, we also need to
focus on the social conditions that foster or constrain agency. This latter aspect is
often underestimated in philosophy and animal ethics. This is problematic because
the conditions of the Anthropocene target not only individual animals but also social
groups and even species, so we need to acknowledge human responsibility not just
in individual relations, but also on the macrolevel.
3.3.1 Relational Agency and Animal Ethics
(Eco)feminist approaches to ethics take (unequal) relations as the starting point for
ethical considerations. Acting morally does not simply involve following rules, as in
deontological approaches such as the animal rights theories mentioned above, maxi-
mizing happiness, as utilitarian approaches demand, or perfecting one’s character as
virtue ethics requires, because the focus of our acts should not be on the self but on
1In this context, we use the term ‘capacity’ to denote the physical and mental Characteristics neces-
sary to be able to exercise agency and we use the term ‘capability’ for the actual possibility a being
has to exercise agency. The latter is dependent not only on the capacity, but also on the situation the
being finds herself in, which is influenced by environmental, social, cultural and political structures.
With this distinction we build on insights from the capability theory (as put forward by for example
Nussbaum, Sen, and Robeyns) without necessarily fully embracing capability theory.
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the other (Held 1990). This other is always a real, situated other, not a universal or
idealized human. Ethical judgments are for this reason not universal but always tied
to a context. Feminist ethicists emphasize that all of us are born into webs of rela-
tions and are dependent on others at several points in our lives, to different degrees.
This dependency is not something to shy away from: relations with others are an
ontological given, they constitute who we are, and can be a source of strength. As
ecofeminists (Adams 2010; Donovan 2006; Gruen 2015) argue, the individuals we
stand in relation to are not just human: we are also always entangled in relations with
animals of other species, and they with us.
This relational and situated approach to animal ethics adds a different dimension to
howwe understand agency, compared to the ones sketched above. Agents are always
tied to specific circumstances, capacities, and contexts, which influence their options
for acting. Humans for example are born as a certain gender, in a specific culture,
as a body that has certain cultural advantages or not, with a specific skin colour,
in a specific class. They can choose professions, religions, partners, and so on; life
will bestow hardships and joy onto them. The same applies to other animals. Social
relations, physical dispositions, work and luck can all play a role in one’s options
for exercising agency. Species characteristics matter, but are never the whole picture.
We are furthermore all entangled in different relations with individual others that can
create different forms of interdependence, influencing our agency and autonomy.
This way of conceptualizing agency in relation to ethics recognizes that there are
different degrees of agency and intentionality, and that there is no one strict line
between species when it comes to exercising these. It also shows that in formu-
lating ethics it is not enough to just focus on biological capacities of certain species.
Focusing on the social dimensions of relations between humans and other animals can
for example help us see the role unequal power relations play and have played in their
options for exercising agency. This is perhaps most clear in the case of domesticated
animals, but the lives of humans and non-domesticated animals are often also inter-
twined. Think for example about the animals that reside in our gardens; our actions
and theirs exert influence on each other. Understanding that human and nonhuman
animal lives are entangled has a normative dimension. Lori Gruen (2015) argues that
in order to do justice to others, including other animals, we should develop a caring
perception that she calls entangled empathy. This form of empathy is focused on the
wellbeing of others, and developing this entangled empathy is a process in which
emotion and reason play a part.
Gruen’s entangled empathy is helpful in thinking about ethical relations with the
individuals we encounter. However, most animals are also entangled in relations
with others on social, cultural or political levels, and these entanglements often also
strongly influence our scope for decision-making. Thismatters for ethical judgments.
Individual nonhuman animals all belong to certain social groups, similar to humans,
and this influences their scope for action. Legislation based on categorization of
species as wild or domesticated determines space of movement or protection for
individuals. Cultural constructions determine whether some city animals are seen as
pests, such as rats (see chapter by Nieuwland and Meijboom in this volume), and
others as belonging, such as songbirds, which has a strong impact on their options
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for self-realization. Cats who are born as companions have a very different set of
options for agency than feral cats (see chapter by Meijer in this volume). Above we
discussed the different specific harms that concern the agency of farmed animals. In
order to adequately conceptualize agency, and to formulate new ethical guidelines,
we also need to take these social and cultural aspects into account; in other words,
we need to take the macro-level into account as well.
3.3.2 Taking into Account Macro-Relations in Thinking
About Agency and Ethics
Recognizing the importance of social and political relations with other animals,
Donaldson and Kymlicka (2011) developed a theory of political animal rights. They
propose to view different groups of nonhuman animals as social groups based on their
relation to human political communities. Specifically, they argue that wild nonhuman
animal groups should be seen as sovereign nations, liminal nonhuman animals—
those who live amongst humans in cities or rural areas but who do not desire close
relations with them, such as mice, crows or feral rabbits—as denizens and domesti-
cated animals as citizens. In all of these groups they emphasize the animals’ agency,
arguing that they and not humans usually know what is best for them. For wild
nonhuman animals, the good life usually means a life without human interference;
for liminal animals this can involve contact with humans under certain conditions.
For domesticated animals it often involves more contact with humans, because many
of them need or desire some human assistance to flourish. This does not mean that
they have no interest in shaping key aspects of their lives themselves, nor does it
imply that the current power relation, in which humans are hierarchically above
them, is just or unavoidable. Donaldson and Kymlicka argue that for these reasons
domesticated animals, co-citizens in shared communities with humans, should have
the right to be represented in political decision-making and should have the right to
be included in the people in whose name the state governs: they should also have
democratic agency, meaning the right to co-shape common decisions.
With their theory of animal rights they draw attention to nonhuman polit-
ical agency, which is often overlooked and erased (Meijer 2019), using examples
that range from resistance to co-creating common interspecies communities. They
also draw explicit attention to the distinction between micro-agency and macro-
agency, arguing that macro-agency is also relevant in the nonhuman context (see
also Donaldson and Kymlicka 2013). Micro-agency refers to the scope for making
personal decisions, which can for domesticated animals include deciding on what to
eat, where to sleep, and who to play with in the park or garden. Only focusing on this
type of agency, however, obscures how larger scale power relations, reified in laws,
institutions, and political and social processes, form the scope for this micro-agency.
Dogs can in many places in the world usually for example not decide to leave the
house they live in when they desire, even if their humanwould allow them to, because
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cities are not safe for them and there are leash laws and areas where they are not
wanted. Horses cannot choose to leave their meadow or barn and are usually not
consulted before riding, even when some riders take their preferences into account
in deciding whether to engage in dressage, jumping, or other sports (see Meijer 2019
for a longer discussion of this problem). Wild nonhuman animals have no say in
the preservation of their habitat. Donaldson and Kymlicka show that taking animal
agency seriously implies more than simply reformulating our individual relations
with them: humans should also consider their political institutions and processes,
laws, and rights, to incorporate nonhuman animal perspectives.
Especially in the Anthropocene takingmacro-agency into account is of the utmost
importance, because the context shapes how and sometimes even if animals can
exercise agency. As we mentioned above, in the Anthropocene animals’ agency
risks being increasingly curtailed due to upscaling of livestock production, habitat
loss and fragmentation, and climate change. In our globalized world, the conditions
for our relations with other animals are institutionalized in many ways. Economic,
political, legal and cultural structures determine their and our space for movement
and for creating new relations. Developing an animal ethics for the Anthropocene
thus asks for more than considering our individual duties: it also implies carefully
rethinking political and social institutions and practices. In the context of interacting
with other animals this means taking into account these macro-factors, in epistemic
and ethical judgments. But it also has ethical implications beyond that, such as that
we should aim to change these large-scale oppressions.
3.4 Risks for Relational Approaches to Ethics
While a relational approach opens up new ways of engaging with other animals
and co-creating communities, there are also risks. One familiar argument against
relational approaches is that they are too dependent on context, thereby making it
impossible to formulate clear ethical guidelines. Following this, ethical judgment is
not universal, but relative to communities. In the case of animal ethics this could lead
to unequal treatment, but also even mistreatment of animals, in particular in contexts
where the human-animal relationship is an instrumental one, such as in industrialized
farming or animal experimentation. We recognize this risk. We understand agency
to be important, because it enables subjects to shape their own lives, in line with
their subjectivity. This presupposes a certain view of the animal subject, and is part
of respectful engagement with them, which is not compatible with killing or abusing
them for human benefit. We believe that this has been adequately argued for by
animal philosophers before and therefore focus on the next step of the argument (see
also Donovan’s 2006 reply to such criticism). Arguing that context forms precise
secondary rights and duties also does not have to be random: we are in favour of
developing clear outlines for this project. As it involves dealing differently with other
animals, however, these cannot be provided beforehand; after all, the outcomes are
dependent on the input from other animals.
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A second risk involves anthropomorphism, falsely attributing human characteris-
tics to other animals. While all theories of animal ethics begin with a human frame-
work to assess animals’ standing, relational theories seem to require more interpreta-
tion, because they involve communication, a focus on a changing context, and a place
for animal perspectives in social and political decisions. Furthermore, even seeing
animals as agents in these relations is according to some (compare Sebo 2017) a
matter of anthropomorphism. To begin with the second point: not attributing any
emotions or cognitive content to other animals is not a neutral stance, but rather the
outcome of (Western) power relations. De Waal (1999) calls this ‘anthropodenial’.
It is a self-serving ideology, because it closes off animal participation beforehand.
While we are not sure how relations with other animals can evolve, we do note
that if we presuppose they have no agency and are not capable of new forms of
interaction, these new forms will never happen. This relates back to the first point.
Relational approaches do not require more interpretation. They require a different
form of interpretation. Instead of taking a view from nowhere, and from there once
and for all defining what animal expressions mean, our aim is to learn more about
animal agency from the ground up, in human/non-human animal interactions, step
by step. In this process philosophy, ethology, and other fields of study have a role
to play, as do actual relations with nonhuman animals. While risks of interpretation
and context are something to be aware of in relational approaches, they are inherent
in doing animal ethics more generally. As such, they should be given attention, but
they should not be overstated.
A final issue for consideration is the relevance of species membership. Focusing
on relations might give the impression that biology and ethology no longer have
a role to play in animal ethics. It would simply be a matter of social or political
philosophy, and experimenting with new forms of co-habitation. However, ‘animals’
are a heterogeneous group.While we know quite a lot about certain animal species—
such as dogs or dolphins—about most species we do not know somuch.We therefore
need more empirical research, as we will explicate in the next section, on species
who are very different from humans, and on those who live close to humans but who
are usually not seen as important research subjects for their own sake, such as farmed
animals. In order to be able to take specific animals’ perspectives more seriously, we
need more, and different kinds of, knowledge about the species the animals belong
to.
3.5 Further Directions
A relational ethics for the Anthropocene should take into account nonhuman animal
voices and perspectives. According to feminist standpoint ethics, the voices of
socially suppressed groups need to be heard, as ‘their views are found inevitably
to be subversive of the ideological system that would render them silent – sexism
in the case of women and girls and speciesism in the case of animals’ (Donovan
2017, 210). This implies taking responsibility for human actions while at the same
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time acknowledging the influence and acts of nonhuman animals. This asks for an
attitude of empathy, listening and curiosity, both with regard to attending to actual
nonhuman animals, and with regard to locating injustice and domination in existing
larger scale relations. This might sound utopian, but we already find examples of
new relations between humans and other animals. As a conclusion we will highlight
these in three different fields: animal research, cultures, and work.
3.5.1 Research
Models of animal research are traditionally human-centred. There is a hierarchy
between the human researcher and the animals, both materially—animals are often
kept in cages—and epistemologically—animals are not seen as interlocutors but as
objects of study. Ethologists such as Smuts (2001) and Bekoff (2007) challenge this
model, studying nonhuman animals as subjects, and not as objects. This leads to
new methodologies—such as following them in their habitats, and letting them co-
shape the conditions of the studies. Smuts for example describes how she had to
learn to ‘speak baboon’ in order to be able to study a group of baboons. Scientists
usually try to ignore primates, so as not to let their presence near them influence their
interaction (Smuts 2001). Smuts found out that ignoring the baboonswas not a neutral
act, because baboons are social animals: she had to learn to interact with them on
their terms. Furthermore, by interactingwith them, she experienced critical aspects of
their society, such as hierarchy, personal space and communication, directly. Because
the questions asked determine the answers nonhuman animals can give, adopting
this kind of attitude towards animals matters greatly to learning about their inner
lives and cultures, leading to knowledge that can and should inform ethical theory.
Taking animal agency seriously most likely also implies not using them in forms of
experimentation that infringe on their liberty or harm their welfare.
3.5.2 Animal Cultures
Another example concerns the increasing recognition of the importance of animal
cultures. In recent years animal culture has become a topic of study in many species.
Elephants are perhaps the most famous example. They usually travel along the same
routes every year (Barua 2014). Knowledge about these routes and specific loca-
tions, for example where water can be found in dry seasons is transmitted culturally.
Matriarchs teach the younger elephants the ropes of survival. Human activity increas-
ingly disrupts these patterns of knowledge exchange and other cultural processes,
in several ways. Humans may designate a certain area as a nature reserve, and use
fences to close it off—sometimes with the best of intentions, aiming to protect the
nonhuman animals living there—which makes it impossible for elephants to find
their way. Poachers also often kill matriarchs and other older elephants in a group,
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which traumatizes younger elephants, and makes it very difficult for them to rebuild
their lives afterwards. Gay Bradshaw researches PTSD in elephants and shows that
while intensive human care may help younger elephants to recover from the trauma’s
they witnessed, it is very difficult for humans to take on the cultural role (Bradshaw
2009). When the matriarchs die, often that specific cultural knowledge dies with
them.
Other examples of cultural knowledge being transmitted concern the migration of
bighorn sheep, birdsong, and chimpanzee fashion. Conservationists take this cultural
dimension increasingly seriously (Laland and Janik 2006), but respect for and knowl-
edge about nonhuman animal cultures is not only relevant for conservationists. It is
important for politicians who design new legislation for liminal animals, city plan-
ners, animal rescue organizations, and others dealing with groups of nonhuman
animals, their travelling routes and habitats.
3.5.3 Animal Workers
New relations are also found in the context of work. While most nonhuman animal
workers, for example in factory farms, are exploited, there are also forms of work
that can benefit both human and nonhuman animals. An example concerns crow
workers. Dutch start-up, Crowded Cities, plans to train city crows to pick up cigarette
butts. Using crows as cleaners raises many questions about their working conditions,
but when the work is safe and their freedom is not compromised, this working
arrangement could be beneficial for crows, humans, and the environment. At this
stage, more research should be done on the benefits and burdens of this type of work
for them, including monitored pilots of the project, in order to make sure they are
not exploited.
Another example of animal work concerns domesticated support animals, such as
for example rescued dogs who go to hospitals to distract young patients. The benefits
of therapy animals for humans have been proven scientifically (Glenk 2017). The
health of these animals, and the possible benefits for them, have however not been
studied in detail (ibid.). Many companion animals suffer from boredom and many
like to work, so for them working could contribute to better health and happiness.
In order to establish which types of engagement are possibly beneficial for humans
and other animals, we need more research into the benefits and burdens of care work
for nonhuman animals. This could for example lead to establishing labor rights,
including the right to play, time off to do stuff with friends, rest, and a pension when
they are old (Cochrane 2016).
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3.5.4 Further Directions
These three examples show that establishing an ethics for the Anthropocene is not a
matter of all or nothing: ethical relations exist and existing relations can be improved.
Furthermore, they show that developing an ethics for the Anthropocene should be an
interspecies project. In order to give shape to an animal ethics for the Anthropocene
we first need to further develop our understanding of animal agency ‘from the ground
up’, through studying animal behaviour and interspecies relationships.2 We also
need to further reflect on the question of how phenomena like agency, intentionality,
autonomy, and self-realisation relate to each other, and how they will change once
we take seriously the different ways in which other animals relate to these concepts.
Animal ethics is not something to be thought out solely by humans behind computers,
it is something for which humans also need to engage differently with other animals.
This is important for several reasons.We needmore, and different forms of, empirical
research, to find out the scope of their agency, their view on relations, and to find
out how we can build better relations, that are beneficial to all those involved. It is
also important to decentre the human and find out how we can theorize together with
other animals. Perhaps it even requires a move from animal ethics to an interspecies
ethics, at least with regard to the (domesticated and liminal) animals with whom we
share our lives, households and cities.
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Chapter 4
Turning to Animal Agency
in the Anthropocene
Charlotte E. Blattner
Abstract Agency is central to humans’ individual rights and their organization as
a community. Human agency is recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights through guaranteed rights, such as the right to life, basic education, freedom
of expression, and the freedom to form personal relationships, which all protect
humans from tyranny and oppression. Though studies of animal agency consistently
suggest that we grossly underestimate the capacity of animals to make decisions,
determine and take action, and to organize themselves individually and as groups,
few have concerned themselves with whether and how animal agency is relevant
for the law and vice versa. Currently, most laws offer no guarantee that animals’
agency will be respected, and fail to respond when animals resist the human systems
that govern them. This failure emerges from profound prejudices and deep-seated
anthropocentric biases that shape the law, including law-making processes. Law
and law-making operating exclusively as self-judging systems is widely decried and
denounced—except in animal law. This chapter identifies standpoint acknowledge-
ment as a means to dismantle these tendencies, and provides instructions on how to
ask the right questions. It concludes by calling for an “animal agency turn” across
disciplines, to challenge our assumptions about how we ought to organize human-
animal relationships politically and personally, and to increase our civic competence
and courage, empathy, participation, common engagement, and respect for animal
alterity.
1Inquiries into agency are still largely descriptive—focusingonwhether and towhat degree someone
exhibits agency—and do not ask if their actions are good or bad. Questions like “should person A
act/have acted that way” fall under the purview of moral agency. Moral agency can be a dimension
or a manifestation of agency tout court, and there are some that have asked if animals are moral
agents (e.g., Rowlands 2012), but I will not address this topic here.
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4.1 The Centrality of Agency
Agency, the capacity for self-willed action, is central to laws that govern the individual
rights of people and their freedom to organize collectively.1 The 1948 Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) was a milestone achievement for human
rights founded on freedom and justice. In its preamble, the UDHR proclaims that
“human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and
want,” to promote “life in larger freedom” (UDHR 1948, preamble). It is on the
grounds of our agency that we commit to securing universal rights and foundational
freedoms for all humans, including the right to life, basic education, freedom of
expression, and the freedom to form personal relationships. These rights, in turn, are
an acknowledgment of the need and desire to protect normative dimensions of our
agency (Griffin 2004, 2008, 149).2 Their realization represents “the highest aspiration
of the common people” (UDHR 1948, preamble) and they must be protected as a
matter of the rule of law, for, without them, humans would be “compelled to have
recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression” (UDHR 1948,
preamble).
Prior to the UDHR and the emergence of a shared commitment to secure human
agency, rebellionwas the only form of protest available to humanswhose agencywas
ignored, restricted, or simply not guaranteed by positive action. In theory and under
perfect conditions, the rights of the UDHR eliminate the need to rebel because they
secure human agency and expand opportunities to exercise it. Aswe acknowledge the
central role played by agency in the organization of human life, we have—so far—
failed to extend this concept to nonhuman animals, although there is overwhelming
evidence that they resist and rebel against (human) tyranny. Elephants break free
from their chains and seek revenge against the people whomaltreated themwith bull-
hooks, tigers leap out of their enclosures and track downvisitorswho tormented them,
whales target trainers who confined them and separated them from their offspring
(Hribal 2010). Sheep escape from the slaughterhouse, pigs jump off transports, and
cows prefer to swim into the open sea rather than enduring heart-wrenching condi-
tions aboard ship. Animals resist by screaming, running, and defending themselves
with horns, teeth, and claws; they express disapproval through eye contact, stiffness,
repetitive behavior, depressive ear drooping and reticence, or simply by retreat (Philo
2There are arguments that agency alone (ought to) ground human rights. Griffin (2008) argues that
“human rights should be seen as protections of our normative agency,”; this “is not a derivation of
human rights from normative agency; it is a proposal” (p. 1). Liao (2009), however, argues for a
wider account of human rights that draws on the notion of agency and other elements of a good
life. Griffin considers agency the sole ground of human rights, based on a classic “rationalistic”
understanding, and argues that we must autonomously conceive of a worthwhile life (autonomy),
be at liberty to pursue this conception (liberty), and have some minimum material provision and
education (Griffin 2002, 311). His conception of agency cannot be upheld because it excludes many
people (i.e., it is ableist), discriminates against people on the basis of wealth, income, and education
(which is untenable, among others, because it directly contradicts article 2 UDHR 1948), and is
manifestly anthropocentric (by precluding recognition and consideration of all forms of animal
agency).
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1998; Wadiwel 2018). In their given environment, animals express many “forms of
resistance against human ordering” (Wilbert 2000, 250), and, as such, materialize
their “capacity for self-willed action” (see chapter by Meijer and Bovenkerk in this
volume).
In a world dominated by humans and governed by laws that further human inter-
ests, resistance to curtailments of their agency is still animals’ only recourse. Agency,
so central to us human animals and the laws governing our relationships, is neither
recognized nor secured by the laws governing nonhuman animals and our relations
with them. Here, I explore the consideration of animal agency as a matter of law,
not whether animals have legal capacity3 and as such, are agents of the law.
The law on the books suggests animal agency is not a matter of or for the law. For
example, the Dutch Animal Law recognizes the intrinsic value of animals (2011, art.
3 para. I), but posits in its preamble that the law serves to secure animals’ welfare
and to market animal products (2011, preamble). Worldwide, “animal welfare acts”
or “animal protection acts” claim to be primarily preoccupied with securing the
welfare of animals or protecting them (Blattner 2019).4 But do concepts of “welfare”
and “protection” include agential action? Generally, an animal’s state of welfare is
considered good if, as theWorldOrganization forAnimalHealth (OIE) provides, they
are “healthy, comfortable, well nourished, safe, able to express innate behaviour, and
[…] not suffering from unpleasant states such as pain, fear, and distress” (OIE 2019,
art. 7.1.1). Crucially, however, “animal welfare laws” often still legitimate using and
killing animals by laying down how and when they can be bred, taken from the
wild, separated from their families, confined, used, maimed, slaughtered, skinned,
and turned into convenience products. Since most animal laws do not interfere with
these and other majority group practices (Deckha 2012), nonhuman animals are,
all things considered, deprived of legal protection (i.e., animal law in a substantive
sense) and recourse (i.e., animal law in a procedural sense) (Kymlicka 2017). The
almost exclusive focus of the law on the needs of humans thwarts its efforts to be
just, equitable, and fair (including fair to all humans, since animal law can be a tool to
oppress certain human groups). These crucial dimensions still require translation into
mainstream debates about animal law, however, I am here not primarily interested in
whether or not the law can deliver on animal welfare grounds. My main criticism is
that the law, even in the best case, namely when it is truly designed to protect animals
and perfectly enforced, maximally sees animals as welfare-recipients—beings who
are acted upon, “victims” in need of rescue, “voiceless beings” that require a human
voice (Corman 2016)—rather than as actors with their own will and deserving of
individual or communal rights that secure their agency.
3By legal capacity, I mean the capacity of individuals to make binding amendments to their rights,
duties, and obligations, e.g., getting married or merging, entering into contracts, making gifts, or
writing a valid will.
4Blattner (2019, 71–80) has looked at the laws of over 60 states to establish this. Note that especially
constitutional laws exhibit a broader variety of rationales or approaches to protecting animals. In
India, for example, people are obliged to have compassion toward animals, and in Switzerland, the
dignity of animals must be protected (Blattner 2019, 321–334).
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The law does not consider animals’ desires and preferences for, e.g., where they
want to live or with whom, whether they wish to bear and keep their young, or
have their organs removed; neither does it require those applying the law to do
so. Instead, laws detail the “proper” way to dehorn or debeak, cut off snouts or
tails, and remove toes and other body parts that animals need and use to express
themselves, navigate their relationships with others, and flourish (see esp. on how
birds, specifically chickens, are forced to endure such practices, Davis 2011). In
doing so, animal law is not only complicit in disregarding animal agency and failing
to respond to itsmanymanifestations, but, above all, operates as a central legitimizing
scheme to ignore and silence animals and inhibit their agency. Some might argue
that these practices were written into law starting in the 1960s up until, roughly, the
1990s, before there was any scientific evidence of animal agency.5 Animals’ agential
capacities could, to some extent, be argued to be recognized by those states that have
recently begun to frame animals as quasi subjects of the law by recognizing them as
“living and sentient beings”, notably in their civil codes.6 Though this is certainly an
improvement over labeling animals as “objects,” these statements notwithstanding,
most states openly declare that theywill continue to treat animals as objects of the law
(Blattner 2019, 243–244). But what can reasonably be the transformative potential
of laws that reject the notion that animals are objects but lay down that, for reasons
of convenience, animals are still treated as if they were property? Since there is no
functional difference between being treated like property under the law and being
property, animals have not yet benefited from the nominal recognition that they are
“living and sentient beings.” And likely, they never will.
Animals’ agency can play a critical role in facilitating the law’s recognition of
their subjectivity, by making plain that each and every animal is an agent with robust
interests in self-determination. Most people living with companion animals take
pleasure in describing the animals’ sassiness or pointing out that their companions
ask for things that are important to them (e.g., particular foods, being taken out for
a walk, or their preferences for and dislikes of particular people). However, these
individual insights rarely shape people’s views about animals at large, who are often
presumed to lack agency. Overall, animals are still seen as reacting in unthinking and
deterministic fashion to natural forces guided by scripts predefined by their genes or
species membership (e.g., Nussbaum 2006; Rollin 1995). Many believe this “genetic
imprint” prevents animals from determining or changing the course of their lives in
a meaningful sense; they operate under the assumption that animals’ actions and
desires are predictable and that they do not have the “necessary free will” to act as
agents. This old-fashioned view is based on arguments that have traditionally been
5The scope and breadth of animal protection laws can be determined, very roughly, on the basis
of three different “generations of animal law.” The first-generation animal laws only protect the
monetary interests of owners. Second-generation animal laws penalize cruelty and abuse of animals,
even if committed by an animal’s owner. And third-generation animal laws additionally lay down
binding rules on the proper care and treatment of animals. See Blattner (2019, 281).
6See, for an overview of these recent developments in Austria, Brussels, California, Colombia,
France, Germany, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, and other countries, Blattner (2019,
243–244).
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used to deprive others of their rights (e.g., women), and is heavily influenced by
confirmation bias as it ignores clear evidence to the contrary.
Our denial of animals’ agency often starts with how we talk about them. Animals
are farmed, they are domesticated, and used for food production, research, or any
other purpose. Animals are primarily defined by how we seek to use them (Eisen
2010) and by framing them as mere passives upon whom we do things, we strip
them of agency. Our everyday language neither recognizes existing forms of animal
agency nor does it, as it is used today, seem to leave room for its recognition in the
future. In addition, we typically see and encounter animals only in highly restrictive
environments, and this, in turn, influences our judgment of their agential capaci-
ties. Everywhere we turn, we see instances of humans suppressing animal agency,
insisting on and enforcing the roles that we ascribe to them. We cram them into
small quarters to fatten them for food, impregnate them for milk production, train
and discipline them to docility; we pen them in restrictive environments that prevent
them from exercising agency; and reduce their lives to “simple, predictable and
monotonous” actions (Špinka and Wemelsfelder 2011, 27). On the socio-political
level, considering animals as belonging into these environments, even just seeing
animals in these environments, reinforces the dominant view that they lack agency.
On the research level, studying animals in these environments means we ask limited
questions and that the answers to those questions are bound to be tainted, biased,
and only marginally useful (Blattner et al. 2020). It is these ideological blinders and
our pervasive anthropocentric bias that create a vicious circle and reinforce existing
power hierarchies, unchecked biases about others, and the continued oppression of
animals. If humans—like animals—were forced to live penned up on one square
meter, denied the ability to interact with others, tied up by ropes to be forcefully
impregnated, or forced into slaughterhouses,7 we would challenge the claims of
those who justify these practices. We would argue that in these instances, any person
under such restrictive and oppressive conditions is denied agency, so it seems reason-
able to turn this argument around and to point out that, if animals do have agency, it
will be least evident under restrictive and oppressive socio-political conditions. To
advance useful proposals for improving the lot of animals, we need to learn to see
the many aspects of our socio-political and interpersonal relationships with animals
that are limited by our ignorance and bias. Only then can we formulate ethical and
legal arguments that can address the issue of animal agency.
4.2 On Animal Agency and Self-Judging Obligations
Animal studies is an emergingfield that builds on scholarship in the humanities, social
sciences, and sciences to investigate past and present relations between human and
7Gillespie (2016), for example, witnessed animals being “beaten, yelled at, kicked, shocked, and
crushed against the wall or floor for trying to escape or fight back against humans who were herding
them through space” (p. 126).
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non-human animals, the representation of those relations, their ethical implications,
and their social, political, and ecological effects in and on the world (Wesleyan 2019;
Kalof 2017).Researchers in thefield seem themost likely candidates for removing the
blinders that rationalize and protect human activities of casually confining and elim-
inating nonhuman animals, but the field is still trapped in the tarpits of anthropocen-
trism. In animal studies, “studying” is still understood as a unidirectional process:
humans study animals, and not the reverse. Humans decide which questions are
asked, choose modes of encounter with animal participants, interpret the results, and
then represent animals in the products of research. Even when animal studies have
positive effects on animals, and even if researchers are well-intentioned and attempt
to center the interests of animals in their studies, nonhuman animals are still fully
dependent on the goodwill of researchers to ask the right questions, correctly inter-
pret the answers, and communicate them adequately to the public. So far, we have
not been able to shift away from this human center of animal studies.
In an era of the Anthropocene, the lives of animals are massively and irreversibly
shaped by human action, to the extent that animal losses regularly manifest as human
gains. Cows, fish, and chickens die so humans can be happy and well-fed. Beagles,
monkeys, frogs, and others are confined and harmed to improve or save human lives.
Dogs and cats are disciplined, patronized, and controlled by using force to ensure
human society is orderly. In these socio-cultural contexts, raising the argument that
animals resist often meets hostility from researchers, who may benefit from misin-
terpreting, misrepresenting, and systematically neglecting the interests of animals.
Even the most well-intentioned researchers, who strive for impartiality and acknowl-
edge the perspective of animals, may hesitate to challenge the larger power structures
that dictate research funding, job availability, professional reputation, and outreach
(Reichlin et al. 2016). When the whole power structure is arrayed against animal
agency, it is difficult to begin and persevere in research projects that look for, or even
better, presume this agency.
Standard research structures, and the results they produce, are especially problem-
atic as they shape our understanding of animals (personally and politically). Informed
by these views, laws are then set up by humans vis-à-vis animals, so any obligations
that flow from them are, without exception, “self-judging.” In international law, self-
judging obligations are widely decried, as the Separate Opinion in the Norwegian
Loans case by Judge Lauterpacht, writing in his capacity as a judge for the Interna-
tional Court of Justice (ICJ), shows: “An instrument in which a party is entitled to
determine the existence of its obligation is not a valid and enforceable legal instrument
of which a court of law can take cognizance. It is not a legal instrument. It is a decla-
ration of a political principle and purpose” (ICJ Norwegian Loans 1957, 43). The
structural shortcomings of self-judging obligations that Judge Lauterpacht analyzes,
are, mutatis mutandis, inherent in any legal system that is organized exclusively by
humans and which unilaterally lays down our obligations vis-à-vis animals. Animal
studies and the broader scientific inquiries that have an effect on animal agency—be
it animal research, food ethics, political theory, environmental ethics, constitutional
and human rights theory, or any other field or discipline—exemplify this sort of
unchecked power: One group investigates another in a wholly unchecked manner,
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and determines the rules of interaction, too, unchecked by principles of objectivity.
Because we humans are beneficiaries of animal use—be it directly or indirectly—
, we are at a perpetual risk of lacking the necessary objectivity to evaluate these
competing interests.
This imbalance is not limited to the animal realm. When researchers study chil-
dren, adults dominate research design, process, and outcome. The difference is that
ethical and legal principles govern these interactions. ResearchEthics Boards (REBs)
ensure that researchers adhere to pre-agreed principles, sanction researchers who
violate them, and guarantee that research with human participants truly meets ethical
standards. But REBs do not review research conducted on or with animals. Instead,
Animal Care Committees and their Animal Use Protocols govern these relations,
taking an instrumental, anthropocentric view wherein animals are treated as research
objects (Cojocaru and vonGall 2019). These protocols center onwelfare and humane
use, framed mainly by the 3R principle, i.e. the duty to replace, reduce, and refine
the use of animals in research (Herrmann and Wayne 2019). The 3R principle typi-
cally requires or, in effect, leads to a cost-benefit analysis (Peters 2012, 31–41),
where harms to animal subjects are weighed against benefits to science, humans,
other animals, or broader ecological groups/systems. Existing guidelines are rarely
concerned with ethical assessments of whether the knowledge we gain merits the
use of animals, and even more rarely ask if animals should be used at all (Orlans
2008). As Gillespie and Collard (2015, 205) note, “[a]nimals are considered outside
the purview of ‘human’ ethics, and animal ethics revolves, in most cases, around a
presumed ‘disposable’ animal life”.
While we can and should challenge this approach in all animal research, invasive
and non-invasive, we still lack principles that can guide us in the pursuit of respectful
research with (rather than on) animals in order to, for example, study animal agency.
Without such principles, instances of animal agency are unlikely to be seen or looked
for, and, as a consequence, we cannot begin to define, let alone move ahead with,
more respectful relations with animals. We thus need to design, advance, contest,
and discuss principles that guide (human) researchers in their interactions with and
representations of animals. In a recent article in Animals & Society, Van Patter and
Blattner (2020) took a first step, and proposed a set of guiding principles to fill
this gap. They suggest principles for designing an ethics protocol for non-invasive
research with animal participants based on welfare- and agency-based considera-
tions, which departs from current speciesist institutional animal care conventions.
The protocol is guided by respect, justice, and reflexivity and defines three core prin-
ciples: non-maleficence (including duties of vulnerability and confidentiality), benef-
icence (including duties of reciprocity and representation), and voluntary participa-
tion (mediated informed consent and ongoing embodied assent). Weaved into these
three principles are duties to represent animals as subjects with their own agencies,
communities, and personalities; to center their stories, thoughts, feelings, and unique-
ness; and to study animals’ material lifeworlds, use of space, and social interactions
with a motivation to acknowledge their agency and subjectivities. The protocol is
designed to spark broader scholarly engagementwith the topic,which can and should,
ideally, permeate into the law. As long as the status quo in research institutions is to
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resort to a welfarist 3R framework, scholars and practitioners who want to engage in
respectful, non-invasive research with animal participants can adopt such protocols
on a voluntary basis. As more researchers do so, institutional review boards may
gradually incorporate ethical considerations for non-invasive research with animals
into their protocols. For, after all, institutionalizing respectful research principles
with animals should be the end-goal not only of people dedicated to advancing the
fate of animals, but of all people dedicated to solid, impartial research.
4.3 Standpoint Acknowledgement and How to Ask
the Right Questions
While we are, as a society and individually, working to ensure that ethical considera-
tions become embedded in research with animals and taken up by law and policy, we
must remain attentive to power relations and positionality (Van Patter and Blattner
2020). Researchers must guard against interacting with and representing animals
in ways that perpetuate relations of domination and marginalization. We must, for
example, stop bending research on animal agency to human supremacy. Current prac-
tice is to ask questions that presume and look for differences in human and animal
agency. Worse even, we tend to avoid the word “agency” altogether when we talk
about animals and when we assess the rules of interaction between us. Or, we admit
to the existence of animal agency to the extent that this does not throw out of order the
dominant ways in which we use and abuse animals. For example, we usually recog-
nize and respond to dogs’ and cats’ food preferences since this does not question
our right to use them, but we ignore chickens’ preference to remain alive as they are
swallowed up alive by “chicken harvesting machines” (Wadiwel 2018). This is even
though in the human case, we consider our interests in life fundamental, whereas
our interests in food types are usually less protected (at least legally speaking). This
suggests that also in the case of animals, when they exercise agency in defense of
fundamental values, like life and bodily integrity, this should be taken much more
seriously (compared to food types etc.).
Again, this tendency to omit looking for agency in animals who find themselves
in heavily restrictive environments is explained by the focus on our use of animals
rather than on the animals themselves. To dismantle these self-reinforcing practices,
we must acknowledge the unequal power relations and our own positionality as
humans socialized within one-sided systems of thought. We should also engage in
reflexive practices and consider how this inequality and our biases may influence
our research design and conduct, asking open-ended questions about animals (rather
than questions that serve pre-determined human interests), including:
• Do animals have capacity and interest in self-willed action?
• How important is it for animals to exhibit agency? In what form? What factors
facilitate animals’ use of agency? And which factors thwart it?
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• What are the best social, environmental, political, economic, and other circum-
stances for studying animal agency?
• If animals do have and value their agency, how must this shift our current ethical
and political understanding of human-animal relationships?
• To what extent and how must the law adapt to ensure animals can realize their
agency?
• What would laws that respect animal agency look like?
So far, the focus of most scientific inquiries into animal agency was on animal resis-
tance, offering us a richer picture of animals’ desires, and throwing into doubt the
presumption that animals can be freely used, handled, farmed, or done to what-
ever humans like to do to them. If resisting animals were taken seriously instead
of silenced, it is easy to imagine how the world could become a more just place
for them: We would respond to instances in which they do not feel comfortable,
adapting our behavior accordingly. However, resistance is not “the only measure for
the wellbeing and welfare of animals living, laboring, and dying in service to capital
accumulation” (Gillespie 2016, 129). Focusing on resistance alone means that the
only agential option for animals is to opt out. Building a political system on this
premise is risky as it disregards the structural, institutional, and interpersonal biases
against animals that render their environment largely unresponsive to their concerns
and reduce their ability to meaningfully resist (Meijer 2016, 66). Animals whose
resistance goes unheard will, as a consequence, often develop learned helplessness,
which renders them “inarticulate” (Despret 2004, 124). Focusing on resistance as a
model for animal agency alone also risks positing animals as reactants, as passive
beings to whom things happen. As such, it does not account for the manifold ways in
which animals shape and change the world around them and initiate and foster rela-
tionships. An exclusive resistance model limits our ability to recognize that animals
have much more agential capacity and a much more profound interest in exercising
and realizing it than we typically assume (Blattner 2020).
Studies set up to reduce researcher bias against animals have consistently shown
that animals have impressive capacities and strong, indeed, intrinsic interests in
decision-making, self-willed action, and relational agency, which we tend to heavily
underestimate (Blattner 2020). Animals have their own individual preferences for,
e.g., specific foods, locations, social partners, activities, and objects (Slocombe and
Zuberbühler 2006), and they invest considerably into getting what they like (Hopper
et al. 2015). Having choices has a strong positive effect on animals. Giant pandas
(Owen et al. 2005), polar bears (Ross 2006), goats and sheep (Anderson et al. 2002),
and many other animals are less stressed and show positive behavioral changes when
provided with, e.g., more space, access to different rooms, or choice about where to
spend time. Rhesus monkeys prefer completing a series of cognitive tasks in a self-
chosen order rather than an assigned order (Perdue et al. 2014). The research with
giant pandas and polar bears (Owen et al. 2005; Ross 2006) shows that animals prefer
choices even when they do not take advantage of them. Chimpanzees and gorillas
respond positively to having the choice to go outside (demonstrating positive social
behavior like grooming, lower cortisol levels, a steep drop in signs of anxiety and
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restlessness), even if they chose to stay inside (Kurtycz et al. 2014). By and large,
whenever humans have gone the extra mile to inquire about animal agency, they
have consistently found that animals have strong instrumental interests in agency
and, indeed, intrinsic interests in agency (Blattner 2020).
Because many investigations of animal agency are still carried out in controlled
environments with confined individuals or groups, they give us only an incomplete
and limited picture of animal agency. Possibilities of agential action are limited,
especially for decision-making that could change the macro-dimensions of animals’
lives, concerning, e.g.,whether theywant to live (which, unsurprisingly,most animals
do), where and with whom they want to live (humans? nonhuman animals? a multi-
species society?), their communities and social structures (with common decision-
making structures, hierarchical, or equality-based), and what their daily routines
should look like (including daily activities, foods, places and routines of food, sleep,
play, greeting, etc.). As we seek to reveal certain glimpses of animal agency without
sensitivity to these bigger questions, we run the risk of re-inscribing larger power
hierarchies. Demonstrating that dogs who have control over ending electric shocks
recover more quickly (Seligman and Maier 1967), for example, does not justify
inflicting pain on dogs, exposing them to stressors, or confining them. Rather, proof
of agency in these controlled environments shows that animals value self-determined
action. Accordingly, we must take full account of animal agency, or, at the very least,
aspire to do so.
We need researchers who are committed to critically evaluating existing accounts
of agency and to developing a more accurate picture of animal agency, its extent and
relevance, especially in environments that provide them with the broadest possibil-
ities for agential action. Innovative research in this area has explored, for example,
individual and collective dimensions of animals’ agency in sanctuary settings, by
studying their use of space and place, their practices and routines, and their social
roles and norms, in order to learn whether and how animals might want to live with
us, and how we can recognize and support their agency through our relationships
(Blattner et al. 2020). Exploring animal languages, too, is a fruitful inquiry that has
the potential to reveal previously unknown manifestations of or desires in exercising
agency (Meijer 2019).
The emerging research area of animal agency is marked by three distinct tenden-
cies. First, this research begins with the animals’ perspective instead of comparing
and contrasting the capacities of animals and humans (Meijer and Bovenkerk, in this
volume). Second, it explores animals’ agency in its positive dimensions—looking for
decision-making, intentional action, pro-active behavior, self-willed action, and rela-
tional agency on top of instances of resistance—instead of taking the welfarist track
and considering them only as pain-avoiders. After all, animals have myriad interests
in deciding for themselves what to eat (cabbage? carrots? chickpeas?), whom to live
with (humans? animals? no one?),what to do throughout the day (wander around? say
hi to different people? forage in the woods? go for a swim at the beach?), whether or
not to have relationships with other animals and humans, where and how to sleep, and
what ground and property they want to traverse. Third, research into animal agency
has the potential to influence and, ideally, change the larger political realities.
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If, however, agency is only superficially explored, within the confines of human
oppression, our understanding of animal agency becomes a watered-down version of
what it truly is. Rather than empowering animals and working toward a multispecies
polity, limited accounts of animal agency operate asmeans for humans not to question
the larger actions by which they disenfranchise and oppress animals. Honest, unbi-
ased, and open-ended inquiries into animal agency, on the other hand, can challenge
existing power hierarchies and make clear that current injustices are not irreversible,
given, or nonnegotiable. One new and particularly promising strand of research
where animal agency is studied to ask and answer political questions is “political
multispecies ethnography”—an ethnographic participant methodology suited to the
study of human and animal interactions, and committed to supporting their agency
and advancing interspecies justice (Kymlicka and Donaldson 2014; Blattner et al.
2019). This is a relational methodology that is dedicated to the study of human-
animal relations (be they close or distant) to understand power-laden entanglements
among species and alter interspecies status and hierarchies (Gillespie 2019). Results
produced by political multispecies ethnography can challenge deep-seated biases in
the larger socio-political structures—such as the ones I identified in this article—, to
make visible animals’ views and help us understand how animals’ agential actions
themselves are challenging broader phenomena, for example, climate change or the
expansion of human population into nature and animals’ territories.
4.4 Calling for an “Animal Agency Turn”
In the Frankfurt Germany’s Fechenheim district, a 22-year old Arabian mare named
Jenny roams the neighborhood on her own. Every morning, she takes a leisurely
stroll through the streets. Dozens of worried pedestrians have called the authorities,
afraid that Jenny has been neglected or poses a danger to herself and others during
her morning walks. These worries were dismissed by veterinarians, who testified that
Jenny knows very well what she’s doing and seems to be satisfied with her activities.
Jenny nowwears a letter attached to her harness, informing concerned people in town
that she knows her way around and is doing her own thing: “I’m called Jenny, not
a runaway, just taking a walk. Thanks.” Locals got used to seeing her walk around
on her own; some even say that more animals should be able to walk freely (DW
Newsletter 2019). Jenny’s story shows that there is much to be gained from the study
of animal agency as it challenges our views about what agency is, who can exercise
it, and how it manifests. Such common knowledge, as well as new scientific findings
about animals’ agency should be integrated into neighboring disciplines, including
politics, law, geography, design, and economics. For example, if the law recognized
animals as agents, this would crucially change the way we organize human-animal
relationships personally and politically: Animals’ voice would need to be considered
in deciding who deserves legal protection and, relatedly, who gets legal recourse.
Building on this, this contribution calls for an “animal agency turn” that we must
take, in concert with animals, by educating fellow researchers and exposing friends,
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family, and the public to instances of animal agency. For animals’ acts of agency to be
heard, seen, and recognized, we need nothing short of civic competence and courage,
empathy, participation, common engagement, and respect for animal alterity.
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Chapter 5
Animal Difference in the Age
of the Selfsame
Nathan Kowalsky
Abstract In this chapter, I argue that mainstream animal-centered (i.e., “humane”)
ethics and critical animal studies attempt to account for nonhuman moral consider-
ability in terms of those animals’ similarities with human animals. I argue that this
emphasis on similarity is a reason why these two fields are generally anti-naturalistic
and ultimately (though ironically) anthropocentric. Moreover, on the assumption
of a general Levinasian ethic of alterity, this anti-naturalism and anthropocentrism
is violently immoral. I propose, therefore, an ethic of animal difference based on
an ethically naturalistic reading of intra- and inter-specific behavior sets. However,
such naturalism is problematic if the Anthropocene is understood to be a natural-
ized fact which undermines all (metaphysical or normative) claims to naturalness or
wildness. In response, I argue that the Anthropocene is not a naturalized fact but a
socially-contingent and constructed fact, and as such is open to moral evaluation. My
proposed ethic of animal difference offers one such critique, and one more effective
than those found in mainstream humane ethics or critical animal studies.
5.1 Progressivist Anti-naturalism
Peter Singer (1981), the founding father of animal liberation ethics, sees the so-called
“circle of ethics” as expanding over the course of history, moving outwards from the
individual human self as normative center. Relying on the nineteenth-century histo-
rian William Lecky, Singer sees ethics in general as a growth of concern from one’s
own well-being towards one’s family, and eventually out towards all people and even
animals. As the story goes, human beings are, by nature, egotistic and “inherently
partial” to themselves (Kemmerer 2011, 73), as is the rest of the animal kingdom.
Eventually, however, it dawned on our species (at least) that our own self-interests
were better served by mutual co-operation, in spite of our innate distaste for getting
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along with each other. Morality was thus invented to keep beneficial social groups
operating smoothly, even though it was initially limited to small groups. Over time,
however, those groups got bigger and moral inclusivity increased; new human sub-
sets were included in the definition of the self-interested ego. Therefore, recent and
more enlightened generations have seen movements advocating the moral and legal
equality of women, African-Americans, LGBTTQQPIANU+ persons,1 and other
oppressed minorities. Today, enlightened or progressive persons find themselves at
the point where all of humanity is within the community of moral concern, and they
face the question of expanding morality further to include nonhuman animals.
The narrative ofmoral progress is notmerely a description of how humans have, in
fact,morally developed. It is a normative claimabout howmorality should havedevel-
oped (and thankfully, is developing). Ethics is and ought to be self -interest increas-
ingly generalized over time. The ego is necessarily the only intrinsically valuable
thing, and “higher ethical consciousness” simply expands the boundary of the ego to
include other selves within its own self-definition (Singer 1997). Progressive ethics
which include at least some nonhuman animals (hereafter called “humane ethics”)2
criticize classical Enlightenment moralities for not being progressive enough—the
latter ethics are “anthropocentric,” an egoism of humanity. While other chauvinisms
recognize no values outside a narrowly defined self, anthropocentrism broadens that
self until it is continuous with a conception of the entire human species that recog-
nizes no inherently valuable things outside itself (Midgley 1994). For humane ethics,
the solution to anthropocentric chauvinism is to expand the definition of the ego
yet further, beyond the boundary of the human species. Thus does John Clark, a
critic, identify this move as moral extensionism, “the project of applying ethical
theories based on anthropocentric (and usually ethical individualist) presuppositions
to greater-than-human and larger-than-individual moral realities such as species,
ecosystems, and the biosphere” (Clark 2014, 171, n. 46).
There is tension, however, between moral extensionism and nonhuman animals.
Up to the species barrier it was comparatively easy for the circle of ethics to expand,
because the differences between one’s own self and other human beings could be
clearly shown to be surmountable. But crossing the species barrier presents progres-
sive morality with an unprecedented obstacle: generally speaking, animals are not
capable of behaving in accordancewith the dictates of generalized egoism. InSinger’s
terms, they do not and indeed cannot act in accordance with the principle of utility. Of
1This abbreviation stands for Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Two-Spirit, Queer, Questioning,
Pansexual, Intersex, Asexual, Non-Binary, Unlabelled, and more. Source: https://www.su.ualberta.
ca/services/thelanding/.
2A convenient shorthand to denote “animal-centered ethics” has been hard to come by. Neither
“animal welfare” nor “animal rights” will suffice, because these terms denote exclusively utili-
tarian or deontological frameworks. “Animal activists” and “animal advocacy movement” have
been proposed, but neither term gives an indication of the sort of ethics operative therein. Thence
my proposed plural “humane ethics,” as it captures (as I shall argue below) the anthropocentrism
implicit in moral extensionism (“the word ‘humane’ is just a dressed-up version of the word we use
for ourselves” [Seitz 2010, 75]) while being colloquially associated with nonhuman animals (e.g.,
the Humane Society), albeit with unnecessary utilitarian connotations.
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course, humane ethics do not claim that animals should voluntarily follow Enlight-
enment norms—at this point Singer (1975, 237), Tom Regan (2004, xxxvi–xxxviii),
and Lori Gruen (2011, 182–183) grant animals the autonomy to be what they are
and behave in their own ways—but Singer, at least, cannot but “regret that this is the
way the world is.” In other words, it’s a lamentable shame that nonhuman animals
do not fit well within the sphere of morality that expands outwards to include them
(Raterman 2008).
This regret is the crux of the well-known clash between humane and environ-
mental ethicists (Hargrove 1992). While many environmental philosophers have
used the language of expansion when encouraging the broadening of human moral
horizons to include ecology (Leopold 1949; Naess 1989; Rolston 2012), in holistic
environmental ethics the individualism assumed by Enlightenment ethics was seen
(albeit controversially) to be relativized by encompassing natural systems (Rodman
1977; Goodpaster 1979; Callicott 1980). By contrast, humane ethics understood
their expansive transcendent self to be a de jure indivisible thing, a norm of moral
inviolability, an ‘individual.’ But the naturalistic holism of land ethics illuminated a
recalcitrant reality: “Nature…is not fair; it does not respect the rights of individuals”
(Callicott 1989, 51). If it did, every food chain that exists would shut down: “The
most fundamental fact of life in the biotic community is eating…and being eaten”
(Callicott 1989, 57). There is no right to life evident in nature, nor any tendency
to alleviate suffering. Nature (or at least the processes of wild or undomesticated
ecologies) does not line up very well with an ethic of generalized self-interest where
the primary duty is not harming whatever counts as an ego.
Environmental ethics thus diverged from humane ethics for the same reason that
nature has fared poorly in Western ethics generally: naturalness, like tradition, func-
tions as a limit to (putative) reason and progress. To be associated with nature or
the body is, as ecofeminists have pointed out, to be considered ‘irrational’ or, in the
socio-political sense, ‘backwards.’ A case in point is critical animal theorist James
Stanescu’s (2012a) advocacy for “theGothic’s resistance to the natural order” because
“a dark animal studies needs to dissociate itself from the tyranny of the natural order”
(p. 44)…“We are now about as far away from [Michael] Pollan’s notion of having
‘a respect for what is’ as we can be” (p. 46). This anti-naturalism is even more
boldly articulated by vegan food writer Stefany Anne Golberg (2011): “Nature is an
asshole. We know this and other animals don’t.” Antipathy towards nature is presup-
posed at the outset of morally progressive narratives, scuttling attempts at resolving
the impasse between humane and environmental ethics.
5.2 Sameness and Anthropocentrism
Enlightenment progressivism sees itself as discontinuous with what it conceives of
as nature, be it vicious wild animals or humanity’s own primitive animality. On
the other hand, Enlightenment progressivism expands by uncovering continuities
between itself and entities not yet included within its boundaries. Between humans,
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particular differences (such as age, gender, class, or creed) are conceptually discarded
as accidental, while universals like ‘humanity’ are held to be the basis of our unalien-
able rights as individuals. The task of humane ethics is to show that this core notion
of self—an ideal derived from the Enlightened human exemplar—shares relevant
commonalities with some nonhuman animals. We have already seen this to be the
casewith Singer’s expanding circle, but it is also the case for awide and representative
swath of non-welfarist humane ethics.
The morally relevant commonality for Regan’s deontological ethic is being a
“subject-of-a-life,” which is supposed to engender moral duties in human animals
to respect the desires of nonhuman animals to not be used, harmed, or killed—
duties which are analogous to how human animals are obliged to treat each other.
Ecofeminist Carol Adams uses clearly progressive language: “Color will lose its
character as a barrier, just as ‘animals’ will lose their otherness, and join human
animals as a ‘we’ rather than a ‘they’ or a collective of ‘its’” (Adams 1994, 78). Gruen
also argues on the basis of similarity with humans: “Other animals matter because,
like us, their lives can go better or worse for them. They are sentient beings who have
interests and well-beings. They can be harmed when their interests are thwarted and
their wellness undermined” (Gruen 2011, 33, emphasis mine). Sue Donaldson and
Will Kymlicka (2011) offer a theory of citizenship and universal rights that applies,
via analogy, from human to nonhuman animals: just as certain human beings are
granted different rights depending on the sort of citizenship they have in a political
community, nonhuman animals are granted different rights depending on whether
they are analogous to human citizens of one’s own country, human citizens of a
foreign nation, or human denizens of one’s own country.
Similarity and sameness between human animals (at the presumptive moral core)
and nonhuman animals (recently relocated from the outside to the inside of the
moral sphere) is at the root of the humane ethics mentioned above, and can be
also found within a wide and representative swath of critical animals studies. Even
though Nik Taylor (2011) criticizes moral expansionism for “simply maintain[ing]
dualist conceptions while moving the boundary slightly…and as such, ultimately
reinforc[ing] traditional anthropocentrism” (pp. 206–207), she goes on to advocate
for “the removal of animal oppression and the serious inclusion of animals them-
selves into our intellectual sphere” (p. 219) by “waging war on essential differences”
(p. 210) and allowing “the cognitive capacities of humans to migrate to objects”
(p. 211), as if she forgot her point about reinforcing traditional anthropocentrism.
Richard Twine, meanwhile, simply assumes that “what we share with other animals
both socially and corporeally ought to be enough to transgress the human/animal
dualism ofmoral considerability” (Twine 2014, 199). Critical animal theorists gener-
ally assume that human exceptionalism is the only philosophical obstacle they face,
and that its solution is an inclusive appeal to cross-species commonalities. Doing
so, however, operates on the assumption that sameness with humans is good while
difference is not: “What is powerful is not what makes us unique, but what makes
us in-common. What is exhilarating is not what individuates us, but rather what
brings us together” (Stanescu 2012b, 576–577); “In other words, we invest a vast
amount of intellectual work in trying to figure out what separates and individuates
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the human species, rather than in what makes us a part of a commonality with other
lives” (Stanescu 2012b, 569). Therefore, as Lisa Kemmerer (2011) adds, “working
to define human beings as distinct from other animals [has] the hidden agenda of
justifying human supremacy, dominion, and exploitation” (p. 70).
I contend that the progressive search for commonalities in humane ethics
(including critical animal studies generally) follows the logic of Hegelian dialectic:
in the beginning there is the self, the subject. But subjective consciousness does not
know very well what it is (or what its ethic should be), and so it puts forth a proposal
of selfhood, externalizing itself, articulating its loosely formed idea in the objective
realm. But objective consciousness is not subjective consciousness and so there is
always an incongruity between the two; the objective other-than-self is different than
the selfsame, and the self is rocked back upon itself, disgusted by its poorly realized
(not inclusive enough) ethic, and so is forced to revise its understandings and to
try again anew. This often violent relation between subjective thesis and objective
antithesis (Hegel [1956, 21] calls it a victimizing “slaughter-bench”) is the engine
of progress, driving the self forward dialectically as it encounters recalcitrant objec-
tivity, appropriating it, and creating new syntheses therefrom. However, the final
goal—the Absolute—is when the negativity inherent in objectivity is overcome by
the self’s discovery of itself in the other.
On my reading of Hegel, other-modification takes priority over self-modification.
As much as Hegelians might want to say that the subject discovers alterity within
itself, this is not what provides the subject relief. The horrors of the objective stage
are resolved by the balm of the selfsame, not alterity. Even if, for Hegel, the Absolute
stagewere to achieve perfectly reciprocal representation of both difference and same-
nesswhereby both subject and object aremutuallymodified by each other, the norma-
tive standards of expansionist moral progressivism are not altered by the encounter
with suitably similar nonhuman animals. In Kemmerer’s unequivocal words:
We ought not to theorize about “others.”… If we can look into the bright eyes of a calf
and see into a mirror – if we can see in this individual a person – complete with interests,
hopes, and fears – not unlike ourselves, then our theorizing is likely to have a greater degree of
validity. If we theorize about self whenever we theorize about fish or a dice snake, crab-eating
mongoose, or killfish, our theories are more likely to be grounded in reality – the reality that
there is no “other,” the reality that we are all animals, and therefore are fundamentally alike,
particularly in morally relevant ways, such as our ability to suffer and our innate desire to
live without suffering…. Those who look at another human being, or another animal, and
see “other” must not theorize about those “others.”… If we are to theorize about oxen and
sheep, then we must theorize about self.… Please, do not theorize about “other” animals.
(Kemmerer 2011, 79–82 original emphasis)
Humane ethics thus reach the satisfaction of the Absolute when they find sameness
at the heart of the other animal. Difference qua difference is simply opposition,
negativity, even evil. The good is that which the self can find in the other to be in
line with itself.
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5.3 Violence Against Otherness
For the purposes of this chapter, I will take for granted a broadly Levinasian ethic of
alterity, whereby moral wrongdoing is paradigmatically defined by violence, which
is in turn defined as the reduction of the Other to the Same. On this account, my
Hegelian reading of humane ethics implicates them in a violently immoral opposition
to animal otherness. This starts with the creeping significance of species difference
into human ethics. While differences between human persons are supposed to be
morally irrelevant in progressive ethics generally, the expansion of the human(e) ego
is not as seamless when encountering animal difference. While moral consideration
can be extended to socially marginalized humans without modification, it cannot be
extended without modification to even our closest “evolutionary comrades” (Vera
2008). Crossing the species barrier is morally relevant, even for moral progressives
whose rhetoric suggests otherwise. Even though Singer (1974, 104) does not want
to admit that species difference is morally relevant, he is clear that animals should
not vote. So prior to the particulars of Singer’s argument (and indeed regardless of
whether this sensitivity to difference is consistent with the expanding circle), we
can already see that as the ethic of moral sameness extends outward from the core
of the human individual, it must be adjusted if it is to apply to nonhuman animals.
The kinds of moral standing we recognize for nonhumans will depend also on the
differences between humans and nonhumans. Natural difference means that human
moral sameness cannot be the absolute moral standard after all.
Moreover, the ethic of sameness can only be extended so far before it exhausts
itself. There are minimum requirements of similarity that must be met before moral
recognition will be extended; failing those, the circle of ethics stops expanding.
Humane ethics set minimum standards for moral considerability (for Singer, the
line is somewhere in-between shrimp and clams [Singer and Mason 2006, 133–134,
275–276], while Regan is largely concerned with adult higher mammals), but at
some point the differences between humans and certain animals—to say nothing of
plants or nonliving ecosystemic components3—are just too great for humane ethics
to include. The more different a being is in comparison to the human, the less it will
count within the scheme of expansionistic moral progress.
What this means, then, is that some animals simply do not benefit from the expan-
sion of human egoism. Their difference is such that insufficient commonalities are
recognized between them and the transcendent Self. In addition to being excluded
from moral considerability, some animals actually stand in clear opposition to the
egoism being extended by moral progress, particularly predators.4 Some humane
ethicists (e.g., Singer, Regan and Gruen) fall back on the lack of moral agency
3Gruen (2011) draws the line between animals and plants, for while plants “can have their interests
negatively affected,” unlike us and (some?) other animals “they will never be interested in that
impact” (p. 29). Regardless of whether clams or mosquitoes should be counted among plants,
subjective rather than objective interests are Gruen’s touchstone.
4The issue of predators is explored explicitly and at length in the chapter by JozefKeulartz’s “Should
the Lion Eat Straw Like the Ox? Animal Ethics and the Predation Problem” in this volume.
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in nonhuman animals—that is, their difference—to avoid advocating the policing
of wild animal behaviors, but Martha Nussbaum’s ethic is more progressive than
that. Her capabilities approach “calls for the gradual formation of an interdependent
world in which all species will enjoy cooperative and mutually supportive relations.
Nature is not that way and never has been. So it calls, in a very general way, for the
gradual supplanting of the natural with the just” (Nussbaum 2006, 399). She there-
fore requires that nonhuman predators, for example, be treated in ways analogous
to how human sexual predators are to be treated (i.e., incarceration and behavioral
modification [Nussbaum and Faralli 2007, 157]). After all, a violent animal’s lack of
moral culpability doesn’t mean that it shouldn’t be stopped. Therefore, when animals
stand in opposition to the extension of human moral standards, those animals need to
be corrected, i.e. forced into alignment with the progressive moral order (Wissenburg
2011).
So while many if not most people have intuitions that there are right and wrong
ways to treat nonhuman animals, andwhile there aremeaningful similarities between
ourselves and many if not most nonhuman animals, difference nevertheless raises its
ugly head and the progressive humane ethic has to backpedal. While there is no need
to modify rights when they are extended from some (adult) humans to other (adult)
humans, there is a need to modify rights when they cross the species barrier. Because
species difference is ethically relevant even to anti-speciesists, it undermines the
expansionistic model of moral progress. Progress is not supposed to have limits, and
yet species difference does constitute a limit. The circle of ethics reaches a point
where it can expand no further: because clams or trees (and whatever lies below
them on the scala natura) do not possess anything like the most basic element of what
counts morally for the humane ethicist, they cannot be directly morally considerable.
When there is no self to be found in the other, difference outweighs sameness and
inclusion stops. Beyond the boundary, the radically nonhuman can be instrumentally
valued, benignly neglected, morally lamented, or coercively policed. The dark side
of the ethic of sameness is its anti-naturalism: the more something can be included
within the expanded human self, the better, whereas the less amenable something is
to inclusion within that sphere, the more naturally problematic it is.
Progressivist anti-naturalism thus ends in the oppression of ‘insufficiently human’
nonhuman animals, just as (on my reading) Hegel’s encounter with alterity violently
reduces the Other to the Same. The Enlightenment ego values things (other persons,
animals) insofar as they cease to be considered different from it and rather come to be
seen (at least in the morally relevant aspects) as the same as it. Moral progressivism
assumes egoism as the ethical starting point, basic to human nature and unavoidably
rampant in the State of Nature, and it sees the solution to egoism as a more inclusive
and broad egoism.Moral progress is the aggregation of egos wherebymore andmore
things which had previously been excluded from the realm of moral sameness are
included. Things that were on the outside are now on the inside; things that were
other are now incorporated into the self. This logic views difference as a threat;
Hans Jonas calls it “the negative experience of otherness” (Jonas 2001, 332). It
tries to affirm variety and diversity by making it all morally homogenous. Anything
outside Enlightened, democratic, liberal tolerance that resists assimilation is vilified
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as uncivilized, barbaric, or even savage. The formof subjectivity advanced byhumane
ethics replicates the imperialist logic of colonialism.
Granted, moral progressivism starts from the reasonable supposition that we value
our selves for their own sakes, and some things (e.g., oxygen) are clearly better for
ourselves than other things (e.g., hydrogen sulfide). It is trivial to say that things may
be either good or bad in relation to the self (instrumentally valuable), but if we go
on to claim that goodness itself is completely defined in terms of what is good for
the self, then we claim the self to be absolute—the only being that matters—rather
than one limited being among many. If the self is (de jure) an absolute being and
an absolute unity, then anything different from the self or anything which threatens
its absolute one-ness, is absolutely bad—the very definition of evil itself. Things
that do not fit with the sameness of the self are cosmically out of order, because the
self is the standard around which the cosmos should be ordered. Anthropocentrism
thus reveals itself to be more than human exceptionalism or the simple denial of
direct moral considerability for nonhumans; it is rather the species-level absolutiza-
tion of otherwise reasonable self-preservation. Because they see alterity antagonis-
tically, aspirationally nonanthropocentric humane ethics self-defeatingly replicate
anthropocentrism by imposing human-modelled sameness onto nonhuman animals.
Animals only count in so far as they approximate human beings. Human beings
remain at the center of the circle, the absolute moral standard for all things, only to
find this ideal increasingly frustrated the further it moves outward into nonhuman
territory. Against this self-defeating ethic of expansionistic sameness, I propose a
direction for ethics where animal differences are viewed positively rather than as
obstacles to be overcome, where animals possess independent standards of value for
themselves rather than being beholden to standards centering on us.
5.4 A Proposal for an Ethic of Animal Difference
Homes Rolston, III is a naturalistic environmental ethicist who offers an ethic which
insists on the axiological relevance of “discontinuity” between animal species as
the touchstone for our evaluation of animals (Rolston 1989). Such discontinuity
vexes humane ethics, because it entails natural animal behaviors that do not appear
to conform to the models derived from human civil society. Predation, parasitism,
cannibalism, coprophagy, and cuckoldry are but a few examples of animal alterity
that cannot be made to fit into the progressive moral order. Coprophagy—the eating
of feces or dung—might just strike us as disgusting (although lagomorphs and juve-
nile iguanas apparently both enjoy and benefit from it), but carnivory, parasitism,
cuckoldry and cannibalism all turn out rather badly for the particular individuals at
the receiving end: prey (or cannibalized cubs) are painfully killed and eaten; hosts
to parasites can suffer greatly before eventually dying; cuckolded parents struggle to
feed their inadvertently adopted offspring, while their own offspring are often fatally
outcompeted. Any ethic of generalized egoism cannot look kindly on such de facto
violations of de jure inviolate individuals, and thus falls into anti-naturalism. My
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proposed solution, then, is to encounter animal otherness without trying to force it
into alignment with individualistic subjectivity.
For Rolston, the key to an ethic of animal difference is recognizing the wildness
of animals as a legitimate form of alterity. If humans should not reduce the value of
animals to what they (or some of them) have found valuable about themselves, then
they should espouse a value pluralism—or species relativism—in nature: “There are
myriad sorts of things and they are differentlymade” (Rolston 1992, 253). Indeed, the
etymology of the word ‘species’ is indicative of this plurality: each species is specific
and special, and there are millions of species. Each one is different from the other in
certain important aspects. There are many degrees of similarity between species too,
of course, but what constitutes them as species is their specificity or specialty, their
unique differences fromother species.5 Earlier, I argued that anthropocentrism should
be understood as the imposition of human-modelled sameness onto the other-than-
human. Here, this means that anthropocentrism should be understood as a denial
of legitimate species-specificity: progressive moral expansionism sees all species
(as much as possible) as unwitting aspirants to the human species. Fittingly, there-
fore, Rolston argues that anthropocentrism is a category mistake because it holds
nonhuman species up to moral standards similar to those we hold ourselves to, as if
it were illegitimate that there should be different kinds of animals.
Environmental nonanthropocentrism must then carefully parse the interrelations
of the value plurality in nature: “intrinsic animal natures and their ecological
places in the world” (Rolston 1989, 134). That is, individual animals (ourselves
included) should be seen as governed by behavioral norms that concern both internal
interactions with their respective species members (intraspecific relations between
conspecifics) and external interactions with members of other species (interspecific
relations between heterospecifics). Classical ethics, being focused exclusively on
human behavior towards other human beings, seeks to identify good interhuman
behavior. The anthropocentric mistake is to think that this human behavior set
exhausts normative (as opposed to aesthetic) axiology. Interhuman ‘morality’ (if
that term is to be limited to animals which possess ‘moral agency’ or volition) is but
a species of the axiological genus, lying within a larger framework of ‘nonmoral’
5I recognize that species essentialism is highly problematic in the philosophy of biology. However,
my argument does not depend on species essentialism being true; it only depends on species nomi-
nalism being false. That is, while it is likely that species (and other biological kinds) do not have
unchanging essences (otherwise evolution would be impossible!) it is not the case that species (and
other biological kinds) are nothing but convenient naming conventions drawn from a contingent
cultural repertoire projected onto an arbitrary group of things. Even though species (and other
biological kinds) are “thoroughly heterogeneous collections of individuals whose phenotypic prop-
erties [change] over time, and [vary] across the population at any given time” (Wilson et al. 2007,
193), radical skepticism about the existence of species does not “do justice to natural kinds as they
are studied in biology and other special sciences” (Brigandt 2009, 79). That is, species identifica-
tion is scientifically convenient for a reason outside simple taxonomic utility. Homeostatic property
clustering (stable grouping) of species (and other biological kinds) is something experienced by
scientists as external to their own acts of categorization, and as such, possesses sufficient metaphys-
ical reality for my proposed ethic of animal difference to proceed. For a fuller treatment of my view
on the metaphysical status of species, see Kowalsky (2012, 129–132).
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Fig. 5.1 Axiological categorization of species difference
valueswhich relativizes humanmorality.Animal and environmental ethics, byway of
contrast with interhuman ethics, prescribe good interspecific behaviors for humans,
or our moral duties to nonhuman agents, entities, and systems (Fig. 5.1).
But none of these moral (i.e., good human) behavior sets have anything to do
with how nonhuman animal behaviors should be assessed. In Rolston’s words, “the
appropriate evaluative category is not nature’s moral goodness, for there are no
moral agents in nonhuman nature. The appropriate category is one or more kinds
of nonmoral goodness, better called nature’s value. Such value is not to be mapped
by projection from culture, much less from human moral systems within culture”
(Rolston 1992, 252 emphasis mine). The axiological inter/intra distinction can be
applied to any species, be it comprised of moral agents or not. There is a set of
good intraspecific behaviors for any given species, just as there is a set of good
interspecific behaviors for that species. And because species are specific and special,
there are often pointed differences between any two species-specific sets of good
behaviors. For instance, it is good (though not ‘moral’) intraspecific behavior for
juvenile iguanas to eat the feces of adult iguanas, but familial coprophagy is not very
good behavior for most other species, likely including our own. For lions, it is good
intraspecific behavior for the newly dominant male to eat the cubs of the previously
dominant male, but cannibalizing stepchildren is not very good behavior for many
other species, likely including our own.
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The same goes for nonhuman interspecific relations. For cuckoo birds, it is good
interspecific behavior for them to lay their eggs in the nests of other unsuspecting bird
species, leaving non-cuckoos to raise overly large cuckoo chicks which out-compete
the surrogate parents’ own offspring. Yet cuckoldry is rightly considered bad human
behavior, both when it is intraspecific (as goes the dictionary definition of the term)
and interspecific (like the legends and tales of Romulus and Remus or Tarzan). Brood
parasitism is not very good behavior for most other species either. Finally, for some
species, say peregrine falcons, it is good interspecific behavior to consume the flesh
and blood of other species, but this does not mean it is good interspecific behavior
for other species, say the Ruby-throated Hummingbird, to engage in carnivorous
predation.
In common parlance, it is often said that nasty animal behavior ‘just is,’ as if it
cannot be subject to evaluation at all. But with these axiological distinctions in place,
we are in a position to capture the intuition of the ‘just is’ while also avoiding the
temptation to see the natural world as lacking any valuewhatsoever, which often slips
into seeing it as a value-neutral repository of material for us to exploit in whatever
way we see fit. The best way for humans to assess the natural behaviors of (especially
wild) nonhuman animals is to see them as good-in-themselves. It is not our place
to say that—because humans are generally not supposed to prey on each other, eat
each other, eat shit, or impregnate other people’s wives so that another parental
pair will raise offspring not their own—the sorts of animals which do exactly these
things are behaving badly. Nor will it suffice to say that those behavior patterns are
value-neutral, for saying so anthropocentrically denies the conceivability of other-
than-human value. Positive value is not the same as ‘moral’ value; morality is what
humans are obligated to do, while positive value is broader than human morality.
Each animal has its own set of proper behaviors and thus positive values, and our
species’ set is not necessarily the same as any other set.
The categorizations established above are generic and as such, empty of content;
the scope of this paper permits only preliminary gestures towards their filling.
However, it cannot be that humans ought to simply stand back and watch disin-
terestedly as animals go about their business, for we are not isolated observers.
What we observe are interactions, and we are ourselves animals who interact and
are interacted with by animals other than us. Indeed, sometimes we are subject to
parasitism or even predation by heterospecifics. Rolston (1988, 84–88) offers two
ethically naturalistic principles for human treatment of other animals (the principle
of the non-addition of suffering, and the prohibition against ecologically pointless
suffering), but for him these apply across the board to any and all sentient nonhuman
animals, and are not situated within the relativization of interhuman ethics by the
larger category of normative species behavior sets.
Elsewhere,Rolston suggests that human treatment of nonhumananimals should be
“homologous with nature,” i.e. having “functional similarities” (1989, 134). Further-
more, he argues that our animal ethics should take their “cues from the nature of
animals and their place in nature and from our animal roots and human ecology…
‘Naturally’ must apply to the object animal and to the subject human” (Rolston
1989, 135). What I propose, then, is that the right way for humans to treat nonhuman
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animals will depend on the way those particular animals are naturally treated by both
conspecifics and other heterospecifics.6 We should not want to treat animals in ways
that fail to do justice to their constitutive ecological relations. Secondly, humans
should treat other animals in ways consistent with our own species-specific natural
history and needs. Just because ticks like to infest moose hides doesn’t mean we
should try to do the same, but likewise, just because ticks don’t use moose hides,
bones or antlers for clothing and tools doesn’t mean we shouldn’t be permitted to do
so. “Resource use of one animal by another,” Rolston says, “is a characteristic of the
world humans inhabit (a premised fact), one which they are under no obligation to
remake (a concluded ought)” (1989, 134). An ethic of animal difference refines this
position by particularizing it: resource use of one animal by another will depend on
the kind of animals in question and their respective natural histories.7
For example, whether it is ethical for a human to hunt a mule deer will depend,
at least, on whether mule deer are typically prey species, whether humans are a
typically predatory species, and if mule deer provide goods suitable to their being
treated as prey by humans (i.e., meat, hides, sinew, bone, or homologous goods that
predators seek through predation). The question would be posed again, and poten-
tially answered differently, with respect to human resource use of grizzly bears,
golden eagles, Richardson’s ground squirrels, leopard frogs, or what have you. If it
is found to be ethical to use an animal on these terms, then Rolston’s principle of the
non-addition of suffering should come into force: animals should not be subjected
to more pain than they would suffer if they were living (and dying) in the wild as
undomesticated animals. However, Rolston’s prohibition against ecologically point-
less suffering (one cannot cause pain in an animal—even if it is less than it might
experience, say, in the claws of a hawk—if that pain does not have or resemble an
evolutionary function) is made virtually otiose by the naturalization of each animal’s
constitution and relation with the other, unless the use of the animal is clearly a
desecration or dishonorable.8
PeterWenz criticizes Rolston’s ethic as “conservative in the worst sense. It papers
over difficulties in the status quo that a philosopher should be exposing” (Wenz
1989, 7), and most humane ethicists would likely level the same charge against
an ethic of animal difference that is open, in principle, to the killing and use of
animals by humans. However, the ethic I am proposing here is more radical than
6Gruen (2011) allows that “[a]lthough some of the morally relevant facts might be gleaned from
species membership, many of them won’t be so apparent…the fact[s] that dandelions reproduce
asexually or that gibbons are monogamous, don’t tell us anything about how we should treat those
organisms,…orwhat obligations or duties wemight have towards them in light of such information”
(pp. 55–57). To the contrary, I would argue that these facts suggest—at the very least—that humans
ought not to attempt to engage in reproductive activities with dandelions and gibbons, and any such
attempts by those species towards humans should be rebuffed.
7Morally prior to this, of course, is the human duty tomaintain ecologically sustainable populations,
without which no resource harvest would be permissible.
8Besides, Rolston’s nature/culture dualism makes virtually any resource use ‘cultural’ and thus
ecologically pointless, making the question “what is natural to humans?” unanswerable on his own
terms (1989, 132; cf. Kowalsky 2006).
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conservative. While it may permit, in principle, killing an animal for the good of
its body, farming an animal for fur or meat may not be permitted. No animals are
typically caged species (and few are typically herded by nonhuman heterospecifics)
and humans are not a typically caging species (nomadic herding arose contingently
a mere 9000 years ago among idiosyncratic cultural groups [Cauvin 2000]). Similar
problems beset the use of animals for traction, like horseback riding. It is not even
clear how a naturalistic ethic of respect for animal difference could justify animal
testing, even for reasons of urgent medical necessity. Rolston (1989, 137) admittedly
does not want his ethic to delegitimize “horses, wagons and plows, nomads and
camels, cows and milk, chickens and eggs…agriculture…, cities and industry,” but
the ethic I have outlined here is poised to do just that. To be sure, we will always
have to “make some pragmatic compromises” (Rolston 1989, 136)—perhaps for
urgent medical necessity, or for the survival of more than seven billion people—but
an ethic of animal difference can provide both operative obligations against many
present animal cruelties, and aspirational or regulative imperatives which, even as
lofty and perhaps unattainable ideals, do not entail colonialist anti-naturalism.While
criticizing and revising humane ethics, animal difference can go a long way towards
reconciling that field with naturalistic environmental ethics.
5.5 Sameness and the Anthropocene
TheAnthropocene, however, is another challenge to the ethic of animal difference that
I’ve proposed. The Anthropocene is the (proposed) name of our current geological
epoch, the one wherein human pollution now forms an identifiable layer in the fossil
record. The idea that there can be such thing as a ‘nature’ distinct from the defiling
effluents of certain human cultures should be dead, therefore, if it isn’t already.
Erle Ellis (2011, 40) asserts that the “long trends toward both the intensification of
agricultural cultivation and the engineering of ecosystems at increasing scope and
scale” are not recent phenomena, but rather began (he thinks) before the Holocene
with Paleolithic human fire-drive hunting techniques. There’s nothing unique or
distinct about the Anthropocene, it would seem, as human beings have always been
a geophysical force on the planet. If so, it follows that there is no such thing as animal
difference, if by that we mean nonhuman animal behavior sets that are independent
of human influence or assessment. The domestication of animals by certain human
cultures is at least 10,000 years old, and domesticated lifeforms are the main sort of
nonhuman animal encountered by most humans today. With the majority of humans
now living in urban areas,most human encounterswithwild animals are likely to be in
urban settings where such animals are a nuisance at best. The natural habitats of wild
animals are fragmented, decreasing in size, and degraded by anthropogenic climate
change. The notion of an ‘animal’ that is other than the ‘human’ is problematic at
best, if not ridiculous, on account of the Anthropocene.
Even though Paul Crutzen proposed the term “Anthropocene” to inspire caution or
regret regarding the ways in which anthropogenic effects alter planetary geology, the
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way the term has been enthusiastically embraced by especially (but not exclusively)
humanist scholars suggests anything but caution or regret.AsLangdonWinner (2017,
291) notes:
The basic sensibility that emerges from the notion “Anthropocene”… is one that blends
a familiar, threadbare, human-centred worldview, often with lavish infusions of techno-
triumphalism, the latest version of a narrative tradition that includes “progress,” “develop-
ment” and “innovation,” this time enhanced with austere rituals of hand-wringing.
The hand-wringing is necessary for appearances’ sake only, for the normative under-
tones of “the age in which nature and culture are no longer neatly separable forces or
spheres” (Williston 2016, 155) are celebratory: humanity at long last has triumphed
in its (supposedly) 200,000 year old war against ‘nature.’ Even though current rates
of anthropogenic ecological change are greater than have been seen for hundreds of
millions of years, ecomodernists Michael Shellenberger and Ted Nordhaus (2011,
10) assert that these are changes of “scope and scale, not of kind.” If that is so, then
there can be no ethically naturalistic critique of the projectwhich finds its culmination
in the Anthropocene. All we can and ought to do is adapt to our new Anthropocene
conditions, just as nonhuman animals are currently being forced to. The way things
are is simply the way things have to be, and there can be no ethical response to it
other than acquiescence (and innovation, of course).
This situation, however, is an odd one for normative ethics: if the only response
to (so-called) human domination of the planet is acceptance of (so-called) human
domination of the planet, then ethics have no normativity vis-à-vis (so-called) human
domination of the planet. Ethics in this case simply have no purchase on the orienta-
tion of human behavior. The projects of ‘our species’ (let us pretend, for the moment,
that domination of the planet is, in fact, appropriately described as ‘human’) are
entirely naturalized in the sense of being devoid of agency, volition, or freedom.
‘Our’ tendency to dominate the globe is itself a geo-physical law, we are led to
believe. If the Anthropocene is what its boosters want it to be, it is the condition for
the impossibility of an ethical critique of the Anthropocene itself; the Anthropocene
narrative is “the rubber stamp [of] the fait accompli” (Charbonneau 2018, 145). This
chapter is not the place for a defense of the reality of human moral agency, but if
there is anything that is phenomenologically true about the human condition, it is that
all of us—regardless of language, culture, color, or creed—make significant choices.
We form societies, for instance, and there is a virtually infinite array of societies
that we can form. If this is so, then we have to face the possibility that the Anthro-
pocene—even as a geological reality—is also a social construction. It is not simply
human; it is the result of a contingent set of some forms of human culture. As such,
it can be subject to normative evaluation, and does not function as a natural limit or
barrier to normative evaluation. There is no need to accept the Anthropocene as a
given, or to see it as characteristically human. Rather, the need is the inverse.
An ethic of animal difference can speak to the Anthropocene project critically,
therefore, but so can humane ethics. Humane ethics have resources with which to
decry the ongoing domestication of animals (Comstock 1992), they critique certain
breeding and grooming practices of companion animals, and voice concern for the
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condition and treatment of wild animals, urban or otherwise. However, all this is
merely formal; in content, the humane ethic succumbs to the ironies of progres-
sivism. As if offering a summary of the earlier parts of this chapter, Don McKay
(2008–2009, 11) contends that “No less than the technological mindset, Romanti-
cism converts the other into the Same of the human self, but by a soft and seductive
path, the generous extension of citizenship rather than violent reduction to utility.”
Humane ethics model their standards for animal treatment on ethics of human treat-
ment, which is why they are more consistent with an embrace of the Anthropocene
thanmayhave originally seemed.At best, humane ethicswould offer a reformist balm
to the Anthropocene’s ‘human’ domination of all that exists on this Earth. So long
as that domination is ‘humane,’ the colonialist and imperialist projects of both are
morally consistent. The anti-naturalism of humane ethics offers nothing but grounds
for accepting the radical ‘humanization’ of the planet, which is the Anthropocene
per se. Both humane ethics and the humanist celebration of the Anthropocene artic-
ulate themselves as fulfilling “the project that has centrally occupied humanity for
thousands of years—emancipating ourselves from nature, tribalism, peonage, and
poverty…” (Shellenberger and Nordhaus 2011, 11). Just as humane ethics progres-
sively expand the definition of ‘person’ to include members of marginal human
communities and (some) nonhuman animals, the Anthropocene is the progressive
expansion of the ‘human’ to geologically and biologically include all of nonhuman
nature (animal or vegetable or mineral). The anti-naturalism in humane ethics is of a
piece with the Anthropocene’s own anti-naturalistic declaration of the end of nature.
The Same triumphs over the Other.
It is fitting that this book should be edited by and have so many contributors from
within the Dutch context, because the Netherlands is essentially a case study in the
Anthropocene. As the saying goes, God made the world, but the Dutch made the
Netherlands. The Netherlands is the most densely populated country in Europe, and
if the embrace of the Anthropocene becomes writ large across the globe, the Nether-
lands’ levels of population density, land use, and types of animal encounters may
become the model for every square meter of the terrestrial surface.9 Very little of the
Netherlands currently counts as ‘wild landscape,’ and of that which does, most is
space reclaimed from the environing ‘cultural landscape’ of urbanization, industrial-
ization, and agriculturalization. Likewise, the Anthropocene is the radical suppres-
sion of wildness, writing domestication and ‘civilization’ (literally, city-fication) into
everything everywhere for all time, from the geological strata to the heady airs of
the atmosphere. This is the naturalization which the Anthropocene seeks to achieve:
a particular version of human society—broadly speaking, high technology human
sedentism (and not necessarily Dutch!)—standardized across time and space, around
which all otherness must and will be subordinated (even if some is allowed to remain
in isolated pockets for recreational purposes or curiosity’s sake).
9Shellenberger and Nordhaus (2011, 8–9) use the precarious technological gamble of the city of
Venice as their metaphor for the Anthropocene, but their comparison is seamlessly applicable to
the Netherlands as an entire country.
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This is why humane ethics appear best suited for domesticated animals within
urban and rural settings. The more oppositional and irreducible differences there are
between wild animals and the core context of sedentary agrarian human civilization,
the less those animals can be tolerated (in their wild form). Civilization—which as a
process, anthropocentrically makes something fit for a city—conceives of anything
outside its own ordering as a chaotic threat. Furthermore, to make something a
citizen—be it a human or another animal—is to reconstruct it as amember of the city,
a place where that thing’s wildness is unsuitable. Domestication therefore removes
difference from animals by genetically changing them so that they can physically and
psychologically tolerate captivity by humans. It forces alignment with the strictures
of agrarian human sedentism, being the literal anthropomorphization ofwild animals,
or a genetic reification of the other to the same.Moral progressivism—be it embodied
in humane ethics or the Anthropocene—emanates outward from the agrarian sense
of self and generates a barnyard ethic of animal treatment. The progressivist anti-
naturalism of both‚ at base‚ aim at the triumph of the selfsame which brings order to
recalcitrant and repulsive nature with the point of a weapon, if necessary.
However, this particular and contingent social project does not need to be natural-
ized. Indeed, naturalizing it is both archaeologically and anthropologically false. It is
clear that for the vast majority of our species’ chronology, we lived without domes-
tication, agriculture, or sedentary civilization (let alone industrialization, mecha-
nization, and mass urbanization), and we were not any less human for lacking it.
Foraging—the primary mode of human subsistence for 95% of the human past—
does not require the large-scale manipulation of the ecosystem in a manner that
sharply contrasts with how the ecosystem would function without human pres-
ence (Tudge 1998, 5–7). There’s nothing universally human about either treating
nonhuman animals as “feral permanently retarded human children” (Pluhar 1991,
26) in need of house training, or viewing the Earth Mother as standing in need
of geological domestication. Nor should there be. If the violent overcoming of the
Other by the Same is fundamentally immoral, then both humane ethics and the
Anthropocene project are morally suspect at best.
Nor is it an impossible task to respond to animal or geological alterity without
antagonism.Most foraging cultures known to anthropology view(ed) wild animals as
exemplars of foreign ways of being that humans could not actually participate in—
and thus companionable behaviors were seen as inappropriate. In these non-agrarian
contexts, wild animals were viewed as both different from humanity and yet as posi-
tive and unopposed to humanness, a non-oppositional encounter with alterity which
is precisely what humane ethics and the Anthropocene lack. The Anthropocene’s
geological domination of the planet and humane ethics’ (im)moral domination of
animals are thus non-natural in the sense of being contingent and unnecessary (not
naturalized) and anti-natural in the sense of being opposed to wildness (i.e., the
natural evolutionary and ecological state of all animals). Contrary to the progressive
narrative, there can (and indeed should) be differentiation between humans and other
animals without endemic conflict, and difference within reciprocal relationship.
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This is where an ethic of animal difference fits in. In so far as the Anthro-
pocene forces the denaturing of nonhuman animal otherness by taming, domesti-
cation, genetic modification, agricultural and urban vilification, habitat destruction,
and climate change, an ethic of animal difference will morally condemn the Anthro-
pocene. Such an ethic will provide grounds for resisting those anthropocentric forces
which convert the Otherness of nonhuman animals into something more conducive
to the Sameness of high-technology sedentary human civilization. That this contin-
gent form of human culture is currently writing itself into the geological record is
metaethically irrelevant. The task of philosophical ethics is not to take human cultural
constructions for granted, but to subject them moral examination. That is precisely
what an ethic of animal difference would do. It is premised on the wild, evolutionary,
and ecological otherness of nonhuman animals, and from that vantage point rejects
the radical suppression of wild alterity by the Anthropocene (and humane ethics).
What if theAnthropocene cannot be stopped?How then shall humans orient them-
selves towards the animals which remain after the anthropocentric juggernaut has
conquered all the places where both can live? On the one hand, temporary pragmatic
compromises can be made. Insofar as domesticated animals are incorporated into
sedentary industrial-agrarian social systems, we may apply certain anthropocentric
moral standards to their treatment (perhaps alleviation of suffering) as a form of
ironic respect for what remains of their wild form’s alterity (e.g., allowing chickens
to express ‘natural’ scratching behavior). Insofar as wild animals migrate into urban
and rural areas and even speciate in response to anthropogenic pressures, we should
allow them to do so, at least in honor of what remains of their eco-evolutionary
agency. If they’re nuisances in our cities, let them be nuisances as a sign to us of the
horror of having brought our cities to the point where wild animals have no other
choice but to be a nuisance therein.
But let us not celebrate these new feral beasts or hybrid species as an innovative
response to a naturalized Anthropocene. Let them rather be icons of the failure
of the currently dominant form of human culture to respond to Otherness without
violence. If resistance is the spirit of the compromises we make, then an ethic of
animal difference can still issue a moral vocation that transcends the fait accompli of
the Anthropocene. Ethics can—without being hamstrung by naturalizing contingent
‘realities’ like the status quo—offer aspirational or regulative imperatives that provide
resources with which to critique the Anthropocene juggernaut, even if it is currently
the victor. There is no need to fully collaborate with the colonizer or the imperialist
‘human.’ Resistance is possible, and resistance is obligatory.
5.6 Conclusion
As with all essays, this chapter can remain only a proposal, and as such its results are
indeterminate and open. Much careful work needs to be done to identify humanity’s
natural intra- and inter-specific behavioral norms, as well as the norms of those
species with whom our species most commonly interacts. This is, however, a project
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worth embarking on. If the vastmajority of theWestern tradition has been the immoral
attempt at conceptually, technologically, and normatively mastering the Other by
reducing it to the Same, then the ethical framework proposed in this chapter offers a
way forward without perpetuating that colonialist and imperialist agenda. Whether
or not it is too late to actually stop the colonialist and imperialist agenda of the
Anthropocene is beside the point. What matters is that we recognize its agenda and
recover resources with which to oppose it at every step. The Otherness of animals
different than ourselves is one such source of grounding. Let us return to the animals
themselves!10
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Chapter 6
Should the Lion Eat Straw Like the Ox?
Animal Ethics and the Predation
Problem
Jozef Keulartz
Abstract Stephen Clark’s article The Rights of Wild Things from 1979 was the
starting point for the consideration in the animal ethics literature of the so-called
‘predation problem’. Clark examines the response of David George Ritchie to Henry
Stephens Salt, the first writer who has argued explicitly in favor of animal rights.
Ritchie attempts to demonstrate—via reductio ad absurdum—that animals cannot
have rights, because granting them rights would oblige us to protect prey animals
against predators that wrongly violate their rights. This article navigates the reader
through the debate sparked off by Clarke’s article, with as final destination what I
consider to be the best way to deal with the predation problem. I will successively
discuss arguments against the predation reductio from Singer’s utilitarian approach,
Regan’s deontological approach, Nussbaum’s capability approach, and Donaldson
and Kymlicka’s political theory of animal rights.
6.1 Introduction
StephenClark’s article The Rights of Wild Things from 1979was the starting point for
the consideration in the animal ethics literature of the so-called ‘predation problem’
(Dorado 2015, 234). In this article, Clark examines the response of Scottish philoso-
pher David George Ritchie (1853–1903) to Henry Stephens Salt (1851–1939), who
is credited to be the first writer to have argued explicitly in favor of animal rights.
Ritchie attempts to demonstrate—via reductio ad absurdum—that animals cannot
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have rights, because granting them rights would oblige us to protect prey animals
against predators that wrongly violate the victim’s rights.
In our guardianship of the rights of animals, must we not protect the weak among them
against the strong? Must we not put to death blackbirds and thrushes because they feed
on worms, or (if capital punishment offends our humanitarianism) starve them slowly by
permanent captivity and vegetarian diet? What becomes of the ‘return to nature’ if we must
prevent the cat’s nocturnal wanderings, lest she should wickedly slay a mouse? Are we not
to vindicate the rights of the persecuted prey of the stronger? Or is our declaration of the
rights of every creeping thing to remain a mere hypocritical formula to gratify pug-loving
sentimentalists. (Ritchie 2002, 109–110)
Clark argues against this predation reductio; he rejects Ritchie’s conclusion that, if
non-human animals had rights, we should be obliged to defend them against preda-
tors. This conclusion, Clark asserts, “either does not follow, follows in the abstract
but not in practice, or is not absurd” (Clark 1979, 187).
This article navigates the reader through the debate sparked off by Clarke’s article,
with as final destination what I consider to be the best way to deal with the predation
problem.
I will first argue that the utilitarian approach to the predation reductio is ultimately
a dead end. Utilitarians can only avoid this reductio if they are prepared to reconsider
their opinion of predation as an evil that must be eradicated (Sect. 6.2).
As I will argue next, Tom Regan’s rights-based approach to animal ethics offers
a less gloomy picture of predation and provides a more solid way to escape the
predation reductio than the consequentialist approach. According to Regan we have
no duty to interfere with wildlife to prevent predation because members of both
predator and prey species possess a certain ‘competence’ and are capable of ‘using
their natural abilities’ to survive on their own in the wild. This recourse to the notion
of ‘competence’ could open an avenue for a more balanced view of the predator-prey
relationship, in which predator and prey are no longer seen respectively as invincible
and defenseless (Sect. 6.3).
To explore this avenue, I then turn to Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach
that centers on the idea that a creature’s well-being is dependent on its opportunities
to realize some basic natural abilities or competences. However, the considerable
conceptual gains that Nussbaum is able to achieve through the introduction of the
species-specific norm of flourishing in the discussion of the predation problem are
at least partly being undone by the way she compiles a catalogue of innate or ‘basic’
capabilities relevant to animal species (Sect. 6.4).
I finally turn to Donaldson and Kymlicka’s political theory of animal rights. There
are important similarities between this theory andNussbaum’s capabilities approach.
But there is also a distinct difference: whereas Nussbaum attaches considerable
importance to species membership, Donaldson and Kymlicka focus on community
membership, thus taking account of the sociopolitical context of animal justice.
They succeed in making further headway on the road to a satisfactory solution of the
predator problem. However, with their sovereignty model Donaldson and Kymlicka
have taken a place-based approach with regard to wild animals that ultimately fails
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to take sufficient account of the scope and scale of the anthropogenic stress that is
inflicted upon these animals during the current stage of the Anthropocene (Sect. 6.5).
6.2 Utilitarianism
In his article The Rights of Wild Things, Stephen Clark mentions an important argu-
ment that utilitarians usually put forward to avoid the predation reductio: that the evil
of predation cannot be eliminated without introducing worse ones. “Caribou may be
spared the pain of wolves, or Eskimos, but the consequent population explosion will
lead to overgrazing, disease, famine, and a population crash” (id., 175).
This argument was introduced in 1973 by Peter Singer in his reply to David
Rosinger who asked him if we have a moral responsibility to prevent predation.
In answering this question, Singer makes a distinction between domestic pets such
as cats and dogs, and wild animals, like the lion. With respect to carnivorous pets,
Singer thinks it right to try to raise them on a special vegetarian diet. But as for wild
animals, he claims to be fairly sure, “judging from man’s past record of attempts
to mold nature to his own aims, that we would be more likely to increase the net
amount of animal suffering if we interfered with wildlife, than to decrease it… So,
in practice, I would definitely say that wildlife should be left alone” (Singer 1973;
1975, 226). Although Singer cautions against interfering with ecosystems because
he fears that doing so would cause more harm than good, as a matter of principle,
he believes that “if, in some way, we could be reasonably certain that interfering
with wildlife in a particular way would, in the long run, greatly reduce the amount
of killing and suffering in the animal world, it would, I think, be right to interfere”
(Singer 1973).1
In order to avoid what he has called a “conceptual absurdity”—that we risk to
cause more suffering than we would prevent—Steve Sapontzis has added a proviso
to the presumption that we are morally obligated to prevent predation. He claims that
we are only committed to stop predation “whenever doing so would not occasion
as much or more suffering than it would prevent” (Sapontzis 1984, 31). Sapontzis
contends that this reformulation still contains a substantive obligation: it would for
instance oblige us to prevent our pets from being predators, something that is also
endorsed by Singer. “It would also obligate us to begin exploring other ways in which
we could reduce the suffering caused by predation without occasioning as much or
more suffering, e.g., in zoos, wildlife preserves, and other areas where we are already
managing animals” (ibid.).
1Fellow-consequentialist Aaron Simmons fully agrees with Singer that saving wild animals “on
any large scale would have disastrous ecological consequences” (Simmons 2009, 26). He doesn’t
believe at all in measures to avoid these bad consequences such as feeding vegetarian diets to
predators to prevent starvation, or feeding contraceptives to prey animals to curb overpopulation.
If done on any large scale, such measures as proposed by environmental philosophers like Mark
Sagoff (1984) would not counter but only compound serious ecological problems.
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In a similar vein, Charles Fink has argued that it does not follow from the alleged
fact that large-scale interventions in ecosystems would do more harm than good
that we should do nothing at all. Fink accuses all those who take an all-or-nothing
approach to the predation problem of black-and-white-thinking. He concludes that
“it is not inherently absurd to suppose that there is an obligation to protect animals
from natural predators, even if this obligation has limited practical application” (Fink
2005, 15).
That we run the risk to causemore harm than good is not the only reasonwhy there
can be no obligation to defend prey animals against their predators. Another reason,
also mentioned by Stephen Clark, concerns the over-demanding nature of such a
duty. Any realistic attempt to fulfill a duty to intervene in predation would inevitably
be detrimental to our performance of other duties. Our possibilities for positive action
are simply limited: “Most of us, not being wandering preachers, can be vegetarians
quite easily. Some of us can be vegans. But very few of us can wholeheartedly devote
ourselves to the defense of mice” (Clark 1979, 179/180; cf. Hadley 2006).
In connection to this second objection Sapontzis speaks about a “practical absur-
dity”, and he is convinced that this objection is as easy to refute as the objection in the
case of the conceptual absurdity. It may be true that we are unable to eliminate preda-
tion entirely; but this does not render the obligation to prevent predationmeaningless.
It can function as a moral ideal that we should work toward and try to approximate
ever more closely: “Consequently, it is not practically absurd” (Sapontzis 1984, 32).
6.2.1 Piecemeal Engineering
So, the consensus among utilitarians is that we should intervene in predator-prey
relations whenever doing so would not cause more harm than good or be overly
demanding and incur costs that significantly outweigh the benefits. In his article
Policing Nature from 2003, Tyler Cowen identifies a number of policy measures that
seem to meet these criteria. Cowen’s starting point is that we are already inevitably
intervening in nature inmassiveways, through agriculture, fishing, industry, building,
mining and, of course, through nature conservation. These policies obviously affect
predators and prey animals differently. Cowen calls for attempts to shift nature’s
balance of power to the detriment of predators and to the benefit of their victims.
We should, however, do so in a cautious and humble way, without upsetting nature’s
balance in intolerable fashion. “We should count negative impacts on carnivores as
positive features of the human policy, rather than as negative features, as we usually
do. Doing so would make us less likely to support the populations of various aggres-
sive carnivores” (Cowen 2003, 174). In order to shift nature’s balance of power in
the desired manner, we should, at the very least, stop subsidizing the propagation
of carnivores and limit or eliminate programs to protect endangered carnivores or
prevent their extinction. We should make hunting strictures against killing carni-
vores less tight than those against killing non-carnivores, or perhaps remove them
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altogether. And we should be more willing to use carnivores than non-carnivores in
laboratory experiments.
6.2.2 The Balance of Nature and the Argument
from Ignorance
The utilitarian consensus that the way forward is to proceed in a piecemeal and
small-scale manner is based on two interconnected assumptions: that the balance
of nature is essentially good for animals, and that we are simply too ignorant to
police nature without constantly running the risk to disturb this balance. Both these
underlying assumptions have however increasingly come under attack during the
past few years.
The claim that the balance of nature is on the overall good for animals has already
been contested in a paper from 1995 by Yew-Kwang Ng. But it took until the late
2000s before this paper started to gain real traction (see, e.g., Dawrst 2009; Horta
2010a, b; Tomasik 2015). In his paper entitled Towards Welfare Biology Ng argues,
on the basis of evolutionary economics and population dynamics, that the natural
equilibrium is something quite terrible because all species suffer enormously in this
situation. This is due to the prevalence of the reproductive strategy know as ‘r-
selection’, which consists in producing large numbers of offspring per reproductive
cycle. The overwhelming majority of animals that follow this reproductive strategy,
including fishes, amphibians and reptiles, die shortly after birth, from starvation or
by being eaten alive by predators or parasites. But even the tiny minority of animals
that follow the other important reproductive strategy know as ‘K-selection’ will
experience their share of suffering and misery as well, because they often also have
a large numbers of eggs or offspring, which will be wasted before they reach sexual
maturity. Ng concludes that for animals in the wild, their pain and suffering vastly
outweigh their pleasure and happiness, so the widely accepted idyllic view that the
current balance of nature is overall good for animals is definitely false.
As a consequence of this analysis, Ng and his followers, suggest that we can
increase the level of overall animal welfare by lowering the birth-rates and reducing
the number of those animals whose lives are not worth living (Ng 1995, 271/275).
Consequently, Oscar Horta (2010b) considers species protection and biodiversity
conservation as counterproductive to the promotion of animal welfare because this
will increase rather than reduce the number of suffering animals. In a similar vein,
Brian Tomasik has expressed the hope “that the animal-rights movement doesn’t end
up increasing support for wilderness preservation and human non-interference of all
kinds” (Tomasik 2015, 148).
The second underlying claim, that our understanding is too limited to intervene
in nature without causing serious ecological problems, is also far from unproblem-
atic. As Clare Palmer has remarked, this argument from ignorance is not a resilient
argument that interfering with wildlife is morally unacceptable in principle. Given
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the continuous development of sophisticated techniques such as vaccination, radio
tracking, and wildlife contraception or sterilization, the argument from ignorance
of the consequences will lose its validity in an increasing number of cases (Palmer
2010, 30; 2015, 205).
Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka agree with Palmer that the argument from
ignorance—they prefer to call it the ‘fallibility argument’—seems to miss the target.
This argument suggests that if we had the adequate tools and techniques at our
disposal, we should start re-engineering the natural world to reduce suffering overall,
thereby “turning nature into a well-managed zoo in which each animal has its own
safe enclosure and guaranteed food source” (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011, 164).
6.2.3 Paradise Engineering
To get a glimpse of this future re-engineered world, we might take a look at the work
of David Pearce, a British philosopher and co-founder of Humanity+, the interna-
tional transhumanist organization, whose purpose is the fundamental transformation
of the human condition by developing and making widely available technologies
to greatly enhance intellectual, physical, and psychological capacities, eventually
building a ‘Triple S’ civilization of Superhappiness, Superlongevity and Superintel-
ligence. Pearce’s ideas have inspired a strain of transhumanism called ‘paradise engi-
neering’, an abolitionist program to achieve nothing less than the elimination of liter-
ally all suffering on the planet. He has outlined this program in his 1995 book-length
internet manifesto The Hedonistic Imperative. In this manifesto, Pearce explains
how technologies such as genetic engineering, nanotechnology, pharmacology, and
neurosurgery could potentially converge to abolish suffering in all sentient life.
An important part of Pearce’s abolitionist program aims to limit or eliminate
predation, reducing the suffering of prey animals. He distinguishes two solutions to
the ‘barbarities’ of predation: extinction and reprogramming. The first solution is “to
use indiscriminate depot-contraception on carnivores and allow predators rapidly to
die out, managing the resultant population effects on prey species via more selective
forms of depot-contraception” (Pearce 2009, 6). The second solution concerns the
genetic ‘reprogramming’ or otherwise behavioral conversionof aggressive carnivores
into model citizens in our wildlife parks. “With suitable surveillance and computer
control, whole communities of ex-predators could be discreetly guided in the norms
of non-violent behaviour” (id., 8). Reprogramming and behavioral management can
help ensure “the civilised survival of reformed lions and their relatives for human
ecotourists to enjoy, if we so choose” (id., 10).2
2Just as David Pearce, White’s Professor of Moral Philosophy Jeff McMahan has also embraced
“the heretical conclusion that we have reason to desire the extinction of all carnivorous species”
(McMahan 2010, 7). McMahan is likewise in favor of selecting carnivorous species for extinction
and herbivorous species for survival, andwould also support using genetic modification to gradually
turn carnivorous species into herbivorous ones, “thereby fulfilling Isaiah’s prophecy” (id., 2).
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Although Pearce’s ideas about future technological developments are highly spec-
ulative, it nonetheless appears that utilitarians can no longer hide behind the argu-
ment from ignorance, but have to show their colors. They can choose to remain firmly
committed to the view that predation is inherently bad, but then they can no longer
escape from supporting some form of ‘paradise engineering’ by which nature will be
turned into a well-managed zoo. Or they can choose to avoid this predation reductio,
but then they will have to be prepared to reconsider their opinion of predation as an
evil that must be eradicated.
6.3 Rights Theories
Tom Regan’s rights-based approach to animal ethics offers a less gloomy picture
of predation and provides a more solid way to escape the predation reductio than
the utilitarian approach. Regan is also opposed to interference with nature to protect
prey animals but not because doing so would cause more suffering than it would
prevent. He argues that, although wild animals can certainly harm one another, they
cannot violate one another’s rights since, in contrast to human predators, nonhuman
predators are not moral agents, but only moral patients; they do not possess the
relevant capacities to be held morally responsible for their actions. So, we have no
duty “to assist the sheep against the attack of the wolf, since the wolf neither can nor
does violate anyone’s rights” (Regan 1983, 285). With respect to animals in the wild,
we have no positive duties of assistance but only negative duties of non-intervention
and are not allowed to confine, torture or kill them.Wildlife managers, Regan claims,
“should be principally concerned with letting animals be, keeping human predators
out of their affairs, allowing these ‘other nations’ to carve out their own destiny” (id.,
357).
Recently, Josh Milburn has convincingly given Regan’s account a much-needed
degree of nuance, arguing that the attribution of moral responsibility is not a question
of ‘either-or’ but of ‘less-or-more’. Milburn illustrates this point by the following
example. A wolf killing a deer in isolated woodland does not violate the rights of the
deer, but if the wolf’s killing of the deer had taken place in a zoo, then there is some
moral agent who is blameworthy in this situation, namely the zookeeper who placed
the deer in the wolf’s enclosure. This example shows that intervention in wildlife is
only morally warranted “in those cases in which morally responsible agents can be
found, and only to the degree that they can be found” (Milburn 2015, 288).3 Milburn
concludes that the rights of prey do not generally necessitate intervention, because
“the vast majority of predator–prey interactions are not linked to moral agents in
an important way” (ibid.). As much as I appreciate the nuance that Milburn has
introduced in animal rights theory, I don’t share this conclusion because, as I will
3In a similar veinDale Jamieson has argued thatmoral evaluation is clearly in order when “predation
is in someway affected byhuman agency, either becausewehave structured the encounter or because
the predator is under our direct or indirect control” (Jamieson 2008, 186/7).
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argue later, in this stage of the so-called ‘Anthropocene’, we humans are massively
implicated in predator-prey relationships, for better or worse.
There are two kinds of objections that have been raised against Regan’s rights-
based approach. The first kind of objections concerns the question if it is really
morally relevant whether or not perpetrators are moral agents. The second kind of
objections is no longer about the perpetrator but concerns its victim, and concerns
the question whether it makes any difference if this victim is human or non-human.
6.3.1 Lack of Moral Agency
According to Steve Sapontzis, it is totally irrelevant for our obligation to prevent
harm whether that harm is caused by a moral agent or not. He points out that we
should separate our moral judgement of an act (as right or wrong) from our moral
judgement of the actor (as innocent or culpable). Because we routinely hold parents
responsible for preventing their ‘innocent’ young child from tormenting the cat, we
also seem to have an obligation to stop the cat from killing birds (Sapontzis 1984,
27/8).4
Dale Jamieson (1990) has also criticized the way in which Regan tries to avoid
the predation reductio by limiting the duty to render assistance to those animals in
need that are the victim of moral agents, the only one’s that can commit injustices.
He illuminates the problematic character of this limitation by considering five hypo-
thetical cases, in which a man will be crushed by a falling boulder unless I warn him.
In the cases 1–3 a woman intentionally or inadvertently causes the boulder to roll
toward the man; in the cases 4 and 5 the boulder is set in motion by a wolf and a
landslide respectively. On the basis of Regan’s theory, we don’t have a duty of justice
to warn the man in the cases 4 and 5, because neither wolfs nor landslides are moral
agents and therefore cannot violate rights (see also Cowen 2003, 176). To avoid
this highly counterintuitive conclusion Jamieson argues that we should supplement
Regan’s theory with a class of nondiscretionary duties that rest on some ground other
than justice.
Regan has addressed Jamieson’s criticism in his book Defending Animal Rights
from 2001, and again, in almost identical terms, in his preface to the second edition
of The Case for Animal Rights, published in 2004. Regan dismisses Jamieson’s
objection because a careful reading of the relevant passages would reveal that he
has never maintained that we owe nothing to those in need who are not victims of
injustice. He has only insisted that we do not owe anything to such individuals on the
grounds of justice. There is nothing in the rights view, Regan contends, that prevents
it from recognizing a general prima facie duty of beneficence that includes duties of
assistance to those in need. “Thus there is nothing in my theory that would preclude
4This example is quite similar to Milburn’s example of the zookeeper who placed a deer in a wolf’s
enclosure.
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recognizing a duty to warn the hiker about the free-falling boulder” (Regan 2001,
51).
Regan has acknowledged that he is “at least partly to blame” for Jamieson’s
misreading of his texts, because he does nowhere discuss other duties of assistance
than those we have to victims of injustice, which he regards as a ‘symptom of the
incompleteness’ of the theory developed in The Case. “In hindsight, I recognize that
it would have been better had I said more about duties of assistance other than those
owed to victims of injustice.” (Regan 2004, xxvii).5
6.3.2 Non-human Victims
But adding duties of assistance that rest on some ground other than justice does
not affect Regan’s view that we have no duty to protect the sheep against the wolf.
Why Regan holds on to this non-interventionist view will become clear as we shift
the focus from predators to prey and look at the second important question raised
by Regan’s rights-based approach: whether it makes a difference if the victim is a
human or non-human animal.
This question was posed by Carl Cohen in an article from 1997, in which he
asks us to imagine two cases. In the first case a baby zebra is hunted to death by a
lioness. If zebras have a right to live, we ought to intervene, but we usually don’t
do so. In the second case the lioness is about to attack a human baby, and now we
surely will intervene to stop the lioness. So, the question is: what accounts for the
moral difference? Cohen’s answer is that “animals cannot be the bearers of rights
because the concept of rights is essentially human; it is rooted in, and has force
within, a human moral world” (Cohen 1997, 95). The baby zebra has no right not
to be slaughtered by the lioness, nor has the lioness the right to kill that baby zebra,
simply because the concept of rights does not apply to animals.
In his article The Predation Argument from 2005, Charles Fink has also discussed
the question why we should save a human life from predators but not an animal’s
life when doing so would be equally within our power, but he came to a conclusion
diametrically opposed to Cohen’s. It may be true, as Regan asserts, that wolves are
not moral agents and thus cannot violate the rights of sheep, but it does not follow,
Fink believes, that we have no obligation to assist the sheep against the attack of
the wolf, considering what our reaction would be if a human being were attacked
by a wolf. If we have a duty to protect all members of the moral community from
harm, even if this harm is not caused by moral agents, then it would certainly seem
to follow that, if sheep are members of the moral community, “there is an obligation
to protect them from wolves, whether or not wolves violate their rights” (Fink 2005,
12).
5However, as Regan has noted “most emphatically”, the duty of beneficence has serious limitations.
Notably, promoting some one’s good should never go at the expense of another one’s rights. “In
this respect, the demands of justice always take precedence over the claims of beneficence” (ibid.).
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In the preface of the second edition ofThe Case, Regan has also addressedCohen’s
critical question concerning the moral difference between the case in which a wild
animal is threatened by a predator and the case in which the predator is threatening a
human child. In his view, we have a duty to save a human child from predators but no
such duty with regard to wild animals. The crucial difference between the two cases
is that members of both predator and prey species possess a certain ‘competence’
and are capable of ‘using their natural abilities’ to survive on their own in the wild,
whereas young children do not have the same competence and are unable to survive,
in the wild or in the home, without our assistance. We honor this competence of wild
animals by just letting them be, even if their lives are threatened by predators.6
This recourse to the notion of ‘competence’ could open an avenue for a more
realistic solution of the predator problem. It allows for a more balanced view of the
predator-prey relationship, in which predator and prey are no longer seen respec-
tively as invincible and defenseless. To explore this avenue, I now turn to Martha
Nussbaum’s capabilities approach that after all centers on the idea that a creature’s
well-being is dependent on its opportunities to realize some basic natural abilities or
competences.
6.4 The Capabilities Approach
The capability approach differs from the consequentialist approach and the rights
approach in one very important respect. Nussbaum rejects the view, taken by both
these approaches, that species membership itself is of no ethical and political signif-
icance at all. Following James Rachels, Nussbaum calls this view ‘moral individu-
alism’.7 The capabilities approach, by contrast, does in fact attach moral significance
to species membership as such. It is based on a species-specific norm of flourishing,
that tells us what the appropriate benchmark is for judging whether a member of
a species has decent opportunities for flourishing. The capabilities approach has
also a strong affirmative character; it “treats animals as subjects and agents, not just
as objects of compassion” (Nussbaum 2006, 351), and commits us to support the
capabilities of all morally considerable beings, up to some minimum threshold level
specific to each species.
However, the significant conceptual gains that Nussbaumwould be able to achieve
through the introduction of the species-specific norm of flourishing in the discussion
of the predation problem are at least partly being undone by the way she compiles
6As Regan points out, that we have a prima facie duty to assist the child from the lion, does not
oblige us to develop general policies “that seek to eradicate every predatory animal under the sun”,
let alone that we should develop such policies because predatory animals harm their prey (Regan
2004, xxxvii; cf. Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011, 165).
7According to Rachels, “moral individualism is a thesis about the justification of judgments
concerning how individuals may be treated. The basic idea is that how an individual may be treated
is determined, not by considering his group memberships, but by considering his own particular
characteristics” (Rachels 1990, 173).
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a catalogue of innate or ‘basic’ capabilities relevant to animal species (Keulartz
2016a). On the one hand, Nussbaum’s account of animal capabilities seems to be
distinctly pluralist. The capabilities approach is attentive to the fact that each species
has a different form of life, and is capable of recognizing a wide range of types of
animal dignity, and of the corresponding needs for flourishing. But on the other hand,
Nussbaum suggests a one-size-fits-all approach, that has a distinctly anthropocentric
character as it applies the same human yardstick to all animal species.8 Although
she fully acknowledges that species-specific entitlements of animals are based upon
their various characteristic forms of life and flourishing, she nonetheless wants to
use the existing list of human core capabilities “to map out, in a highly tentative and
general way, some basic political principles that can guide law and public policy in
dealing with animals” (id., 392).9
6.4.1 The Other Species Capability
Nussbaum’s list of central capabilities includes Life; BodilyHealth; Bodily Integrity;
Senses, Imagination, and Thought; Emotions; Practical Reason; Affiliation; Other
Species; Play; and Control over One’s Environment. What seems most problematic,
when applied to animals, is the Other Species capability, i.e. the capability or enti-
tlement to be able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants, and the
world of nature (Cripps 2010, 8). This capability, Nussbaum suggests, “calls for the
gradual formation of an interdependent world in which all species will enjoy cooper-
ative and mutually supportive relations with one another. Nature is not that way and
never has been. So it calls, in a very general way, for the gradual supplanting of the
natural by the just” (Nussbaum 2006, 399). Due to the inclusion of the Other Species
capability in her list of central capabilities, Nussbaum’s solution to the predation
problem is highly ambivalent.
Like most animal ethicists, Nussbaum attaches moral weight to the possibility for
animals to enjoy sovereignty. She supports “the idea that species autonomy is part of
the good for nonhuman animals” (id., 375). So at first glance, she seems to endorse
the view that animals can pursue their own flourishing best when left to their own
devices, and that we have no positive duties to support their welfare, providing them
with food, shelter and healthcare. Such a “benevolent despotism” of humans over
animals might even be perceived as morally repugnant, because part of what it is to
8In Women and Human Development, Nussbaum argues that the central capabilities “are held to
have value in themselves, in making the life that includes them fully human” (emphasis added)
(2000, 74).
9In her review of StevenWise’s bookRattling the Cage, Nussbaum points to an important difference
in the ethical evaluation that is involved in preparing capabilities lists: “With the human capabilities,
we are evaluating ourselves. If we get it wrong, we are the ones who take the consequences. With
animals, we are again the ones performing the evaluation – and there is great danger that we will
get it wrong” (Nussbaum 2001, 1542/3).
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flourish for animals “is to settle certain very important matters on its own, without
human intervention, even of a benevolent sort” (id., 373).
On closer inspection, however, Nussbaum does not fully accept the view that we
have no positive duties towards animals in the wild, although she admits that there
is “much truth” in this view. The reason is that in today’s world it is hardly the case
anymore for animals to live sovereign and autonomous lives, unaffected by human
interference. The environments on which animals depend for their survival are being
increasingly disturbed or destroyed by human activity, and their opportunities for
nutrition, shelter, and free movement are in constant decline. Under these human-
caused conditions of deprivation, Nussbaum believes that we have a much greater
moral responsibility to assist wild animals’ flourishing than may at first appear.
But if non-intervention is not a plausible option, the question arises whatmeasures
should be taken to assist animals in the wild. More specifically, Nussbaum asks,
“Should humans police the animal world, protecting vulnerable animals from preda-
tors?” (id., 379). This seems absurd, Nussbaum contends, should it imply that all
vulnerable animals or, alternatively, all predators were to be put in ‘protective deten-
tion’, because this would surely do more harm than good. But, like Peter Singer,
Nussbaum believes that we should protect prey animals from predation if we can do
so without such massive, harm-producing interventions.
Another important question raised by Nussbaum concerns the introduction of
‘natural predators’ to control animal populations. As an example, she mentions the
case of the introduction ofwolves to control an overpopulation of elks, something that
took place in Yellow Stone in 1995.10 Nussbaum is opposed to such introductions
of predators. She prefers any non-violent method of population control to such a
violent method. The “painless predation” of animals through human hunting, she
argues, may be an alternative to “other deaths that elks would die, such as starving
or being torn apart by wolves” (Nussbaum 2006, 394). In an interview with Carla
Faralli, Nussbaum puts it this way:
Sometimes people think that they have done a great good thing if they make hunting illegal
and then, when the deer are reproducing too rapidly and can’t find enough to eat, they
introduce wolves to tear the deer apart. Actually, I am sure that for the deer the hunter’s gun
is better than the wolves’ jaws, more sudden and less excruciating (Nussbaum and Faralli
2007, 158)
6.4.2 Broadening the Capabilities Approach
Nussbaum’s aversion to predation is rooted in her vision of nature. She warns for
the danger “of romanticizing nature, or suggesting that things are in order as they
10With the return of the wolf the elk herd, one of the world’s largest elk herds, declined 40% in five
years. The wolves prevented elk from overbrowsing willow and aspen near rivers and streams, and
this gave rise to a substantial rebound of the beaver, a keystone species that may increase species
diversity et cetera. Recently, some doubts have been raised regarding this success story (Mech
2012).
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are, if only we humans should stop interfering” (Nussbaum 2006, 367). But she runs
the risk of falling into the other extreme, by demonizing nature.11 Following John
Stuart Mill in his essay Nature, she portrays predators as vicious criminals, merci-
less executioners and great monsters, inflicting painful torture and gruesome death
on other vulnerable and defenseless creatures. Consequently, Nussbaum maintains
that the harm-causing capabilities of predators “are not among those that should be
protected by political and social principles” (id., 369). And she also seems to ignore
or seriously underestimate the prey animal’s natural abilities to evade predators. So,
contrary to our initial expectation, Nussbaum’s capabilities approach seems far from
offering the prospect of a more balanced view of the predator-prey relationship.
However, Nussbaum’s version of the capabilities approach is not uncontested;
some authors, such as Breena Holland and David Schlosberg, have proposed to
re-shape this version because it suffers from a too narrow view of the capabilities
necessary for the nonhuman world to function and flourish. Although Nussbaum’s
approach, by contrast to most other approaches to animal ethics, does attach ethical
and political significance to species membership as such, it nonetheless adheres to
a liberal individualist framework. Schlosberg notably has argued that the capabili-
ties approach should be broadened to include not only individual animals but also
entire species and ecosystems. Such broadening allows us to evaluate the predation
problem in a wide ecological context. It sheds new light on the question what it
means to flourish as a prey animal: “We need to understand and accept that part of
the flourishing of animals is to be the protein for other life forms…To be food for
others is the essence of functioning for some beings” (Schlosberg 2007, 151).
Elizabeth Cripps has questioned whether Schlosberg’s solution of the predator
problem is convincing. Because, even if prey animals as a species benefit from
performing the function to be food for other species, it is far from obvious that
individual prey animals themselves will flourish when killed for food. To say that
it is part of an individual prey animal to be food for another species, “overlooks
precisely the concern for the capacity of individual animal lives to go better or worse
that Nussbaum wants to recognize” (Cripps 2010, 10; cf. Hailwood 2012).
Cripps suggests that it might be possible to reinvigorate Schlosberg’s attempt
to make flourishing as a species, which often requires predation, compatible with
flourishing as an individual by introducing the notion of ‘risk’. As an example to
illustrate what she means, Cripps refers to a proposal by a group of scientists to
introduce the Old World cheetah as ecological replacement for the extinct American
cheetah. This cat has played a crucial role in shaping the astounding speed of the
pronghorn antelope, among other traits such as visual acuity. In the absence of this
predator, “the pronghorn appears overbuilt today in precisely those traits that make
it so distinctive among North American mammals, raising the question of whether
a reconstitution of Pleistocene selective pressures warrants consideration” (Donlan
11Val Plumwood, who has profoundly reflected on the meaning of her experience of being crocodile
prey after surviving a crocodile attack in February 1985 in Australia’s Kakadu National Park, more
or less mockingly remarked that “Predation is often demonised as bringing unnecessary pain and
suffering to an otherwise peaceful vegan world of female gathering” (Plumwood 2012, 84).
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et al. 2006, 662).According toCripps, this could indicate that, due to lack of cheetahs,
the pronghorn cannot flourish fully because it has no incentive to make full use of
its remarkable abilities. “Thus, quite apart from the benefit to the species, it might
be in the individual pronghorn’s interest to run a risk of being killed by a cheetah”
(Cripps 2010, 17).
As we will see in the next section, with this suggestion Cripps anticipates, as it
were, the solution to the predation problem that Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka
have presented in their seminal 2011 book Zoopolis.
6.5 Political Theory of Animal Rights
Donaldson and Kymlicka have developed their political theory of animal rights as an
alternative to the traditional animal rights theory. Due to its one-sided focus on the
intrinsic moral status or standing of animals as the sole basis of our moral obligations
towards them, the traditional animal rights theory seems unable to resolve a wide
range of pressing issues regarding human-animal interactions, and is thereby at least
partly to blame for what Donaldson and Kymlicka perceive as the political and
intellectual impasse of the animal advocacy movement. To overcome this impasse,
they have made an attempt to shift the debate from the field of moral theory to the
field of political theory, focusing on the differential obligations that arise from the
varied ways that animals are related to human societies and institutions.
In Zoopolis, Donaldson and Kymlicka draw upon the concepts and categories of
political theory to illuminate the specific rights and responsibilities we have in our
various relationshipswith animals. Theydistinguish three types ofmorally significant
human-animal relationships: domesticated animals, such as companion animals and
farm animals, should be considered and treated as our co-citizens; wild animals
should be recognized asmembers of separate, sovereign nations, entitled to protection
from infringements of their right to self-determination; and, lastly, “liminal” animals,
i.e., non-domesticated animals such as rats and raccoons who live among humans,
should be designated the status of “denizens”.12
6.5.1 Similarities and Dissimilarities with the Capabilities
Approach
Donaldson and Kymlicka concede that they are sympathetic to Nussbaum’s capabil-
ities approach, and that, at the most abstract level, their own citizenship model could
be described in broadly capability terms (2011, 95, 275). Like Nussbaum, they treat
12The group of liminal animals include opportunistic animals, agricultural symbiotics (or niche
specialists), feral animals and introduced exotics (see Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011, 219–226).
6 Should the Lion Eat Straw Like the Ox? … 113
animals not just as passive victims of human domination andmere objects of compas-
sion but rather as subjects with a clear capacity for agency. And like Nussbaum, they
consequently also challenge the one-sided focus of most accounts of animal ethics
on negative rights—“thou shall not kill, use, or keep animals” (id., 254). It is the
dominant view within animal ethics that the abolishment of animal exploitation and
the liberation of animals from enslavement will ultimately rule out virtually all forms
of human-animal interaction—“there should be no human-animal relations” (ibid.).
According to Donaldson and Kymlicka, this narrow vision of animal rights is at the
root of the impasse of the animal advocacy movement because it may discourage all
efforts to find out what non-exploitative relations might look like, and what kind of
positive obligations we owe to animals, be they domesticated, wild or liminal.
So there are important similarities betweenNussbaum’s capabilities approach and
Donaldson and Kymlicka’s political theory of animal rights: both consider animals
as moral agents rather than as moral patients, and both aim to complement negative
rights with positive rights. But there is also a distinct difference: Nussbaum attaches
considerable importance to species membership, whereas Donaldson and Kymlicka
focus on community membership, thus taking account of the sociopolitical context
of animal justice. They acknowledge that Nussbaum’s species norm of flourishing
is probably a reasonable standard for animals living in the wild, but they deny that
this norm makes sense with respect to domesticated and liminal animals. Another
drawback of the preoccupation with species norms is a lack of sensitivity to the
associations between species and individual variation within species.
6.5.2 Competence and Risk
According to Donaldson and Kymlicka, the argument that the flourishing of wild
animals would be undermined by interfering with wildlife to prevent predation is
“perhaps the most important one, but also the least developed” (2011, 165). This
“flourishing argument”, as they call it, needs qualification and clarification. Similar
to Cripps’ critique of Schlosberg, they argue that it is difficult to see how preventing
a deer from being killed by a predator is detrimental to her flourishing. And just like
Cripps they invoke the notion of ‘risk’ to address this question. For societies with
an interest in self-determination, eliminating the risk of harm or suffering “would
involve a terrible curtailment of freedom, including the freedom to fully develop and
explore one’s capabilities. Individual action to protect a human child at the moment
of harm contributes to her flourishing; collective action to prohibit the actions or
processes that create the risk of harm is likely to undermine human flourishing. So,
too, with animals” (id, 166).
Donaldson and Kymlicka believe that, when it comes to the daily management
of the risks of living in the wild, it is reasonable to assume that wild animals are
fully competent in general to address the challenges they face: they have the skills
to secure and store food, to find or construct shelter, to care for the young, to cover
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long distances, to hunt, and also to reduce the risk of predation.13 Because wild
animals are competent to manage their own affairs, we are not obligated to system-
atically intervene to end predation or to control natural food cycles. Respect for the
sovereignty of wild animals, in fact, rules out this kind of intervention as it would
condemn wild animals to a permanent state of dependency.14
6.5.3 Positive and Negative Duties
It would, however, be a mistake to think that respect for sovereignty requires a
complete hands-off approach with respect to animals in the wild. Donaldson and
Kymlicka mention two broad categories of assistance and intervention that do not
threaten but may even promote values of autonomy and self-determination: large-
scale interventions to prevent or mitigate natural or human-caused disasters, such as
deflecting a large meteor on a collision course with a wilderness zone populated by
numerous animals, or halting an aggressive new bacterium which is ready to invade
and destroy an ecosystem; and small-scale or micro-scale interventions aimed to aid
or rescue individual animals in distress, such as saving an animal who has fallen
through the ice from drowning or releasing a beached whale to open water.
In addition to these positive duties to aid, assistance, and intervention, there are
also important negative duties that derive from the respect for sovereignty we owe
animals in the wild. We should never infringe on the rights to their own territory
and to autonomy on that territory, which are key components of the principle of
sovereignty. These rights impose, first of all, immediate and drastic restrictions on
human expansion into wild animal territories and the ongoing fragmentation and
destruction of wild animal habitat. They also impose stringent limits on human
actions that have harmful impacts beyond the borders of wild animal territories, such
as water contamination, air pollution and the various effects of climate change. To
avoid such cross-border impacts we will have to reduce our ecological footprint and
replace our environmentally destructive behavior and cost-externalizing practices
with fair and sustainable ones.
13Ethological and ecological research shows that prey species have gained over evolutionary time a
stunning array of mechanisms to cope with predators for every stage of their struggle: the avoidance
of detection by the predator (such as camouflage, refuge use, nocturnality), the avoidance of attack
once detected (mimicking animals with strong defenses, signaling to the predator that pursuit is not
worthwhile), the avoidance of capture once attacked (fleeing, bluffing strength), and the avoidance
of consumption once captured (playing death or ‘thanatosis’, sacrificing body parts or ‘autotomy’).
14Donaldson and Kymlicka admit that their competence argument is more compelling in relation
to some animals than to others. In fact, they agree with Horta (2013) that members of r-selected
species have less scope for ‘competent agency’ thanmembers of K-selected species. But on balance,
they believe that “we should still respect the sovereignty of wild animals, including those for whom
there is minimal evidence of competent agency” (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011, 177; cf. 2013,
154).
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6.5.4 The Limits of a Place-Based Approach
Donaldson and Kymlicka contrast their sovereignty model with the ‘stewardship’
model, often found in environmental science, philosophy and policy. In this model,
habitat for wild animals is created in the shape of wild areas such as wildlife refuges,
nature reserves, and national parks, where humans enjoy sovereign authority and
exercise stewardship over wild animals. The sovereignty model, on the other hand,
doesn’t grant humans the right to govern wild animal territory, but is based on the
principle that sovereign entities are entitled to the same or similar claims to authority,
and should dealwith each other on an equal footing. Thismeans thatwhenwe humans
enter wild animal territory, “we do so not in the role of stewards and managers, but
as visitors to foreign lands” (id., 170).
Both models, however, have one thing in common—like the classical stewardship
model, the sovereignty model has taken a place-based approach with regard to wild
animals. Donaldson and Kymlicka argue for an immediate check on the expansion of
human settlement, for giving wild animals back control over their own territories, for
returning vast areas of land currently devoted to animal agriculture to wild animals,
for re-establishing wildlife corridors andmigration routes et cetera. But such a place-
based approach seems to fall far short of what presently is really required to maintain
or restore wild animals’ autonomy (Sandler 2012).
Hitherto, place-based or in situ conservation is usually given priority over ‘out
of place’ or ex situ conservation. The latter is considered to be justified only as a
supportive measure to the former. This hierarchical understanding of the relation-
ship between in situ and ex situ conservation reflects the importance of the place of
origin—‘wild nature’ (Braverman 2015, 33). This understanding is however increas-
ingly being called into question given today’s ecological challenges that can be
summarized under the denominator of the ‘Anthropocene’, the current geological
epoch in which human activities are so profound and pervasive that humanity itself
has emerged as a global geophysical force, at least as important as natural forces
(Keulartz and Bovenkerk 2016).
6.5.5 Blurring Boundaries
Under Anthropocenic conditions many wild populations are no longer viable on
their own. Mainly due to habitat fragmentation and habitat loss, there is an ongoing
conversion of what originally were continuous populations to so-called ‘metapopu-
lations’: collections of subpopulations, that are spread geographically over patches
of habitat. Because these patches are usually small and because the movement of the
animals between these patches is restricted for lack of connectivity, an increasing
number of subpopulations are declining and are teetering on the edge of extinction.
In this situation ex situ conservation has a more prominent role to play and is now
regarded as equivalent, rather than subordinate to in situ conservation.
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Because it is no longer considered effective to manage wild and captive popula-
tions in isolation from one another, practitioners of species conservation therefore
increasingly use the so-called One Plan Approach that was officially proposed to the
IUCNWorld Conservation Congress in 2012. The One Plan Approach promotes the
interactive exchange of animals between in situ populations (in the wild) and ex situ
populations (in captivity) for mutual reinforcement, a management approach that is
also referred to as inter situ conservation (Braverman 2014) or pan situ conservation
(Minteer and Collins 2013). With animals moving in both directions, the stability
and sustainability of wild and captive populations can be greatly enhanced. On the
one hand, captive populations can be used for restocking in areas with declining
populations or for reintroduction in areas where populations have gone extinct; on
the other hand, the demographic and genetic viability of ex situ populations can be
boosted by supplying genetic founders from wildlife populations (Byers et al. 2013).
With the One Plan Approach captive populations can be used for the conservation
of in situ populations on the brink of extinction as a result of habitat fragmentation.
But what if in situ conservation itself is being undermined by that other major envi-
ronmental stressor—rapid global climate change—, that makes the species’ historic
indigenous ranges increasingly inhospitable? And when, moreover, populations are
not able to move on their own to other areas with more suitable environmental condi-
tions? A conservation measure that may prevent species that are unable to keep pace
with rapid climate change from going extinct is assisted migration or assisted colo-
nization, i.e. the intentional movement of ‘climate refugees’ to new habitats outside
their historical range, which they otherwise could not reach (Hoegh-Guldberg et al.
2008). Whereas inter or pan situ conservation involves the movement of animals
from one location to another within the species’ indigenous range, assisted migra-
tion or colonization relates to animal translocations outside the species’ indigenous
range.15
The emergence of these new conservation strategiesmakes it clear that the distinc-
tion between classic in situ (on-site) and ex situ (off-site) conservation is becoming
blurred to the point of disappearing entirely. We witness what Braverman (2015, 15)
has called a shift “from bifurcation to amalgamation” of in situ and ex situ conser-
vation: the increased development of hybrid approaches, that integrate the wild and
the captive. (Pritchard et al. 2011; Redford et al. 2012; 2013; Minteer et al. 2016).
It is clear that with the ongoing blurring of the boundaries between in situ and
ex situ conservation, placed-based models such as the classic stewardship model
but also Donaldson and Kymlicka’s sovereignty model, are increasingly rendered
meaningless. Under Anthropocenic conditions positive interventions can no longer
be limited to providing assistance in the event of natural or human-caused disasters,
or to micro-level individual acts of compassion only. Apart from these isolated,
incidental cases, Donaldson and Kymlicka believe that we should leave nature to its
own devices—“in general, a hands-off principle towardswild animals is a sound one”
15“The indigenous range of a species is the known or inferred distribution generated from historical
(written or verbal) records, or physical evidence of the species’ occurrence” (IUNC/SSC 2013, 2).
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(2011, 185). But that ship seems to have sailed already.16 Ironically or not, but today
we are morally obligated to systematically interfere with wildlife, not to prevent
predation, as consequentialists in particular would have it, but to assist endangered
species in maintaining and improving their competences to survive on their own in
the wild, including the skills to hunt and to avoid predators, something which is
already taking place on the ground.
6.5.6 Learning to Hunt and to Avoid Predators
Especially zoo-based expertise in sustaining small but demographically and genet-
ically sound populations of captive animals has been proven useful for the conser-
vation of small and declining populations in the wild. Zoo-based skills in animal
handling may, moreover, be helpful at many of the main stages of animal transloca-
tions, from capture, transport, and captive breeding, to pre-release training (Fa et al.
2011, 210). The latter is particularly important because captive animals may lack the
behavioral competences needed for survival in the wild, and may thus compromise
the ability of captive populations to contribute to the recovery of wild populations.
Pre-release training is aimed at maintaining or developing the skills that may have
been lost in captivity such as orientation and navigation, finding or building suitable
nest sites, hunting and foraging behavior, and predator avoidance (Earnhardt 2010;
McPhee and Carlstead 2010).
Predator avoidance training is vital to the success of conservation efforts that rely
on captive animals because a substantial number of post-release deaths are due to
predators. It usually consists of exposure to live predators or to predator models
paired with some aversive or stressful stimulus such as an alarm signal. Given that
many animals are so-called ‘mesopredators’, i.e. animals which both predate and
are predated upon, antipredator training has often to be combined with developing
predatory skills. A case in point is the black-footed ferret.
In 1986, the population of ferrets had diminished to a mere 18 individuals, but
thanks to a captive breeding program, between 500 and 800 now roam the prairie
of the US state of Wyoming. The program was not, however, entirely plain sailing.
When the kits were released they were far too blasé to make themselves scarce when
predators such as eagles, coyotes and badgers arrived on the scene. The researchers
tried to resolve this problem by building a mock predator. They attached wheels to
a stuffed badger, which would win fame as RoboBadger. The only way the ferrets
could escape RoboBadger was to find a burrow. The researchers then tried to increase
16Donaldson and Kymlicka grossly underestimate the impact of anthropogenic environmental
change, that currently takes place at such a fast speed and large scale that it definitely poses a
threat to the resilience of the Earth System (Steffen et al. 2007, 2011). They denounce the “fash-
ionable talk” of the Anthropocene, that has had “the perverse effect of making continued human
encroachment on, and management of, wild animal habitat seem inevitable” (Donald and Kymlicka
2016).
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the ferrets’ aversion to RoboBadger by firing rubber bands at them. (McCarthy 2004,
196/7).17
But the ferrets have not only to learn how to avoid predators, but also how to
locate and kill prairie dogs which make up between 65 to 90 percent of their diet. In
addition, they have to learn how to invade and inhabit prairie dogs burrows because
they do not build their own burrows. Their preconditioning period lasts for 30 days.
During that time the ferrets ideally kill four prairie dogs and live in an actual prairie
dog burrow system. The survival rate of these animals is about ten times higher than
animals released straight out of the cage (Braverman 2015, 119–123).
6.6 Concluding Remarks
Donaldson and Kymlicka rightly argue that wild animals are fully competent to
manage their own affairs, and that we therefore should refrain from protecting prey
animals against predation. Without predation, prey animal’s possibilities for flour-
ishing will be diminished, because all the amazing capabilities they have gained
over evolutionary time to cope with predators might be rendered meaningless. All
in all, we can safely conclude that it is counterproductive to extent Nussbaum’s
Other Species capability to the animal kingdom. Instead of working to ensure that all
species will enjoy cooperative and mutually supportive relations, we should respect
the natural capabilities of animals, be they predator or prey, without romanticizing
or demonizing their agonistic interactions.
But their place-based sovereignty model is inadequate in the light of what has
been called the planet’s ‘sixth mass extinction’. Unlike earlier mass extinctions, the
current one is not primarily driven by natural events such as meteorite impacts or
volcanic eruptions but by the effects of the activities of Homo sapiens. Especially
human-caused rapid climate change together with habitat conversion, fragmentation,
and destruction have led to a global wave of species and population extirpations and
declines in local species abundance.18
If we really want to stop or even reverse this so-called ‘defaunation’ process we
can no longer hold on to the idea that species conservation can be accomplished
with minimal management by establishing large nature reserves and by creating
connections such as corridors and stepping stones between them. Preserving the
ecological status quo through such traditional measures increasingly resembles a
Sisyphean task. In situ conservation (in the wild) is no longer effective without ex
situ conservation (in zoos and aquariums).
17This was, by the way, not a great success as became clear when the ferrets started riding on the
back of RoboBadger.
18Surprisingly enough, nowhere in Zoopolis do Donaldson and Kymlicka even mention the stag-
gering decline in species numbers; they use the notion of ‘extinction’ only in relation to those
proposals from animal rights theorists who call for a complete end to domestication and the
extinction of domesticated species.
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Donaldson and Kymlicka condemn capturing animals and putting them in zoos,
even in the most progressive zoos, as “a violation of their basic individual rights, and
a violation of their rights asmembers of sovereign communities” (2011, 283, cf. 293).
Such condemnation only shows how blind they are to the important role that zoos
and other ex situ institutions have to play under current conditions of anthropogenic
stress (see Keulartz 2016b).
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Ronald Sandler and John Basl
Abstract Acore question in practical ethics is ‘which entities dowe need to consider
in our decision-making?’ In this chapterwe evaluate the justifications andmotivations
for defending species-membership views of human moral status. These are views
on which human beings have a distinctive type of moral status grounded in their
being human or possessing some property that almost perfectly correlates with being
human. Many ethicists endorse species-membership views on moral status because
they believe that moral status differences are needed to support widely held and
purportedly well-justified beliefs about species differentiation in consideration and
treatment. We argue against the need to adopt a species-membership or human-
privilege view on moral status in order to justify species partiality in consideration
and treatment. The sort of partiality with respect to consideration and treatment
that motivates species-membership views is largely consistent with more egalitarian
views about moral status, according to which an entity’s moral status depends on
its own features, not the biological group to which it belongs. Given the traditional
objections to species-membership views, to the extent that justified species partiality
is consistent with alternative views of moral status, there is reason to reject the moral
status significance of being human.
7.1 Introduction
A core questions in practical ethics—in trying to figure out what we ought to do
in a situation—is ‘which entities do we need to consider in our decision-making?’
If we need to take nonhuman animals into consideration, for example, there are
implications for everything from what we ought to eat to whether we ought to have
pets (and if so, which ones). In ethical theory this question is often referred to as the
question of moral status. If something has moral status, then it needs to be taken into
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consideration regarding actions, practices, and policies that could impact it. So, if
we want a theory that accurately depicts the ethically relevant features of the world,
then we need to determine which entities have moral status as well as the properties
in virtue of which they have it.
In this chapter we evaluate both the justifications and motivations for defending
species-membership views of human moral status. These are views on which human
beings have a distinctive type of moral status that is grounded in their being human
or possessing some property that almost perfectly correlates with being human, such
as having the biological basis for moral agency. Species-membership views have
been challenged by animal and environmental ethicists as being unsupported, ad
hoc, arbitrary, and speciesist—i.e. unjustifiably biased against nonhumans. However,
species-membership views persist, especially in the bioethics and disability ethics
literatures. Part of what motivates species-membership views is that the criteria or
principles that guide ethical treatment of humans and nonhuman animals varywidely.
For example, standards and protocols for conducting research on human subjects are
quite different from those for conducting research on nonhuman animals. Many
ethicists endorse species-membership views on moral status because they believe
that moral status differences are needed to support widely held and purportedly
well-justified beliefs about species differentiation in consideration and treatment.
In this paper we argue against the need to adopt a species-membership or human-
privilege view on moral status in order to justify (contextual) species partiality in
consideration and treatment. The sort of partiality with respect to consideration and
treatment that motivates species-membership views is largely consistent with more
egalitarian views about moral status. We discuss several strategies for justifying
favorable consideration and treatment of humans over non-human animals—justified
species partiality—that do not depend on species-membership or some proxy to
ground a distinctive type of moral status. Given the traditional objections to species-
membership views, to the extent that justified species partiality is consistent with
alternative views ofmoral status, there is reason to reject themoral status significance
of being human.
Here, then, is a summary of our core argument:
1. One of the primarymotivations for speciesmembership accounts of humanmoral
status is the need to justify differential consideration and treatment between
humans and nonhuman animals.
2. If differential consideration and treatment can be justified on other (i.e. non-
species-membership) accounts of human moral status, then this motivation for
species membership accounts of human moral status is undermined.
3. Differential consideration and treatment between humans and nonhuman animals
can be justified on other accounts of human moral status (e.g. species-egalitarian
accounts).
4. Therefore, this primary motivation for species membership accounts of human
moral status is undermined.
We begin by reviewing the debate over species-membership views, with an emphasis
on recent work by disability ethicists critical of species-egalitarian views on moral
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status. The aim is not to evaluate the legitimacy of the concerns or the validity of
the arguments, but to identify their motivations for supporting a species-membership
approach to human moral status. We then discuss three strategies for grounding
justified species partiality that do not depend on giving special moral significance
to species boundaries. One strategy is to show that a highly egalitarian view of
moral status and pluralistic conception of moral considerability can support justified
partiality. A second strategy is to show that there can be grounds for species partiality
within law and policy even if humans and nonhuman animals have equalmoral status.
A third strategy is to show that the fact that we are in a better epistemic position
with respect to understanding human interests than non-human interests justifies
considering them differently in some contexts.
These strategies are not mutually exclusive or collectively exhaustive. Partiality
can be justified in different contexts for entirely different reasons, though there are
limits to the amount, forms, and situations in which species partiality is justified. To
the extent that these strategies, and potentially others as well, can support justified
(though not unlimited) species partiality, the case for adopting a species-membership
view of moral status is undermined. Furthermore, they provide those that are moti-
vated to justify species partiality with new avenues to defend their view, changing
the landscape of debates over these issues in, hopefully, productive ways.
7.2 Species-Membership Views of Moral Status
Biological group membership views of moral status are those on which the moral
status of an individual is explained at least in part or in some cases entirely by its
biological features and/or relationships. The view that human beings have a special,
unique or differential moral status (or dignity) is a biological group membership
account of moral status. It asserts either that (1) being a member of the species
homo sapiens is itself morally significant (and explains why members of the species
have greater worth or are due greater/special consideration), or (2) that the species
boundary accurately tracks something that is morally significant (and explains
why members of the species have greater moral worth or are due greater/special
consideration).
The primary argument against species membership views of moral status is that
they are arbitrary and question begging, and that as a result they either unjustifiably
exclude individuals from the scope of ethical concern or else unjustifiably reduce
the amount of concern due to them (Singer 1989, 1975; Taylor 1986; McMahan
2005, 2008; Rachels 1999). The answer to “why should only humans be regarded as
havingmoral status?” or “why do humans have a special or unique status?” cannot be
“because they are human” (Singer 1989;McMahan 2005, 2008). But it is exceedingly
difficult to provide any other justification. The reason for this is that Homo sapiens
species boundaries do not track anything ethically significant—for example, moral
agency, autonomy, language, types (or range) of interests, or ability to participate
in social relationships. Some human beings are moral agents, highly autonomous,
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capable of reciprocal concern, and able to participate in complex cooperative arrange-
ments, but not all are. Moreover, some individuals of some nonhuman species—for
example, orangutans and dolphins—are as capable of these as are some humans.
Similarly, some nonhuman animals have equal or greater psychological capacities
in some respects than do some humans, and so have equally or more complex and
diverse interests.
Proponents of the greater moral status of all humans might argue that the fact that
all healthy or “species-typical” members ofHomo sapiens have comparable interests
and capacities—e.g. moral agency—justifies treating membership in the species as
morally special. However, why should co-membership in a group confer the moral
status associatedwith somemembers of the group to allmembers, even those that lack
the relevant capacities?There are a lot of possible biological groups—e.g. vertebrates,
eukaryotes, andmammals.Why shouldwe prioritize one grouping over anotherwhen
determining moral status? To privilege one biological grouping over others seems
arbitrary and question begging. In response, proponents of the moral relevance of the
Homo sapiens species boundary sometimes appeal to conspecificity (Kittay 2005,
2017). It is not that the species boundary ofHomo sapiens is itself morally significant
or marks something morally significant. It is the fact that it is our species. But this
response also begs the question. We are part of a lot of possible biological groups—
e.g. mammals, vertebrates, and eukaryotes. Why is co-membership in one biological
grouping privileged over all the others in moral status determinations, particularly
when that grouping does not track anything that is ethically significant, such as
interests or capacities? If we found out that what we currently think of as Homo
sapiens were really two distinct species with indistinguishable capacities—Homo
napiens and Homo mapiens—we would not have any new reason not to consider the
individuals of the other species. Or, at least, no non-question begging and arbitrary
one, since the distinction would not track anything other than one among many
possible (and often imperfect) biological groupings.
The alternative to a biological grouping account of moral status is an individualist
and capacities-based account. According to such accounts, what matters to whether
and howwe should consider something’s interests iswhat the individual is capable of,
what its interests are, how it can be harmed and benefited, and the relationships that it
can have—i.e. its capacities (McMahan 2002, 2005, 2008; Singer 1975, 1989; Regan
1983, 1985; DeGrazia 1996, 2007, 2014; Rachels 1999; Taylor 1986; Sandler 2013).
What these views share, qua individualist capacities basedview, is that: (1) ascriptions
of moral status difference must be explained (in the sense of being justified); (2) they
can only be adequately justified by appeal to something about the entities themselves;
and (3) the only thing about the entities themselves that could justify a moral status
difference is their having differential capacities and interests—e.g. whether they are
moral agents, can have positive and negative experiences, can be benefited or harmed,
can participate in certain types of relationships, or can set their own ends.
Individualist capacities-based views of moral status have come in for criticism
in recent years from some ethicists working in disability ethics because the views
deny that all human beings necessarily (or qua human being) have equal moral
status greater than that of all nonhuman animals. They believe that the views thereby
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allow that some people—e.g. thosewith permanent and severe cognitive impairments
(hereafter PSCI)—could have less moral status (or be due lesser consideration) than
other people, and some psychologically complex nonhuman animals could have the
same or even greater moral status (or be due greater consideration) than some people
with PSCIs (Kittay 2017; Carlson 2009; Curtis and Vehmas 2016; Jaworska and
Tannenbaum 2014). This is troubling to disability ethicists for several reasons. (As
discussed above, our purpose here is not to assess either (1) whether capacities based
views actually have the implication that some human beings could have lesser worth
or be due less consideration than other human beings or some nonhumans, or (2)
whether the concerns below are warranted if they do have that implication. Our aim is
to establish the first premise in our overarching argument, which is that the belief that
capacities-based views have these implications and give rise to these concerns are
a primary motivation for proponents of species-membership approaches to human
moral status.)
One reason that it is seen as troubling is that it is offensive to assert that someone’s
child or loved-one are not due full and equal respect because of their impairments or
condition, as well as to compare them to (sometimes unfavorably or as having less
status or being due less consideration than) dogs and pigs (Kittay 2005).
Another is that it is problematic to hold that the presumption against harming or
exploiting someone is weaker because they are more vulnerable, more dependent,
due to their condition or disability. This seems to have things backward. Those who
are dependent are due greater protection, not less. We have special responsibilities to
consider their interests and needs, precisely because of their vulnerabilities. There-
fore, any account of moral status on which people with PSCIs have less presumption
against harm and exploitation is seen as problematic.
A third concern is that giving up the idea that all humanbeings have the samemoral
status is likely to lead to further exclusions and mistreatment. As Eva Kittay (2017,
31) puts it, “The claim that humans are not equal threatens to plunge us backward.
The idea that ‘all men were created equal’ was hard won and it has taken centuries
to make all ‘men’ include women, racial, ethnic, and sexual minorities, and people
with disabilities. To claim that any humans are of unequal value is to let the camel’s
nose inside the tent. The Nazi’s first victims were those with mental disabilities.”
A fourth concern is to do with the empirical inadequacy of comparisons between
people with PSCIs and psychologically complex nonhuman animals, and the ways in
which those inaccurate comparisons are pernicious. The lives, emotions, preferences,
perspectives and abilities of people with PSCIs are various and nothing like those of
pigs and apes. As Kittay (2017, 25) puts it: “Respectable contemporary philosophers
have, for instance, spoken of the radically or severely mentally impaired as unable
to recognize familiar people in their lives, as having cognitive abilities comparable
to those of a dog, as always remaining at the mental age of an infant, although it is
often unclear whether they are speaking of actual people or a hypothetical case.”
Kittay has been particularly critical of theway inwhich “marginal cases”—human
beings who lack the “full set” of cognitive capacities of healthy adult humans—have
been used in arguments for elevating the moral status of nonhuman animals. When
animal ethicists engage in “leveling by intrinsic properties” (Kittay 2017), they are
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not only elevating nonhumans, in her view they are often diminishing themoral status
of people with PSCIs “to the level of the raised status of those nonhuman animals
possessing such putatively comparable intrinsic properties” (Kittay 2017, 30).
Perhaps themost influential positive argument in support of the view that all human
beings have equal and full moral status, without respect to their individual capacities,
is a reductio ad absurdum from cases. Proponents offer a range of intuitively objec-
tionable, or downright repulsive things, that they believe would be permitted to do to
peoplewith PSCIs if one accepts the individualist and capacities based approach—for
example, that it would be permissible to sacrifice them for their organs, do invasive
and harmful experiments on them, or euthanize them if resources could be better
used elsewhere. If people with PSCIs lack full moral status because of their different
capacities, they either do not have as great of protections against these sorts of things
or their interests are not weighed as heavily as non-impaired people (and nonhumans
with full status). Therefore, to avoid these unacceptable implications, it is necessary
to locate people with PSCIs in the category of entities with full and equal status. On
their view, this means rejecting the view that individual capacities are fully deter-
minative of moral status, and it leads theorists to try to bring species membership
back into the moral status picture (Grau 2010; Kittay 2005, 2017; Curtis and Vehmas
2016; Rothhaar 2019; Kipke 2019).
For example, Grau (2010, 2016) suggests that intuitions about such cases and that
all humans have full moral status are sufficient to motivate the ‘speciesist’ option.
Curtis and Vehmas (2016) argue that confidence in the belief that all human beings
have equal moral status greater than that of all nonhumans is itself sufficient to
warrant belief. And that this is so even in the absence of a positive argument for the
view and the absence of counterarguments against views (such as capacities based
individualism) that entail that the equal and greater moral status view is false. Kittay
(2005, 2017) argues that there are relationships we can enter into with members of
our own species and not members of other species (2005), and that “We have moral
obligations to other human beings for the simple reason that we find ourselves in
relation to them.Wecannot be the sorts of creatures we are except by being in relation
to other human beings” (2017, 36, emphasis original).
But none of these is satisfactory. They amount to just asserting that a view is
warranted or else are based on false differences. For example, we cannot be the sorts
of creatures we are except by being in relation to a lot of other things, nonhumans
included. We can enter into many of the sorts of (nonbiological) relationships with
individuals of other species that Kittay highlights as being so important and valu-
able among humans, including people with PSCIs (Townley 2010). As a result, the
discourse seems to be at something of an impasse. On the one hand, there are what
seem to be strong philosophical arguments in favor of individualist capacities-based
views of moral status and against group membership views. On the other hand, there
are strong concerns about the ways in which those views have been developed and
presented, as well as about some of their implications.
Both animal ethicists and disability ethicists have the aim of expanding our moral
horizons beyond (and removing the prejudices in our ethical theories in favor of)
“paradigm” moral subjects—i.e. healthy adult humans. Is it possible to hold that
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species membership is not a morally relevant property and accept an individualist
capacities based approach to moral status—thereby bringing nonhumans more fully
into the domain of ethical concern—without giving rise to the worries about the
marginalization of and implications for people with PSCIs? That is to ask, is it
possible to defend a view of justified species partiality even given moral status
egalitarianism? In what follows we argue that it is possible.
7.3 Strategy One: Moral Status Equality and Moral
Considerability Diversity
One concern raised by disability ethicists against proponents of leveling moral status
by intrinsic properties (or capacities) is that the strategy is empirically inadequate. It
fails to recognize how very different are the capacities, interests, desires, perspectives
and lives of people with PSCIs and those of nonhuman animals like dogs, pigs and
dolphins, which are themselves very different from each other. They do not seem
comparable or “like” in the ways that leveling arguments suppose. Another concern
is that the focus on intrinsic properties as the basis for moral status excludes other
important ethical considerations, such as familial and care relationships (Kittay 2005,
2017; Francis and Norman 1978; Gunnarsson 2008).
Emphasizing the moral significance of relationships and the moral importance
of attending to difference have strong analogs in environmental and animal ethics.
The core idea is that moral considerability is underdetermined by an entity’s capac-
ities. To take an example from Clare Palmer (2010), compare a pet dog and a wild
coyote. They have similar cognitive capacities. However, how one should consider
their interests is very differently. There is a responsibility to promote the interests of
our own pets—to feed them and give themmedical care—that we do not have to wild
animals. The reason is not that they have different interests (though they sometimes
do). It is because there is a history of dependency, shared experiences and emotional
engagement with one’s pet. Wild animals, in contrast, should not be harmed unnec-
essarily, but there is not a positive responsibility of beneficence to them. On many
environmental ethics, trying to help wild animals is even prima facie ethically prob-
lematic (Taylor 1986; Palmer 2010; Sandler 2007; Everett 2001). The reason for this
is that it fails to appreciate the significance of their wildness and their relationships
within ecological systems. If this is right, then the capacities a nonhuman animal has
might tell us something about their moral status, but there is a lot that it does not tell
us, particularly regarding consideration and treatment.
The same is truewith respect to themoral considerability of human beings. Capac-
ities based accounts of moral status might convey some information about consid-
eration, but it is not the whole or even most important part of the story. Familial
relationship, being part of a community, having a shared history, being in a partic-
ular role/position, and forms of dependency and vulnerability are, amongmany other
things, also crucial to consideration and treatment (Hursthouse 2006). To be clear, the
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claim here is not that relationships and contextual factors change an entity’s moral
status. The view is that they change how we ought to consider and respond to entities
with moral status. The fact that a parent’s child is their child is an ethically relevant
property. It justifies relating to her in ways, taking responsibility in ways, prioritizing
her in ways, and being emotionally invested in her wellbeing in ways that it would
not be appropriate for them to do with other children or for other adults to do with
their child (Williams 2012). But this does not mean that their child has a moral status
that other children do not have, or greater or different moral status from them. The
same is true of wild coyotes and domesticated basset hounds.
Suppose now that an inclusive egalitarian account of moral status is correct, and
that people with PSCIs, cognitively complex nonhuman animals, and healthy adult
humans all have equal moral status. This would tell us some very general things
about the need to take their interests fully into account or treat them as an end and
not a mere means, for example. However, it would not tell us very much about what
their interests are, how we should consider them, and how we should treat them.
After all, they are the same with respect to having full status, but they are different
with respect to consideration, interests and treatment (Singer 2009). Getting from
knowledge that something has moral status to a meaningful account of howwe ought
to take them into consideration, let alone treat them, requires being attentive to their
lives, their capacities, their perspectives, their experiences, and their relationships.
The more things that are included as having moral status—the more diversity and
variety there is within the group—the less moral status ascription can substantively
convey about the morally salient features of the individuals and their lives, and about
how we ought to respond to them (Hursthouse 2006; Sandler 2013).
Given this, if ethical theory is ultimately about mapping the normative terrain—
i.e. the features of the world that are relevant to how we ought to consider others and
make decisions aboutwhatwe ought to do—thenmoral statusmust play amoreminor
role within ethical theory than is often supposed. Moreover, adopting a minimalist
conception of moral status helps move beyond the impasse described earlier between
disability ethicists and those who advocate for capacities based individualism. It
becomes possible to agree that everything with certain intrinsic capacities has equal
or fullmoral status,while recognizing thatwhat is owed to those that have equal or full
moral status varieswidely. This is possible becausewe can distinguish betweenmoral
status (which things have interests that we ought to care about),moral considerability
(howweought to consider them), and treatment (howweought to act regarding them).
It enables a view on which all human beings and nonhuman animals have the same
or full moral status, such that their interests are fully considerable in all the ways that
are appropriate to them. But the ways that are appropriate to them differ on the basis
of their capacities and relationships. That is, they are differentially considerable.
Compassion is due to sentient animals, but not to nonsentient ones. Respect (in the
hands-off sense) is due to wild animals but not household pets. Friends and family
are due reciprocity and loyalty, strangers are not. All of this can be made sense of
in ways that do not involve status differentiation. Indeed, as we have seen, status
differentiation does not explain the differential consideration and treatment—the
relevant relationships and capacities do.
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Moreover, things are only obscured by introducing degrees or levels of status. As
already mentioned, the problem is one of inclusion and differentiation. The more
inclusive an account of moral status, the more it has to be possible to differentiate the
implications of having moral status. Wild animals, household pets, children, people
with PSCIs, family members, and strangers can all have moral status, but we should
consider and respond to them and their interests in different ways. We certainly
should not treat them the same. So ‘having moral status’ under-explains how we
should consider and treat anyone. And the issue here is not one of prioritization. The
issue is not how should we rank people and nonhuman animals in some ordering
of who to harm first (or how much justification we need to harm them). The ways
of responding to them are different in kind. Respect for autonomy is appropriate
to other adults, but not to infants. Loyalty is appropriate to friends, but not to wild
animals. This is why appeals to degrees or levels of moral status are theoretically and
practically unhelpful. Is respect or loyalty a “higher” degree of moral status? The
question does not make sense. It looks for a scalar comparison where there is none.
There is a plurality of forms or ways of appropriately responding to the interests of
individuals—e.g. respecting, promoting, prioritizing, and acknowledging—and there
is no strict ordering among them (Hursthouse 1999, 2006; Sandler 2007; Warren
1997).
What generates the controversy over moral status between animal and disability
ethicists is the belief that moral status ascriptions convey significant information
regarding consideration and treatment. However, when moral status ascriptions are
made for a wide range of types of entities the ascriptions can do little practical work,
since consideration and treatment are enormously informed by not only whatever the
qualifying capacities are for moral status, but also by other capacities that an entity
has, as well as by its relationships and the relevant contextual features (Bovenkerk
and Meijboom 2012). (For example, a parent-daughter relationship might justify
favoritism in somecontexts but not others.)Moreover, there are diverseways of taking
individuals with moral status into consideration and responding to them. Therefore,
we ought to adopt a minimalist conception of moral status—to have moral status
is just to have directly considerable interests—and embrace (non-lexically ordered)
pluralism in forms of consideration. On this view, there are not paradigm cases or
marginal cases, just cases.
Furthermore, on this view, people with PSCIs are no more or less like dogs or pigs
with respect to moral status than are any other people. Each has full moral status.
However, context-specific partiality is justified in some cases. Just as Kittay argues,
the fact that a person with PSCIs is someone’s child and stands in social relationships
within a community are justifications for partiality—i.e. differential consideration
and treatment. Moreover, the view is sensitive to the differences in capacities among
people and nonhuman animals with moral status, so is not empirically inadequate.
Getting consideration and treatment right requires being attentive to an individual’s
particular relationships and capacities.
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7.4 Strategy Two: Equal Moral Status Without Equal
Political Status
Even if we accept that different individuals are due different forms of considera-
tion and treatment despite having equal moral status, there are cases where it seems
difficult to reconcile claims of equal moral status and radical asymmetries in how
humans and nonhumans are treated or considered. For example, consider the protec-
tions afforded to human research subjects compared to those afforded to nonhuman
research subjects. Research involving human subjects is constrained by principles
that we typically associate with deontological normative theories, such as respect
for persons, which is operationalized in terms of requirements of informed consent
and special protections for the vulnerable. Research involving nonhuman animals
is subject to entirely different ethical standards. In the US, for example, research
on vertebrate animals is constrained by principles that are associated with conse-
quentialism. Animals are not to be used in a wasteful manner and they are not to be
caused unnecessary harm, although what constitutes a ‘necessary’ harm is given by
the aims of the research project. If an experiment promises to generate sufficiently
useful knowledge, then the harms necessary to animals to complete the experiment
are sanctioned.
It might seem as if this asymmetry in the consideration and treatment of humans
andnonhuman animals in research (not tomention, in foodproduction) is inconsistent
with an individualist capacity-based view of moral status, even given significant
differences in their capacities and relationships. If humans and nonhuman animals
have full and equal moral status, how can anything like this be justified? (Of course,
many proponents of individualist capacity-based views of moral status have been
concerned that non-human animals used in research are not considered or treated in
a way that is commensurate with their moral status (Singer 2009; Francione 2009;
Gruen 2011; Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011; Engel 2012)).
One possibility is that there are important differences in the criteria used to assess
whether some action, practice, or institution is unethical and whether some law
or regulation that allows for those actions, practices, or institutions are legitimate
(Cohen 1997; Basl and Schouten 2018). For example, while being unfaithful to
one’s partner is unethical, it doesn’t follow that laws that coerced fidelity would be
legitimate. The distinction between ethics, on the one hand, and political legitimacy
on the other opens up the possibility that even if humans and nonhuman animals have
the same moral status, the laws and regulations that govern animal use in research
may be legitimate even though they differ radically from the laws and regulations
that govern the use of human subjects. In other words, there is a potential basis for
justified species partiality in law that does not track a difference in moral status.
On the basis of this distinction, Basl and Schouten (2018) have suggested that
proponents of individualist capacity-based views of moral status make a mistake
when they claim, for example, that animal experimentation should be legally abol-
ished on grounds that it is inconsistent with the moral status of nonhuman animals. In
order to establish that these practices should be abolished, it must be shown that such
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legal interventionwould be legitimate (and that the current practices are illegitimate),
that it would constitute a justified use of the coercive power of the state to prohibit or
restrict animal use and experimentation in those ways. On their view, justifying the
coercive power of the state requires showing either that it is “authorized by citizens
through democratic or majoritarian processes” (Basl and Schouten 2018, 635) or that
it is necessary to protect a “political interest”, which is an interest necessary to allow
citizens to form their conception of their good (Basl and Schouten 2018, 638).
While there has been debate about whether and how to bring animals into the
political fold (see, e.g., Nussbaum 2009; Abbey 2007, 2016, Cochrane 2009, 2012;
Donaldson andKymlicka2011, 2012;Garner 2012, 2013;Meijer 2016), the “political
turn in animal ethics” has primarily focused onwhether animals are properly subjects
of justice, whether they are citizens in the sense they are owed duties of a special
class. However, just as we can and should recognize that questions of justice are
distinct from questions about other sorts of duties, so too should we recognize that
questions of legitimacy are distinctive. The question of whether we, collectively,
have duties of fair treatment or distribution toward animals is distinct from whether
the state may legitimately coerce compliance with those duties.
Basl and Schouten argue that neither of the above conditions for legitimacy are
met with respect to nonhuman animal research. For example, while there is a trend of
increasing concern for nonhuman animals among the US public (Gallup 2015), there
is little evidence that the public at large is opposed to current practices and policies
that govern the use of nonhuman animals in research, or that they are willing to give
up the goods that these practices make possible (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011;
Basl and Schouten 2018). This could change, and there are perhaps modifications
that could be made to existing animal care and use policies that would be legitimate.
However, the fact that there are changes to the current oversight regime that would be
authorized by democratic processes does not show that the current oversight regime
is illegitimate. Moreover, citizens that are opposed to nonhuman animal research on
ethical grounds do not have a political interest in ending the practice. The existence
of nonhuman animal research as currently practiced does not limit their ability to
form and live according to their conception of the good. Nor does it disrespect their
status as a full and equal citizen. Furthermore, nonhuman animals do not themselves
meet the criteria for having political interests. They lack the capacities such that they
are to be recognized as citizens to whom justifications for coercive interventions are
owed.
In order to deploy this strategy in defense of an asymmetry in the consideration of
humans and non-human animals, two things must be established. First, as discussed
above, it must be shown that there is not a legitimate basis for extending certain
protections to non-human animals. Second, it must be shown that that there is a
legitimate basis for extending those protections to all humans.What are the prospects
for defending this second claim?
There are at least three approaches available to defend the extension of certain
protections to all humans as politically legitimate in the sense discussed above. First,
it is possible to argue that there exists a majoritarian consensus or other democratic
process that licenses the extension of those protections. So long as there is broad
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general support for equal protections of all humans (and assuming that such protec-
tions don’t conflict with fundamental political interests), then there is a legitimate
basis for protections for all humans. Even absent broad public support for a specific
policy extending certain legal protections to all humans, there might be other demo-
cratically licensed processes by which such protections are extended in this way. For
example, there might be broad public support for extending the relevant protections
to nearly all humans coupled with a recognition that it will be difficult, in terms of
writing a law or policy, or due to concerns about a slippery slope, to distinguish
between those for which there is support and those for which there is not. This could
serve as the basis for extending legal protections to all humans.
This approach faces some difficulties. Even though there now may be a majori-
tarian consensus about the scope of, for example, protections for all human research
subjects, this might not always have been the case. Those seeking to justify species
partiality are likely to want a less contingent basis for such partiality. The second
and third approaches avoid this sort of contingency by showing that extending some
protections to all humans is essential to protecting the political interests of citizens.
The second approach is to show that all humans, though not all animals, are
or should be seen as citizens, individuals with political interests. On the traditional
Rawlsian account of citizenship, citizens are those that have the capacity (or potential
capacity) to form and revise their conception of the good and be held responsible or
accountable for the way they go about acting according to their conception of the
good (Basl and Schouten 2018, 639). Non-human animals fail to meet this standard
(though see Meijer 2013, 2017 for a dissenting view). It seems that at least some
humans will fail to meet these conditions as well. However, as we discuss in the
next section, in conditions of uncertainty it might be that we should, in the case of
humans, err in favor of ascribing them capacities or interests even if we aren’t sure
they have them. This leaves open the possibility of arguing that all humans should
be seen as citizens.
The third approach, and perhaps the most promising for justifying species
partiality, is to argue that even if only a subset of humans are citizens in the sense rele-
vant to legitimacy, extending legal protections to all humans is essential to protecting
the political interests of those that are citizens. Basl and Schouten consider this as
a route to justifying some legal protections of animals that would otherwise not be
legitimate. For example, it could be that while abolishing factory farming would
be otherwise illegitimate, given the role that this practice plays in anthropogenic
climate change, abolition is justified on the grounds that it contributes to protecting
the political interests of citizens (640, fn. 23).
In the context of thinking about differential treatment and consideration of humans
and nonhuman animal research subjects, there are differences between humans and
nonhuman animals that might be used to justify species partiality. This is because
humans stand in different relationships to one another than do humans to animals.
Every human, whether or not theymeet the technical conditions for Rawlsian citizen-
ship, is a relative of some that do. This is not true of nonhuman animals, in particular
the animals used in animal research. Given the nature of these relationships, there
is room to make the case that extending equal consideration and treatment to all
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humans, in certain contexts, is important to protecting the political interests of citi-
zens. For example, perhaps it is the most efficient mechanism available to protect
citizens from certain forms of abuse in scientific research.
The above are overviews of how one might justify species partiality in a particular
context by appeal to political legitimacy. They are intended to indicate spaces for
proponents of justified species partiality to make their case without a commitment
to species membership views of moral status. All the pieces of the above argument
are subject to challenge. For example, while the view of political legitimacy used in
support of the above argument draws from a fairly standard and widely-held concep-
tion of political liberalism (for defense and discussion see Rawls 2005; Ackerman
1980, 1994; Larmore 1987, 1996; Quong 2011; Schouten 2019), it is not uncontro-
versial. Furthermore, the conditions for legitimacy discussed above are necessary but
not sufficient conditions for justifying the coercive intervention of the state. It must
also be shown that such interventions are, for example, an efficient use of power
compared to other legitimate alternatives.
However, even if one disagrees about the details of the approaches described
above, the general lesson still holds. The criteria for what is unethical or unjust,
including when those involve moral status claims, are not the same as the criteria for
what is politically legitimate or required. As a result, there is room for the proponent
of species partiality to argue for limited species partiality without adopting a species-
membership view. This is important because the above grounds for limited species
partiality, while up for philosophical debate, may be less questionable than species-
membership views.
7.5 Strategy Three: Differential Epistemic Position
A third strategy for justifying species partiality in some contexts, even given moral
status egalitarianism, appeals to differential uncertainty about the relative capacities,
and thereby interests and strength of those interests, between humans and nonhuman
animals. Our epistemic state as it concerns inferences or knowledge about the pref-
erences, desires, and other mental states of humans is substantially different than
that concerning nonhuman animals. In particular, we often should be more confident
in our judgments about the mental life of humans than that of nonhuman animals
(Allen 2006; Allen and Bekoff 2007). The reason for this is that other humans are
more physiologically and evolutionarily similar to us than are nonhuman animals.
As a result, we are not only in a better position to assess which capacities other
humans have, but are in a relatively good position to simulate the mental life of other
humans andmake inferences about their desires and preferences given other informa-
tion we have. With respect to nonhuman animals, our confidence in such inferences
should diminish as we consider animals that are more evolutionarily and physio-
logically distant from us. This is not to say we should be skeptical that nonhuman
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animals have amental life.We can have good physiological, evolutionary, and behav-
ioral evidence that they do (Varner 2002; Godfrey-Smith 2016), without being as
confident about its content as we are for other humans.
This difference in epistemic position can have implications for consideration and
treatment. For example, imagine having tomake a decision aboutwhether to continue
life support for a family member that has not left explicit instructions about their
desires as compared to making a similar decision about a family pet. In the case
of the family member, we are likely to try to determine whether they would have a
preference regarding being kept on life support. In the case of the pet, we are not
likely to consider whether the pet has such preferences, since it is reasonable to
believe that our pets either lack well-formed preferences about how they are to be
treated when they are unconscious or that we could not infer with any confidence
what their preferences would be if they did have them.
In the above case, the differential epistemic situation justifies or explains differ-
ential consideration and treatment of two individuals. This sort of strategy can be
deployed to explain or justify common views about tradeoff cases. For example,
lifeboat cases that force a tradeoff between a human and a non-human animal, where
one or the other must be sacrificed, can be used to motivate species-membership
views. If we think that we should, all else equal, favor humans in such cases, it seems
that this must be simply because all humans have greater status than all nonhumans.
However, even if, holding all else equal, on a capacity-based view such favoritism
would be unjustified, it may be that in such choice contexts we would actually not
be in a good position to judge that all is actually equal. Given the evidence we have
available to us, it might be justified to favor humans because we are justified, for
epistemic uncertainty reasons, in assuming they have capacities that in some cases
it turns out they do not in fact have.
This epistemic uncertainty strategy also supports the second strategy based on the
difference between what is ethical and what is politically legitimate. Some of the
arguments deploying that strategy depend on being able to show that all or nearly all
humans have some capacity or property that nonhuman animals lack. This is difficult,
in part because it seems plausible that there are some humans very alike in terms of
the relevant capacities to some nonhuman animals. For example, whatever capacities
ground political interests or citizenship, it seems either that some humans will lack
those capacities or some nonhuman animals will have them. However, when it comes
to judging which humans lack those capacities, we might be in an epistemic position
where it is most justified to make assumptions (or defining inclusion) on the basis of
species membership—i.e. to assume that all humans (but not all nonhumans) have
them.
Again, whether this strategy is ultimately successful depends on the details and
context in which it is deployed. However, as with the other strategies, it opens up
additional space to defend context-dependent partiality in a way that track species
membership but does not commit one to thinking that species membership itself is a
morally relevant property.
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7.6 Conclusion
The primary justification in favor of the special moral status of humans—i.e. the
view that all humans have equal moral status greater than that of all nonhumans—is
that it is needed to support the differential consideration and treatment due to humans
in comparison with nonhuman animals. We have argued that this justification fails.
Differential consideration and treatment of humans, what we have called justified
species partiality, is consistent with an egalitarian account of moral status. We have
shown that (contextual and limited) justified species partiality can be warranted by
pluralism in the forms and bases of moral considerability, the distinction between
the considerations relevant to ethics and those relevant to policy, and our differential
epistemic position with respect to humans and nonhumans.
Admittedly, our approach does not get proponents of species-membership
accounts of human moral status everything they want either theoretically or practi-
cally. It is not the case that all human beings have equal moral status greater than that
of all nonhuman beings. Nor is it the case that all human beings take priority over all
nonhumanbeings in every case.However, our approach avoids their primary concerns
about disvaluing human beings. It also allows for contextual and situational partiality
in favor of humans (sometimes humans in generally, sometimes particular humans).
Moreover, it does not allow that any human beings have lesser moral status or are
due lesser consideration than any nonhumans. For these reasons, justified species
partiality in consideration and treatment does not require rejecting capacities-based
accounts of moral status.
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Chapter 8
Humanity in the Living, the Living
in Humans
Michiel Korthals
Abstract Recent studies in biology, ecology, and medicine make it clear that rela-
tionships between living organisms are complex and comprise different forms of
collaboration and communication in particular in getting food. It turns even out that
relations of collaboration and valuing are more important than those of aggression
and predation. I will outline the ways organisms select and value specific items
in their network of living and non-living entities. No organism eats everything; all
organisms prefer certain foods, companions, and habitats. Relations between organ-
isms are established on the basis of communication, exchange of signs, actions and
goods, throughmutual learning processes on all levels of life.Micro, meso andmacro
organisms participate in this process of valuing and communication. Animals and
plants therefore show features that were traditionally attributed only to humans, like
selfless assistance. The usual distinction between humans and other living beings on
the basis of human’s sensitivity for altruism, language and values crumbles down due
to the circumstance that also non-human living beings are prone to selfless assistance,
communication and valuing.
8.1 Introduction: Animals, Plants and Humans
In the past the relations between different species and between species and human
beings were seen as quite limited. Studies analysed the enduring competition of non-
human living beings with each other in their struggle for survival, and members of
different species didn’t mix. Eating and being eaten was seen as the main principle.
Moreover, it was conceded that whereas humans can act altruistically, other living
beings cannot. It was proven that humans had a sensitivity for beauty, but other living
animals did not. Anthropomorphism, projecting human-like values as motives for
animal behaviour, was seen as a big scientific sin. As a consequence, living entities
were conceptualised either from a narrow behaviourist, or from a survivalist and
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objective point of view: members of different animal species don’t mix, don’t show
altruism, and don’t have a sensitivity for beauty. Animal relationswere studied from a
survivalist, ‘objective’ approach: animals of a species and species were always acting
according to their own advantage, survival of the fittest meant an enduring struggle
with each other in a race towards fitness. Although evolution was acknowledged as
the important dynamic force, when a species had established itself and its competitors
had died off, it kept developing in trying to establish fitness with its environment.
For example, bacteria present in the gut system of animals and plants were seen as
egocentric agents (driven by selfish genes), in the best case not harming the host,
but in worse case killing it. These bacteria were seen as parasites, as for example by
Wilson (2014): “Almost all species of plants and animals carry parasites. Which by
definition are other species that live on or inside their bodies and in most instances
take some little part of the hosts without killing them” (idem, p. 180).
I will argue that what Wilson calls a parasite should count as a worthy collabo-
rator, or even as a separate organ. Cows, squirrels, all animals and plants have micro-
bial collaborators, which ensure food digestion and stimulation of their immune
system and even determine their cognitive capabilities. More and more biologists
are studying these forms of cooperation (e.g. Bray 2019; Valles-Colomer et al. 2019;
Cryan et al. 2019).
Not only values like cooperation and altruism were victims of the behaviourist,
survivalist or genetic outlook on nature’s processes, but also a value like beauty. It was
crazy to argue that beauty played a substantial role in the relations between animals or
between plants and animals. Geneticists allowed beauty only as a genetic advantage.
However, I will argue that in light of recent research these differences between
humans and other living beings collapse. The exceptional place of humans in nature
does not hold, not because humans are more like non-humans, but on the contrary,
because non-human beings are more like human beings, at least like the ideal human
being. They embrace values; they act altruistically and they are sensitive to beauty. I
therefore fully agree with the proposition of Harry Kunneman (2017), that humans
participate in animality and animals and plants participate in humanity. Moreover,
these values comprise a kind of non-egotistic agency: organisms are beings, and this
means that in looking for food, assisting others or appreciating beauty they are not
ego’s acting in an objective world. They are, just like the early Heidegger (1963) or
Sartre would say, modes of being: being in the web of food or being in the assistance
or in the web of beauty.
First, the role of food will be discussed, secondly the role of values in animal
interactions will be tackled. Next, I will discuss various types of relationship, the
misleading metaphor of the tree of life and the difficulties anthropocentrism causes
in analysing these interactions. Finally, I will argue for caution in deriving practical
recommendations of changing these complex connections between beings and their
world.
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8.2 Food Makes the World Go Around
Food processes are an illuminating focus to find out how members of a species and
a species in general are embedded in altruistic relations and value altruistic actions.
Looking for food, eating and digesting are for all living beings time consuming
and daily activities. Nutrition also establishes an intrinsic relationship between dead
entities such as earth, and living organisms, or better: between non-living and living
processes. Water, air and minerals play a decisive role in producing the right quality
of food. Animals (including humans) are important links in this. Animals live on
water but also on sunlight, sugars and oxygen via plants. And animals also feed on
minerals and deadly gases made digestible through plants, such as nitrogen. Carbon
users such as plants in turn need animals for their reproduction and food production:
mammals, insects and birds pollinate flowers and plant shrubs and trees and therefore
maintain forests. Plants and trees warn each other for predators through the emission
of odours and other signals (Kohn 2013; Wohlleben 2015; Mancuso 2015). Worms
and bacteria make the soil fertile for crops and trees. Trees provide food (sugars,
water) for other plants and so indirectly for plant eating animals. The fact that all
living beings need food, and can feed themselves, assumes that they are assisted by
other living beings in providing them their food either directly or indirectly, via their
contribution to the establishment and the maintenance of an useful food-context.
Darwin had an idea of these processes in his analysis of the activities of worms in
The Formation of Vegetable Mould, through the Action of Worms, from 1881: “When
we behold a wide, turf-covered expanse, we should remember that its smoothness,
on which so much of its beauty depends, is mainly due to all the inequalities having
been slowly levelled by worms. It is a marvellous reflection that the whole of the
superficial mould over any such expanse has passed, and will again pass, every few
years through the bodies of worms. (…) Some other animals, however, still more
lowly organised, namely corals, have done far more conspicuous work in having
constructed innumerable reefs and islands in the great oceans; but these are almost
confined to the tropical zones” (p. 313).
Darwin makes it clear that worms prepare the soil by making it a fertile context of
nutrients for plants and other living beings. Worms do this probably unintentionally
by digesting soil debris, and as a consequence bringing air, nitrogen, and improving
nutrient availability for plants in general. Here they work in their own advantage
assisting other living beings.
Another relationship is established when two or more parties evolve in reaction to
each other to their reciprocal advantage. The coevolution of flowers and pollinators
like bees and certain birds is a very good example. I can only shortly raise the issue
of intentionality here. My main point here is that organisms have intentions (for
example to select, eat, exchange or give food), however they differ in how many
consequences their intentions take into account.
However, living beings can also assist other living beings without pursuing their
own advantage. More radical thoughts on this have been proposed and are verified
(Simard 2018;Mancuso 2015;Wohlleben 2015).Many individuals of a species assist
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other individuals of different species in finding their food or even in producing their
food without any advantage for the assisting actor. Oaks for example provide with
their large underground root system sugars to smaller trees, in particular in times of
scarcity.
8.3 Values in Animal Plant Interactions
Organisms cherish a lot of different values, like consoling and assisting others,
playing, and enjoying beauty. For example, mammals can give consolation to others
when they are sad and apparently are grieving their misfortune. Taking the position
of the other and offering others their preferential food stuff or improving their food
context happens quite regularly, in particular in parent child relations, but also in
inter- and intra-species relationships when for example an elderly animal perceives
helpless young being. The case of a gorilla trying to comfort a young child that has
fallen in its compound is an emotional example (Goodall 2016). Between species
and within species play of elder members with young ones and between young ones
is a quite common spectacle.
Susanne Simard (2018) analysed forests and identified what she called a hub tree,
or “mother tree”. Mother trees are the largest trees in forests that act as central hubs
for vast below-ground mycorrhizal networks. A mother tree supports seedlings by
infecting them with fungi and supplying them with the nutrients they need to grow.
In this way birch and firs communicate by exchanging nutrients. She discovered that
Douglas Firs provide carbon to baby firs. She found that there was more carbon sent
to the baby firs that came from a specific mother tree, than random baby firs not
related to that specific fir tree. It was also found that mother trees change their root
structure to make room for baby trees.
Crows cause fires to keep forests open for birds and other animals. TheAboriginals
talk about the ‘Karrkkanj’ (hawk falcon) that brings a burning branch to a forest to
set it on fire and catch small fleeing animals. Haviksevken steal bread and throw it in
a river to catch fish. Scientific research has confirmed these processes (Bonta et al.
2017). Red squirrels start forests in their diligence to make stocks.
Last but not least, many animals are sensitive to beauty, i.e. which is a value that
is not directly related to utility or survivalist motives. Birds and fishes are motivated
by beautiful looking members of their species. Perceiving and tasting something as
pleasant and as delicious, a phenomenon that regularly happens to animals, cannot
directly be connected with a struggle for survival or an advantage for fitness (Prum
2017). Just as with humans, the sensitivity of animals for beauty and something deli-
cious is at least clearly influenced by social context and upbringing. These aesthetic
preferences for certain types of food or partners don’t seem to have any adaptive
benefit. Birds with certain feathers can attract partners and their offspring can have
a mix of the best genes, but it is not always the case. Strong evidence seems not to
support the good-genes hypothesis (Noble 2016). Colored skin or feathers are both
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signs of evolutionary progress and of a capacity for beauty of valuing animals (Ryan
2017).
8.4 Do They Communicate with Each Other?
No individual or species arises, lives and dies by itself. Animals are core and junction
points in processes of exchange of substances that are food. Animals in this sense
work together with plants to produce food and drink, as well as oxygen and other
chemicals. All are sensitive to signs other organisms are showing to their own and
other species. Demand and response are a general feature of their collaboration.
For many biologists it is increasingly clear that animals, plants and microbes
are dependent on a network, where some species jointly develop (in co-evolution),
others have the lead, and others just emerge or are parasitic. The cooperation between
living beings has remarkable connections. Everyone knows the intensively inter-
locked evolutionary developments of flowers and those of pollinators (insects, birds).
Deeper chalices were accompanied by longer tongues; some plants even suggest fake
flowers to attract certain insect species (Peeters 2015).
But there is a lot more to it: for example, animals, including humans, cannot
live without the enormous numbers of bacteria and viruses in their gastrointestinal
tract (Enders 2013). The human brain is also inspired by these food processing and
producing gut microbes (a fact that was denied by science ten years ago, Sonnen-
burg and Sonnenburg 2015). Every animal species, including humans, consists of
a combination of various different species (Margulis 1998). Communication, i.e.
the exchange of information and of claims and preferences via instinctual, but also
cognitive, learned, processes play a role in all these processes. There is learning,
communicating and threatening. And there is collaboration.
8.5 Collaboration as a Mechanism of Co-evolution
Darwin has done extensive research on co-evolution in orchids and their pollinators.
In a centuries-long developmental process these organisms constantly adapt to each
other. But co-evolution goes even further than Darwin’s views on orchids. All parties
in a co-evolutionary network exert pressure on each other to specify, that is, to look
for a niche that has not yet been used in the food supply and more broadly, in the
ecosystem. This selective pressure is not often a form of competition or even war,
because the goal is different for all parties. The pressure can go in all directions, with
often not directly clear consequences. The birds that build forests by burying seeds
from trees, or even by burning forests, provide their own food supplies. But they also
create open spaces at the same time, with the effect of the germination of other, new
seeds (Wall et al. 2013).
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The selective pressure on species does not necessarily imply a war for their own
survival. The warning systems and defence mechanisms that plants use to warn their
own species of predators are sometimes also intended for other species. Some plants
ward off predators by luring the enemies of those predators and they warn other
species. For example, some plants emit odour signals when they are affected by
spider mites. In this way they attract the natural enemies of spider mites, namely
predatory mites.
8.6 Tree of Life or Network?
In fact,Darwin has underestimated the fullmeaning of collaboration and co-evolution
due to his idea that evolution can be represented by a tree with branches of species
(Kropotkin 1902 was the first to mention this). According to Darwin the general
development of species is supposed to form a tree of life, a Great Chain of Being
(Peeters 2015). Once species have become a separate branch of this tree, they develop
on their own. The branches represent the classifications of species of living beings.
Traditionally, it is assumed that species once separated from their ancestors follow
their own path separated from other species. But recent evolutionary genetic research
shows something completely different. Molecular researchers such as Eric Bapteste,
an evolutionary biologist, show that hybridisation (crossbreeding between species)
and symbiosis are important factors in evolution (Margulis 1998). Bapteste (2013)
says about the tree:
Ever since Darwin, a phylogenetic tree has been the principal tool for the presentation and
study of evolutionary relationships among species. A familiar sight to biologists, the bifur-
cating tree has been used to provide evidence about the evolutionary history of individual
genes as well as about the origin and diversification of many lineages of eukaryotic organ-
isms. Community standards for the selection and assessment of phylogenetic trees are well
developed and widely accepted. The tree diagram itself is ingrained in our research culture,
our training, and our textbooks. It currently dominates the recognition and interpretation of
patterns in genetic data.
However, thismetaphor of the tree of life has its limitations.Organisms fromdifferent
branches can transfer genes to each other—and often do; branches are not separated
from each other with an origin in a single main stem.
The transfer of properties (now we would say: genes) between species takes place
much more often than Darwin originally thought. There are hardly any separate
branches on the tree of life, and the species do not evolve on their own, but they
also integrate foreign DNA. Microbes do this to a large extent, but also animals such
as mice and rats. Frogs generally have at least ten percent of foreign DNA. Hori-
zontal gene transfer happens quite often, and therefore genomes are not completely
isolated within species boundaries. In nature different species can exchange genetic
information, as it has been shown for rice to millet (Diao et al. 2006). Even gene
transfer takes place between very different species from different kingdoms, as from
Agrobacterium to sweet potato (Kyndt et al. 2015). Reproduction between different
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species does not always lead to infertility, as the dogma still reads. The metaphor
of the tree of life must be replaced by a kind of network of constant fusion and
differentiation.
The tree of life with its classifications is also problematic in another way. Central
here is the overall classification of living organisms in various ‘kingdoms’, such as
Linnaeus distinguished between animals and plants. However, new additions have to
bemade each time, often on the basis of the invention of new detectionmethods, such
as DNA and epi-genetic research methods. That is why this overall classification has
now been replaced by eight ‘kingdoms’. Moreover, a major problem of these distinc-
tions is that there are always intermediate forms that are difficult to classify. Every
classification remains a human invention, which always tries to capture complexity
and renewal, but never completely succeeds.
The ‘tree of life’ concept misinterprets the mutual cooperation between species.
Through this cooperation, species can develop in response to each other (selective
pressure) and to the symbiotic networks and processes that organisms are part of.
Scholars come up with all sorts of terms for this biosocial collaboration, such as
co-evolution, bio-socialities (Rabinow 1996), naturecultures (Haraway 2003), entan-
glement of matter and meaning (Barad 2007). Barad argues: “matter and meaning
cannot be dissociated, not by chemical processing, or centrifuge, or nuclear blast.
Mattering is simultaneously a matter of substance and significance, most evidently
perhaps when it is the nature of matter that is in question, when the smallest parts
of matter are found to be capable of exploding deeply entrenched ideas and large
cities.”
8.7 Symbiosis, Symbionts, Holobionts and Place
As can be seen from the foregoing, symbiosis is one of the most important mech-
anisms of evolution. This includes selective pressure, place and co-evolution. Most
individuals, or species aremixed forms (holobionts). They consist of different species
(symbionts) and yet are ecological units (Margulis 1998). People are also holobionts,
which bring symbiotic expression to both their own genome and that of other species,
the symbionts. Plants work together with microbes, and feed on inorganic material
and thus establish a link between dead matter and life and via-via with live animals
(Hansen 1993).
Because of thesemutual connections in a locally developed ecosystem, the locally
evolved relationships are extremely important. The place is a breeding ground. The
mutual symbiotic adjustments of the symbionts in a holobiont are disturbed when
one species is removed. Biologists call this preference for locally evolved relation-
ships ‘Home-field advancement’ (Rúa et al. 2016). The geographical location and
the specific soil and aboveground condition is the place where adaptations and co-
evolution with micro-organisms take shape. Manure from animals that have eaten
local plants and that is broken down by bacteria and insects belongs to one network.
Local manure fertilizes the soil better than manure from elsewhere.
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Ultimately, the entire web of relationships is carried bymicrobes (Rosenberg et al.
2016). For example, in humans, communication between the brain and the stomach
is just as fundamental to capabilities and behavior as the brain. These stomach-brain
connections apply to all mammals. One of the most famous researchers in this area,
Emeran Mayer, writes in The Mind-Gut Connection: How the Hidden Conversation
WithinOurBodies ImpactsOurMoods,OurChoices, andOurOverallHealth (2016),
that the gut and the inhabitants of the gut, the microbes, think for the brain. That is
why he calls the bowels the ‘second brain’. The bacteria in the gastrointestinal tract
play a central role: the presence of certain types of bacteria and their products have a
major influence on the willingness to take risks, on thought processes and on moods
such as apathy and depression. In addition, the digestion of foods is largely provided
by intestinal bacteria, as is the stimulation of the immune system. This microbiome
is a second brain.
8.8 Different Types of Relations Inter- and Intra-species
Categorising these different types of relations is a little pretentious (giving the
complexity), nevertheless can be useful for further study. Kunneman (2017) has
done an interesting job in outlining at least four relations. Relations can be either
beneficial or advantageous to all parties, or only to one, or not harmful to the other,
or harmful. Advantage means here improving fitness, or even improving quality of
life. Short term and long term are often difficult to distinguish. The best known and
earliest analysed relation between species that is distinguished is that of parasitism. A
relation where only one party profits at the cost of the host can be called parasitic. For
example, striga is a plant that is totally dependent on grain species, and after a certain
time the host is so exhausted that it dies. Probably inspired by the dominant nine-
teenth and twenty century societal ideas about outcasts and beggars, biologists were
eager to analyse ‘parasitic behaviour’ in plants and animals and neglected symmet-
rical relations. A more mutually beneficial relation happens when both organisms
improve their chance for survival. Famous and fundamental example are the mycor-
rhizal relations between roots of plants with fungi and bacteria, that provide plants
with inorganic compounds and trace elements and plants that provide the fungi and
bacteriawith sugars and other chemical compounds.Many plants have these relations
and they are therefore crucial for ecosystems. Seed dispersal by animals which gives
them food advantages is also a very good example of mutual symbiosis. Without
animals dispersing seeds of trees, shrubs and other plants couldn’t move to other
places than that of the mother plant.
Cooperation is happening with members of the same species, for example when
dolphins chase after fishes, or wolves try to catch a deer. However, other animals are
often also involved, and cooperation can therefore be an inter species affair. Altruistic
types of symbiosis are also well-known.
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8.9 Matter and Meaning; Philosophical Questions
When humans are dependent on other species to such an extent, especially microbes,
to what extent do the microbes control them, rather than the people themselves?
Did microbes start wars? Do organisms determine how we think? These are difficult
questions. Jared Diamond (2000) seems to suggest a positive answer: people are
driven by microbes. I think we still do not know enough to say something sensible
about this.
There are proposals to answers to these questions. One of these is that we have so
many health and psychological problems due to the fact that our modern food is not
adapted to our gut system. We have to return to the wild food that our microbiome
has received over the past millions of years (thus type of food changed considerably
since the agricultural revolution about 10,000 years ago). Jeff Leach (2015) explicitly
states that people (not just animals) must also become wild, and therefore he likes to
crawl through mud in Central Africa to get rid of health problems.
According to many, the emphasis on hygiene, especially since Pasteur showed
the influence of bacteria on food, is having a detrimental impact on health. The
‘hygiene hypothesis’, for example, states that the excess of hygiene is the cause of a
weak immune system, so that people are more susceptible to diseases and allergies
(Blaser 2014; Okada 2010). Bacteria function as impulses to strengthen the immune
system and when they are no longer present, the immune system does not develop
or develops insufficiently.
Incidentally, in the tree and plant world it has been much more common to antic-
ipate the role of fungi (microbes) in the way roots feed (Rainer 2015; Hansen 1993).
The roots give sugars through those leaves through photosynthesis, and the roots
through the fungi and their fungal threads have a very wide network that provides
water and inorganic minerals. Fungi also protect the roots against infections. When
plants root between the right fungi, mycorrhiza (i.e., symbioses between roots and
fungi) develop and they improve their growth processes. Almost all plants and trees
take part in mycorrhiza.
Anyhow, the notions of value, cognition and communication also merit recali-
bration: animals and plants value their contexts, they remember their predators and
develop defence mechanisms. They also warn their fellow species. I hereby join the
research of Frans de Waal (2016), who uses a broad concept of cognition, “a wide
range of cognitive mechanisms”, such as memory and information processing (2016,
282). Values enable to select the information that an individual and a group believe
to be relevant.
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8.10 Barriers: Classifications, Anthropocentrism
and Hubris
Thinking and learning about evolution and cooperation between species is hampered
by a number of rationalistic principles. Western rationalism, from Descartes to
Heidegger, places strong emphasis on the individual ego that is in a world full of
things with qualities, but also on the view that humans are superior to other living
beings (Korthals 2018). The view that man is a symbiotic being contradicts this idea
of individuality. Men as symbionts means there is no I, there is everywhere a (wide-
spread) we-process, composed of different species, namely symbionts of life and
death.
Because of our inadequate senses, our unilateral communication ability through
spoken language and the growth of our brains, people believe that other beings
do not communicate. That is why it took so long to discover communicative and
cognitive skills in other species (see also Meijer and Bovenkerk in this volume). The
evolutionary achievements of the brain have simultaneously equipped man with very
deficient senses. The brain has shrunk the senses (Wilson, 2014, 48) Language is an
extensive network of useful communication with the world for people and therefore
the specific possibilities the senses can realize are diminished.With spoken language
and a thinking brain, people see themselves as separate beings, separate from plants,
animals and microbes. Man is secluded at the top of evolution, or sees himself as a
world-shaping against all those other world-blind beings.
As a result of this anthropocentrism, man is blind to important, life-feeding inter-
actions and communications between other animals, plants and dead matter. Due to
the great emphasis on language as a superior communication system, other commu-
nication systems are not covered. But animals and plants have other, equally effective
communication systems that enable co-evolution. Slowly we become a little smarter
in research into how living beings live, communicate and, above all, feed themselves
and others (De Waal 2016).
In western philosophy, many barriers have been raised against the elaboration of
this idea. In particular, the view that man is an exceptional being due to rationality
or consciousness makes it difficult to see that animals and plants also think, feel and
communicate in a certain way.
This anthropocentrism can be found in leading philosophers such as Descartes,
Kant or Wittgenstein. Heidegger also has a strong anthropocentric view in his own
way: man and animal differ according to him because man is ‘world-meaning’, the
animal is ‘world-poor’ and the plant is ‘without world’. He claims: “Throughout the
course of its life the animal is confined to the environmental world, as it is within a
fixed sphere that is incapable of further expansion and contraction” (1995, p 198).
That is why he says: “The animal is poor in the world” (idem, p. 186). Plants and
animals are locked up in their own environment (Umwelt) and they are never in the
open space (Lichtung) of being. “In its essence, language is not the utterance of
an organism; nor is it the expression of a living thing. Nor can it be thought in an
essentially correct way in terms of its symbolic character, perhaps not even in terms
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of the character of signification. Language is the clearing-concealing advent of being
itself” (idem, p. 248).
However, it is quite naive to single out language as the distinctive feature between
man and animals. There are so many other important features that some animals
possess and humans do not possess. As I have argued, all living beings have pref-
erences, and communication systems with respect to these preferences. They value
their contexts of life and their own life. Here I agree fully with Korsgaard, who in
her newest book (2018), starts her reasoning with the acknowledgement that animals
(in the quote a rabbit) value items, and then concludes in this way:
For even if the rabbit’s life is not as important to her as yours is to you, nevertheless, for her
it contains absolutely everything of value, all that can ever be good or bad for her, except
possibly the lives of her offspring. The end of her life is the end of all value and goodness
for her. So there is something imponderable about these comparisons. (p. 65)
8.11 Philosophical Challenges: Pandora’s
Box Versus New Skills
The philosophy that symbiosis and mutualistic relationships through eating and
excretion are central to life confronts philosophy with countless new issues. It is over
with the ‘superior man’, who, as lord and master of nature, dominates all the living
beings. Human rationality, thinking, communication and feeling are not unique. Man
does not stand alone. The interwovenness with dead and living processes necessitates
attention to local and long-term processes.
At the same time, a new temptation arises: to make this insight useful, and to
open a Pandora’s box. “Symbiotic relationships are fundamental for all forms of life
on the planet and for our own existence, if we could learn to redirect some of them
the results could be spectacular, for example if we could transform the symbiotic
relationships of plant and nitrogen fixing bacteria from just the legumes to all crops
we could change the face of agriculture for ever” (Mancuso 2015, 93).
What Mancuso points out is an important issue: the technological impact of this
view. The temptation strikes: technologies are being developed and applied that inter-
vene in holobionts, in microbiomes, such as the introduction of fungi, bacteria and
other organisms into the soil. But also by means of intervention in animal or human
stomachs and intestines with ‘psychobiotics’, biotechnologists want to bring about
certain health effects. A Pandora’s box opens with the knowledge about symbiotic
relationships. Countless commercial companies propagate the development and use
of these psychobiotics. Regulating bodies do not knowhow to give these psychobiotic
interventions a legal framework (Green et al. 2017).
The question here is whether we know enough about these complicated and subtle
relationships, and whether we do not seriously disrupt them with simple interven-
tions. The risks to food supply for animals and people are great, as are those for
health. The search for the right combination of, for example, plants and soil bacteria,
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of human behavior and gastrointestinal bacteria cannot be concluded with a few
association studies, some longitudinal studies and a clinical practice.
Philosophically these developments could be seen as challenges to find the right
way inwhichwe could and should deal with this process-based embedding of people.
This embedding in a context is the biological equivalent of the hermeneutical concept
of ‘place’ and the pragmatic concept of ‘practice’ (Keulartz et al. 2002). Place is
where people (and living organisms in general) grow up and live; it is the starting
point for pluralism of opinions, and of practices. Partly because of their place of
embedding, plants, animals and people differ more or less from each other.
The other philosophical challenge is how we deal with pluralism and with the
differences that are so much needed for the symbiotic networks. For the many who
strive for unity that pluralism is a stumbling block. Ethically dealing with symbioses
also requires a substantive valuation of the processual and local relationships in
a globalizing world society, where place is increasingly difficult to determine and
respect. But the place of embedding matters. That is why place has an enormous
significance for symbionts and holobionts and it should be a central point of attention.
Endlessmobility of people, plants, animals and even entire habitats has its clear limits.
There are therefore various epistemic and moral skills to formulate from the
idea that people live in the midst of animals and animals in the midst of people. I
speak here about ‘skills’ in the sense of Sen’s ‘capability theory’ (2009). Epistemic
skills should focus on complexity and on setting priorities in the enormous amount
of relevant connections. Moral skills should focus on responsive interactions with
totally different organisms and on the responsibility for the interventions they want
to do and their consequences. The question is not: can people govern microbes? But:
what does a responsible symbiotic biopolitics look like? Caution and respect are
required. One small change and one whole ecosystem changes completely, or even
collapses. Mancuso’s desire for profound changes in mycorrhiza networks bringing
about a new agriculture should be postponed for the time being.
8.12 Conclusion
All living beings communicate with each other and value elements of their ecological
contexts, be it as food, partner, companion or enemy. Values like beauty, solidarity
and sociality play an important role in living their life. A neutral objective, utility
perspective on living organisms neglects these values and the role they play in ecolog-
ical processes. Although the exact motivation to value for example feathers, colours,
and certain types of food is unclear, this cannot only be determined by a genetic
disposal (Noble 2016). Kunneman (2017) is right about his idea that animals partic-
ipate in humanity. Moreover, these values comprise a kind of non-egotistic agency:
organisms are beings embedded (located) in a broader food web or web of assistance
or a web of beauty. The misleading metaphor of the tree of life causes difficul-
ties in analysing these interactions because it rules out coevolution and symbiosis.
Anthropocentrism erect a barrier between humans and other living organisms and
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therefore denies the wide variety of processes of communication, valuing and soli-
darity with non-human animals. Finally, I argue for caution in deriving practical
recommendations in changing these complex connections between beings and their
world.
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Chapter 9
Comment: The Current State
of Nonhuman Animal Agency
Joost Leuven
Daily at schools all over the world, human children rebel against their teachers.
When they are forced to make assignments, they don’t want to do, children often
resist and try to challenge authority. This shows us that agency, the ability to make
choices regarding their own lives, matters to them, at least to a certain extent. Good
teachers try to accommodate the students’ desire for agency by creating lessons and
assignments in which there is room for students to make personal choices, like giving
them the freedom to decide the specific topic for an essay or classroom presentation.
Children don’t lose this desire for agency once they grow up though and the desire
for agency and the tendency to rebel against attempts to take that agency away, can
be seen in human adults as well.
Human beings are not the only ones actively rebelling when their agency is
curtailed. As we enter the geological era that some have fittingly named the Anthro-
pocene (due to the increasing impact of human activity on ecosystems and geology),
the examples of nonhuman animals trying to rebel against the increasing impedi-
ment of their agency also seem to become more numerous and frequent. We can
see nonhuman animal rebellion in small and relatively harmless situations, like
companion animals who refuse to be disciplined to use the litter box, but also under
more serious circumstances, like livestock animals refusing to fall in line when
entering a slaughterhouse (Palmer 2001). It is difficult to overstate the extent to
which human beings nowadays control the lives of nonhuman animals. For the ones
we keep in captivity, we control their movement, when and what they eat and even
who they mate with, while the ones still living in the wild have to face the conse-
quences of climate change, deforestation and the destruction of natural habitats in
general. The existence of cases of rebellion forces us to consider themoral importance
of agency in the lives of nonhuman animals.
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Especially in an era in which the overall relationship of humans with nonhuman
animals is one of near total domination of human beings over nonhuman animal lives,
it is necessary that moral philosophers look critically at the topic of self-realization
in nonhuman animals. By reflecting on the attempts by the authors in this section
of the book to do just that, this comment aims to make sense of nonhuman animal
agency in the Anthropocene.
9.1 Changing Perspectives Within Animal Ethics
Traditionally the academic debate on animal ethics has focused predominantly on the
question ofwhether nonhuman animal interestsmatter and how these interests should
be taken into account. Authors such as Tom Regan (1983), Peter Singer (1975) and
David Degrazia (1996) have contributed importantly to this debate, making cases
against speciesism and in favor of animal rights and welfare. However, in recent
years the debate has moved towards more complex questions and authors have now
begun to challenge the idea that nonhuman animals are simply passive recipients of
rights or care and argue that they are much more than that. Instead they should be
seen as actors in a social (Gruen 2015), political (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011) or
moral (Monsó et al. 2018) sense. In their chapter, ‘Taking Animal Perspectives into
Account in Animal Ethics’, EvaMeijer and Bernice Bovenkerk explore this relatively
new idea of animal agency and the ethical ramifications of accepting that nonhuman
animals too have an interest in shaping their own lives.
Meijer and Bovenkerk identify and review two opposites on a spectrum of
approaches to conceptualizing animal agency. The first they call propositional
agency, which links agency to capacity for propositional thought. The second they
call materialist agency, which links agency to the capacity to move something else.
Both views have major problems, either being too limiting and anthropocentric (as
human forms of rationality are taken as the standard) or too broad to be of practical
use (as a framework to make normative and political judgments is missing). Meijer
and Bovenkerk instead propose an alternative working definition of agency, based on
a relational approach to ethics that doesn’t take an anthropocentric view of agency as
a starting point and one that takes the unique perspective of nonhuman animals into
account. In their view agency should be seen as the capacity of a subject to influence
the world in a way that expresses their desires and will. Their paper highlights the
advantages and disadvantages of a relational approach to agency and makes a case
for philosophers to engage differently with nonhuman animals in order to develop
an interspecies ethics.
Charlotte Blattner’s chapter, ‘Turning to Animal Agency in the Anthropocene’,
makes a similar case, but from a judicial perspective. Blattner demonstrates how
the current legal system is unable to provide justice for nonhuman animals. While
there are laws that claim to protect the welfare of nonhuman animals, Blattner argues
these laws in practice serve only to silence nonhuman animals and inhibit their agency
by cementing the moral and legal status of nonhuman animals as human property.
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Changes are therefore necessary to make the legal system fair and just towards
nonhuman animals. This can only happen once we acknowledge the difficulty of
objectively evaluating competing interests of human and nonhuman animals (due
to the fact that, as humans we are the ones making the laws while also being the
ones who benefit immensely from exploiting nonhuman animals). To overcome this
issue, Blattner convincingly argues in favor of honest, unbiased and open-ended
research into nonhuman animal agency to empower animal agency and work towards
a multispecies polity.
The importance of removing an anthropocentric perspective from the way we
think of nonhuman agency is further emphasized in Nathan Kowalsky’s chapter,
‘Animal Difference in the Age of the Selfsame’. Kowalsky critically reflects on the
flaws of the ‘growing circle of ethics’ perspective, put forward by Peter Singer.
He sees an historical development of growing concern from only caring for one’s
own well-being towards also caring for other humans and eventually caring about
nonhuman animals as well. Instead of determining the moral worth of a nonhuman
animal by measuring them to the human standard, we should judge them solely on
their own merits. By challenging the inherent anthropocentrism in how we decide
moral considerability, Kowalsky also touches on a type of nonhuman agency that the
previous authors did not discuss in depth, namely moral agency.
9.2 The Problem of Predation
Ever since people started making the case for animal rights and questioned the ethics
of killing them for food, the question of how to judge predation is one that has been
a challenge for philosophers. Especially when one acknowledges the moral agency
of nonhuman animals, accepting that their actions might be good or bad, it becomes
difficult to ignore the question of whether we have a duty to educate animals in right
moral behavior and if we should punish them for behaving in ways we consider
deplorable. How should we relate to the state of nature, where life is nasty, brutish
and short? Should we try to intervene and police wild animals, e.g. save the gazelle
from the hungry lion?
In his chapter, ‘Should the Lion Eat Straw Like the Ox? Animal Ethics and
the Predation Problem’, Jozef Keulartz explores this issue and evaluates the way
different philosophers have tried to tackle this problem fromdifferent ethical perspec-
tives. He reviews Peter Singer’s utilitarian approach, Tom Regan’s deontological
approach, Nussbaum’s capability approach and the political animal rights approach
of Donaldson and Kymlicka. Singer argues that the evil of predation cannot be elimi-
natedwithout introducingworse suffering,whileRegan tries to argue it is not our duty
to intervene and that nonhumans animals should simply be left alone. Keulartz shows
the problem with both approaches and he goes on to discuss Nussbaum’s capability
approach, which seems promising at first, but ultimately fails to offer amore balanced
view of the predator-prey relationship. In the end the political animal rights theory
of Donaldson and Kymlicka, which argues that wild animals should be recognized
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as members of separate, sovereign nations, seems the most promising. However,
Keulartz identifies problems with their approach as well, arguing that they underes-
timate the large destruction that is taking place globally, due to climate-change and
human activities. Simply giving wild animals back control over their own territories
won’t save them from the mass extinction that is taking place in the Anthropocene.
Keulartz’s paper forces us to ask ourselves whether treating wild animal populations
as sovereign entities is really the best way to respect nonhuman animal agency.
In the end, it seems that as philosophers we still struggle with how to evaluate
the (moral) agency of animals in the context of predator-prey relationship. While it
might be clear what the current state of these (often violent) relationships between
nonhuman animals is, it is not yet clear what they can and ought to be.
9.3 Human and Nonhuman Animals
It’s not strange that, as the academic field of animal ethics matures and other inter-
disciplinary fields like animal studies emerge as well, scientists and philosophers
become more sensitive to the ways humans and nonhuman animals are alike. The
chapter by Michiel Korthals, ‘Humanity in the Living, the Living in Humans’, high-
lights this as it shows how difficult it is to maintain a clear boundary between humans
and other animals, based on altruism, language or certain values.
Furthermore, as an academic field we should also become more aware of the
interconnectedness and similarity in the ways different groups are oppressed. Only
by being mindful of all manners of oppression can an ethical theory be developed
that respects the agency of human and nonhuman animals alike. The aim of ‘Justified
species partiality’, the chapter by Ronald Sandler and John Basl, should be seen in
this light. While I think that animal ethicists in general might be more aware of
and sensitive to the interests of humans with certain impairments or conditions than
Sandler and Basl give them credit for, the paper does show how important it is for
ethicists to look critically at how their words can be interpreted or (mis)understood.
While the famous ‘argument from marginal cases’ might still be logically valid,
no one likes to be called ‘marginal’, which is another good reason to rename the
argument to the ‘argument from species overlap’, as some philosophers have argued
for (Horta 2014).
9.4 The Future of Agency
The state of nonhuman animal agency is dire. Human domination unforgivingly
curtails opportunities for nonhuman self-realization, the human legal system works
against them and mass extinction due to human-caused climate change threatens
their continued existence. The discussed authors not only successfully make clear
where the theoretical debate on nonhuman animal agency now stands and what the
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remaining conceptual hurdles are, but they also make the societal and moral urgency
of more research in this area abundantly clear. As Meijer and Bovenkerk discussed
in their paper, philosophers and scientists will need to rethink the way they approach
this research, inventing new innovative ways of empirical research that engage with
nonhumans animals and gives them the opportunity to reshape our relationship with
them and determine their place in our shared society.
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An Introduction to Ecomodernism
Hidde Boersma
Abstract Land use change has detrimental impacts on the planet. It is not only a
major cause of biodiversity loss, through habitat destruction and fragmentation, but
also an important driver for climate change, through deforestation and peat oxidation.
Land use change is mainly driven by food production, of which meat production
comprises the major share. Ecomodernists therefore feel reduction of the impact of
meat production is paramount for a sustainable future. To achieve this, ecomodernists
focus on intensification of the production process to produce more on less land, both
through the closing of global yield gaps and through the development of integrated
indoor systems like agroparks. On the demand side, ecomodernists feel a diverse
strategy is needed, from the development of meat substitutes and lab meat, to the
persuasion of consumers to move from beef to monogastrics like pork or chicken.
10.1 Introduction
With the 2005 essay The Death of Environmentalism Ted Nordhaus and Michael
Shellenberger introduced the world to Ecomodernism, and with that the start of a
new greenmovement. The first 10 years they build their organization and philosophy,
culminating in 2015 in The Ecomodernist Manifesto, a document, written by experts
from different backgrounds, where the basic principles of the new movement where
laid down. The writers felt the classic Green environmentalists lost sight of saving
the planet, amidst political interests. Ecomodernists generally agree they owe a great
deal to the environmental movement from the 1960s and 1970s, but felt increasingly
frustrated by the lack of results of the last decades of the twentieth century. It was
time for the old movement to die, for a new one to thrive.
Ecomodernists, as a principle, strive to reduce mankind’s impact on the planet by
concentrating its activity on as little land as possible. The more humans intensify
their activities, the more space there is for nature to thrive. At this moment, humans
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use more than 70% of the ice-free land for the build environment, infrastructure,
energy, but mainly for agriculture (IPCC 2019). And although the earth’s population
grows from 7,5 billion to 10 billion in 2100 and at the same time will get more
prosperous, ecomodernists feel it is possible to reduce our need for land to amaximum
of approximately 30% of the total ice-free land.
As a consequence of this principle, ecomodernists favor nuclear energy as an
energy source for combating climate change, over renewables like wind and sun,
as nuclear reactors provide the most dense form of energy, and thus save space for
nature. Ecomodernists also support the ongoing urbanization trend. Currently, half
of the population, 3,5 billion people, live in cities thereby occupying only 3% of the
globe. Estimations are that in 2100more than 70%of the peoplewill live in cities (UN
DESA 2018). Finally, on agriculture, ecomodernists believe intensive agriculture is
the most sustainable way of combining a well fed and green planet in 2050.
As to the stance on agriculture, the focus point of this essay, ecomodernists owe a
big deal to the work of Ben Phalan and Andrew Balmford, both from the University
of Cambridge, UK, and their work on the land sharing versus land sparing debate. In a
nutshell, this debate revolves around the question whether for biodiversity it is better
to combine high yielding agriculture with setting away large swaths of the planet for
nature, or go for wildlife-friendly farming, with lower yields and thus requiring more
land, but with more biodiversity on the farm. The results of Phalan and Balmford,
but also of others, unequivocally show that land sparing in most cases saves more
biodiversity than land sharing, currently, but also in scenarios where in 2050 70%
more calories need to be produced (Phalan et al. 2011; Balmford et al. 2015; Hodgson
et al. 2010; Egan 2012). This is true for birds, mammals, trees, plants and insects, and
can simply be explained by the fact that animals or plants don’t like agricultural fields,
no matter if they are extensively or intensively managed. Especially rare organisms
need ‘wild’ nature to thrive.
The aim to reduce land use, fits with another core principle of ecomodernism:
saving nature by not needing it. In stark contrast with the classic green motto of
wanting to live more in harmony with nature as a way to save the planet, ecomod-
ernists feel that dependency on nature for one’s survival leads to its detriment. There
are some striking historical examples where nature was saved by not needing it
anymore. The population of whales, whose oil was used for lighting, was saved by
the discovery of fossil oil, and the same accounted for forest all around the world: by
switching from wood to oil and coal many forests around the world were saved from
the axe. Moreover, the rise of synthetic rubber, saved forests from turning into rubber
plantations, and, more recently, wild fish stocks are being saved by the development
of fish farms (Asafu-Adjaye et al. 2015). The less we need nature for its ecosystem
services, its resources or its land, the more it can follow its own dynamic, and the
more wild nature there is for us to enjoy. Nature should be saved for its intrinsic
value, not for its use for humankind, as then it is bound to lose.
So how do animals fit in this picture? Most ecomodernists don’t oppose eating
animals from amoral point of view, but naturally feel those animals should be treated
well. They however also realize that it is often hard to exactly pinpoint what exactly
comprises a good life for animals and how to measure it, without falling in the trap
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of anthropomorphizing. Ecomodernists often question our meat consumption from
an efficiency point of view: how much land can we save if we eat less meat, and how
do we produce meat in the least harmful way for the planet, with the lowest possible
greenhouse gas emissions and eutrophication potential.
10.2 The Optimal Role of Animals in Our Food System
From an environmental point of view, eating meat generally is a very inefficient
and wasteful way of producing food. Life Cycle Analyses (LCAs) show that meat
production over the whole range uses more land and comes with more greenhouse
gas emissions per kilo protein then a plant-based diet (FAO 2006). There is however
a large difference between the various meat sources regarding their environmental
impact, mainly through their different feed conversion ratios. While cows on average
need around 6 kilo feed to produce 1 kilo of meat, chicken need less than 2 kilo.
This means that to produce a kilo of beef, 100 m2 of land is necessary while
greenhouse gas (ghg) emissions reach 300 kilo CO2-equivalent for that same kilo. A
kilo of pork is produced on 13 m2, poultry on 8 m2. Similar calculations can be made
for milk and eggs, using respectively 4 and 5 m2 per kilo protein. For comparison:
the production of 1 kilo of proteins from pulses costs on average 1 m2 (Nijdam et al.
2012).
This seems like a clear call for eating less meat, but it is not as simple as that.
Animals serve an important role in the feed system, as they are able to feed on
feed not suitable for human consumption, like leaves and stems from crops, co-
products of the production system like spent grain of breweries and even food waste.
Furthermore cows feed on grass, non-digestible for humans, which often grows on
soils not suitable for crops. Historically, it is in this function animals roamed on the
premises of the small scale Dutch farms of the nineteenth century and before: by
upcycling waste, the system, which was characterized more by scarcity then by the
current abundance, wasmademore circular and less nutrients werewasted (Bieleman
2010).
During the twentieth century, agriculture professionalized, leading to specializa-
tion of the various tasks. Farmers specialized in crops or cattle, specialized butcheries
were erected. But animals still somewhat serve the same functions as before: more
than half of the feed of Dutch pigs consists of residual feed, for instance from the
starch industry. Over the years however, several residual feeds, like swill and animal
meal have become off-limits, because of disease risks. This made circular agriculture
harder, and sentenced a lot of food waste to the incinerator.
Recently, Dutch researchers from Wageningen University calculated the optimal
amount of animal protein consumed per day per capita for a system with as few
food waste as possible, to be between 9 and 23 grams (Van Zanten 2019). The large
range can be explained by legislation, which allows for residual streams, and by the
types of animals used for upcycling. As humans need approximately 60 grams of
protein per day, only a third of it should be of animal origin, the rest should come
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from either plants or seafood. Currently Dutch consumers consume 104 grams of
protein on average, of which 74 are of animal origin, on a daily basis, which implies
a drastic reduction of meat consumption is crucial for an optimal and sustainable
future agricultural system (Dagevos et al. 2019).
It is important to notice that this analysis largely applies to rich countries in North
America and Europa, as this is where most meat is consumed. Where American citi-
zens consume 120 kilo meat per year, which translates into more than 400 kilocalo-
ries per day, Indians only devour 4 kilo and China around 60. In many developing
countries increasing meat consuming improves overall health, as meat is an easy
and dense source of nutrients, much more than vegetables. Ecomodernists therefore
accept UN predictions that global meat consumption will continue to rise, which
begs the question what the most sustainable way is to raise animals.
10.3 The Case for Intensification
Under pressure of population growth, technological progress, globalization and
scarcer land, meat production in the Netherlands, but also in other western coun-
tries changed during the twentieth century from extensive grazing or roaming, to
intensive production systems. This was especially true for pork and poultry, as they
cannot live on grass and became more and more ‘land independent’, fed by feed
sometimes from far away. As a result of this intensification process, during the twen-
tieth century the number of pigs in the Netherlands grew from 3 million in 1960
to 12,5 million in 2018, while the numbers of broiler chickens grew from 2,4 to 48
billion. Cows showed a far moremodest growth (CBS). Similar intensification trends
are currently underway in China and other countries like Brazil, where the economy
and the population are growing (FAO 2006).
The process of intensification has increased food security but led to a series of
environmental problems, ranging from eutrophication of streams and waters due to
overuse of fertilizer, to land degradation and deforestation through the increasing
need for land for grazing and for the production of soy and maize for feed (ibid.).
It furthermore led to rising greenhouse gas emissions, raised concerns about animal
welfare and made people question the impact on the landscape.
Lately, this has led to an increasing interest in meat raised in extensive systems. In
theUSsales of grass-fed beef is on the rise, as opposed to feedlot-finishedbeef (Hayek
and Garrett 2018). Similarly, sales of organic produce is growing in the Netherlands,
often motivated by both environmental and animal welfare concerns (Bionext Tren-
drapport 2018). Environmental organizations like Friends of the Earth (2017) call
for buying locally and organically produced meat, next to reducing consumption in
general.
Ecomodernists very much question whether a move to a more extensive meat
production system is the right direction. As Marian Swain (2017), fellow by the
American thinktank the Breakthrough Institute notices in her essay on The Future
of Meat, intensive livestock farming produces more meat, more quickly, with fewer
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animals. The controlled environment and formulated feed promote optimized growth
and reduce losses. As most of the greenhouse gas emissions come from the need for
land for feed production, and, in the case of ruminants, the production of methane
through burping, it are these characteristicswhichmake intensive cattle farmingmore
environmentally friendly. The direct use of fossil fuels in those intensive system is
small, usually less than 20% of the total greenhouse gas emissions of agriculture.
Several studies endorse the notion that intensification ismore sustainable: Pelletier
et al. (2010) for instance find that in the US pasture beef almost takes 20 kilo of CO2-
equivalents per kilo to produce, while the more intensive feedlot-finished beef costs
a little more than 15 kilo. Dutch intensive agriculture is even more efficient, with
10,9 kilo of CO2-eq emissions per kilo beef. In poultry, it takes 39,2 kilo CO2-eq
emissions to create a per kilo protein in intensive production systems, compared to
48,7 in extensive systems. Only for pork, extensive systems have lower greenhouse
gas emissions: 47,6 over 52,0. With total combined yearly greenhouse gas emissions
of 1609million ton the production of chicken and pork is dwarfed by the 5024million
ton which is yearly emitted by the production of beef (FAO 2017).
Similar calculations can be made for land use, where in the US feedlot-finished
beef needs only half of the land compared to its grass-fed equivalent. In 2016,
the American agronomist Jason Lusk from Oklahoma University calculated that
if there had been no intensification and technological progress since the 1950s, 15,3
million more beef cows would be needed to produce the amount of meat we produce
now. Also, 228 million more acres of corn would be needed, as well as 101 million
more acres of soybeans (Lusk 2016). Thus, intensification saves nature from being
ploughed under, a phenomenon also known as the Borlaug hypothesis, named after
Norman Borlaug, the famous plant breeder and Nobel Peace prize laureate, also
known as the father of the Green Revolution.
Recently, a team of scientists endorsed the importance of sparing land by intro-
ducing the concept of carbon benefit. Currently, life cycle analyses of food production
often do not take into account the carbon storage opportunity of fields taken out of
production, but the concept of carbon opportunity costs in this study solves this
lacuna. The consortium of scientists shows that intensification of production, and
thereby freeing land for forest is a powerful and efficient climate change mitiga-
tion strategy (Searchinger et al. 2018a). In a similar vein, Lamb et al. (2016) two
years earlier calculated that by intensifying agriculture in the UK on the best suitable
places, and returning marginal land to nature, the UK would be able to produce the
same amount of food, whilst at the same time achieving the goals of the 2015 Paris
Agreement, without changing its energy portfolio.
The Dutch Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR) was an early advo-
cate of intensification. Already in 1992 the council calculated that for the European
Union it is possible to produce a similar amount of food on a quarter of the current
area, by concentration and optimizing production in the most fertile places. In this
way, 75% of all European fields, could utopically be rewilded, used for climate
change mitigation or have any other beneficial function.
Similar calculations can bemade for theNetherlands,where at themoment already
80% of economic value in agriculture is made on 20% of the land (Van de Klundert
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2012). By intensifying these areas further, it is possible to put marginal lands like the
poor sandy soils in the northern province of Drenthe out of production. Those areas
can be turned into reserves for meadow and farmland birds, which are an important
part of the identity of theDutch landscape and people. It also opens up the opportunity
to stop oxidation of peatlands in the west of the country by flooding these areas and
turning them into biodiverse wetlands, instead of using them for milk cows to graze
upon.
Opponents of such land sparing strategies often point to the so called rebound
effect, also known as Jevons Paradox. Historically, gains in efficiency often do not
lead to environmental wins but ramp up consumption by lowering prices, thereby
increasing the pressure on earth and its resources. William Jevons already in 1865
showed that improved technology in the coal industry led to more, not less fuel
consumption. Applied to agriculture, it means that a farmer who intensifies his
production most often will not spare land, but expands his business either because
technology allows him, or because low prices force him.
Ecomodernists agree this is a serious problem. Especially in the age of rapid
economic growth, combined with a rising population, intensification and agricultural
expansion often go hand in hand. Ecomodernists therefore believe that intensifica-
tion only works when accompanied by strict zoning policies from the government,
which allow for the setting aside of large swaths of nature (Boersma et al. 2018).
Ecomodernists even consider the erection of an IPCC-like body for global land use
(Ellis andMehrabi 2019). Without strict land use policies, it will be very hard to save
biodiversity and stabilize the climate, whatever the agricultural system in place.
10.4 How History Shapes the Way We Think About Animal
Farming
Making the case for intensification isn’t popular. This stemsnot only frommisconcep-
tions about what sustainability actually compromises or from sincere concerns about
animal welfare, but also has historical and sociological components. What scientifi-
cally counts as sustainable, often isn’t considered beautiful or culturally correct, and
this makes for a murky debate. People often make inconsistent, and sometimes even
contradictory demands.
Such contradictions iswhat theGermanphilosopher JürgenHabermas (1985) calls
the conflict between the worlds of subjectivity, objectivity, and intersubjectivity, or,
more simply put, the worlds of facts, social norms and individual experiences. As
an example, in animal agriculture this means that from a scientific, rational point
of view it is best to keep cows indoors, with high productivity and low emissions
under tightly controlled circumstances. But from a normative point of view, those
animals belong in the meadow, as this is how it should be, this is what we see on
paintings of famous Dutch artists of the seventeenth to nineteenth century like Paulus
Potter and Willem Maris. Grazing cows are part of the Dutch identity. Finally, from
10 An Introduction to Ecomodernism 169
an individual point of view, the sight of a cow slogging in a field at 35 °C, might
make an onlooker think it is better to take the animal inside. Such conflicting views
slow down transitions, as they lead to contradicting views and thus conflicting policy
recommendations. Transitions often only come to fruition when the three worlds
come together.
In the discussion about the future of animal agriculture, environmental organiza-
tions have a peculiar position. Environmentalists generally are highly educated, live
in urban environments and live a cosmopolitan lifestyle. They optimally benefit from
the globalized, industrialized and interconnectedworld and live awealthy life,mostly
shielded from the hardship of the normalworld, inwhat theGermanphilosopher Peter
Sloterdijk (2005) calls a Crystal Palace.
But when it comes to the landscape in their direct surroundings, they expect the
exact opposite. They don’t like the globalized and highly connected, technological
food chain, and what it has done to the landscape. For them, farmers should move to
a way of farming resembling the past: more extensive and in harmony with nature.
The conflicts between peoples own lifestyles, in this case cosmopolitanism, and
preferences on how others should live their lives, show how hard it is to align the
world of subjectivity, objectivity, and intersubjectivity.
To whether animals are better off outside, the evidence is mixed. In intensive
systems, disease rates are often lower, as are animal losses, but in extensive systems
animals are able to display more natural behavior. For cows, living outside in hot
summers can be stressful. With their sophisticated metabolism of grass, their bodies
generate a lot of heath, and cows therefore dislike temperature above 16 °C. Recently,
Von Keyserlingk et al. (2009) from the University of British Columbia showed that
cows in temperate climates like their pastures, but only at night when it is cooler. In
more tropical regions, like India and Brazil, from a welfare stance, it might be better
for cows to always stay inside. For pigs, Hötzel et al. (2004) showed that indoor
pigs displayed more aggressive and unnatural behavior then their outdoor living
equivalents. If held indoors, efforts should be taken to mimic outside circumstances.
Finally, chicken by nature are forest animals, and refrain from going far in open
fields.
As for global human health, indoor systems are preferred.Diseases like the various
versions of the avian flu, which can also infect humans, are more easily spread in
open, outdoor systems, sometimes through contact with wild relatives like ducks.
Similarly, wild boars more easily spread swine fever to pigs roaming outside, then
to those living in closed systems (Brown and Bevins 2018).
10.5 The Future of Animal Farming
How do ecomodernists feel animal farming should develop the coming decades?
First of all, efforts should focus on making best practices common practice. In crop
agriculture, closing the yield gap between maximum and actual yields, is a major
strategy in solving hunger and malnutrition while saving nature (Floey et al. 2011),
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and a similar effort should be made in animal agriculture. Research shows there
are large gaps in efficiency and productivity between countries, but also between
farms within countries. Especially in beef production the gap between the best and
the worst performing farms is large. Nijdam et al. (2012) show that greenhouse gas
emissions vary from 9 kilo per kilo beef for the most efficient intensive system, to
129 kilo for the worst performing pastoral system. Land use varies from 7 m2 per
kilo for the best to 420 m2 per kilo for the worst performer. For pigs and chickens the
gaps are smaller, but the best performing systems still use half the land of the more
unproductive ones.
The country of Brazil serves as an example where closing the gap can make a
difference.Although soy plantations get themost attention as a driver of deforestation
of the Amazon and the Cerrado (a vast tropical savanna), 80% of the fields which
used to be pristine forest are used for grazing, in a very extensive way, often with
only one cow per hectare (Pendrill et al. 2019). The introduction of feedlot-finishing
alone will already drastically lower land demand.
For the places where intensification already is in place, ecomodernists feel that
environmental gains can be made by transforming farms into so-called agroparks.
Agroparks are integrated, concentrated facilities where multiple actors in the food
chain come together, from breeding to processing, and where residual flows can be
re-used on site. Agroparks aim to make as efficient as possible use of space, scale,
distance and waste (Smeets 2011).
Agroparks come from the field of industrial ecology and were first mentioned at
the turn of the century. They were born out of the idea that a strict separation of
functions would increase livability of the countryside: agroparks for agriculture, the
landscape for nature. Agroparks are inspired by themixed farmswhichwere common
in the Netherlands in 1900, especially on the poorer, sandy soils of the east and south
of the country. Those farms kept a couple of animals, mainly for themanure, grew the
feed themselves and even slaughtered the animal on site. The discovery of artificial
fertilizer, the growing global market and better infrastructure made mixed farms to
inefficient and led to specialization. This went so far that whole regions began to
focus on the production of one type of product, like vegetables under glass in the
area around the cities of Rotterdam and The Hague, and pigs in the province of
Noord-Brabant.
However, technological progress has made it possible to operate mixed farms
that are actually competitive enough in the global market. Mixed farms are more
sustainable as they are easier to make circular by re-using residual streams on
site. They furthermore avoid transporting animals, and thus lowering stress levels,
as an agroparks can have their own butcher. Key to making this work is scaling
up: butcheries are only profitable on farms with more than 200.000 animals, and
agroparks make this possible, in an animal-friendly way.
Agroparks build on the success of the famous greenhouses in the Netherlands.
By controlling all circumstances in a closed circuit, Dutch horticulturists are able
to make products with minimal input. Where a kilo of tomatoes in an open field in
Spain need 60 L of water to grow, Dutch growers work with only 8. Furthermore,
yields per hectare are significantly higher than elsewhere in the world, which means
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the Dutch are making efficient use of space. The advantages of indoor systems are
reflected in the price. The costs of a kilo chicken in a closed system add up to 2,30
euro, in an open system to 3,70 (ibid.).
Size and proximity in agroparks also make horizontal integration possible. This
means for instance that slaughter waste can be processed into useful resources, which
can be used to grow crops. The energy and heat of this process can be used on
site, or returned to the net as green energy. Wastewater from the greenhouses can
serve as feed for algae, fish or mollusks. As animals live in a closed off area, it
is easier to separate feces and urine, and reuse nutrients as phosphate and nitrogen.
Technical improvements to make such things work, are often expensive, and are only
cost-effective in large systems.
In 2018, Peter Smeets, researcher atWageningen University and Research, retired
geographer Steeph Buijs and me developed a redesign of the Dutch landscape,
based on increasing urbanization and the use of agroparks for the production of
food (ibid.). We were inspired by the plan of the Chinese government to create so-
called metropolitan regions, like the greater-Beijing area, which will grow to 130
million people (Johnson 2015). To house them, the government allocated an area as
big as 200.000 km2, which means every inhabitant has on average 1500 m2 at her
disposal, 1,5 times as much as people living in the Randstad, the urbanized area in
the west of the Netherlands. The Chinese plan to make this area self-sufficient for
fruit, vegetables, meat, eggs and dairy. Staple crops and feed will be imported from
the hinterland of from other countries.
The Netherlands should also be developed like a metropolitan region. For that,
it is essential to think across borders. City planners already for a long time call
the Netherlands, and more specifically the Randstad, an empty city, and the same
counts for surrounding areas like the Ruhr in Germany, the Brussels-Antwerp axis
in Belgium and the area around Lille in France. This whole area houses 35 million
people, and Dutch agriculture at the moment produces mainly for this region: 70%
of all products are sold here, which makes the area largely self-sufficient. This forms
the perfect basis for the development of a metropolitan region.
With the clustering of agricultural activities there is finally room to really improve
nature and biodiversity in the Netherlands. The last couple of decades the Dutch
landscape has become cluttered, and it has proven hard to create large areas for
nature and recreation (PBL 2017). In the 1990s the Dutch government planned the
Ecological Main Structure, in an effort to connect Dutch nature areas, but it largely
failed to materialize due to political inertness in the following decades (LNV 2018).
To improve biodiversity, interconnected reserves are crucial, as many scientists have
shown in different parts of the world (Kuussaari et al. 2009).
In our plan, agroparks are built or expanded in areas which are already leading
the way. This means more greenhouses around Rotterdam and The Hague, and more
in the north of the province of Noord-Holland, where Seed valley is located. Poultry
agroparks will be built around the Veluwe, in the middle of the country, while de
Peel in the province of Noord-Brabant is perfectly suited for agroparks for pigs. We
furthermore anticipate a continuing urbanization, and thus expanded housing areas
around cities. Through this concentrating of housing and food production, large
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swaths of land can be returned to nature, most notably the peatlands of the ‘Green
Heart’, the area in between the cities of Utrecht, Rotterdam and Amsterdam, which
will be completely turned into wetlands, both for nature purposes and to increase
water storage potential, in the wake of climate change.
10.6 The Future of Animal Eating
Clearly, the production side isn’t the only lever to pull when it comes to making
animal agriculture more sustainable; there is also the demand side. As stated above,
from an environmental point of view, reduction of meat consumption is paramount.
Although a full plant-based lifestyle isn’t necessarily the best, as long asmany people
eat more than their fair share of meat, every extra vegetarian should be welcomed.
Like every major behavioral change, getting people to eat less meat is hard.
Notwithstanding years of promotion of ideas like meatless Monday, average meat
consumption in theNetherlands has stagnated at 77 kilo per year, down from a peak of
79 kilo in 2010. The last two years no change in consumption has been detected. Simi-
larly, the percentage of vegetarians is relatively stable at approximately 4% (Dagevos
et al. 2019). To lower the impact of the consumption of meat, several strategies have
to be set in motion simultaneously. People have different values when it comes to diet
and eating meat in particular, and to get people to change their diet, means catering
to those different values.
As full vegetarianism is hard to adhere to, one important strategy might be to
get people to swap their beef for chicken or pork. The World Resource Institute
in December 2018 calculated that swapping one third of ones beef for pork or
poultry already reduces ones greenhouse gas emissions by 14% and land use by
13% (Searchinger et al. 2018b). The transition from beef to chicken is already in
place in most western countries, as Linus Blomqvist (2019) notices in his essay Eat
Meat, Not Too Much, Mostly Monogastrics: “In the US, beef consumption declined
from 169 kcal/capita/day at its peak in 1976 to just 100 kcal/capita/day in 2013, a
drop of over 40 percent.”
Another strategy is the development of meat substitutes. The last couple of years
there have been many improvements and new introductions, and substitutes now
resemble realmeat in taste, structure and look.Aprominent example is the Impossible
Burger, which uses a plant heme, produced bymodified yeast, to let its burger ‘bleed’
like a really burger, thereby mimicking its mouthfeel. The pea-based Beyond Burger
uses beet juice, to do the same. Both are available in restaurants and shops around
the world.
A third important strategy is the development of labmeat.1 In 2013Dutch pharma-
cologistMark Post fromMaastricht University presented the first burger created from
stem cells in a petri dish (Jha 2013). Back then, it costed 250.000 euro to create, but
since then various companies have optimized and standardized the process and got
1See also the chapter by Cor van der Weele in this Volume.
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the price down to 1000 euro per kilo. In a few years lab meat will probably be afford-
able for the masses. Lab meat presumably will have the biggest impact replacing
bulk meat like nuggets, minced meat and shawarma, as these are the simplest form
of meat, containing only muscle tissue. As these meat products constitute a major
chunk of total consumption, lab meat might make a big difference. Several studies
already show lab meat being superior from an environmental point of view, espe-
cially with regard to land use (Tuomisto and Teixeira de Mattos 2011; Smetana et al.
2015).
Ecomodernists recognize that in the end, a sizeable part of the people still prefer
the real deal over meat substitutes. To tackle this, in the Netherlands, food writer
Joel Broekaert (in Hertzberger et al. 2018) introduced the concept ‘eating less meat
by eating more meat’, in which he advocates for eating the whole animal instead
of only parts. For him, there are four major upsides, namely (1) people will get
more knowledgeable about the food chain and eat their animal with more respect;
(2) farmers will be able to capitalize on the whole animal, instead of having to sell
leftover parts for lower prices to the processing industry; (3) people’s quality of life
will rise, as the parts we seldom eat actually are the most tasteful; and lastly (4)
when people recognize what good meat really tastes like, it makes it easier to swap
tasteless chicken in other dishes for substitutes like tofu.
10.7 Conclusion
For a sustainable future, ecomodernists aim to minimize humanity’s footprint
primarily by shrinking the area humans use to live and produce. Where humans now
use more than 70% of the ice-free land, ecomodernists aim to reduce that to around
30%. As cattle, pigs and chickens tread heavily on the earth, our meat consumption
and production serve as an important lever. Ecomodernists believe that a pragmatic
combination of intensification and demand reduction are the most important ways to
lower impact. The former consists of a combination of closing the yield gap between
the best and the worst performers, alongwith the development of innovative concepts
like agroparks; the latter needs a combination of the (further) development of meat
substitutes and lab meat, combined with a move away from beef to pork or chicken,
and an increased use of the whole animal instead of only a few parts.
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Chapter 11
Place-Making by Cows in an Intensive
Dairy Farm: A Sociolinguistic Approach
to Nonhuman Animal Agency
Leonie Cornips and Louis van den Hengel
Abstract Based on recent ethnographic fieldwork at an intensive dairy farm, this
chapter examines the usefulness of posthuman critical theory for developing a new
sociolinguistic approach to nonhuman animal agency. We explore how dairy cows,
as encaged sentient beings whose mobility is profoundly restricted by bars and
fences, negotiate their environment as a material-semiotic resource in linguistic
acts of place-making. Drawing on the fields of critical posthumanism, new mate-
rialism and sociolinguistics, we explain how dairy cows imbue their physical space
with meaning through materiality, the body and language. By developing a non-
anthropocentric approach to language as a practice of more-than-human sociality,
we argue for establishing egalitarian research perspectives beyond the assumptions
of human exceptionalism and species hierarchy. The chapter thus aims to contribute
towards a new understanding of nonhuman agency and interspecies relationships in
the Anthropocene.
11.1 Introduction
Human thinkers in the western philosophical tradition have long relied upon the
silencing of nonhuman animal others to confirm the exceptionalism of their own
species. SinceAristotle, philosophers and scientists have defined “man” as a “rational
animal” distinguished from other animals by his—and, more recently, her or their—
capacity for a special kind of thinking, variously described as self-consciousness,
reason, or representational thought (Cull 2015, 19). If, as Eva Meijer asserts (2016,
73), in this tradition “humans are viewed as radically different from other animals,”
then language is commonly seen as “one of the main ways in which this difference is
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expressed.” The idea that language is what makes us human, or more precisely, that
the possession of language allows humans to separate themselves from nonhuman
nature, including their own animality, is indeed a key component of philosophical
humanism and its exclusionary conceptions of individual and collective person-
hood. The philosopher Giorgio Agamben (2004, 33) uses the term “anthropological
machine” to refer to the process by which the human is defined over and against
what is nonhuman or animal, thus dividing the human subject from more-than-
human forms of sentience, sociality, intelligence and communication. The strict
identification of the human with language, or what Agamben (2004, 38) calls an
articulation between “speaking being” and “living being,” is central to the func-
tioning of the anthropological machine, that is, the ways in which humans ought to
continually create themselves as speaking political beings by creating hierarchies
between human, animal, vegetable and mineral species. The traditional humanist
understanding of the human as a unique creature, one that rises above the natural
world of animals, plants and the physical environment, thus rests on a fundamental
denial that nonhuman animals might be capable of language and other forms of
complex symbolic communication.
In this chapter, wewish tomove beyond the assumptions of human exceptionalism
and species hierarchy in order to advance an understanding of language that displaces
the centrality of the human subject. Specifically, we will explore how dairy cows,
as caged living beings or what sociologist Rhoda Wilkie (2010, 115) has called
“sentient commodities,” negotiate their environment as a material-semiotic resource
in the production of a meaningful world. While their physical mobility is profoundly
restricted by bars and fences, we will examine how dairy cows enact social and
linguistic agency through complex assemblages formed by human and nonhuman
bodies, materials and environments. Starting from the assumption that, within the
context of dairy farming, the subjectivities of cows and humans are continuously co-
produced, we want to highlight how recognizing the linguistic agency of dairy cows
may allow us to resist anthropocentric understandings of interspecies relationships
and to formulate a new perspective on language as a social practice of human-
nonhuman interaction. The central aim of this chapter, therefore, is to elaborate a
radically post- or non-anthropocentric sociolinguistic approach that may help foster
more egalitarian relationships to and between different species, or, as Agamben
(2004, 83) phrases it, to bring to a “standstill” the anthropological machine that has
historically articulated humanity and animality through their mutual exclusion.
The chapter has four sections. The first section examines how traditional humanist
conceptions of languagehave structureddominant philosophical and linguistic under-
standings of human-animal relationships. The second section discusses the cogni-
tive, emotional and social capacities of cows as sentient and intelligent beings, and
proceeds to argue for the usefulness of posthuman critical theory for expanding the
linguistic research agenda to include the study of nonhuman animal languages. This
sets the stage for the third section, which discusses recent fieldwork at an inten-
sive dairy farm in order to explore how cows, as social actors, engage in processes
of linguistic place-making. Drawing, on the one hand, on recent work at the inter-
section of critical posthumanism and applied linguistics (Pennycook 2018) and, on
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the other, on new materialist conceptions of agency as a distributed phenomenon
(Bennett 2010), we will elaborate a non-anthropocentric approach to human and
nonhuman language practices. In the last and concluding section, we consider some
of the implications of our findings for negotiating, or renegotiating, contemporary
questions of nonhuman animal agency. As a whole this chapter argues that acknowl-
edging nonhuman linguistic agency is essential for thinking through and responding
to the specific conditions and challenges of theAnthropocene,where the advent of the
human as a global geophysical force has muddled conventional distinctions between
culture and nature, human and nonhuman, self and other. If, as Donna Haraway
suggests, nonhuman animals “are not here just to think with,” but rather they are here
to “live with” (Haraway 2003, 5, emphasis added), then we must indeed embrace
modes of inquiry suited to the task of confronting human and nonhuman acts of
language, sociality and world-making.
11.2 Language and the Politics of Human Exceptionalism
The view that nonhuman animals have no speech, and therefore cannot establish
themselves as ethical, juridical and political subjects, goes back at least to the ancient
Greeks. In a well-known passage of his Politics, Aristotle associates the formation
of political community with the supposedly unique human capacity for reasoned
speech. Aristotle insists that the capacity for speech informed by reason (logos) is
what separates “man”, as a political animal, from the mere beasts who do not speak
but simply produce sound (phonè):
And so the reason why man is a political animal more than any bee or any gregarious animal
is clear. For nature, as we often say, does nothing in vain; and man alone of the animals
possesses speech (logos). The mere voice (phonè), it is true, can indicate pain and pleasure,
and therefore is available in the other animals as well (for their nature has been developed so
far as to have feelings of pain and pleasure and to signify them to one another), but speech,
for its part, is designed to express the useful and the harmful and therefore also the just and
the unjust.1
Because nonhuman animals are incapable of speech, Aristotle argues, they cannot
express the civic and moral virtues that he considered essential for the wellbeing of
the household and the city-state. Aristotle, as Derrida explains in The Beast and the
Sovereign (2009, 343–349), thus makes a categorical distinction between human and
nonhuman animals to posit an inextricable link between language and the political
sphere. His philosophy therefore not only delimits political agency to certain privi-
leged human beings—the free adult male citizens that make up the polis—but also
actively excludes nonhuman animal voices from the definition of language itself.
Many later philosophers have followed Aristotle in rejecting the linguistic and
cognitive abilities of nonhuman animals (Meijer 2016, 75–76). Descartes, for
example, argued that animals do not think because they cannot speak: he regarded
1Aristotle, Politics, 1253a. Translation by Louis van den Hengel.
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nonhuman animals as machines, governed by the laws of physical matter alone and
hence devoid of mind and self-awareness.2 Although he did recognize that animals
such as magpies and parrots can utter words, and that dogs make noises that might
resemble speech, Descartes maintained that other animals “cannot speak as we do:
that is, they cannot show that they are thinkingwhat they are saying” (Descartes 1985,
140). Heidegger, despite his phenomenological critique of Descartes, also claimed
that nonhuman animals are incapable of language and therefore lack access towhat he
called “world-formation”, that is, the ability to form true and conscious relationships
with others and with their environment. According to Heidegger, nonhuman animals
are unable to apprehend the world as such—that is to say, in the world-forming
ways that language, understood as logos, allows for—because they are captivated
by their instincts and bound to their environments. Animals do have access to the
world—they are not, like stones and other inert objects, what Heidegger calls “world-
less” (weltlos)—but their relationship to it is an impoverished one: Heidegger calls
nonhuman animals “poor in world” (weltarm), whereas humans are deemed to be
world-forming (weltbildend). Insofar as an animal is essentially absorbed in its envi-
ronment (Umwelt), it cannot truly act in relation to the world (Welt) as such, or, as
Heidegger puts it (1995, 239), an animal “behaves within an environment but never
within a world.”
Although Heidegger repeatedly observes that “the relation between poverty in
world and world-formation does not entail hierarchical assessment” (1995, 192),
he does nonetheless privilege human beings to the extent that, in his view, only
language, by which he means human language, is capable of disclosing the world
as an intelligible and meaningful place. “Language alone,” he writes, “brings what
is, as something that is, into the Open for the first time. Where there is no language,
as in the being of stone, plant, and animal, there is also no openness of what is,
and consequently no openness either of what is not” (Heidegger 1971, 73). In fore-
grounding human language as central to the practice of world-formation, Heidegger
not only seeks to demarcate human from nonhuman animals, but also postulates a
distinction between language and communication that echoes Aristotle’s assumption
of a fundamental difference between speech and sound, between logos and phonè, as
well as Descartes’ view on animals as mindless machines. For Heidegger, language
is “not only and not primarily an audible and written expression of what is to be
communicated” (ibid.), but rather it serves to manifest the world as such as a field
of significance: an open space of possibilities, as opposed to an animal’s instinctual
captivation. Language, in this view, is thuswhat separates human being-in-the-world,
or Dasein, from the being of other animals, which, as Heidegger writes, “has nothing
to do with the selfhood of the human being comporting him- or herself as a person”
(Heidegger 1995, 238–239).
Linguistics, no less than philosophy, has long reiterated the humanist under-
standing of language as a fundamental dividing line between human and nonhuman
2Most commentators attribute to Descartes the concomitant view that animals, because they cannot
think, have no feelings and do not suffer pain, yet some scholars (Harrison 1992; Cottingham 2008,
163–173) have sought to contest this interpretation.
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animals, thus reinforcing the predominant view of language as the essence of human
personhood.Aristotle’s distinction between logos and phonè is still holding ground in
concepts of language as either amental or social construct in twodominant contempo-
rary linguistic theories, namely generative grammar (Chomsky2002, 2006) and (vari-
ationist) sociolinguistics (Labov 1994, 2001). The generative framework, advanced
since the late 1950 s by Noam Chomsky and others, theorizes language as a human
mental construct where processes of thinking and knowledge about abstract symbols
are generated: a cognitive systemor “innermental tool” (Berwick andChomsky2016,
164) that works independently from phonetics or the speaking voice (phonè), which
is assigned to language-in-use. This view consolidates the older assumption that the
primary function of language is for human thought rather than for external commu-
nication. Even though language can, of course, be used to communicate with others,
most of speech is inner speech, or, as Chomsky (2002, 148) puts it: “almost all the use
of language is to oneself.” In suggesting that language, defined in the narrow sense
of an abstract computational system for thought, does not occur beyond the human
brain, Chomsky gives a new inflection to the Cartesian understanding of language
as essentially disembodied and non-social, while at the same time reinforcing the
anthropocentric idea that language constitutes “a yawning chasm between what we
[humans] can do and what other animals cannot” (Berwick and Chomsky 2016,
110).3
Language, in generative linguistics, is thus seen as a species-specific ability that
sets human beings apart from nonhuman animal others: “When we study human
language, we are approaching what somemight call the ‘human essence’, the distinc-
tive qualities of mind that are, so far as we know, unique to man (sic)” (Chomsky
2006, 88). Even though, in a paper coauthored for Science, Chomsky has acknowl-
edged that “available data suggest a much stronger continuity between animals and
humans with respect to speech than previously believed” (Hauser et al. 2002, 1574),
he nonetheless maintains his faith in a uniquely human property of language, located
either in the capacity for recursion—the ability to “generate an infinite range of
expressions from a finite set of elements” (ibid.)—or in what he calls the “creative
aspect” of language use, that is, the “distinctively human ability to express new
thoughts and to understand entirely new expressions of thought” (Chomsky 2006,
6).4 And while Chomsky, as Donna Haraway notes, has been cautious enough to
present the idea of linguistic uniqueness as “a testable hypothesis, not an assumption
rooted in premises of human exceptionalism” (Haraway 2008, 373 note 44), there
is no doubt that the tradition of anthropocentric thought assumed in the generative
3In his Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics, Heidegger in a similar manner suggests that
nonhuman animals are “separated from man by an abyss” (1995, 26, emphasis added). Because
nonhuman animals lack language, they cannot apprehend other beings conceptually, as beings: for
Heidegger, only humans are capable of grasping that which is as such.
4In this view, the linguistic ability to innovate—to form new statements that express new thoughts
appropriate to but not directly caused by their immediate contexts—is considered a fundamental
factor that distinguishes human language, seen as free from control by any detectable stimuli,
from nonhuman animal communication, which is assumed to occur only in response to an external
environment or to internal drives.
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framework has been a serious obstacle to investigating the linguistic, rather than
communicative, abilities of nonhuman animals.
In contrast to Chomsky’s non-social view of language, sociolinguistic research
has built on the pioneering work of William Labov and others to theorize language
as both dependent on cognition and interconnected with the workings of society
and culture.5 In the sociolinguistic framework, language is understood as a social
construct stemming from the need to contextualize how humans use language in
interaction with others, aiming to find out how and why languages vary and change,
and how (groups of) speakers employ linguistic resources to shape individual and
collective identities, communities and social hierarchies. This view converges with
recent approaches to language as an embodied (Bucholtz andHall 2016), multimodal
(Müller et al. 2013) andmultisensory (Pennycook andOtsuji 2015) phenomenon that
includes not only verbal speech but, among others, bodily gestures and facial expres-
sions, actions, movements, sensorial practices of meaning-making through tasting,
touching, seeing and smelling, as well as the mediation of embodiment by material
objects, spaces and environments. Encompassing a wide range of research areas,
including the social meaning of different language varieties, the role of stylization
in language use, the construction of social identity categories like class and gender
through language practices, bi- and multilingualism, and social norms and attitudes
towards linguistic diversity, sociolinguistics has opened valuable new avenues for
researchers interested in the manifold relationships between language, identity and
power.
Although much sociolinguistic research remains faithful to the human as the most
important user of language—in fact, the very notion that humans may use certain
linguistic skills and resources is in no small part dependent on liberal humanist
conceptions of choice and agency—this framework is nevertheless promising for
a linguistics that wishes to be inclusive of human and nonhuman actors (Cornips
2019). By approaching language as both embodied and embedded in a variety of
interactive social practices, contexts and environments, sociolinguistic studies chal-
lenge the anthropocentric understanding of a language as an exclusively verbal,
decontextualized object that is completely autonomous, inaccessible from outside
the mind, and therefore somehow fixed in character. In this perspective, embodi-
ment is central to the production and interpretation of language as a form of social
practice, while bodies, in turn, are themselves part of the semiotic landscape as they
are “imbricated in complex arrangements that include nonhuman as well as human
participants, whether animals, epidemics, objects, or technologies” (Bucholtz and
Hall 2016, 186).
Broadening up the concept of language (grammar) to include multimodal and
multisensory practices of meaning-making allows us to foreground nonhuman semi-
otic capacities, including specific sensorial abilities such as olfactory ones for cows
and dogs, as language-specific grammatical means. It thus provides a useful frame-
work to analyze differences between and among human and nonhuman animals
5Neither generative nor sociolinguistic theory has questioned the legitimacy of each other’s
discipline, yet attempts to integrate both have not been successful (Cornips and Gregersen 2016).
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in terms of grammatical possibilities and expressions instead of simply ascribing
deficiencies to the latter (Kulick 2017, 373). For example, if a cow in an indoor
dairy farm steps back and withdraws her face through the iron bars when humans
approach her, this bodily movement combined with head positioning, gaze direc-
tion and the sound of the moving iron bar may be analyzed equally to how human
animals phrase negation as in the sentence do NOT approach me (Cornips and van
Koppen 2019). Further below, we will demonstrate how recent scholarship produced
at the intersection of sociolinguistic theory and critical posthumanism will allow
us to take the study of language beyond the speaking human subject and into the
more-than-human material world. But first, let us discuss the linguistic abilities and
communicative competence of cows in more detail. What can a non-anthropocentric
approach to language contribute to our understanding of the ways in which cows
speak to each other and to humans? And how can this understanding, in turn, help
us confront, and respond to, the enabling and constraining conditions under which
dairy cows, as speaking beings, participate in the formation of a meaningful world?
11.3 Cows as Social and Linguistic Beings
Human thinkers, as we have seen, have produced the idea of language as a uniquely
human trait by categoricallymarginalizing nonhuman animal speakers, denying them
recognition as linguistic subjects. But, as Eva Meijer suggests, learning about how
other animals use language “can help us understand them better, and build new rela-
tions with them; challenging an anthropocentric view of language can help us see
animals of other species, and their languages, differently” (Meijer 2016, 74). Recent
research into howdifferent animal species communicate, ranging frombirds and bees
to whales, apes and cephalopods, indeed suggests that there may not be a “sharp
divide between human language and nonhuman communicative systems” (Evans
2014, 258; see also Meijer 2019). This does not mean that human and nonhuman
forms of communication are the same, but, as Alastair Pennycook (2018, 82) notes,
“it is an argument against human exceptionalism.” In this chapter, we take the view
that both human and other animals create meaning through language conceptual-
ized as a social, spatial and artefactual resource. By theorizing language in terms of
material-semiotic assemblages and spatial repertoires (Pennycook 2017), we wish
to avoid an anthropocentric definition of language that not only a priori excludes
nonhuman animals, but also neglects all other aspects of language beyond the “dis-
tinctive qualities of mind” so often privileged in philosophy, linguistics and cognitive
science.
Cows, including domestic dairy cows, have distinct personalities and stable
personality characteristics and have a clear capacity to lead rich and socially complex
lives. Measured assessments of cows’ cognitive, emotional and social abilities
provide scientific support for what people familiar with cows already know, namely
that cows demonstrate intelligence, experience a range of emotions and display a high
level of social complexity, including social learning, in ways that human animals can
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recognize (Marino and Allen 2017; Colvin et al. 2017). When given the opportunity,
cows form strongly bonded social groups, with mother cows and calves sharing an
especially powerful emotional connection that, in part, depends upon the possibility
for the mother to be able to lick her child for several hours after birth (Marino and
Allen 2017, 484). Cows are competent learners and possess both short- and long-term
memories: they are capable of discriminating between different objects, colors and
geometric shapes, and are able to learn and recognize individual differences among
humans, as well as conspecifics, under a variety of circumstances.6 These abilities
show that cows do not merely respond to external stimuli but engage in the forma-
tion and categorization of mental concepts (Colvin et al. 2017, 7). Moreover, cows
display emotional reactions to their own learning and in response to each other’s
feelings, which has been suggested to reflect sophisticated levels of psychological
capacities such as self-awareness and empathy (Hagen and Broom 2004; Marino and
Allen 2017, 482–483).7
As social mammals, cows depend on each other for interaction and emotional
support; social isolation therefore inflicts great stress on them, as does the imme-
diate, and life-long, postpartum separation of mothers and calves in intensive dairy
farming. In commercial settings, where human-cow relations are deeply instrumen-
talized and commodified, the possibilities for cows to express species-appropriate
behavior are severely compromised by periods of confinement in indoor housing,
health problems due to higher milk yields and distress caused by various forms of
social separation. As caged living beings, with little or no opportunity to escape their
exploitation by humans, cows raised for food in factory farms experience “unnat-
ural conditions from birth to slaughter” (Marino and Allen 2017, 474), including
procedures that cause severe pain and suffering such as dehorning and disbudding.
In these circumstances, where young calves are raised individually and cows are
killed before their time, social bonding formation is extremely difficult to establish
and maintain (McLennan 2013), which has devastating consequences for their well-
being and welfare. It is decidedly problematic, then, that most research into the lives
of cows is done within the framework of their use as “livestock” for human consump-
tion. As the scientific literature on cow psychology and behavior is dominated by an
applied science perspective mainly relevant to human practices of intensive farming
(e.g. training cows to use automatic feeders) (Marino and Allen 2017, 475), there is
a felt need to understand, and relate to, cows on their own terms.
6In one study, cows have been demonstrated,within a few training sessions, an ability to discriminate
photographs of different cows’ faces from faces of other species. A later study has shown that heifers
can differentiate between two-dimensional facial images of familiar and unfamiliar cows, treating
these images as mental representations of real individuals (Marino and Allen 2017, 478–479). So
far, there is no knowledge yet on social learning from humans or the use of human-given cues in
cattle (Nawroth et al. 2019, 5).
7Emotional reactions to learning in cows have to do with “the positive emotions and excitement
that go with realizing one is controlling a situation” (Marino and Allen 2017, 482). This does not
merely show that cows understand the causal relation between accomplishing a task and receiving
a reward, but rather it suggests that they learn to experience task solving as intrinsically rewarding
by adopting “an emotional perspective on their own agency” (Hagen and Broom 2004, 212).
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While it is undeniable that dairy cows are always already caught in the anthro-
pological machine of industrial animal production—an “apparatus” (Despret 2008)
that essentially prevents them from experiencing a full quality of life—we do believe
that an inquiry into how dairy cows make use of language, conceptualized in a non-
anthropocentric manner, can help human animals to get to know cows better and to
understand them as “the someones they actually are” (Colvin et al 2017, 3). This will,
in turn, allow us to respond to the question of nonhuman animal agency in new ways
that not only serve to challenge established structures of species hierarchy, but also
entail a fundamental rethinking of how agency is enacted in and through language as
a practice of human-nonhuman sociality. In the context of what has been termed the
“cage age,” it is routinely assumed that the restrictive and monotonous captive envi-
ronments in which domesticated animals usually live, will “limit the frequency and
diversity with which [their] agency is expressed” (Špinka and Wemelsfelder 2011,
34). Yet, as we will demonstrate below, these same restrictive conditions can, para-
doxically, also give rise to new modes of linguistic agency and resilience, revealing
the copious ways in which dairy cows, as speaking beings, orient themselves towards
the world.
Dairy farmers bring their own perspectives on how cows, as social and sentient
beings whose freedom ofmovement is nevertheless severely restricted, give meaning
to their physical environment and negotiate their housing conditions. A female dairy
farmer based in the south of the Netherlands recently provided this chapter’s first
author with a hand-written letter with some of her thoughts in preparation of an
interview addressing how cows and farmers communicate with each other.8 She
wrote:
A true story: Cows are herd animals and they have a leader whowill inform the others what to
expect. Mientje was always the first waiting by the fence for the farmer to collect them [from
the meadow] to be milked. The cows would first be treated to snacks in the barn which is a
feast. They might become so impatient as children, and Mientje always watched carefully
how the farmer would unlock the fence. An iron slide bolt. For days she would be licking
that bolt and the farmer assumed she liked the taste of it, but actually she was practicing how
to accomplish that [unlocking the bolt] by sliding it across with her tongue bit by bit long
enough, and yes the farmer stayed away for too long and she opened the fence by herself,
moved a bit backwards so that the fence could open further and so she managed to steer all
the cows to the barn where there were no snacks present since it was no milking time yet.
The barn was an overshitted barn that first had to be cleaned with very restless cows back in
the meadow. The blacksmith made a new bolt.
Mientje, in the narrative above, is clearly positioned as an actor, even though her
actions arise from within a state of unfreedom that makes it difficult, if not impos-
sible, to draw sharp boundaries between action and passion, between doing and
suffering. Seemingly functionless activities such as repetitive licking and/or biting
of non-food objects, including bars and fences, are common stereotypic behaviors
in captive ungulates and are caused by the frustration of natural behavior patterns
8The interview anticipated in the letter took place at the second farm (Farm 2) in the south of the
Netherlands where the first author conducted her field research which is further discussed below.
This interview took place on 15 February 2019 and is not discussed further in the current chapter.
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or by repeated attempts to deal with some problem (Bergeron et al. 2006). Tongue
rolling, object licking and biting at fences—important indicators of compromised
animal welfare—are especially prevalent among intensively housed cattle, as they
are routinely deprived of the freedom to pursue natural patterns of grazing and rumi-
nation (Moran and Doyle 2015, 47). Nevertheless, it is also clear that Mientje’s
actions are not at all inconsequential or meaningless. On the contrary, by unlocking
the bolt, leading the herd to the barn in the expectation of finding some snacks and
by shitting the barn when they find nothing there, Mientje and the other cows not
only spur their humans into action (cleaning the barn, producing a new bolt) but also
engage in linguistic acts of place-making by transforming their shared living space
into a site for negotiating, or renegotiating, the semantics of power, resistance and
belonging.
A place, in the sociolinguistic sense, is not simply a fixed geographic location
but rather a changeable site of symbolic meaning as well as a material assem-
blage of objects or things that mediate social processes and relationships (Johnstone
2011; Cornips and de Rooij 2018a; Peck et al. 2019). Place-making, then, involves
the assigning, through interaction and other forms of connectivity, of social mean-
ings to physical (and, increasingly, digital) spaces, thereby “creating places that are
perceived as the basis of belonging” (Cornips and de Rooij 2018b, 7–8). In contrast
to other branches of linguistics where languages are seen as “naturally” anchored to
specific spaces—a view that only holds if a language is conceptualized as a mono-
lithic and identifiable object detached from real-time practices—a sociolinguistics
of place takes a practice-based approach focused on speakers and their activities.
This shifts the focus from the linguistic system or structure to a whole range of
situated practices in which speech is produced, so that what is typically labelled
as a language is reconceived as a linguistic resource that only becomes socially
meaningful in combination with other material-semiotic resources distributed across
people, places and environments (Pennycook 2017).
Although previous sociolinguistic research has conceptualized place-making
primarily or even exclusively in terms of human practices and institutions, we suggest
that other animals, like cows, also engage their senses, thoughts and emotions in the
material-semiotic production of the world as a meaningful place. This entails a clear
break away from the previously discussed humanist conceptualizations of language
as a computational system located exclusively within the human mind—a view on
language which, as we have seen, is itself informed by a desire to place the human
above all other animals—and steers us towards an understanding of language as a
distributed phenomenon, an emergent property deriving from the interactions and
interrelations between human and nonhuman actors, including spatial resources and
things usually seen as inanimate (Cowley 2011; Pennycook 2017). This shift in
thinking corresponds to the critical posthumanist “turn” that has been put on the
linguistic research agenda recently by Alastair Pennycook, who urges us “not just to
broaden an understanding of communication but to relocate where social semiosis
occurs” (Pennycook 2016, 446).Oncewe acknowledge that, as Pennycook (2018, 51)
notes, “linguistic and other semiotic resources are not contained in someone’s head,
nor just choices available within a speech community, but are spatially distributed,”
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we can begin to explore how dairy cows, such as Mientje, engage in linguistic place-
making in relation to other cows, farmers, fences, iron bars and spaces such as
barns and meadows, as well as through embodied acts of looking, smelling, licking,
walking, eating, defecating, playing and listening.
11.4 Linguistic Place-Making in an Intensive Dairy Farm
In the previous section, we suggested that cows, as sentient and intelligent beings,
engage their cognitive, emotional and social abilities in practices of linguistic place-
making. Just as for people, we assume that the formation of meaningful bonds
between cows and a place is “a powerful factor in social life… and is often based
on the social relationships that are enacted in a place” (Schieffelin 2018, 35). In this
section and the next, we will examine in more detail how intensively housed cows
engage in place-making through language, understood as a distributed phenomenon
emerging fromwithin “materialwebs of humanandnonhumanassemblages” (Penny-
cook 2017, 279). Drawing on recent fieldwork at an intensive dairy farm, we seek
to demonstrate how in this context linguistic place-making occurs through multi-
modal and multilingual repertoires where human and nonhuman bodies, materials
and environments come together in co-shaping motion. We will pay special atten-
tion to the questions of material and nonhuman animal agency, not merely because
“processes of place-making and place itself are always sensible to power dynamics
and asymmetries” (Schieffelin 2018, 34), but also because these questions are crucial
for thinking through the challenges of human-nonhuman coexistence in the current
context of the Anthropocene.
First, a cow becomes connected to her place as a “territory of knowledge” (Schief-
felin 2018, 30, citing Århem 1998) through her verbal practices. While cattle vocal-
izations are often proposed as indicators of animal welfare, scientific analysis of
naturally occurring contact calls produced by crossbred beef cows and their calves
have provided insight into the acoustic structure and information encoded in these
vocalizations. One study showed that calf calls encode age, but not sex, and are
produced (F0 = 142.8 ± 1.80 Hz) when separated from their mothers and preceded
suckling (Padilla de la Torre et al. 2015, 58). Also, indoor housed calves produce
individually recognizable calls to theirmothers and vice versawhereas indoor housed
cows signal verbally that they are hungry, sexually aroused, and experience milking
delay in distinctive ways (Jahns 2013, 247). Thus, although cow sounds may be
meaningless to most human animals, they constitute meaningful signs recognizable
by mother cows and their calves, as well as by fellow cows as a sociolinguistic
community of practice.
Further, cows establish place-making throughvisual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory
and tactile practices, as well as through creative behavior such as play. Sight is a
cow’s most dominant sense, with a field of vision of at least 330° and a fine eye
for details. Cows pay more attention to moving objects than ones that remain still,
such as bars, and they are often “spooked” by sudden movements. A cow’s hearing
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is better than that of horses, but she is less able to locate sounds compared to goats,
dogs and humans. She has an acute sense of touch, which enables her to enjoy some
forms of tactile contact, such as scratching behind the ears, but it also means that
the conditions of industrial farming cause her considerable pain. Olfaction plays an
important role in cows’ social lives, and there is evidence that they can detect the
scent of stress hormones present in the urine of fellow cows (Marino and Allen 2017,
475–476). Cows engage in all forms of play found inmammals, including gamboling
and running, playing with objects such as balls and social play withmembers of other
species. While play is an important indication of an animal’s pleasure, curiosity and
capacity to innovate, and as such it “forms the basis for complex object-related and
social abilities” (Marino and Allen 2017, 481), play behavior in captive animals
is also dependent on their housing conditions; for example, being released from
confinement will increase the frequency of movement-based forms of play such as
galloping and bucking. In what follows, we will discuss specific examples from field
research to demonstrate how dairy cows can mobilize these structural constraints to
imbue their environmentwith linguisticmeanings and thus negotiate their positioning
within an anthropological machine that is, by and large, designed to deprive them
from the opportunity to speak.
11.4.1 The Fieldwork Site
From May 2018 through 15 February 2019, this chapter’s first author conducted
fieldwork in three dairy farms in the south and west of the Netherlands and in one
small dairy farm in Norway. The observations presented in this chapter are based on
data collection at Farm 1 in the south of the Netherlands, where the first author spent
several weeks during her holidays inMay andwhich subsequently became the site for
three days of ethnographic observation, including two days of gathering audio- and
video recordings.9 The dairy farm counts about 150 adult cows, heifers and calves.
The dairy cows are milked by robots, while an automatic feeder takes care of pushing
the food towards them,minimizing embodied practices between farmers and cows. A
small camp site and some holiday apartments accompany the farm, as so often in the
south. Many tourists, children in particular, seek contact with the newly born calves,
as well as with the older calves and heifers to be discussed below, petting them and
speaking to them. Feeding the newly born calves, who are housed individually in
fiberglass cages outside the barn, is an especially popular activity among the human
9The fieldwork took place on 25 July (observation), 26 July and 17 August 2018 (audio- and video
recordings). Awritten and signed consent form by the owners of Farm 1was obtained abiding by the
guidelines for research as stated in the protocol of the Ethics Assessment Committee Humanities
of the Radboud University Nijmegen and adopted by the Royal Academy of Arts and Sciences
(KNAW). From the perspective of establishing egalitarian research methods for interspecies collab-
oration, there is a need to examine how to receive permission from the nonhuman animals under
study, while at the same time one should interrogate how the bioethical framework of “informed
consent” is set up through human-centred discourses of rational agency and choice.
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visitors. During the on-site observations, the cows would often reach through the
bars and fences to touch the farmers, tourists and field worker through licking and
nuzzling. They would also establish contact through nonverbal interactions such as
eye gaze and body positioning, as well as by using language in the form of rumbling,
calling, hooting, sniffing and coughing. These practices would happen frequently,
even though neither humans nor cows were able to traverse to sharing space with
each other directly.
Farmers usually assign dairy cows to fixed places in artificial groupings based on
their age without male peers, revealing extreme power asymmetries between cows
and humans. In the farm under observation, cows are assigned to eight distinct places
differentiated by age: new-born calves, older calves up until a few weeks of age,
young heifers, older and oldest heifers, dry cows (pregnant cows), and dairy cows.
As noted, new-born female calves are separated from their mothers immediately after
birth and isolated in fiberglass enclosures, so-called “igloos,” for about three weeks.
In Farm 1, these igloos are placed in the open air facing the dairy cows in the open
barn. After this period, the somewhat older calves are housed together with their age
mates in igloos holding up to four or five animals, positioned sideways to the open
barn so that visual contact with the older cows is much more restricted. Growing
older, the calves are placed in the so-called jongveestal (young cattle barn) in four
different age groups (see Fig. 11.1). The dry cows are housed in a separate space and
the dairy cows reside in the large open barn that also contains three milking robots.
In spring and summer, the dry cows and dairy cows can graze in the meadow during
the day and, when it is very hot, during the late evening and night. The assignment to
specificphysical places in distinct housings prevents the calves, heifers and cows from
forming a natural herd that would include a matrilineal social structure with strongly
clustered networks and many non-random attachment and avoidance relationships
(Marino and Allen 2017, 488). It also prevents the younger ones from engaging in
processes of cognitive and social learning, and deprives them from being comforted
by older conspecifics, including mother cows.
The fieldwork took place in the jongveestal, where audio and video recordings
were made while observing the calves and heifers. The jongveestal is an oblong
building, about twenty by ten meters, with half bowed windows, touching the house
where the farmer’s family lives. It is the oldest barn on site with a main entrance
in the middle of the long front side and a full opening at one of the short sides.
The cattle stay indoors: their day includes some combinations of eating, lying and
Fig. 11.1 Jongveestal (“young cattle barn”), housing 36 calves and heifers (Friday 17August 2018,
2.30–6 p.m.)
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standing. The oldest heifers were about one year old during the fieldwork.10 In May,
swallowswould fly in and out to take care of their new-born in themany nests they had
fabricated under the beams of this old building. The floor of the jongveestal consists
of cubicle divisions for calves and heifers to lie down and stand up (see Picture 11.3
below), while in-between the cubicles, they can stand or walk on discrete beams
where feces and urine pass.
In the jongveestal, the calves and heifers (n = 36) were spatially positioned in
four sections divided by iron bars, as illustrated in Fig. 11.1. The calves and heifers
in the jongveestal are thus profoundly restricted in their mobility—much more so
than the adult cows who are able to graze in the meadow, but less than the new-born
calves confined to the small igloos. Consequently, from birth onwards throughout
their lives, calves, heifers and dairy cows—either individually or with same-sex and
agemates—are confined to human-made physical spaces. How, then, do theymanage
to assign their own meanings to the restricted environment in which they are placed?
11.4.2 Place-Making Through Practices of Sociality
and Multilingualism
The housing conditions of the jongveestal not only restrict mobility but also limit
the visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory and tactile practices that calves and heifers
may display under less restrictive conditions. This significantly affects their modes
of sociality and processes of belonging: calves and heifers cannot touch and/or
allogroom each other cross-sectionally; a lack of daylight hinders optimal vision
and the walls obstruct a far vision; the sound of tractors may penetrate; calves and
heifers are dependent on the farmer for how to lie down as well as for when, what
and how to eat (with no attention for individual food preferences); ventilation is
often not optimal so that calves and heifers, whose sense of smell is far superior to
that of humans, deal with omnipresent scents of ammonia, carbon dioxide, methane
and hydrogen sulfide (Vallez 2013, 12); and the beams on the floor, often slippery
due to feces and urine, impede playing and running (see Picture 11.3). Limited space
allowance furthermoremakes it difficult tomaintain a preferred distance to neighbors
with whom the individual likes to bond or not. The spatial distance that cows estab-
lish between each other is affected by their relationship and proximity might indicate
the existence of a social bond (McLennan 2013, 26). Under more natural conditions,
cows seem to engagewith particular individuals with whom they prefer to spend their
time, creating voluntary bonds while grazing and lying together in close proximity
(McLennan 2013, 49–50). In the captive environment of the jongveestal, however,
10During her holidays in May, the first author frequently visited the jongveestal since there was
one heifer who was very much looking for contact with human animals. She was positioned near
the main entrance and would nearly jump towards the author to put her head on her shoulder. This
extravert expression of contact seeking behavior might be interpreted as indicative of a willingness
to engage in interspecies collaboration.
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a calf or heifer who is a non-preferred partner may stand, lie down or eat in closer
proximity than would naturally occur, which may lead to feelings of uneasiness and
has been suggested to have negative consequences for animal welfare (McLennan
2013, 52).
How, if at all, do calves and heifers in the jongveestal create sociality under these
conditions? And how is this sociality mobilized in and through material-semiotic
practices of place-making? Fieldwork observations show that the calves and heifers
in their cubicle divisions (see Fig. 11.1) may not show any sign of interaction or
connectivity, thus is it not self-evident for individuals who are placed in a restricted
space to construe it together as a social place. Picture 11.1 shows an example: four
older calves stand in the second section of the jongveestal. Although they share a
restricted physical space, their body positioning does not reveal any form of co-
shaping the act of standing together. The calves position their bottoms to each other,
taking diverging positions, avoiding eye contact and body contact. Although the
calves in the right corner seem to align sideways, there is no form of interaction.
Their bodies don’t touch and while the calf in the middle bows her head, the calf in
the right corner is rubbing her chin at the iron bar and wooden demarcation while
establishing eye contact with the fieldworker, as shown in Picture 11.2.
Both pictures also show that in the second section of the barn four cows are
standing on their feet whereas two cows are lying down in cubicle divisions. The
calf to the right in Picture 11.2 was headbutted by another for about two seconds
when trying to move over to the most right-hand section of the barn (not visible in
the picture). Picture 11.3, however, shows calves in section 2 mirroring each other’s
body positions when lying down in the cubicles. Although their bodies do not touch
and they are not able to lie down in a circle as less restrictive settings, they are able to
choose to lie down all together in the sameway at the same time. The two calves in the
cubicles in the back are facing each other whereas the two shown in the foreground
Picture 11.1 Standing in the jongveestal (Farm 1, 17 August 2018)
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Picture 11.2 Calf is rubbingher chin at the fencewhile establishing eye contactwith thefieldworker
(Farm 1, 17 August 2018)
do not. Note that the younger calf in section 1 has decided to look out of the window
instead of synchronizing with the others.
As a material-semiotic resource, bodily synchronizing can be seen as part of what
Frans de Waal has described as “identification” with the other, a process of “bodily
mapping the self onto the other (or the other onto the self)” which not only relates to a
capacity for shared neural representation, but also forms “a precondition for imitation
and empathy” (De Waal 2012, 123). During the fieldwork, a clear practice of bodily
synchronizing—which we consider here as a social form of meaning-making typical
for encaged dairy cows—emerged during the communicative event of feeding (by
the farmer) and eating (by the cows). The farmer feeds the calves twice a day by
putting upside down a wheelbarrow loaded with food on the ground before them. An
iron feed fence separates the human and nonhuman animals during this event while
at the same time it mediates the meanings that arise from their mutual interaction.
The farmer provides the food from one side of the fence whereas the calves on
the other side need to position themselves before individual openings and put their
heads through the bars in order to reach the food below. Since there are only as many
openings as calves, every individual has to touch her neighbor to secure a place (see
Pictures 11.4a, b).
As the calves put their heads through the iron bars they simultaneously bow
their heads forward and downward to pick up the food from the ground, taking a
slightly more upward head position in order to chew. Within this joint “embodiment
of movement,” a collective form of sociality in which each calf will instantaneously
“follow and lead” (Argent 2012, 120),11 the calves engage one another and the space
around them in bodily acts of identification that articulate the jongveestal as a shared
social place. Thus, although for encaged calves feeding is clearly a habitual and
11Argent writes about synchronizing between horses and riders.
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Picture 11.3 Bodily synchronizing in cubicle divisions in the jongveestal (Farm 1, 17 August
2018)
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Picture 11.4 a The calves positioning themselves at the feed fence (wheelbarrow on the right);
b The calves are synchronizing during their eating practice
routinized practice, from a sociolinguistic perspective it also entails creative acts of
place-making through what Argent calls “kinesic, haptic, and proxemic communi-
cation modes” (Argent 2012, 119). The synchrony of movement that occurs in and
through the spacing of interactional distances not only orients calves to group living,
but also enables them to imbue their restricted environment with meaning in the form
of social bonding and thus constitute themselves as linguistic agents.
Specifically, we argue that nonhuman practices of place-making in an intensive
dairy farm can be seen as a form of bi- or multilingualism peculiar to the context
of industrial animal production. The iron bars make sound when the synchronizing
calves put their heads through them and move their faces up and down in co-motion
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to reach for the food on the ground during eating practice. These sounds are not
meaningless or arbitrary but constitute a semiotic resource for calves to reinforce
social bonding, specifically since the sounds of the iron bars and bodies co-shape
each other acoustically. Eating practices in the jongveestal, then, are acts of place-
making where calves do not only use their vocal tract to produce language, but
also establish themselves as linguistic beings through the rhythmic clattering of the
iron bars that shapes the synchronizing bodies into socially meaningful sounds. In
other words, these calves engage in a process of nonhuman place-making not only
by producing one language with their own bodies, that is, the words or vocaliza-
tions for “greeting” and “hunger” which are inextricably combined with multimodal
and multisensory ways of meaning-making through body positioning and visual,
auditory, olfactory, gustatory and tactile practices, but also by producing a second
language with the material-semiotic means that both compose and transcend their
restricted environment.
Being socialized into the environment of an industrial dairy farm, then, for cows
implies being or becoming bilingual, where bilingualism is to be understood as a
“complex set of practices” (Heller 2007, 15) which draw on linguistic resources that
belong to two codes which are structurally maximally divergent (see Auer, forth-
coming, 8), in this case one code produced by vocal tract and one code produced by
synchronizing bodies and iron bars. The latter language is more context-dependent
than the former because of its restriction to the practice of feeding in conditions of
captivity. These two codes thus reveal structural constraints in the linguistic sense:
they can combine together in a multimodal way but cannot be mixed. The obser-
vations do not show that calves alternate between the two codes within one single
discourse—the social practice of eating together—even if both codes are part of the
broader material-semiotic assemblage throughwhich place-making is established. In
the sociolinguistic framework, the two codes might be said to correspond to different
social functions and identities, since different languages, or language varieties, are
associated with diverging “processes of construction of social difference and social
inequality” (Heller 2007, 15). The “bars and bodies” codewill be associated primarily
with encaged individuals, suggesting that this form of bilingualism is specific to the
complex network of connections among human and nonhuman agents that constitutes
daily life at an intensive dairy farm.
Crucially, the material presence of the feed fence, which both enables and
constrains the expression of linguistic agency in this context, should be understood
not merely as a demarcation of physical space, but as belonging to the spatial reper-
toire through which language is produced as a “distributed effect of a range of inter-
acting objects, people and places” (Pennycook 2017, 278). As an embodied and
embedded practice, linguistic place-making in the jongveestal is thus not simply
a conditioned response to an unresponsive environment, nor does it arise from
the individual communicative competence of calves and heifers; rather, it emerges
from within a complex assemblage of material-semiotic resources distributed across
human and nonhuman subjects, artefacts and environments, including the means of
confinement by which humans seek to restrict the freedom of other animals. In other
words, the conditions of captivity in an intensive dairy farm are not external but
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intrinsic to how cows engage in acts of place-making that we, in Heideggerian terms,
might understand as linguistic practices of world-formation. This view, as we will
conclude, has significant consequences for howwemay conceptualize the expression
of nonhuman animal agency, in particular linguistic agency, in the troubling context
of the Anthropocene.
11.5 Conclusion
From a traditional humanist perspective, domesticated captive animals are doubly
barred from entering into a meaningful relationship with the world: not only are
nonhuman animals, in this view, by nature captivated in their environment (as
Heidegger and many others have suggested), it is also assumed that confinement
in cages does nothing but further limit their natural instincts and capabilities. This
view effectively renders nonhuman animals, cows in particular, mute and dumb,
while at the same time it reinforces a traditional mechanistic worldview where both
nature and matter are considered to be passive and inert, available for manipulation
by humans and exploitable for profit (Merchant 1992, 48–55). The critically posthu-
manist perspective developed in this chapter, by contrast, not only acknowledges
cows as the social and intelligent speaking beings that they are, but also approaches
their material encagement—the bars and fences meant as barriers to prevent calves
and heifers from freely going wherever they want—as a social and spatial artefac-
tual resource for building a meaningful world. Paradoxically, then, it is their state of
unfreedom that allows dairy cows to open up the restricted environment of indus-
trial animal farming, exemplified here by the young cattle barn, as a linguistically
meaningful place.
In drawing attention to the linguistic agency of dairy cows, we do not wish to reit-
erate the familiar observation that “agency is intrinsic to the way animals behave”
(Špinka and Wemelsfelder 2011, 34), nor are we suggesting that the capacity of
captive animals to act is somehow“expanded” or “curtailed” through acts of linguistic
place-making. In the context of industrial dairy farming, where categorical bound-
aries between humans and other animals, aswell as between organisms andmachines,
have collapsed—a condition exemplifying the “implosion of nature and culture”
(Haraway 2003, 16) that marks the Anthropocene—neither agency nor language
can be understood as a property of individual persons or collectivities. Rather, we
must account for how different forms of agency, including linguistic agency, emerge
from within what political theorist Jane Bennett (2010, 107) has called “agentic
assemblages,” that is, networks of human and nonhuman actors living together in
relations of systemic inequality. In this chapter, therefore, we have tried to show how
a non-anthropocentric approach to linguistic place-making, understood as a practice
of more-than-human sociality, can help us reckon with the question of nonhuman
animal agency in new ways.
Assemblages, as Pennycook (2017, 278) notes, “describe the way things are
brought together and function in new ways” and as such they provide a way of
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thinking about agency as a distributed force, much like we described language
and cognition as spatially distributed. Bennett, indeed, suggests that we think of
agency as “distributed across an ontologically heterogeneous field, rather than being
a capacity localized in a human body or in a collective produced (only) by human
efforts” (Bennett 2010, 23). Linguistic agency, then, is not an individual or collec-
tive competence that can be “mastered” or “possessed” but should rather be seen as
a processually emergent quality arising from multiple assemblages of human and
nonhuman elements, including material things, artefacts and spaces. This concep-
tion of agency, rooted in what Bennett (2010) calls a “vital materialism” and what
Pennycook (2018) describes as a “posthumanist applied linguistics,” disturbs the
traditional understanding of agency as the capacity for self-willed action, linked espe-
cially to human subjectivity and intentionality, as well as the corollary presumption
that the more-than-human material world—including other animals and the physical
environment—is essentially passive, inert and predetermined in its operations.
Throughout this chapter, we have sought to demonstrate the usefulness of a non-
anthropocentric approach to language and language practices in light of a long history
of human exceptionalism that has routinely denied nonhuman animals the freedom
and ability to speak. We have elaborated a posthumanist conception of language as
a distributed effect of multiple interacting bodies in order to foreground the fluidity
throughwhich a cow, a calf, calves, awheelbarrow, a farmer, an iron feed fence, a lock,
the clattering of bars, sounds of chewing, sounds of puffing, sounds of urinating, the
smell of food, urine, feces, other bodies in proximity or distance, movements up and
down, become relationally entangledwith one another and, crucially, with the anthro-
pological machine of industrial animal production. Furthermore, we have shown how
rethinking nonhuman animal agency in terms of material-semiotic assemblages, as
an equally distributed effect of linguistic interactions and social processes, allows
us to break away from the idea of lifeless matter, including the Cartesian under-
standing of nonhuman animals as mindless machines, an idea which has shaped the
pervasive modes of human exceptionalism and instrumentalism that have tradition-
ally characterized the humanist agenda and which continue to inform ideas about
the “muteness” and “bruteness” of nonhuman creatures today. In this way, we hope
to contribute to a greater recognition among humans of other animals, not only as
sentient living beings, but as intelligent, social, speaking beings, linguistic agents
who even under poor conditions form rich and complex relationships with the world
to make it a meaningful place.
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Chapter 12
The Vanishing Ethics of Husbandry
Paul B. Thompson
Abstract The ethics of food production should include philosophical discussion
of the condition or welfare of livestock, including for animals being raised in high
volume, concentrated production systems (e.g. factory farms). Philosophers should
aid producers and scientists in specifying conditions for improved welfare in these
systems. An adequately non-ideal approach to this problem should recognize both
the economic rationale for these systems as well as the way that they constrain
opportunities for improving animal welfare. Recent philosophical work on animal
ethics has been dominated by authors who not only neglect this imperative, but
also defeat it by drawing on oversimplified and rhetorically overstated descriptions
of the conditions in which factory farmed animals actually live. This feature of
philosophical animal ethics reflects a form of structural narcissism in which adopting
a morally correct attitude defeats actions that could actually improve the welfare of
livestock in factory farms to a considerable degree.
12.1 Introduction
Bernard Rollin has argued that when university programs in animal husbandry began
to relabel themselves as programs in animal science, therewas an accompanying shift
in ethics. The changeover occurred during the 1970s, as the agricultural sciences
generally began to adopt a more positivist ethos (Johnson 1976). Rollin’s claim is
that while animal husbandry had both implied and encouraged an ethic of caring for
livestock and consideration of their interests, the turn to science discouraged empathy
and substituted a headlong pursuit of efficiency in its place (Rollin 2004). Husbandry
had “vanished” from the curriculum of students training for animal agriculture, as
well as in the organization of veterinary research. Rollin’s thesis has been developed
as a vehicle for both exploring and reformingpractices in industrial animal production
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(Harfeld 2011). In this paper, I will explore a very different sense of vanishing. My
focus will be on the way that husbandry ethics are missing from the discourse of
philosophers working on animal issues.
For both Rollin and myself, husbandry ethics consists of norms and standards
for the care of animals in livestock production settings. Such standards give rise to
philosophical puzzles, conundrumsandevenparadox.The conceptualworkneeded to
develop and implement husbandry ethics is especially important in theAnthropocene
because climate change promises to exacerbate already-existing deficits of animal
welfare in industrial production systems. The highly influential report Livestock’s
Long Shadow from the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United
Nations has beenwidely cited by philosophers and animal advocates for documenting
how methane emissions from animal production contribute to the greenhouse effect.
In this philosophical literature, the FAO report is often cited as a supporting argument
for condemnation of industrial animal production and in support of ethical vegetar-
ianism (Ilea 2009; De Bakker and Dagevos 2012). Yet the report itself argues for
more use of intensive animal production systems owing to their greater efficiency
of emissions per unit of consumable animal protein when compared to traditional
pasture-based production (Steinfeld et al. 2006).
Both Rollin and I (as well as a handful of other philosophers such as Peter Sandøe
and several contributors to this volume), have undertaken philosophical analyses of
the challenges that attend a functional and practical ethics of husbandry. It is not
as if there is absolutely no philosophical research on these questions. However, I
contend that this work remains marginalized in mainstream academic philosophy.
This chapter extends an argument made in my 2015 book, From Field to Fork:
Food Ethics for Everyone. I compared three ways in which the ethics of livestock
production might be structured differently. First, one can ask whether vegetarianism
is ethically mandatory. This is an old question with a distinguished philosophical
pedigree dating back to Ancient Greece. Second, one can ask whether industrial
animal production is ethically acceptable. This question typically presumes a negative
answer to the first, but acknowledges the potential for housing and treatment of
livestock species that fails to respect animal interests in a morally significant way. A
negative answer to this question might, then, lead to a third: How should industrial
animal production be reformed to improve animal welfare? Almost all philosophers
who have taken the trouble to ask have concluded that industrial animal production is
not ethically acceptable, but very few have been interested in the third question. Their
philosophical curiosity is satisfied by finding some alternative, morally acceptable
source of meat, milk or eggs (Thompson 2015, 134–137).
This lacuna in the philosophical literature is how I will understand the vanishing
ethic of husbandry.Why is it that philosophers who are interested in animal ethics are
so incurious about what counts as improving the lives of livestock? Any defensible
answer to this broad question would require consideration of many themes, some
of which will have little philosophical relevance. A narrower thesis is explicitly
normative: The approach that philosophers are taking to livestock exhibits a form of
narcissism that deserves critique. This narcissism is not limited to philosophers, but
reflects a broader cultural movement evident in other dietetic disciplines.While I will
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touch briefly on this trend, my focus in this paper will be limited to the philosophical
community, on the one hand, and to animals and animal products, on the other. In the
concluding section, I will link it to emerging applications of extreme biotechnology
that are attempting to decouple consciousness from meat production, entirely. This
component of my argument will connect with my previous work on “the opposite
of human enhancement” (Thompson 2008). I begin, however, with a frank (and
probably unpopular) statement on the state of animals currently housed in industrial
production systems.
12.2 Industrial Animal Production
Production of meat, milk and eggs—the primary food products derived from live-
stock—went through a dramatic transformation over the course of the twentieth
century. Circa 1900, livestock farmers throughout the industrialized world raised
their animals in comparative small groups on pasture, with occasional confined
housing during inclement weather. By the year 2000, concentrated animal feeding
operations (CAFOs) or “factory farms” had displaced a large percentage of this
extensive production. CAFO amass much larger herds and flocks, often in large
industrial barns, to facilitate mechanical delivery of feed and water, as well as auto-
mated milking, collection of eggs and herd or flock management, including manure
disposal. A comprehensive overview of CAFO systems for each agricultural species
would exceed the remit of the present essay, but a number of reasonable summaries
are available (see Rollin 1995; Norwood and Lusk 2011; Mench 2018).
Although CAFOs pose both animal welfare and environmental challenges, they
are not going away soon. Global demand for animal products is growing. Total global
meat production increased from 71.36 million tons in 1961 to in 317.85 million tons
in 2014 (Ritchie and Roser 2017). The FAO projects that “Between 1997/99 and
2030, annual meat consumption in developing countries is projected to increase
from 25.5 to 37 kg per person, compared with an increase from 88 to 100 kg in
industrial countries (FAO 2003). Comparable percentage growth in consumption of
milk products and eggs is also predicted. Whatever the moral case for reducing or
eliminating the consumption of animal products fromone’s diet, the economic drivers
for increasing production remain strong. Absent an almost unimaginable upsurge of
political support for regulations that would constrain demand or regulate production,
it would appear that livestock will continue to be produced for human consumption
of animal products for the foreseeable future.
What ismore, for reasons already foreshadowed,more andmore of this production
will occur in CAFOs. Although the capital costs for an intensive animal feeding
facility are high, they are distributed over a large number of salable units. When the
cost of production per unit of product is viewed over the usable life-span of these
facilities, they are economically competitive. When combined with the feed, labor
and management efficiencies of scale, as well as market advantages derived from
being able to reliably supply a high volume of product, CAFOs are economically
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attractive investments for producers who are focused solely on the monetary bottom
line (Mench et al. 2008; Norwood and Lusk 2011). The original FAO report on
climate impacts of livestock production argues CAFOs also limit the environmental
impact of producing meat, milk and eggs when environmental costs are computed
on a per unit basis (Steinfeld et al. 2006). As we move deeper into the Anthropocene,
the case for using these industrial systems grows stronger, not weaker. Intensive
animal feeding facilities introduce the potential for greater efficiencies in landscape
impact from animal production (Capper 2012). Adjustment of feed rations in CAFOs
facilitates additional means for limiting climate forcing emissions (Hristov et al.
2013). Cost efficiency coincides with environmental efficiency, yet the economic
and environmental rationales for CAFOs appear to be on a collision course with
animal welfare.
Authors from Ruth Harrison (1964) to Peter Singer (Singer and Mason 2007)
have pilloried factory farming for neglecting animal interests. It is important to
temper these criticisms by recognizing that for some producers, at least, improving
animal husbandry was a motivation for moving toward more industrialized produc-
tion methods, in the first place. Jim and Pamela Braun are Iowa hog farmers. They
describe how up until 1969, pigs on their family farm had been raised in an extensive
(e.g. open field) system. In an attempt to limit MMA (mastitis metritus agalactia)
infections that were becoming difficult to control in their pasture-based farming
system, Jim Braun’s father shifted to a totally confined, indoor system. They report,
“Each stall was its own self-contained sow hotel, with an automatic feeder, waterer
and manure removal system. We farrowed year round, and the sows could not run
from their shots, thereby helping to ensure the health and safety of the piglets” (Braun
and Braun 1998, 40–41). The Brauns are not arguing for the welfare of their pigs in
this article; they simply take that for granted. They go on to criticize vertical integra-
tion in the pork industry and the subsequent loss of control by family farmers that
would allow them to make changes based on animal welfare.
Of course, it is possible that the Braun’s decision was a mistake, especially when
welfare impacts beyond MMA are included in the evaluation. My point is not to
defend any particular model of industrial production, but only to show that some
producers saw confinement systems as beneficial to their animals. As noted already,
there is little doubt that CAFOs led to a dramatic change in the economics of livestock
farming, just as the Braun’s claim. While it might have been reasonable for an old-
school animal producer to assert that their personal economic interests were (at least
roughly) consonant with the health and well-being of their animals, that was largely
because the animals themselves represented a large share of the farmer’s total capital
investment. The large barns, automated feeders, watering systems and mechanisms
for manure disposal or retrieval of milk and eggs changed that. In many cases,
maximizing return on investment in equipment required accepting the reduced yield
in per-animal production of the salable commodity that accompanied rising rates
of herd or flock morbidity and mortality (Norwood and Lusk 2011; Bennett and
Thompson 2018). Indeed, recognition of the welfare deficits associated with CAFOs
motivates the ethics of husbandry: How should we reform these systems?
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12.3 Reforming Husbandry in Industrial
Animal Production
The economic structure of animal production provides a clue to one of the most
important philosophical features of husbandry ethics: In industrialized economies,
husbandry ethicsmust be addressed collectively. An individual producer acting alone
cannot adopt many of the changes that husbandry ethics recommends. The farming
approach that maximizes capital returns will be the most competitive in a market
economy. To the extent that animal products are pure commodities, with one example
fully substitutable for another, price will be the dominant factor in consumer decision
making, and the system that is most efficient in its utilization of capital will be the
system that can offer products at the lowest price. Producers who fall too far short
of this efficiency standard will not be able to recover the cost of their investments,
and will eventually fail. Farmers must recover moneys expended on buildings and
equipment just as much as they must recover the costs of feed and labor. As buildings
and equipment become an ever-larger share of the livestock producer’s expenditures,
there is a downward spiral in which only producers who are willing to exploit animals
remain in the industry.
There are several possible responses to this situation, each with respective
strengths and weaknesses. First, collective action can take place at the level of the
state by regulating production systems based on animal welfare. This approach has
been taken throughout Europe. While it is philosophically satisfying, it suffers from
three main problems. First, regulation does not necessarily entail compliance. Imple-
mentation of European rules has been slow and there is evidence that compliance
is highly variable (see Thompson 2015, 154–156). Second, regulations tend to be
quite inflexible, meaning that they can actually retard change in a production practice
when new science and technology becomes available. When the replacement of poor
systems requires large capital investments, farmers are deterred from taking action
to improve welfare. The sheer cost of a new barn is itself a form of deterrence, but a
producer must also be confident that these large investments will continue to comply
with regulations throughout the useful life of the facility. The result is a vicious
circle. Producers do not improve for fear that they will not comply with the rules,
while regulators do not revise rules for fear that producers will be financially unable
to comply. Finally, the existence of regulations may encourage moral complacency.
Producers and consumers alike presume that once regulations are in place they no
longer ask the compelling ethical questions implied by a husbandry ethic. There is
thus some risk that a too strict regulatory environment can actually undercut the
motivation for continued work on husbandry ethics.
Along with Canada, Australia and New Zealand, the United States relies almost
exclusively on collective action taken by producers themselves. This has taken the
form of husbandry guidelines and industry standards that voluntarily bar certain
problematic practices. For example, the United Egg Producers, the principal trade
organization for shell eggs in the U.S., has promoted a standard that ends forced
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molting and institutes minimum space requirements for hens in the facilities oper-
ated by its members. Tail docking in pig and milk production has also been signifi-
cantly curtailed, and there have been improvements in welfare prior to slaughter in
processing facilities. Although these are voluntary standards, they have significantly
improved the lives of many thousands of animals. Producer action does achieve
substantial compliance and it has the advantage of flexibility. It is much easier to
implement incremental changes when producers are directly involved. However,
voluntarily developed standards are often quite low and some other American
commodity groups have failed to take any kind of meaningful action at all (Mench
et al. 2011). As such there is a continued need for documentation of remediable
deficits in animal welfare—a key activity of husbandry ethics.
Finally, there is the potential for decommodification of animal products by
enabling and encouraging consumers to choose meat, milk and egg based foods
certified to meet higher standards of welfare. The popularity of this approach has
grown in Europe and America alike, but there are two weaknesses. One is that in
depending on consumer willingness to pay, the best that animal welfare certification
can achieve is improvement for a subset of farmed animals. Ethical meat, milk and
eggs appeal to niche markets. Commodity production standards will still apply in
many production systems (Kehlbacher et al. 2012). Second, animal welfare labels
are, in effect,marketing devices. They are subject to all of the distortions and obfusca-
tions that we typically associate with advertising. This means that, on the one hand,
consumers are skeptical that welfare claims are true, while on the other they can
be misled by anthropomorphic images of animals used to promote these products.
Inconsistency in the various schemes currently used to measure animal welfare may
also undercut consumer confidence (Main et al. 2014).
Ethical inquiry into what actually improves the lives of farmed animals operates
in the logical space circumscribed by these options, which are not necessarily exclu-
sive of one another. Husbandry ethics must be open to the possibility that reform of
CAFOs might call for doing away with them altogether. The arguments cited above
notwithstanding, this possibility is reinforced when the environmental impact of
CAFOs are taken into consideration (Ilea 2009; Fairlie 2010). Yet an honest concern
for animal welfare should take note of the fact that millions of animals currently
live in the CAFO environment, and that CAFO-like systems are rapidly displacing
extensive animal production in Asia, Latin America and Africa (Thornton 2010).
To the extent that improving the quality of life for these animals is a moral priority,
there are compelling reasons to undertake husbandry ethics, even if these CAFOs
cannot be ethically justified. This means that animal yhusbandr is a form of non-
ideal ethics: Inquiry into the welfare of animals aims to make morally compelling
improvements in quality of life. It does not presume that improvements in welfare
justify the continuation of these systems, on either animal welfare or environmental
grounds. This feature of the husbandry ethic holds for CAFOs and for more tradi-
tional, extensive systems alike. Many arguments for veganism, for example, hold
that no form of animal agriculture is morally acceptable, but this does not logically
vitiate the question of how the lives of animals living in these systems could be made
better.
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12.4 Philosophers and Animal Husbandry
Given the preceding discussion, one might think that there would be a robust philo-
sophical discourse on how animal welfare could be improved in industrial systems.
This discoursemight probewhen or underwhat circumstances practices that compro-
mise animal welfare are truly unavoidable or unnecessary. It might investigate trade-
offs between animal welfare deficits and benefits to humans, especially those on
limited budgets. Most fundamentally, it would take up the deep philosophical ques-
tions that arise in drawingupdiverse and sometimes logically contradictory indicators
of welfare to make a justifiable evaluation of the comparative merits of alternative
systems for improving welfare (Fraser 1999). Ethologists and veterinary researchers
are accumulating a large body of empirical research on the condition of animals
raised in CAFOs, and one might think that philosophers would take some interest in
the value dimensions of this work.
Of course, some philosophers have done precisely that (Rollin 1995; Appleby
et al. 2014). Yet in what follows I will take a more polemical turn, focusing on what
I take to be the dominant strands of thinking by philosophers writing on the animals
amongst us. There is, I submit, an archetypical mode of address toward industrial
animal agriculture among mainstream philosophers. It consists of a few sentences
(or a paragraph at most) reciting the horrific conditions in CAFOs, followed by a
blanket statement of moral condemnation. This generally appears quite early in the
analysis, from which the author moves on to consider their favored philosophical
topic. For example, Alistair Norcross begins his widely read paper “Puppies, Pigs
and People: Eating Meat and Marginal Cases,” by sketching the thought experiment
of Fred, who tortures puppies in order to attain sensory pleasure in his consumption
of chocolate. Norcross motivates the significance of this thought experiment with
the following:
No decent person would even contemplate torturing puppies merely to enhance a gustatory
experience. However, billions of animals endure intense suffering every year for precisely
this end. Most of the chicken, veal, beef, and pork consumed in the US comes from intensive
confinement facilities, in which the animals live cramped, stress-filled lives and endure
unanaesthetized mutilations. (Norcross 2004, 230–231)
Norcross provides no peer-reviewed literature in support of these empirical claims,
though he does reference several rabble-rousing critiques of industrial agriculture.
The rest of his article takes up a variety of well-known philosophical questions,
including the extent to which “marginal cases” (e.g. humans suffering cognitive
deficits of various kinds) challenge our intuitions. He makes no further references
to practices in industrial agriculture beyond noting the 8 billion chickens slaugh-
tered in 1998, calling them “the most cruelly treated of all animals raised for human
consumption, with the possible exception of veal calves” (Norcross 2004, 232). He
ends thusly: “I conclude that our intuitions that Fred’s behavior is morally imper-
missible are accurate. Furthermore, given that the behavior of those who knowingly
support factory farming is morally indistinguishable, it follows that their behavior is
also morally impermissible” (Norcross 2004, 244).
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Norcross thus draws a moral conclusion that references animal agriculture while
providing no discussion of any specific husbandry practice (whether in industrial or
traditional extensive systems).His normative thesis is an attempt to shamehis readers,
who he has characterized as mindlessly supporting factory farming. He is, I submit,
mobilizing intuitions widely shared about “factory farming”. One could undertake
a critique of the broad claims that Norcross makes about the condition of animals
in CAFOs,1 but it is more important to stress that none of the ethical problems that
actually arise in CAFOs really concern Norcross. His argument does not depend on
whether opportunities available for ameliorating factory farming’s deleterious effects
on an animal’s quality of life are required by regulation, adopted through producer
cooperation or supported by consumers hoping to support more humane production
systems. He is deploying a pre-existing intuition about the “torture” animals endure
in these systems to stimulate interest in philosophical problems that have no bearing
on an animal’s quality of life, at all.
It is easy to find instances of this archetype in the work of contemporary philoso-
phers. Rosalind Hursthouse notes how Peter Singer’s Animal Liberation created
awareness of “how horrible the factory farm conditions were” (Hursthouse 2011,
117) and then implies that anyone who is informed about animal ethics “knows,
as I do, that in regularly eating commercially farmed meat we are being party to a
huge amount of animal suffering” (Hursthouse 2011, 129). Yet Hursthouse’s interest
lies in exploring how virtue theory compares with Singer’s utilitarianism in offering
a philosophical analysis of animal ethics, and there is nothing in her discussion
that takes up ways in which the suffering she notes could be reduced. Jeff McMahan
motivates a consequentialist analysis of animal death with a single sentence on indus-
trial agriculture: “An increasingly common view among morally reflective people is
that, whereas factory farming is objectionable because of the suffering it inflicts
on animals, it is permissible to eat animals if they are reared humanely and killed
with little or no pain or terror” (McMahon 2016). It would rapidly become tedious
to recite instance after instance in which this archetype occurs in the philosophical
literature on animals. The point is not to suggest that these authors should be taking
up husbandry questions in lieu of the philosophical issues that they do investigate.
Rather, it is note how the irredeemable nature of factory farming is so thoroughly
engrained in the philosophical literature that it can be cited in a passing comment
and without support from any factual discussion the actual conditions that animals
in these systems endure.
1For example, unanesthetized surgical procedures (e.g. mutilations) are common in traditional
animal production. This is not a practice that distinguishes production in CAFOs from all forms of
livestock farming (or, indeed from things done to pets or mutilations that human parents practice
on their children). Stress is also common in traditional systems, though as the empirical literature
shows, stress is not always detrimental to welfare (Moberg 2000). CAFO production does involve
crowding, but the ethology literature suggests that this is much less problematic for chickens (who
have a flocking instinct) than it might be for humans. The lack of opportunities for perching and
nesting, and the impact of a large flock size on feather pecking are almost certainly much more
serious issues from the chicken’s perspective (Lay et al. 2011). In all these respects, the claims that
Norcross makes to elicit the intuition of cruelty in factory farming are misleading or ill informed.
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To cite just one more pieces of evidence, The Oxford Handbook of Animal Ethics
includes some 35 essays on various topics, including 11 on practical questions.
Although the Handbook is nearly 1000 pages long and putatively covers the full
range of topics in animal ethics, no chapter takes up husbandry ethics. Three of the
“practical question” chapters do mention livestock farming. Elizabeth Harmon uses
my archetypal strategy, claiming blandly that “factory farming involves subjecting
animals to intense suffering” (Harmon 2011, 727). She then moves on to her chief
concern: arguing that killing animals is itself morally wrong. David DeGrazia
includes a short discussion of harmful impacts on livestock in his article of animal
confinement before concluding, “I contend that wherever the term “factory farming”
is properly applied the conditions of confinement are so intensive that they render
the animals’ lives not worth living” (DeGrazia 2011, 757; italics in the original). The
only extended discussion of animal production in the Oxford Handbook occurs in a
chapter entitled “Vegetarianism.” Here the extensive peer reviewed literature on the
welfare of animals in contemporary livestock systems is ignored in favor of treat-
ments intended to shock readers into support for vegan diets (Rachels 2011). The
Handbook editors have not thought to include any treatment of the philosophical
issues that arise in the practice of animal husbandry.
To sum up, a small cadre of philosophers do work alongside veterinarians, cogni-
tive ethologists and animal producer groups to fashion better husbandry methods
for confined and unconfined livestock production. Nevertheless, this topic is simply
not on the radar screen of mainstream philosophers writing on animal issues. Most
philosopherswriting on animal issues hold university appointments and as suchmight
be expected to rely on (or at least be informed about) studies by their peers in science.
However, when philosophers do make empirical claims about industrial agriculture,
they do not consult the extensive literature in peer-reviewed journals such as Animal
Welfare, the Journal of Applied Animal Welfare Science or in animal science and
veterinary outlets such as Poultry Science or The Journal of Animal Science. Instead,
they rely exclusively on reports from journalists or animal activists.
12.5 Animal Husbandry and Animal Activism
The fact that philosophers ignore the peer-reviewed literature on animal welfare
should not be taken to imply that what they say about welfare in CAFOs is false.
The most frequently cited source in the “Vegetarianism,” article just discussed is
Peter Singer and Jim Mason’s The Ethics of What We Eat. As far as I can tell,
virtually everything that Singer and Mason say in this book is either true or was true
at one time. Other philosophers have built their impressions of industrial agriculture
by reading materials published by animal protection advocacy groups such as the
Humane Society of the United States (see McPherson 2016). Much of what they say
is also true because activist groups do generally rely on the peer-reviewed literature
fromanimalwelfare science inmaking their claims.Does this imply that philosophers
whopass over detailed discussions of the conditions that obtain inCAFOsare justified
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in doing so? I argue that it does not. There is a gapbetween thepeer-reviewed literature
crucial to husbandry ethics and the literature summaries that are prepared by animal
protectionists. Philosophers should be more mindful of this gap than they typically
are.
The empirical side of husbandry ethics involves documenting the state of welfare
in animal production. There is now an extensive peer-reviewed literature on the
welfare of livestock, and as noted, animal protection groups are avid consumers of this
literature. However, there are important sources of implicit bias that emerge when the
scientific findings are summarized in critiques of industrial production systems. First
and most obviously, peer reviewed literature usually weighs both benefits and costs
to welfare, while the summaries mention only costs. More subtly, welfare claims in
scientific studies are qualified because the data are far from complete. In the scientific
literature, classicHumean skepticism combineswith lack of statistical power, leading
scientists to inject a note of skepticism into all of their claims. There is also the fact
that data from actual production environments is extremely scarce, and that producers
may lack both the skill and the motivation to remedy this situation over the near term.
Activist tracts report claims about the state ofwelfare in production systems as simple
assertions. Accounts of harm to welfare are stripped of any qualification by noting
offsetting benefits or acknowledgement of uncertainties. The critics are accurately
reporting what the literature states, but unqualified declarative sentences imply both
more certainty and more sweeping generality than one would find in the scientific
literature.
Second, there are systemic availability biases in the scientific literature. We know
quite a bit more about the welfare of animals in CAFOs than we do about the welfare
of animals raised in traditional systems, simply because those systems are harder to
study. This is because there are hundreds or thousands of small producers, requiring
study methods that standardize and aggregate data. In contrast, one can collect data
on thousands, tens and hundreds of thousands of animals from a single industrial
farm. It is even more difficult when those small producers are in far-flung rural locals
in Africa, Asia or Latin America, where travel distances, language barriers and field
conditions make data collection expensive and difficult. Activists report findings
on CAFOs because that is what gets studied, but it is at least logically possible
that welfare on traditional farms and ranches is as bad or worse. The implication
that CAFOs are the main problem is an artifact of reporting what we know and
remaining silent about what we don’t know. The inference that animals in CAFOs
endure significantly more suffering than animals raised by small farmers may be
plausible, but it is not supported by data.
What is more, activists are trying to motivate change, and producers are trying to
forestall it. Both have a tendency to cherry pick such data as is available. Ethological
studies have made enormous progress since Thomas Nagel speculated that we can’t
really knowwhat it is like to be a bat in the 1970s (Nagel 1974). Experimental studies
have done much to reveal what conditions, needs or amenities appear to be of most
importance to animals of different species (Mench 1998). Animal welfare science
is replete with studies quantifying maladies from bone breakage to mortality, and
the activists love to cite it. But behavioral and physiological studies have also given
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us strong reason to think that chickens are much more concerned with perches than
with crowding, and to suspect (here we’re less sure) that pigs are less stressed by
confinement than byworries about whether the boss pig will get their food (discussed
in Thompson 2015). Where husbandry ethics sees a puzzle in such findings, the
activist looks for findings that will help the campaign. What gets reported are claims
about injury, pain and stress, but difficult questions about how to limit injury, relieve
pain or limit stress are omitted.
Finally, welfare scientists often (I would say generally) care about animals and
hope that their work will have uptake among animal producers. When they are able
to identify a cost-effective method for improving the condition of animals, they
want producers to use it. Especially when producer organizations are in the lead on
encouraging change (as in the U.S.) there is thus an incentive to adopt a posture of
working with them to encourage change. Even when welfare scientists work with
state agencies, they will be dealing with ministries and departments organized for
the governance of agricultural production. Officials in these agencies will have little
interest in campaigns designed to put livestock farmers out of business. With a few
important exceptions, activist organizations have taken a political stance of opposing
the interests of animal producers, especially in theUnited States. Organizations (such
as People for the Ethical Treatment ofAnimals) advocating vegetarianismof any kind
are acting in direct opposition to producers’ economic interests. At the same time,
animal welfare scientists are aware that they need pressure from activist groups to
incentivize change by producers. The tension that emerges as advocates of husbandry
ethics (as I’m now claiming that many animal welfare scientists are) try to occupy
a middle ground between producers and advocates can be seen in the rhetoric. At
one juncture standards for animal welfare are weakened in hopes that producers can
be enticed to adopt them, while at another juncture they are overstated in hopes of
increasing pressure for political or market reform.
There is a philosophical complement to these observations. It is that cognizance of
the implicit biases and tensions of working to improve animal welfare should become
part of animal ethics itself. An ethic that sides with activists is just as problematic
as one that sides entirely with producers, who have their own reasons for resisting
change. Mainstream philosophers who adopt the archetypical approach seem to be
unaware of this problem. A philosopher should aim to expose and articulate what
makes husbandry reform intellectually and politically challenging. Once this work
is done, it may be possible to articulate the case for or against a particular practice,
or to encourage the average consumer to pay more attention to one set of welfare
product claims, over and against another. The mainstream philosophical community
seems to lack any appreciation of this context. They may be selling the animals who
live in these systems short, as a result.
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12.6 The Eclipse of Husbandry and the Rise of Narcissism
Following the analysis from my 2015 book, I interpret the literature in animal ethics
as preoccupied with one of two dietary questions. Either one should be a vegetarian
(probably a vegan) or failing that, one should avoid eating meat, milk or eggs from
industrial farms. Nothing that I have said in this paper can be construed as a rebuttal to
either of these dietary claims. I have simply not engaged them. Instead, I have argued
that preoccupation with these dietary questions has prevented mainstream philoso-
phers from engaging questions that could lead to significant improvement in millions
of animal lives. Unlike David DeGrazia, I believe that the lives of animals in CAFOs
areworth living, but like themajority of animal welfare scientists contributing empir-
ical findings for husbandry ethics, I believe that their lives could be significantly better
than they currently are.2
In light of this, I hope it will not be considered too impolite for me to suggest
that there is a thread of narcissism in mainstream animal ethics. Narcissism is, of
course, a philosophical and psychological phenomenonwith a complex history, influ-
enced significantly by the thought of Friedrich Nietzsche. The term has been used
to critique forms of absorption with the self that frustrate both social attachment and
political engagement, but this should not imply that all forms of self-reflection have
these outcomes (Gendlen 1987). Richard Rorty wrote that narcissism is simply a
pejorative way of observing that our situated humanity pervades all of our observa-
tions, going on to claim that he was proud to be a narcissist (Rorty 1979). Given my
professed affiliation with pragmatism, Rorty’s statement might be taken as indica-
tive. Yet Jeffery Stout insists that even given this position, Rorty can (and should)
maintain a commitment to the potential for objective truth. Our situatedness is neither
an excuse for adopting indefeasible views nor does it make all viewpoints equally
narcissistic (Stout 2007). My sentiments are with Stout. Rather than taking a deeper
dive into the philosophical literature on narcissism, my approach will be to offer a
series of characterizations that emerge directly from the subject at hand.
A strong claim of narcissism might go like this: At bottom, mainstream animal
ethics is less about the animals than it is clean hands. There are indications of this
strong narcissism in the philosophical literature. Norcross writes that the ethical issue
is one of not “supporting” the torture of animals, not about undertaking actions that
would make them better off. This might be taken to mean that a person’s attitude
2Indeed, many of the ills DeGrazia notes in the lead-up to his sweeping conclusion have been
targeted by husbandry ethics. When bone-strength characteristics are included in the index of traits
used by poultry breeders, problems decrease, but leg problems increase with selection based on fast
growth (González-Cerón et al. 2015). It is also possible to reduce injuries through feed additives and
behavioral management. It is an open question whether reforms could ever make factory farming
ethically defensible on quality of life grounds. Nevertheless, there are measurable improvements
that can be and have been made. DeGrazia does not do enough to show that we should simply
dismiss opportunities to improve the welfare of these animals on the ground that their lives are
not worth living, (see Thompson 2020). The argument might be persuasive to someone who is
wondering about their own “support” of livestock farming, but it is irrelevant to the question of
whether and how systems should be changed.
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to torture is more important from the moral perspective than the effects of torture.
Yet strong narcissism overstates the case. Dietetic ethics intersects with economic
markets, and it quite reasonable for a vegetarian to think that their refusal of animal
foods lowers the demand curve for these products, reducing a farmer’s incentive to
produce them (seeNorwood and Lusk 2011). This is amore reasonable interpretation
of what Norcross means by support. As previously stated, I have no desire to argue
against the dietetic approach to animal ethics. My claim is only that it is seriously
incomplete, and that animals themselves are the losers.
Efforts to promote human gustatory satisfaction by displacing the experience
of an animal entirely exhibit a more nuanced sense of narcissism. This was the
problem considered in my “blind chicken” scenario (Thompson 2008). It is exceed-
ingly unlikely that blind chickens actually have better welfare than sighted ones. My
point was to bring our discomfort with extreme genetic manipulation as a solution to
animal welfare problems into the foreground (see also Thompson 2010). While most
of the response to this paper has suggest that I was not forceful enough in articulating
objections to genetic transformation (see Ferrari 2012; Bos et al. 2018), some have
argued that the lack of realism in the blind chicken thought experiment disguises the
insight that what matters really is welfare, after all (Sandøe et al. 2014). In the decade
since my paper was published, the totally insentient animal organism has become a
reality and the mainstream animal ethicists love it. A growing literature documents
the enthusiasm for cellular production of animal products, eliminating animal minds
entirely (Chiles 2013; Welin 2013). Concerns that manipulation of stem cells and
genetically engineered heme and other biologics might stimulate concern about the
extreme instrumentalization of food have been raised (Thompson 2014), but there is
little evidence that they will quell animal advocates’ excitement over the prospects
of eating a meat product that did not come from a sentient being.
Are proponents of cellular protein production advocating on behalf of animals?
If one truly thinks that the lives lived by livestock today are not worth living, it
is feasible to think that future generations of human beings will be doing a favor
to future animals by not bringing them into existence at all. Claire Palmer called
attention to paradoxical elements in my original analysis of animal disenhancement
by interpreting it as an instance of the non-identity problem. As described initially
by Derek Parfit, the problem is a radical discontinuity between the identity of the
individuals being harmed (or benefited) and the identity of the individuals that actu-
ally eventuate, given the intervention under discussion (Palmer 2011). In the original
example, a genetic intervention leads to an animal that suffers less (perhaps because
of a reduced capacity for pain) than the one that would have resulted if the inter-
vention had not taken place. But there is a problem in thinking that one is either
benefiting the animal that does not come into existence, or harming the one that
does. In the case of cellular meats, it is potentially millions of animals that never
come into existence, but if Palmer is correct in claiming that we would be making a
metaphysical error to think that we are benefiting the animals that do not come into
existence, what possible benefit could there actually be? The most straightforward
answer that I can see is that people who eat cellular meat are benefiting themselves.
216 P. B. Thompson
They are satisfying a gustatory desire, while assuring themselves that they are not
“supporting” the suffering endured by livestock being raised in confined settings.
There are also environmental reasons for not eating meat, but here, too, the inter-
ests of animals that never exist do not really come into play. Expanding the outlook
on dietary ideals into environmental ethics does not resolve the problem of narcis-
sism with respect to animal interests. Broadening even further, Christina Van Dyke
has reviewed a number of emerging food practices advocated under the heading of
“food ethics”. Her focus has been on the analogy between dietetics and traditional
forms of spiritual askesis, or ascetic practice. Like traditional religious spirituality,
these practices combine social formation and personal redemption, albeit defined
in terms of health, when we are talking food. Van Dyke argues that on any philo-
sophically secular account, these dietetic regimes qualify as genuine spiritual prac-
tices. However, like the spiritual practices of religious extremists, dietetics become
pathological when absorption with one’s individualistic salvation overwhelms the
social aspect of spirituality and the pursuit of conviviality (Van Dyke 2018). In other
words, dietetics cease to function as properly ethical practices of spirituality when
they become narcissistic.
Donna Haraway has written convincingly on the role of interspecies relationships
in framing normative networks. She has characterized thinking that one is doing a
creature a favor by making sure it never exists as a form of exterminism, linking
it to genocide (Haraway 2008). Haraway does not mention cellular meat, but she
is targeting what she characterizes as extreme vegan views that would call for the
total elimination of animal production. Her claim here is a little vague. She is clearly
claiming that human-animal relationships are constitutive ofmoral situatedness. This
claim might be developed through a feminist care ethics that emphasizes the mainte-
nance of interdependencies and network bonds (see Noddings 2013). However, the
meaning of Haraway’s reference to genocide is less straightforward. She seems to
imply that in thinking that food animals would have been better off not to have existed
at all, the extreme animal ethicists arrogate to themselves a standpoint capable of
determining the ultimate value of another being’s life. Deciding who should live and
who should never be born is genocidal exterminism, even if it is not yet genocide,
because it is only a half-step away from deciding who should live and who should
die.
This reading of the desire for cellular meat is narcissistic in that one elevates
oneself to a Godlike standpoint to decide the fate of other creatures. One might,
of course, claim that livestock breeders have themselves taken on that role long,
long ago. There is certainly a germ of truth in this worry. On this view, the problem
with advanced breeding, including stem cell technologies, gene editing and cellular
techniques is that they exacerbate a germinal trope that was, indeed, present in
conventional breeding, but that was held in check by the limitations of technique.
Breeders did pursue self-regarding roles in selecting which animals would repro-
duce. Yet breeders were unable to sever themselves from relational responsibilities
to the progeny that resulted from their activity, and this limitation had a morally
salvific socializing effect. It blocked the complete instrumentalization of the animal,
and situated the breeder’s instrumental goal within a situated network calling for
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attentiveness to animal needs. The imperative of husbandry, of a moral regard for
the animal itself, thus also blocks total realization of the narcissistic instinct present
in all self-interested action.
Advocacy for cellular production of animal proteins does not fully satisfy the
conditions of genocidal exterminism outlined byHaraway. Yet when this advocacy is
coupled with the archetypical caricature of family farming that I have critique above,
the resulting dismissal of husbandry ethics in CAFOs alleviates the need for empathy
or attention to the animal’s experience. There is, then, a kind of cultural narcissism
that emerges throughout the scholarly practice of philosophy. The repetition of the
archetype and the subsequent failure to actually consider the condition in which
animals live reproduces (if not also encouraging) a pattern of normative practice.
The lives of animals in factory farms are repetitively characterized as involving
extreme suffering, so much so that in DeGrazia’s words, their lives are not worth
living. Engaging substantively with this suffering is taken to be both pointless, and
even problematic from a moral perspective. Animal suffering in CAFOs engages
no philosophical interest, because the lives of these animals are without value. It
would be better if these animals did not exist; we should pursue strategies that
eliminate them.With no value, these lives cannot generate any ethical response other
than disengagement of one’s self from the nexus in which these worthless lives are
embroiled. Individual philosophers may not feel like they are ignoring the interests
of animals, and might take umbrage at the suggestion that they do not care about
how animals actually fare in factory farms. Yet by ignoring the questions of ethical
husbandry, they replicate a pattern of disengagement that can be observed in other
forms of structural injustice. Our overweening concern with our own consumption
reinforce institutions thatmilitate against improving the lot of the animals themselves.
12.7 Conclusion
I have tried to sketch the contours of an argument that would hold mainstream
philosophers accountable in part for the lack of movement toward improving the
condition of animals living in industrial production systems. Those who do discuss
these systems fall prey to implicit biases associated with activism for animal causes.
A non-ideal theory would excuse activists for using whatever tools are available to
motivate change, at least insofar as they resist outright falsehoods (after all, that’s
what activists do). But non-ideal theory would hold that, like animal welfare scien-
tists themselves, those who occupy the social position of a philosopher or a scholar
have a duty to present a more nuanced and complex account any controversy on
which they report (see Pielke 2007). In making this case, I have emphasized a set of
questions that emerge within husbandry ethics: the need to address collective action,
the trade-offs between distinct welfare indicators, the matter of how far our ability
to reform a system is really constrained. I have gestured at an archetype that I find
too commonplace with most philosophers who have taken up animal ethics, and I
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have gone on to illustrate how this archetype oversimplifies the tasks of husbandry
ethics, even when the claims it makes about industrial agriculture are strictly true.
The archetype conjoins with philosophers’ penchant for relying on activist reports
for their empirical understanding of what happens on industrial farms. Although
activist reports are often factually accurate, they overstate what is known about the
condition of animals in CAFOs in two ethically significant respects. First, by simply
listing known welfare deficits, they fail to contextualize these deficits within a larger
and comprehensive understanding of animal welfare, one that would include not
only comparative discussions of traditional farming and wildlife, but that would
also acknowledge what we do not know about how animals fare in all of these
settings. Second, they fail to convey what ethologists and veterinary specialists have
learned about ways in which the welfare of animals may depend on features that
livestock species do not share with human beings. While anthropomorphism has its
place, these statements promote a pernicious form of anthropomorphism that fails to
respect ethically important differences in animal lives.
As an interest in the ethics of husbandry has vanished from the philosophical
discourse, it is almost certainly disappearing from the consciousness of the average
person woefully disconnected from the production of food. It is, thus, not surprising
that radical responses to the suffering of animals in these systems advocate disappear-
ance of the animals themselves. I argue that this mode of thought exhibits narcissism
in several forms. In the extreme, it is a concern formy involvement that erases interest
in what might be done for the animals themselves. It emerges more subtly in the view
that biotechnology could resolve the factory farm issue by doing away with animal
consciousness altogether. This thought conjoins with Christina Van Dyke’s analysis
of dietetic spirituality and finds further reinforcement in Donna Haraway’s discus-
sions of genocidal exterminism. In the end, however, a more modest structural form
of narcissism may be the most appropriate diagnosis. Here narcissism is a reflection
of the cultural institutions that block understanding, leaving us to think that moni-
toring of our own personal conduct is a morally adequate response to circumstances
of structural injustice. This view of narcissism as a cultural form owes more to Niet-
zsche than to Freud. In contrast, some serious philosophical dialog with people who
are trying to mitigate the suffering in factory farms is a better estimate of what the
profession of philosophy owes to the animals in our midst.
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Towards Animals for Disaster
Management in the Anthropocene
Andreia De Paula Vieira and Raymond Anthony
Abstract Animals, like human beings, are prone to suffering harms, such as disease,
injury and death, as a result of anthropogenic and natural disasters. Animals are
disproportionately prone to risk and adversely affected by disasters, and thus require
humane and respectful care when disasters strike, due to socially situated vulner-
abilities based on how human communities assess and value their moral standing
and function. The inability to integrate animals into disaster risk and management
practices and processes can sometimes be associated with a lack of understanding
about what animal ethics and animal health and welfare require when designing
disastermanagement programs.This chapter seeks to reimaginehuman responsibility
towards animals for disaster management. The pervasiveness of disasters and their
impacts on animals, human-animal and animal-environment relationships under-
score the importance of effective animal disaster management supported by sound
ethical decision-making processes. To this end, we delineate six ethically responsible
animal caretaking aims for consideration when developing disaster management
plans and policies. These aims, which address central vulnerabilities experienced
by domesticated animals during disasters, are meant to be action-guiding within the
disaster management context. They include: (1) Save lives and mitigate harm; (2)
Protect animal welfare and respect animals’ experiences; (3) Observe, recognize and
promote distributive justice; (4) Advance public involvement; (5) Empower care-
givers, guardians, owners and community members; (6) Bolster public health and
veterinary community professionalism, including engagement in multidisciplinary
teams and applied scientific developments. To bring about these aims,we offer a set of
practical and straightforward action steps for animal caregivers and disaster manage-
ment teams to ensure that animals’ interests are systematically promoted in disaster
management. They include: (1)Respect and humane treatment; (2) Collaboration and
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effective disaster communication; (3) Strengthening systems of information sharing,
surveillance, scientific research, management and training; (4) Community outreach
and proactive contact; (5) Cultural sensitivity and attitudes check, and (6) Reflection,
review and reform.
13.1 Introduction
We are living through the Anthropocene, an epoch defined by the fact that human
activities have touched nearly every aspect of life on Earth,1 including accidental or
inadvertent pollution from industries that result in the deaths of fish and pigs,2 as
well as intentional projects such as damming rivers that flood and drown a plethora of
animal species and rapid, widespread urban development that contributes to wildfires
that consume wild animals’ habitats.3 Further, the effects of climate change and
environmental degradation have left humans and animals vulnerable to drought, food
shortages and lack of habitability. In addition, the rise of emerging infectious disease
outbreaks has been connected to industrial agriculture, environmental destruction
and habitat loss (FAO 2017; Johnson et al 2020; Hiko and Malicha 2016).
Animals are constantly vulnerable to disasters and are not equally protected when
they occur. For example, at the time of drafting this chapter, the world is gripped by
two major disasters—the Australian bushfires and a novel coronavirus pandemic. In
the first instance, conservative estimates point to upwards of 800 million mammals,
reptiles and birds affected by the New South Wales fires.4 A viral Internet video
from Adelaide of a koala approaching a group of cyclists and climbing on one of the
bicycles to get a drink has become an iconic image during this calamity.5 It and other
images of injured or charred animals have ushered in an overabundance of concern,
including handmade goods and medical supplies from across the globe to help the
animals injured in the heatwave and wildfires. Could the Australian animals’ vulner-
abilities have been reduced and many lives spared? What landscape management
disaster plans were in place and were they designed to safeguard the wildlife popu-
lations and their habitats and/or shepherd human behavior to care for the animals
during an anticipated climate-induced crisis? Howmight real-time sentinel mapping
ofwildlife populations havemitigated these negative effects?What disaster strategies
were in place to evacuate animals in vivariums as well as in research and shelter facil-
ities in case the fires reached these places? In order to prevent similar future disasters,
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what have decision-makers learned and implemented about effectively integrating
animal, human and environmental health and welfare? What disaster regulations
should be enacted?
In the second instance, the SARS-CoV-2/COVID-19 outbreak,6 which originated
in China, has led to a global pandemic that had infected more than 25 million people
by 5 September 2020. Animals can be major reservoirs of zoonotic diseases, which
can jump to humans and vice versa, especially when basic public health measures are
not vigilantly observed in relation to animals and the environment. These measures
include prevention, detection, monitoring and eliminating outbreaks and epidemics
through sanitation and epidemiological surveillance. Initial reports speculate that the
COVID-19 outbreak was caused by a spillover infectious virus that surfaced at a live
wholesale seafood and wet market in Wuhan, China. Differently from the bushfires
in Australia, perhaps due to delayed confirmation and notification of the outbreak by
the local authorities, little was said by field investigators and researchers about the
number of animal deaths and the impact of the outbreak on the health and welfare
of infected and non-infected animals. It is unclear what has happened to the tens of
thousands of animals that would have been sold in Wuhan in conjunction with the
Lunar New Year celebrations after authorities banned the trade of live animals. Have
they been slaughtered (if so, how) or have some been abandoned and what was the
main motivation for doing so?
The questions associated with these examples highlight significant ethical chal-
lenges posed by disasters. While a host of difficult choices must be made during
a disaster, our ethical commitments to animals will frame how they count morally
and how disaster planning, together with improved emergency-response capacity,
should be designed and deployed to prevent and reduce risks to both humans and
animals. Thus, further research, regulations and practices in animal disaster manage-
ment should consider what outcomes are intended for animals in specific disaster
events, how are they justified, and what ethical and scientific blind spots exist when
it comes to how the substance and effects of human activities, such as better animal
welfare and care and husbandry practices, influence regard for animals and their
welfare.
Our focus in this chapter is on the plight of domesticated animals—those with
whom we have direct or proximate contact.7 We begin by defining “disaster” and
discuss the ethical biases that result in many animals, by and large, still being left
out of or minimized in disaster management plans. Next, we discuss the impor-
tance of improving disaster management for animals in the Anthropocene. We argue
that animal health and welfare perspectives, together with an emphasis on human-
animal-environment relationships should be strengthened in disaster risk reduction




7Some animals that are recovered from disasters for rehabilitation by qualified animal health and
welfare professionals become domesticated if they cannot be returned to the wild.
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discuss six ethically responsible caretaking aims for animal disaster management,
and in concert with these aims, we end by offering practical and straightforward
recommendations to increase the visibility of animals’ interests during a disaster.
These recommendations are meant to catalyze further engagement and strengthen
policies and practices on the subject.
13.2 Animal Disaster Ethics: Developing Disaster
Frameworks
Disasters are emergencies endured by people and animals and can be induced
by anthropogenic or natural agents. Anthropogenic cum technological disas-
ters include fires, environmental contamination, toxicological or chemical events,
and disasters due to human negligence or abuse, conflict, criminal activity or
terrorism. Meanwhile natural disasters fall under four broad categories: (a) Hydro-
meteorological-climatological: floods, wave surges, storms, hurricanes, cyclones,
landslides, avalanches, fire, droughts and climate change; (b) Geophysical: tsunamis,
earthquakes and volcanic eruptions; (c) Biological: pandemic diseases, epidemics
and insect infestations; and (d)Extraterrestrial: asteroids,meteoroids, and comets that
alter interplanetary conditions that affect the Earth’s magnetosphere, ionosphere, and
thermosphere (EM-DAT 2020; Heath 1999). Disasters can be international, national
or local in scope. The onset of a disaster can be sudden/rapid (fire, flood, avalanche,
mudslide and earthquake) or slow (disease, biosecurity breach).
A disaster occurs when the ability to anticipate and reduce risk to natural or
anthropogenic hazards overtakes standard health and well-being accommodations
and the conventional capacity to cope is destabilized. Disaster management is neces-
sary when the scale, timing and unpredictability of events threatens to overrun
routine capabilities of civic and public health systems, communities and individ-
uals to address the emergency (Nelson et al. 2007). Disaster management activi-
ties include risk communication, regulating environmental conditions, minimizing
and detecting disease threats and outbreaks, planning for emergency medical and
public health response capacities, and preventing secondary emergencies following
a disaster (Salinsky2002).Disastermanagement teamsmust address a complex emer-
gency situation in the most humane and respectful way possible for all the parties
involved—human, animal and environment (Murray and McCutcheon 1999). The
experience and skills of the social, behavioral and health sciences, prevention and
surveillance, risk communication, data gathering, architecture and planning, environ-
mental sciences, engineering, and public safety are commonly required in traditional
disaster management.
However, disaster management is also a poignant animal issue. Indeed, animal
disaster management is a “wicked problem” (Glassey 2020), marked by the conflu-
ence of increasing human dependence on animals for survival (Delgado et al. 1999)
including nutrition, food security, health, safety and livelihood. The challenges posed
13 Reimagining Human Responsibility … 227
by climate change and extreme natural events, population growth and urban sprawl,
emerging and reemerging diseases, and global political and economic instability
also bring focus on human ethical commitments towards animals. The capacity for
human communities to recover after a disaster is inextricably linked to how animals
fare.8 According to the international Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduc-
tion (United Nations 2015), countries should enhance their disaster preparedness
and recovery efforts, strengthen governance and invest in disaster risk reduction
since there are significant economic, social, environmental and public health and
safety benefits in doing so. A focus on understanding the complex interconnections
between health and welfare at the intersection of human-animal-nature conflicts
can lead to preventative and mitigation measures that reduce the number of deaths,
injuries, disabilities and losses in economic, physical, social, cultural and environ-
mental assets. The Sendai Framework includes strategies for stakeholder engage-
ment and dialogue to develop implementable community guidelines and financing
intervention, dependable surveillance, strategic planning that enhances clear lines
of governance and authority for decision-making in veterinary and public health
emergencies, early warning systems, coordinated and reliable risk analysis, equi-
table triage protocols for animals during medical support and rescue, and practi-
cable policies for landscape planning and infrastructure (e.g. evacuation centers and
temporary housing) that reflect scientific advice and the most recent evidence-based
information.
How a disaster is framed is key in successfully preparing for and responding to
it. In framing a disaster in terms of its management aims, the disaster management
team reveals their ethical commitments. This involves making explicit the priori-
ties, values and moral assumptions, and reasons underpinning crisis policies and
actions while fostering coordination at all levels to manage an all-encompassing
crisis (Institute of Medicine 2007). Disaster management aims can highlight the
adequacy of the infrastructure involved in advancing equity, inclusion and commu-
nity relationships, which will be necessary in mobilizing political will. Further,
this framing provides a window into the people, devices, systems, procedures and
methods necessary to realize significant community ends during a disaster, including
constraints such as existing laws, regulations and public policies. A disaster calls for
specialized communications and surveillance systems, adequate equipment, trained
responders and deployment of professionals who can provide quick and appropriate
response to the threat (Institute ofMedicine 2003; O’Toole et al. 2002). Furthermore,
adequate disaster preparedness involves awell-prepared community to ensure vulner-
able populations are well-integrated into an existing infrastructure (for example, see
8A case in point is the January 2019 collapse of the Feijão dam in Brumadinho, which has been
billed as Brazil’s worst industrial accident. The incident not only killed at least 248 people, but also
engulfed nearby farms, thus affecting the environment on which local and regional communities
built their economies. Numerous farm animals were terminated on humanitarian grounds per the
directive of the Federal Council of Veterinary Medicine (CFMV) (https://www1.folha.uol.com.br/
cotidiano/2019/01/animais-agonizando-sao-mortos-a-tiros-em-brumadinho.shtml). In addition, the
response team also rescued more than 400 animals (https://crmvpb.org.br/a-atuacao-da-brigada-vet
erinaria-no-resgate-de-animais-em-brumadinho/).
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AVMA Emergency Preparedness and Response Guide 2012; Itoh 2018; Murray and
McCutcheon 1999; Vinícius de Souza 2018; Powers 2016). Government and animal
industries’ investments in capacity building and personnel training, together with
practical operation and maintenance records allow for better governance, since they
prevent mistakes in operating pre-established contingency and biosecurity plans. For
example, previously designed action plans to address a pandemic like COVID-19
were not executed due to under-resourced facilities and a lack of personal protective
equipment for frontline animal caregivers (Winders 2020). Since an essential objec-
tive of disaster management is minimizing the vulnerability of affected populations,
animal disaster management plans should include detailed information about miti-
gation and prevention such as housing, husbandry and waste management standards
for animals, the built environment, and social, political, environmental and economic
structures around animals, including those in animal facilities. These include zoos,
vivariums, sanctuaries and concentrated animal feeding operations to minimize both
the loss of animal lives and poor welfare conditions during recovery from a disaster.
Particularly urgent in the Anthropocene are holistic framings which can serve as
a foundation for governments, civic and public health systems, disaster management
professionals, animal health andwelfare, veterinary emergency care, surveillance and
public health, private sector stakeholders, animal-related organizations and facilities,
university researchers and communities to investigate specific risk reduction strate-
gies, develop guidelines for disaster management and provide effective messaging
during outbreak response.
The One Health Framework,9 which is gaining popularity in zoonotic disease
control, brings the connectivity of human-animal-environmental health and welfare
issues into sharp focus when dealing with animal, environmental and public health
crises (ECDC 2018; Rist et al. 2014; Stauffer and Conti 2014). One Health seeks
“to promote, improve and defend the health and well-being of all species and the
ecosystem, by enhancing cooperation and collaboration between physicians, veteri-
narians, other scientific health and environmental professionals and by promoting
strengths in leadership and management to achieve these goals” (http://www.one
healthinitiative.com/mission.php). The One Health resolution marks the first time a
holistic definition was formally agreed upon to address the interconnections between
human-animal-ecosystem health, and it resulted in greater public visibility for the
well-being of animals (Zinsstag et al. 2011). Here “health is a state of complete phys-
ical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity”
(https://www.who.int/about/who-we-are/constitution). Within this framework, field
investigations and scientific and technological disaster developments would seek to
clarify the effects of past disasters on climate and environmental variability, welfare
and disease occurrence in order to predict and plan for future disasters. Further,
because disasters challenge the welfare of the agent-environment-host triad, as in the
case of a pandemic, the frameworkmay be applied to ongoing challenges to shed light
on changes in the intensity of disease outbreaks in humans and animals, the access
9A competing framework, One Welfare, has also been gaining traction in disaster management as
an alternative to One Health (Pinillos 2018).
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of pathogens to new landscapes, the relationship between previous disaster variables
and the epidemiology of diseases and interventions, aswell as the effects of biological
development, emergence and re-emergence of infectious diseases. The OIE (World
Organisation for Animal Health), a One Health initiative partner, has taken a lead-
ership role in the development of animal disaster guidelines and in identifying the
current state of disaster management and risk reduction processes (Villa et al. 2017).
The OIE supports the Veterinary Services of member countries to enhance their
resilience and strengthen their disaster management capacity, reduce risks at the
global level and promote close collaboration among emergency services and all other
agencies involved in disaster management. The OIE also provides wide access to the
epidemiological information that public veterinary institutions and organizations are
called to collect at national and international levels through the OIE Information
System WAHIS, the World Health Organization (WHO), and the Animal Disease
Notification System (ADNS-EC) in Europe.
Considering animal disaster management through the lens of One Health can
broaden current knowledge and provide new ways to minimize harms, such as
revealing how animals cope immunologically with infections or respond in search
and rescuemissions. AOneHealth perspective can offer an important set of orienting
questions to guide disaster management. For example, could improved welfare prac-
tices boost animals’ immunity and reduce the spread of infectious diseases amongst
animals and humans? To what extent have climate mitigation or adaptation strate-
gies been designed to reduce harms to animals? Could the transmissibility of recent
outbreaks have been minimized if the health and welfare of animals were given
priority?10 Could scientists demonstrate the possible link between human and animal
welfare in terms of the social, economic and political complexity of emergency
planning, response and recovery involving animals? Could animal welfare science
improve search and rescue missions often performed by animals? While One Health
is a promising candidate for animal disaster management, the questions outlined
here reveal various anthropocentric biases, animal ethics and considerations as well
as other moral, political and budgetary priorities and commitments (Van Herten et al.
2019).
13.3 Animal Disaster Ethics: Revealing Animal
Vulnerabilities
As more disasters are emerging, some of unpredictable scale and magnitude, it
becomes clear that the Anthropocene has heightened animals’ vulnerability. While
10For example, Britain’s Foot andMouth Disease outbreak (2001), avian influenza outbreaks across
China and Asia, the highly pathogenic A(H5N8) strain of avian influenza (HPAI) epidemic that
occurred in 29 European countries between 2016–2017, the porcine reproductive and respiratory
syndrome (PRRS) outbreak, and the H5N2 outbreak that ravaged poultry systems in more than 20
US states in 2015–2016.
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concern for some animals is palpable (e.g., companion animals and those that capti-
vate the human imagination such as koalas and polar bears), what constitutes an
adequate response to the needs and interests of other animals is not universally
consistent (e.g., livestock). Since Hurricane Andrew in 1992 (Heath 1999), emer-
gency and evacuation plans and early warning systems in the United States have
started to address the importance of contingency plans to save animals; however,
after 25 years, as demonstrated in the responses to Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and
Maria, these contingency plans are still not widespread and lack the breadth and
depth to technically, scientifically and responsibly address animals’ issues before,
during and after a disaster. Other countries prone to natural disasters, such as Brazil
(from drought, landslides and flooding) and Japan (from tsunamis, earthquakes, land-
slides and flooding), also continue to struggle to address thewelfare of animals during
emergencies (Itoh 2018; Vinícius de Souza 2018). When a disaster strikes, human
considerations tend to take precedence or are still considered independently from
animal considerations (consider the two examples that began this chapter). Conse-
quently, the necessary infrastructure, methods and capacity to adequately address
animal-related issues is absent in many cases (photographer Yasusuke Ota’s depic-
tion of this omission in the context of the aftermath of Tohoku earthquake and tsunami
in Japan is an excellent example of a lack of aesthetic, moral and evidence-based
engagement in disaster management).11
Another challenge that pushes for better animal disaster management plans is
the problem faced by animal owners who leave companion animals and livestock
11The authors thank Clemens Driessen for alerting us to this exhibition. https://www.aestheticama
gazine.com/yasusuke-ota-the-abandoned-animals-of-fukushima-amsterdam.
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behind during a disaster. It is still common that first responders have neither clear
outcomes for minimizing welfare harms to the fewest number of animals nor the
capacity to rescue them because the resources or equipment are not available to save
people, animals and property. While animals are considered property under the law
in most places, given the intimate relationships people have with their animals (e.g.,
as members of families, and as sources of nutrition, food security and livelihoods)
(Sawyer and Huertas 2018), they are increasingly being granted more social consid-
eration (Meijboom and Stassen 2016). Further, there is every indication that animals’
welfare and lives will continue to be amajor issue affecting disaster management and
rescue in the future (LEGS 2015). The COVID-19 pandemic, for example, has raised
fear and anxiety among pet and companion animal owners, livestock producers,
zoos, shelters and consumers of animal products. There has been little guidance on
how to ensure the welfare of feral, wild and community animals during mandatory
stay-at-home orders for those on whom they depend or of livestock when meat and
milk processing cannot occur. Local community values and practical constraints
in tandem with technical and scientific information should be factored into deci-
sion making about how animals are managed during a disaster and what constitutes
desired outcomes for animals vis-à-vis disaster response.
Disasters may present opportunities to explore protections for animals in prepa-
ration for future ones. In the US, the Pet Evacuation and Transportation Standards
(PETS) Act was passed shortly after Hurricane Katrina in 2006 tomitigate loss of life
of some animal species during a disaster. As a federal law, the PETS Act mandates
that in order for states, cities, and counties to receive federal funding for disaster
relief plans, those plans must “account for the needs of individuals with house-
hold companion animals, pets and service animals before, during, and following a
major disaster or emergency.”12 The Act allows the Federal EmergencyManagement
Agency (FEMA) to provide funding to states and localities for the creation, opera-
tion, and maintenance of pet-friendly emergency shelters, along with other disaster
emergency actions for companion and service animals.13 Rescuing and rehabilitating
animals need not be in conflict with promoting human welfare and agency, and can
serve to soften the human-animal divide. For example, during Hurricane Irma in the
US (2017), Florida’s Governor Rick Scott urged hotels to waive their no-pet policies
for pet owners seeking refuge from the hurricane. TheUniversity of Florida’s College
of Veterinary Medicine (UFCVM), part of the state’s disaster response system, also
set up pet-friendly shelters so that whole families could stay together. “Do not leave
your pet behind,” was the refrain from the UFCVM since, “If it’s not safe for you, it’s
not safe for your pet.” Similarly, theGeorgeR. BrownConventionCenter inHouston,
Texas, permitted survivors to bring their animal companions with them. Some care-
givers and owners will not leave their homes unless they know their animals can
accompany them or that their animals will be saved. Owners who do not relinquish
their animals during a disaster have made it harder for first responders to evacuate
people—their target survivor group—which can also inadvertently sabotage rescue
12See p. 1 of https://www.congress.gov/109/plaws/publ308/PLAW-109publ308.pdf.
13https://www.congress.gov/109/plaws/publ308/PLAW-109publ308.pdf.
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efforts to save animals, especially if the owners put themselves and the animals at risk
when trying to save the latter. Furthermore, when animals are left behind, the trauma
of abandoning them can haunt both rescuers and owners. From a public health and
biosecurity perspective, however, itmust bemade clear to ownerswhen it is necessary
to practice physical distancing from their pets; quarantined animals may be carrying
a pathogenic agent, especially if a natural disaster occurs concomitantly with an
animal or public health emergency (WSAVA 2020). In the case of veterinary and
public health emergencies, reference laboratories in every country should be consid-
ered in disaster management plans and work in tandem to investigate the efficacy
of interspecific transmission and the manifestation of a disease in animals so that
subsequent diagnostic, therapeutic and prevention interventions can be developed
and deployed effectively. Local and international laboratories should be involved
early on and interactions should happen often for proper technical collaboration. An
example of a multi-nation concerted effort to improve animal disaster management is
the OIE Reference Laboratories and Collaborating Centres that have the objective of
harmonizing and exchanging data, and sharing information and reference materials
to improve disease surveillance, control and veterinary emergencies worldwide.14
There aremany anthropocentric reasons to provide for animals during a disaster—
for example, humans have an acquired responsibility due to animals’ membership
in our homes, the human-animal bond, their health and welfare, psychosocial and
emotional trauma, the potential for environmental degradation, and savings in time,
labor and financial expense if animals are neglected during an emergency. While we
have a duty to plan and prepare well ahead of a disaster for our own benefit, recent
disasters have made clear that the heavy loss of animal lives and their poor welfare
due to disease and injury constitutes a moral harm in terms of their injustice and
inhumaneness. Therefore, there are also non-anthropocentric reasons for providing
aid to animals during a disaster. The weighty effects of our continued domestication
of animals in the modern age signal the need to carefully consider the ethical aspects
of animal disaster management and to incorporate ethical considerations involving
animals into emergency planning activities. For animals, first responders will most
likely be their immediate caretakers. Here, it will be incumbent upon the organiza-
tions that engage first responders to develop disaster plans that include evacuation
(also taking into consideration the capacities of certain species of animals to fend for
themselves and the health status of both owners and animals) and having contingency
plans if the animals cannot be removed or can be a hazard to humans and vice versa,
such as wildlife.
Disaster management is still largely defined by the interests of human communi-
ties. Members of the public and elected officials are hardly surveyed to discern their
commitment to protecting human and animal lives prior to and during a disaster,
as well as its impact on the ecosystem, including their perceptions and the rela-
tive weight placed on human-animal lives and how resources should be allocated to
mitigate future disasters.
14See https://www.oie.int/scientific-expertise/collaborating-centres/reference-centre-networks/.
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Disasters, however, remind us that human beings and animals share an ecological
landscape. In a sense, many of our uses of animals themselves may constitute a
hazard, exposure or vulnerability for animalswhennot properly cared for ormanaged.
Human beings have much work to do to ensure conditions for mutual coexistence
and alter activities and projects in ways that minimize human-animal conflicts in
order for effective interspecies relationships to flourish. Disasters are occasions that
can draw people into caring for animals in extraordinary situations and to reconsider
the “norms of normality” by rethinking our existing uses of animals and practices
that give rise to their vulnerabilities in the first place.15
The vulnerabilities experienced by animals take many forms and manifest them-
selves in different ways. For example, reducing animals’ vulnerability during emer-
gencies include mitigation and prevention strategies that prepare for possible evacu-
ation, redesign of animal housing, and handling waste pollution and carcass disposal
effectively to minimize public health hazards. Animals also experience socially situ-
ated vulnerabilities, that is, how human communities assess and value the moral
standing of animals and their function, and how a lack of understanding about what
constitutes good animal welfare during disasters may impact their consideration.
Arluke and Sanders (1996) suggest a sociozoologic scale to assign relative moral
worth to humans and animals. The socially situated vulnerability that follows species
lines and/or our traditionally cultivated uses of animals and that forms the basis of a
deep-seated cultural hierarchy of valuing animals, influences howwemake decisions
about animals in disasters. Irvine (2009) argues that one’s species status on the scale
influences one’s relative moral considerability and the extent to which resources will
be devoted to save one’s life. The scale is complicated by other considerations such
as economic value, function and types of relationships and liability.
Although human lives tend to have priority during an emergency, increasingly
animals matter. Our close relationship with dogs and cats and the recognition that
the human-animal bond is a significant feature during rescue and evacuation, and
has propelled these “near-person” (Varner 2012) companion animals into the “also
victims” arena during a disaster. In the US, the PETS Act provides accommodation
for companion animals and their caregivers. Livestock and research animals tend
to be more vulnerable than companion animals due to the position that livestock
occupy on the sociozoologic scale. They suffer disproportionately in the wake of
a disaster, especially if no disaster management plan is in effect. Historically (and
because of their high stocking densities and paucity of hazard mitigation strategies),
livestock experience more injuries, disease and loss of life/termination. Farmers and
producers responsible for their care, when faced by delivery failures at processing
plants, may not be able to sell their animals even though they care for them (FAO
2020). Rescuing large animal populations (for example, a herd of cattle, wildlife
translocation, research animals) is a tremendous effort compared with rescuing a
small number of family pets. Whereas a family can often bring their pets in their
personal vehicle, moving large numbers of animals requires many transport vehicles
15The authors are indebted to Clemens Driessen for this insightful skein of thought.
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and adequate shelter facilities, whichmay not be possible during an emergency situa-
tion because this type of priority is not included in disaster management plans. These
conditions make euthanasia, depopulation or culling very likely to minimize harms
to these animals. However, we argue that alternative strategies that also prioritize
animal welfare should be developed and implemented in the field through practical
guidelines that include indemnity procedures for loss of animals and mitigation of
animal suffering. During Hurricane Katrina (2005), millions of farm animals in the
United States died.Hurricane Sandy claimed the lives of tens of thousands of research
animals because there was no conceived contingency plan for them.16 Meanwhile,
more than 3 million chickens and 5,000 pigs died during Hurricane Florence (2018).
The USDepartment of Agriculture (the primary agricultural regulator) does not have
the resources to address animal welfare andmortality. The chronic effects of disasters
may influence animals and can predispose those that are already health or welfare
compromised to infectious and non-infectious diseases due to low immunity that
leads to distress, behavioral maladaptation and negative affective states (FAO 2020).
In disaster emergency sites, feed and water quality and quantity may be severely
lacking and common management practices such as moving manure, moving feed
and stock, and automated activities that rely on energy supplies can be subverted due
to power outages.
Ethical judgments are implicit in all decisions and recommendations made about
how to conceptualize a “disaster” (AVMA 2012; Irvine, 2009), its impact on animal
welfare (Anthony 2004; AVMA 2020a, b; Sawyer and Huertas 2018), or which
disastermanagement framework to deploy (e.g.,OneHealth). The currentCOVID-19
crisis providesmany examples about the ethical decisions associatedwith animal care
during a global pandemic. Some farmers in North America have had to dump milk
following lockdown and social distancing restrictions when processing plants and
institutional buyers shut down (Splitter 2020). Meanwhile, supply chain disruptions
meant that some poultry farmers were required to depopulate their animals (i.e., the
rapid, large-scale destruction of multiple healthy animals in the most efficient way
possible) (Kevany 2020). With fewer slaughterhouse spaces to process the market
animal surplus, farmers and farm workers are forced depopulate them, resulting in
food waste and animal welfare issues when depopulation or euthanasia go awry.
Terminating animals before they are able to go to market has a significant emotional
and financial toll on farmers. Ethically, depopulation due to a lack of operational
processing plants duringCOVID-19 is entirely different fromdepopulation necessary
to curtail disease spreadwithin a herd or flockor to society.Another significant animal
welfare problem during the COVID-19 pandemic is limiting animals’ access to feed
and water in an attempt to slow their growth (AVMA 2020a).
Animals are also put at risk differentially by their physical or housing condi-
tions. The way animal facilities are organized and the magnitude of animals housed
can result in disastrous consequences for animals and humans alike. For example,
erecting concentrated animal feeding operations (CAFOs) in floodplains that are in
16https://www.businessinsider.com/hurricane-sandy-killed-tens-of-thousands-of-research-ani
mals-2012-11).
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the path of hurricanes or storms (with little option for animals to evacuate on their
own), or encouraging stocking densities that incubate and exacerbate animal diseases
without clear disaster management strategy are cases of negligent planning. These
forms of ‘human-induced’ hazards fly in the face of acknowledging the independent
moral value of animals. They are examples of difficult conversations we must have
regarding how we value certain animals. In the Netherlands, thousands of animals
have succumbed to stable fires because farmers did not want or could not afford
to invest in fire alarms and management systems.17 Further, being cognizant of the
‘carrying capacity’ of a particular geographical locale—that is, the number of animals
in a particular location and the location’s susceptibility to certain kinds of hazards—
is essential for both human and animal well-being and to minimize environmental
degradation (Irvine 2009). The proximity of animal farms to human communities
and precarious ecological entities, and management of farm waste and pollution,
continue to have negative implications for human, animal and environmental health
as experienced since the Australian Bushfires or Hurricanes Floyd andDennis (1999)
and Florence (2019), despite being almost 20 years apart.18
In summary, an ethical conclusion about whether the interests of animals are
regarded morally is largely contingent on the type and magnitude of disaster facing
a community, how animals are viewed relative to human interests and priorities, and
what disaster management plans are in place to attend to animals during a crisis.
High and low income countries should take steps to consider the impact of disasters
on both humans and animals since their fates are often inextricably bound together.
Acknowledging our ‘solidarity’ with animals during a disaster can serve as an effec-
tive and equitable basis for mitigating harm to all affected parties. Where animals
are more directly tied to peoples’ livelihoods (and thus, cannot be easily replaced),
early disaster interventions for animals need to reduce disaster damage (e.g., animal
suffering, mortality, morbidity, displacement, asset damage) and indirect losses, in
order to promote overall economic recovery and owners’, producers’ and commu-
nities’ and veterinary professionals’ psychological and social well-being (Campbell
and Knowles 2011; FAO 2020; Knowles and Campbell 2014; Martin et al. 2020;
Rollin 2011).
17The authors are grateful to Bernice Bovenkerk for this addition and link: https://www.verzekera
ars.nl/media/5048/20180705-actieplan-brandveilige-veestallen-definitief.pdf. To date, a new action
plan has been agreed upon by Dutch farmers, the fire department, an animal protection organization
and an insurers’ organization in order to create safer barns.
18At the time of drafting this chapter, citizens in Mozambique, Malawi and Zimbabwe are facing
floodwaters and waterborne disease outbreaks (like cholera) in the aftermath of the category 2
Cyclone Idai. Early reports suggest that the storm claimed nearly 1000 human lives and countless
livestock lives. Also, floodwaters in the US Midwest have meant that farmers who subscribe to
conventional forms of agriculture are contending with economic losses due to lost stockpiled grain
and diseased animals and dead livestock (https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/for-midwest-far
mers-floodwaters-threaten-millions-in-crop-and-livestock-losses).
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13.4 Animal Disaster Management: A Reimagining
Animal disaster ethics is a distinctive component of disaster management activity. It
asks a central question: “How are animals regarded during a disaster?” The ethical
aims orienting this activity involve a societal component—the responsible caretaking
of vulnerable animals and groups. It is a systematic social activity governed by norms
andmotivated by core values to minimize human and animal harm and protect public
interests. It aims to bring about welfare outcomes for animals commensurate with
their interests and needs. It also obligates communities—not just individuals—to
promote these outcomes for the common human-animal good. As indicated above,
not all animals are equally protected during disasters and some may be subjected to
harms more than once during a disaster (e.g., laboratory animals conscripted in the
fight against SARS-CoV-2/COVID-19).
The core ethical problems in disaster management all apply in the case of animals:
an unprepared public, limited resources, special responsibilities to vulnerable popu-
lations, special obligations of health and veterinary professionals, lack of capacity
building and training, community engagement and involvement in all disaster
management phases, effective disaster communication, and barriers to gathering rele-
vant evidence to guide interventions. Disaster animal managers need to act rapidly
and decisively on the basis of incomplete knowledge. Ensuring public trust and
confidence are an essential part of a robust disaster management program involving
animals, which can include developing response mechanisms regarding triage care,
separation measures such as quarantine, isolation, and physical distancing, and
measures to prevent animal-to-human transmission from companion, laboratory,
livestock or wild animals (adapted from Heath 1999; Jennings and Arras 2016;
OIE 2016). Rapidly growing imbalances regarding supply and demand of essen-
tial resources and services during a disaster will require clear ethical guidance on
rationing scarce resources and sound triage principles, including implementation
procedures that are executable, transparent, equitable, inclusive and engender public
trust. Knowledge of animal behavior and of the capacity of different species to cope
in different disasters are also crucial.
Transparency and direct links to community and stakeholder involvement will
also ensure that public health decision-making related to animal welfare will be
effective, humane and just (Vroegindewey 2012), especially if large numbers of
animals must be destroyed through depopulation. In the event that depopulation is
necessary (such as the highly pathogenic Avian Influenza outbreak in 2014–2015 in
the US19), adherence to strong ethical standards and procedures, and state and federal
laws and regulations should take precedence to ensure that as much consideration as
possible is given to the welfare of affected animals.
By and large, animal disaster managers straddle two differing worlds. They
are challenged to extend the humanitarian impulse directly to animals within the
constraints of a human-centric world. It is imperative, then, that those working in this
realm appreciate the vulnerabilities and social and economic positioning of animals
19https://www.ers.usda.gov/webdocs/publications/86282/ldpm-282-02.pdf?v=3994.
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within the risk and the emergency scenarios at the intersection of animal welfare and
ethics. Here, sensitivity to the moral considerability placed on human-animal rela-
tionships should be observed alongside respect for the interests of animals. Assisting
animals and their caregivers can ensure greater survivability and better long-term
outcomes for the whole community (Sawyer and Huertas 2018; Vinícius de Souza
2018). The perspectives of those interested in good outcomes (e.g., clinical, behav-
ioral and affective) for animals such as animal owners and caregivers, farmers, the
public, first responders, veterinarians, industry agents, aid agencies, policy makers
and public health officials, and affected communities, should be considered when
deciding the fate of animals during a crisis. Without the support of these groups, the
public and animal caregiversmay reproach governments for their disregard for animal
welfare, a sentiment that could frustrate the disaster management process. According
to Sawyer and Huertas (2018), common barriers to effective animal protection from
disasters include insufficient knowledge of animal needs in emergencies and a lack of
animal management skills; absence of resources for veterinary emergencies within
the disaster cycle; lack of recognition to protect animals despite a high depen-
dency between people and their animals; responsibility for veterinary emergencies
(nationally and internationally) is either unassigned or ineffective; absence of integra-
tion (people and animals) in emergency management; lack of organization amongst
subsistence livestock owners making emergency management of animals very diffi-
cult (pp. 2–3). The current COVID-19 pandemic reminds us that disasters are rapidly
evolving situations and can be experienced differently by different communities.
Some communities may be better prepared than others and have contingency plans
in place. Disaster management plans should have clear decision-making matrices to
outline when animals should be quarantined, depopulated, slaughtered in alternative
facilities, sent to a shelter and so on. Furthermore, disasters can put extraordinary and
sustained demands on essential community services and public health systems, and
frontline workers, veterinarians and those caring for animals, leading to compassion
fatigue.
13.5 Animal Disaster Management: Humanitarian Impulse
and Animal Welfare Science
Howmight disaster managers and responders sharpen their sensitivity and judgment
regarding animals and their interests before and when disaster strikes?
During a disaster, human beings and animals experience atypical and urgent need
of rescue and protection. This is a time of shared vulnerability and solidarity. During
an emergency, no one is self-reliant and animals in confined settings are dependent
on human beings for their rescue, evacuation and care (e.g., during euthanasia and
depopulation; when planning management of animal facilities, shelters and so forth;
when performing translocation, rehabilitation and release practices; during triage
and clinical treatment; when developing scientific and technological prevention and
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mitigation strategies). The focus of animal disaster ethics is to understand animals’
needs within the context of the humanitarian impulse to aid animals in need, which
includes reducing pain, suffering, and loss of life. This humanitarian impulse is
at the core of the discipline of animal welfare science, and in the case of disaster
management it is recast as respect for animals, ensuring humane treatment, andmini-
mizing harm and vulnerability (i.e., protecting animal welfare), with a view toward
the well-being of the entire community and the common good. Animal loss or poor
animal welfare prior to, during or after a disaster have devastating implications for
owners, caregivers and communities. Communities who rely on animals for social
and economic well-being, food security, health, and livelihoods are most in need of
community disaster innovations (LEGS 2015; Sawyer and Huertas 2018). The expe-
riences of citizen and animal advocacy groups who self-organized in the wake of
Hurricane Sandy underscores the need to consider the collective wisdom and agency
of a stricken community. In the aftermath of the storm, animal advocacy organi-
zations like the ASPCA and PETA, local residents, government agencies, FEMA,
veterinarians, Petsmart Charities, Iams, and Del Monte Foods banded together as
part of a broad though unintegrated coalition to assist the region’s animal survivors.
Aid came in the form of search-and-rescue operations, food and veterinary services
and care, temporary emergency shelters for lost companion animals found during the
storm, and use of social media to reunite animals with their families. It is necessary
for animal shelters and other animal facilities to establish practical disaster manage-
ment and planning, and that policies and personnel are prepared and have prompt
access to necessary infrastructure.20
As animals and their interests gain moral significance in disasters, a deliberate,
comprehensive and systematic disaster management system will require sufficient
input from central stakeholder groups and planning (i) to prevent disasters through
reliable scientific evidence, technology and surveillance sentinel systems, and (ii)
to mitigate and prevent potential hazards and strengthen response practices (e.g., by
deploying evacuation plans that include animals, since they are evacuated together
with their owners or are part of search and rescue operations).21 The goals of a
comprehensive and systematic planning system should be to reduce animal suffering,
loss of life, and exposure to agents, venomous and synanthropic animals, chemical
and contaminants, contaminated water, and to limit the scale of depopulation and
improve recovery initiatives. Research is also needed on the effects of disasters on
animal diseases that are not vector-borne and on the impacts of social and economic
factors on the consequences of disasters for animals in different parts of the world.
Here, animal welfare science is important in determining the research trajectories to
pursue.
20https://www.thedailybeast.com/how-pets-survived-hurricane-sandy?ref=scroll.
21This aspect of the chapter is currently being pursued by the authors through a grant-funded
research project with colleagues in Alaska, Brazil and Japan. Technological solutions (e.g., robots,
artificial intelligence and monitoring devices, easy escape housing) that augment animals’ capacity
to be self-reliant during an emergency may help animals evacuate or seek shelter quickly.
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The examples in the introduction and many others highlighted in this chapter, as
well as captive animals abandoned in conflict zones and animals harmed by floods
and earthquakes, highlight the invisibility or lack of attention to animal care at the
population level when disaster strikes. Reducing negative impacts to animals requires
advanced planning, and prevention and mitigation strategies. Animals are subject to
varied impacts during a disaster; some prosper in the absence of humans while others
to suffer. Since disasters that affect animals are likely to become more common in
the Anthropocene, much work needs to be done to ensure that animals’ needs and
interests become part of the established norms in disaster management. Moreover,
disaster management programs should lay out practical and executable guidance that
considers all phases of a crisis. This involves examining how ethical processes and
animal welfare science apply to and are implemented in the content of policies and
processes associatedwith both specific and integrated disaster events (i.e., compound
extreme events) that occur alongside natural and anthropogenic calamities. Examples
of multiple simultaneous crises that add a further layer of complexity to an already
difficult response include the Australian bushfires, a dengue fever outbreak in Singa-
pore, wildfires in California, and inclementmeteorological events in Southern Brazil,
all of which are happening due to sudden temperature changes and are concurrent
with the COVID-19 pandemic. Special preparations are necessary to address such
layered disaster events. Responding to local catastrophes during a global disaster
highlights the personal decisions each citizen must make and also the stress placed
ondifferent systems (e.g., health, foodproduction).Compound extreme events accen-
tuate the need for trustworthy disaster communicators to demonstrate empathy when
framing key questions and answers about personal and interspecific threats. Doing
so can ensure public acceptance of recommendations regarding how to navigate a
human-animal relationship and equitably allocate scarce resources (FAO 2020; OIE
2016).
Animal welfare science (AWS) can be characterized as the rigorous use of scien-
tific methods to study the quality of life of animals, including companion animals,
wildlife, research animals, and those farmed for food. AWS, however, is also borne
out of ethical concern for animals (Fraser et al. 1997; Fraser and Weary 2003) and
while there is still some conceptual disagreement about what constitutes animal
welfare and how to assess it (Weary and Robbins 2019), the field of study can
inform deliberations about practices involving animals with a view towards animals’
perspectives or animal-based measures. AWS integrates ethological or behavioral,
psychological, physiological, environmental, and health measures or indicators to
identify whether life is going well or poorly for animals in different contexts (De
Paula Vieira and Anthony 2020; Fraser 2008; De Paula Vieira et al. 2008). AWS can
broaden how veterinarians and other disaster management professionals consider
what is important to animals during an emergency, including highlighting human
activities and built environments that lead to vulnerabilities for animals, developing
frameworks to set desired outcomes for species, and evaluating the likelihood of
success of a contingency plan (Allen and Taylor 2014; Anthony 2004; OIE 2018).
AWS will also be essential in informing the development of evidence-based assess-
ments in concert with ethical objectives to minimize harm to the fewest numbers of
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animals, including when and how euthanasia or depopulation should proceed for the
affected species.
In a disaster, AWS can promote good outcomes for animals, through offering
technical, systematic and species-specific guidance to manage animals as well as
strategies to minimize suffering and loss of life. For example, the welfare impacts of
toxins on animals’ behavior, physiology and affective states, aversive handling and
depopulation techniques, identification of measurable species-specific harms, and
effective/positive human-animal-technology interactions in a crisis. AWS training
can provide first responders with the knowledge and skills to approach, handle and
terminate animals with the least harm and—in the absence of trained responders—
empower laypersons who lack specialized knowledge. Training in AWS can help
responders recognize when animals are distressed and what constitutes poor and
good animal welfare, and to take effective steps to address welfare harms. Further,
AWS may also help responders and managers identify animals’ natural capacities
that might help them cope during rescue or evacuation as well as inform the design of
housing systems that can increase animals’ chances of survival. AWS can provide,
for example, an understanding of population dynamics, animals’ affective states
and of social behaviors when coping with disasters, provide strategies for curbing
zoonoses, animal handling, translocation/relocationmanagement, and the assessment
of the effectiveness of a rescue procedure or depopulation techniques at the species
level. Through systematic scientific evaluation, AWS can identify indirect harms to
non-target animals as a result of ecological or social group disruptions or use of a
depopulation technique.
Addressing significant ethical and animal welfare aspects are important to
ensuring public support and inclusion of diverse social, cultural, practical and norma-
tive perspectives regarding animals in developing a strong, well-functioning disaster
management system. Animal disaster management plans should consist of properly
trained and well-equipped individuals (e.g., veterinarian animal health and welfare
services, animal welfare experts, wildlife service managers, epidemiologists, vacci-
nation administrators, and strike teams) to respond to welfare considerations as
well as to the link between humans and animals (Sawyer and Huertas 2018). These
management plans should have clear outcomes for animals and their owners in an
emergency situation to minimize unnecessary termination of animals’ lives through
depopulation (AVMAGuidelines on the Depopulation of Animals 2019 Edition). As
part of emergency preparedness and response, disaster response teams must decide
whether an animal/animals can be saved and what constitutes a good death for the
animal/animals given exigent circumstances. Members of the team (which typically
will include veterinarians and animal behavior specialists) can advise animal owners,
research institutions and animal industries to form an emergency operation plan to
minimize welfare harms and the loss of animal life during a disaster as well as
promote effective and responsible communication to society and professionals.
Disastermanagement should consider a cycle of processes that need to be assessed
dynamically and continuously, engaging different sectors and actors. In all processes,
animals should also be taken into consideration. Disasters bring into focus the
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practical intervention, welfare, public health, civil defense and protection, biose-
curity and scientific challenges associated with each phase of the disaster manage-
ment cycle (FAO 2020) as well as the inevitable normative decisions and choices
reflecting ethical values that must be made through judicious deliberation regarding
our responsibilities to animals (Mepham 2016; Schwartz 2020; van Herten et al.
2020). Below we exemplify common aspects of the disaster management cycle that
should be considered by multi-professional teams when devising disaster manage-
ment plans aimed at maximizing animal health and welfare (adapted from EM-DAT
2020; OIE 2016; Heath and Linnabary 2015, pp. 174–190; Sawyer andHuertas 2018,
pp. 20–23).
(a) Planning: Planning is central to all phases. A community-centered disaster oper-
ations plan should be concrete and implementable and consist of contingency
and action plans. It should incorporate the needs of animals and their owners.
Such plans should identify and prioritize realistic threats and delineate the
response mission, goals, capabilities and any gaps to meet them such as through
the law or descriptive epidemiology, environmental and other disaster-specific
data sets.
(b) Prevention: Prevention is necessary to avoid harms. It should consider the
existing infra-structure for animals in rural and urban areas and include
geographic information regarding distributions of animal populations and loca-
tions, etc. Prevention strategies and funding allocation should include a defined
exit strategy involving removal of threats, conservation efforts, epidemiological
data of populations through passive and active surveillance, destination or relo-
cation of animals to alternative sites to avoid droughts or flooding and for vector
control. Prevention includes mapping risks and vulnerabilities to animals, such
as susceptibility of certain populations to landslides and infectious diseases.
(c) Mitigation: Mitigation involves interventions aimed at minimizing the impact
or costs of disasters to vulnerable animals ahead of their occurrences through
anticipation measures. It includes identifying what legislation, regulations and
their enforcement are needed and strengthening commitments to resource
availability when disaster strikes to protect animals and their welfare. Miti-
gation reduces animals’ vulnerabilities to physical, behavioral and psycho-
logical harms. Specific disaster technologies and scientific developments can
help to mitigate harms for animals and should be encouraged. Other examples
are strengthening animal shelters and building structures in low-risk zones or
constructing physical barriers to prevent flooding or the effects of hurricanes,
typhoons or tornadoes.
(d) Preparedness: Preparedness planning involves all threats that cannot be elimi-
nated through prevention ormitigation, butmust be executed in order to strategi-
cally organize and plan the response when disaster strikes. It involves educating
and training community members and professionals. Roles of participating
animal health and welfare organizations and other officials and stakeholders
should be clearly defined. Vulnerable areas and threats to animals should be
identified and a network of operational and public communication strategies,
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including simulation exercises that would consider animals in all steps and
evacuation plans should be devised. Essential ingredients include credentialing
responders, bolstering public awareness of animals’ issues during a disaster and
strengthening caretaker capacity to address both human and dependent animals’
needs.
(e) Alert: Predictive models can warn a population to evacuate before a disaster
strikes. This phase relates to disaster prediction through monitoring the level
of animal risk via specific technologies and current scientific data, such
as seismology networks, hydrometeorology sensors, and cameras, alongside
welfare-friendly animal training and signals/cues that would be essential for an
evacuation, such as during an earthquake.
(f) Response/emergency relief: Response/emergency relief focuses on minimizing
morbidity,mortality and protecting goods, and sets the stage for helping commu-
nities bounce back in the recovery phase. This stage involves the execution of
preparedness plans (action and contingency) in concert with different disaster
management professionals and organizations. It involves search and rescue,
veterinary services and care, evacuation and temporary shelter, and safety and
protection. The welfare of animals working in search and rescue operations
should also receive specific attention. When disaster triage for animals needs to
be performed, first responders and related professionals should have the ethical
decision-making tools to maximize the use of resources in order to save the
most animals and minimize risks to responders. Training in triage care should
advance systematic and immediate assessment to treat critically ill or injured
animals and rehabilitation.22
(g) Recovery/Rehabilitation: This phase involves activities that center around a
vision of a desired future or to restore a community to a pre-disaster status quo
as best as possible, including reinstating basic services. Here health, genetic
tests, psychological and behavioral rehabilitation practices can be intensified
in proper animal facilities to prepare for release and essential monitoring of
animal populations and wildlife, post-release. The recovery phase is the longest
and most expensive and can take several months or years (e.g., the impact of
the Exxon Valdez oil spill on animals and the environment in Alaska’s Prince
WilliamSound). The recovery phase gives decisionmakers a unique opportunity
to improve the animal health/welfare infrastructure.
(h) Reconstruction: Financial resources to cover material damages or reconstruct
animal facilities or to indemnify losses are important assets in this phase. Inter-
institutional coordination and implementation of new legislation and practices
also underscore this phase.
Unfortunately, current disaster responses adopted globally expose significant gaps
and challenges in disaster management. The COVID-19 outbreak, for example,
has uncovered a lack of attention to the risks that infected animals and humans
pose to public, animal and environmental health. In particular, the FAO Guidelines
22For example, see http://veterinarynews.dvm360.com/hurricane-lessons-four-things-we-learned-
harvey-and-irma.
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(2020) emphasized that disasters not only impact the supply chain (e.g., resulting
in animal losses, reduced slaughtering and processing capacity as well as miscon-
ceptions regarding animals and animal products being hosts or vehicles of zoonosis
that can infect humans) but also the prevention and control capacity of common
animal health andwelfare services. These include labor shortages disrupting common
animal health and welfare practices adopted by farmers and food processors, delays
and reduced testing and diagnostic capacities as well as animal disease surveillance
and reporting due to restrictions in testing for animal diseases. Additionally, the
COVID-19 pandemic underscores the importance of including animals in disaster
management practices in the future. Further, the pandemic stresses the need to engage
the public and all relevant stakeholders to develop concerted response mechanisms
to be followed by practical and systematic knowledge supported by disaster simula-
tion models and the best available scientific evidence, including from animal welfare
science.
Incorporating AWS and ethics into epidemiological and environmental studies
could illuminate our current understanding of the natural history of disease and of
epidemic processes by considering characteristics of the agent, host and environment
together with animal care and husbandry (e.g., success of immune transfer, epige-
netic effects, level of pathogens in the environment, pre-clinical and clinical signs,
local commitment to animal welfare, effects of the human-animal bond, ability to
perform species-specific behaviors, and experience of positive and negative affect).
Such characteristics could be used not only in observational and experimental studies,
but also in predictive epidemiologicalmodelswhen deciding on criteria such as parsi-
mony, goals and data “best fits.” It is paramount that current integrated models of
epidemiological population projections (e.g., cohort component models, Bayesian
probabilistic projections) begin to include current animal welfare science data and
expert opinions in order to enhance understanding of animals and how to improve
their welfare in the short, middle and long term. These models would, for example,
reflect cutting-edge animal welfare and health knowledge in disease outbreaks, thus
allowing veterinary epidemiologists to better represent animals’ realities and coping
mechanisms under professional frameworks (e.g., theOneHealth initiative [De Paula
Vieira andAnthony 2020]). Information technologies can also be used to improve the
quality, completeness, and speed of information obtained in field investigations and
the speed and sophistication of reports that can be generated from that information at
the individual or aggregate level. An example of a decision support system used for
emergency planning, response, and recovery that facilitates decision-making when
veterinary services are involved in crisis situations is the Veterinary Information
System for Non-Epidemic Emergencies (SIVENE), that includes a database, web
application, mobile app, and Web Geographic Information Systems (GIS) compo-
nent. SIVENE provides Italian Veterinary Services (local health units and national
and regional veterinary services) with an emergency management tool for disaster
management. The data is maintained within its database and converted into real-time
information (Possenti et al. 2020).
244 A. De Paula Vieira and R. Anthony
13.6 Animal Disaster Management: Aims
and Recommendations for Ethically
Responsible Caretaking
Disaster or emergency ethics is oriented to promote the public interest. In the human
case, it has become a systematic field of study (O’Mathuna et al. 2014; Zack 2009).
However, animal disaster ethics has yet to catch on as a systematic field, but its
time may be ripe (see Heath and Linnabary 2015; Itoh 2018; Meijboom and Stassen
2016; Mepham 2016; Sawyer and Huertas 2018; Vinícius de Souza 2018). As a
practical matter, we have a responsibility to domesticated animals simply by virtue
of their dependence upon us. Domesticated animals (including wildlife rescued for
emergency treatment and rehabilitation) should not be left to fend for themselves
during a disaster. The aims of animal disaster ethics should be to minimize the
vulnerability of animals to physical hazards and their social stations. For example,
minimizing animals’ risks to hazards in the first place, providing humane treatment
of animals until they are terminated, selecting and using termination methods that
are swift, efficient and humane, minimizing negative psychological and emotional
tolls on animal caregivers, owners and the public, and mitigating harm (e.g., spread
of disease) to adjacent animals (Meijboom and Stassen 2016; AVMA 2013; Rollin
2009).
Determining obligations to animals during a disaster requires having a method
of ethical assessment and decision-making that explores the various dimensions of
both the hazard and decision on animal life and welfare, and which weighs the
considerations that will impact the relevant parties according to specific objectives.
Practicing responsible caretaking23 emphasizes the dynamic and multidisciplinary
nature of disasters involving animals and the need for a problem-posing approach to
animal disastermanagement that prioritizes concrete problems and reveals inequities.
Animal welfare and One Health considerations serve as an appropriate orienta-
tion for action-guidance. The fluid, all-encompassing, unpredictable and uncertain
nature of disaster ethics requires practicable and operational guidance for veterinary,
public health, civil defense and protection services and other interested professionals
embedded in disaster management who must act quickly and decisively.
A centerpiece of animal disaster management is saving lives and ensuring that
every effort has been taken in the planning and response phases to ensure the humane
treatment of animals. Accordingly, improving critical disaster management issues
involves identifying and reflecting on ethical principles, values and inherent biases
relevant to disaster management and the plight of animals during disasters.
The nature and complexity of the task of animal disaster management suggest
that a one-size-fits-all formula is inadequate and that ethical assessment, analysis and
23Haynes (2008) distinguishes an ethics of caretaking from one of caregiving. The latter is more
appropriate to primary caregivers of animals, such as farmers and ranchers. In the case of insti-
tutional responsibility such as stewardship of the food system, citizen-consumers, policy-makers
and industry agents have a collaborative role to inculcate and express virtues of caretaking in the
design, development, and maintenance of the industrial food system.
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deliberation (involving impact on animals) should occur continuously and at several
levels (Mepham 2016; Zack 2009). General principles such as a lifeboat scenario do
not provide appropriate guidance in the wake and aftermath of a disaster, for they
are largely academic and removed from the realities of a crisis situation. For one
thing, tens or hundreds of thousands of animals may be involved in a situation over
which human beings have little control. Secondly, the nature of disaster management
requires proportionality, flexibility, and patience to allow events to evolve and clarify.
In real-world contexts, disasters are marked by the pressure of time, interrupted
communications and coordination, constant recalibration in response to uncertainty,
imperfect knowledge and inadequate equipment and supplies, and legal sanctions and
enforcement. Disaster managers and first responders must also contend with unfore-
seeable developments, huge financial losses and emotional distress, containment of
harm (e.g., zoonotic disease) to the health and well-being of the human public, long
recovery time and adequate capacity/resources, and safety of responders and strike
team members.
Management and response decisions are context-dependent and reflect the social
and cultural norms and prioritization of ethical factors (e.g., analysis of beliefs,
values and interests) of various stakeholders, as well as legal, economic and prac-
tical constraints and considerations. For example, responses to flooding will be very
different depending on a community’s capacity to mobilize assistance swiftly. The
community’s capacity is influenced by whether the disaster is connected to overall
readiness, human culpability andwhether legal fault can be assigned (this will impact
who will pay for response or recovery), geography, local political and economic
factors like resource allocation and wealth distribution and how and which ethical
issues are recognized, deliberated, weighted and prioritized. Also, different commu-
nities may place different importance on human life and livelihoods, protection of
property, risks and harms to human and animal safety, suffering and loss of life,
and community resilience. These differences can impact the objectives and desired
outcomes of a response and rescue. For example, in the case of the collapsed Feijão
dam in Brazil, the objective was to rescue human lives first. The rescue efforts were
hampered by the scale of the disaster, a lack of overall response readiness, unavail-
ability of equipment and confusion about culpability. By the time a local veterinary
group (CRMV-MG) was mobilized, decisions to kill animals that were assessed to
be in irrevocable distress were made strictly on technical grounds. However, this
decision may have been influenced by a relatively weak network for prioritizing
animals’ interests that is not yet deep or widespread in Brazil. A seemingly clinical
or scientific determination about whether to rescue animal survivors may also be
impacted by social, economic and ethical factors, such as who is responsible for the
long-term care costs for animals, the possibility of reunification with owners, and
the cost of rehabilitation or relocation.24 In contrast, greater attention and prepara-
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to the availability of reliable weather forecasts, and a deeper network of existing
frameworks to mobilize people and resources to rescue animals
Not all communities attribute the same moral status to animals. Further, different
communities will subscribe to different risk analyses. These differences will impact
investment in local capacity to address large-scale and abrupt onset of a disaster.
Hence, the ethical aims of emergency preparedness and response for animal disaster
ethics is up against deeply embedded background conditions that result in elevated
risks or vulnerabilities for animals during a disaster. While it will take time to
dismantle the deep-seated cultural hierarchy of valuing animals, there are specific
opportunities for both ethics and science to help reimagine goodoutcomes for animals
in emergency situations. As alluded to above, AWS and frameworks such as One
Health can offer evidence-based support to minimize welfare harms to the fewest
number of animals and unnecessary euthanasia and depopulation.
The lack of attention to the needs and interests of some animals as a function of
their position on the sociozoologic scale is a preexisting inadequacy in the disaster
management (including veterinary and public health emergencies) infrastructure and
delivery of aid. While not all animals can be saved due to resource scarcity and a
stressed response system, it is important to address institutional or systemic biases
about the needs of animals and organizational roles in disaster management. A first
step in emergency preparedness is to take into account the population of isolated
persons and animals in a given area who might have special vulnerabilities. For
example, we should not neglect the experiences of rural or farming communities.
Next, by addressing implicit and explicit institutional biases around how we talk
about or experience animals in our mixed communities (Midgley 1983), we might
begin to appreciate their different meanings and see different ways to value them in
order to provide effective solutions in times of crisis.
Disaster management activities should protect public safety, and promote health
andwelfare to producedesired outcomes consistentwith a community’s social values.
In the Anthropocene, animal interests intersect with human interests. Thus, disaster
management activities should minimize the extent of death, injury, disability and
suffering during and after the emergency. The disaster management objective to
reduce morbidity and mortality of isolated individuals also includes protection and
promotion of the health and welfare of the human-animal-environment community
with a view to the interest of the common good (adapted from Jennings and Arras
2016;OIE 2016;Heath 1999).With these objectives inmind,we propose six ethically
responsible caretaking aims involving animals in a disaster:
1. Saving lives and mitigating harm: Disaster management activities should be
respectful of and humane towards animals, individuals and groups, with a view
towardpublic safety, health, andwelfare and animal care during and after an emer-
gency. These activities should also include confronting structural factors and deep
systemic prejudices that give rise to preventable anthropogenic vulnerabilities
endured by animals (for example, livestock).
2. Protect animal welfare and respect for animals’ experiences: Disaster manage-
ment activities should be mindful of standard veterinary clinical measures and
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veterinary services, the functioning capacities and behavioral needs of different
species of animals and their affective states, and how they are coping during
the emergency and its aftermath. Well-trained professionals with knowledge of
the capacities and behavior of each species and effective handling should be
emphasized.
3. Observe recognition and distributive justice: Disaster management activities
should ensure that animals and their interests do not remain invisible during a
disaster and that the benefits and burden imposed on the population by the emer-
gency are shared as equitably and fairly as is practicable. As COVID-19 reminds
us, the health and welfare of animals should not be ignored during a disaster.
Research infrastructure and resources to identify the natural history of emerging
diseases and spillover events from animal health and welfare perspectives should
be strengthened through animal health and well-being disaster reference centers.
4. Advance public involvement: To maintain public trust, disaster management
activities should be grounded in and include decision-making processes that are
equitable, inclusive, transparent, and accountable. This basis can help to iden-
tify participation and knowledge gaps that should be addressed with appropriate
systematic ethics and scientific assessment, outreach and education models. In
normal times, an open process of community engagement informed by frank and
full consideration of the relevant animal health and welfare science and ethical
assessment of community values and interests should be encouraged as part of
disaster management governance.
5. Empowerment of caregivers, guardians, owners and community members:
Disaster management activities should strive to empower animal caregivers,
guardians and owners and community members through education, training and
mutual communication exchange as part of community vigilance, responsibility,
solidarity and resilience, and developing capacity to provide effective animal
care during and after the disaster.
6. Public health and veterinary community professionalism: Disaster management
activities should recognize and enhance the skills and competencies of, and coor-
dination among, public health and veterinary professionals. It should also include
protective and coping strategies that can help minimize unnecessary mental and
emotional distress on both the affected animals and the disaster management
professionals.
13.7 Recommendations
In the Anthropocene, we—individuals, communities, governments, businesses, and
professionals in disaster management—bear a moral responsibility to identify where
the barriers to ethically responsible animal disaster management are likely to occur
and to take appropriate steps to rectify them in order to prevent or reduce harm to
animals. The collective interests embodied in disaster management measures should
also include those of animals.
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The foregoing discussion highlights that disaster management solutions in the
Anthropocene have to be at the intersection of human-animal-environmental touch-
points and cannot be amended by simply attending to human interests. The list of
unanswered questions for animal disaster management in the Anthropocene is long.
How can we empower first responders to be resilient under the chronic stress of a
zoonosis and natural disaster? How should individuals and communities prepare for
layered disaster events?Howcould animalwelfare scientists catalyze the engagement
with the public and other professionals to come up with funding, science-based poli-
cies and technologies that benefit and maximize resources benefiting animals during
disasters? What sort of public engagement, risk communication and early warning
systems can improve uptake so that individuals, governments, organizations and
communities have feasible and effective intervention strategies at their disposal to
act ethically to advance animal care during a disaster or a compound extreme event?
While the One Health framework can provide a foundation for guiding collective
attention, ethical inquiry that actually improves the lives of all animals during a
disaster requires government regulation based on animal welfare, voluntary commer-
cial schemes (e.g., standards and guidelines) tominimize the vulnerability of animals
and commitment byprivate sector stakeholders, communities and individuals towards
disaster preparedness and caretaking activities.
Towards advancing the six ethically responsible caretaking aims we need a
publicly accountable set of operating procedures or action steps that can empower
immediate caregivers of animals and disaster management teams to ensure that
animals’ interests are systematically promoted in disaster management. They are
(not an exhaustive list):
1. Respect and Humane Treatment: Animals should not be considered a “prob-
lem” or an afterthought for disaster management. Indeed, animals can be a valu-
able resource for emergency planning, mitigation and response (e.g., animals as
sentinels of danger and vehicles to assist in the evacuation of human beings).
Disaster management and implementation should recommend a strategic frame-
work for deliberation and action and strive for humane outcomes for animals
in a crisis situation. Disaster management should clearly articulate the legal
and ethical bases for achieving certain objectives involving animal welfare and
public health, including humane handling and knowledge of animals’ anatomy
and physiology and temperament of the species being handled or terminated.
2. Collaboration and Effective Disaster Communication: Animal exponents (local
farmers, veterinarians, civil defense and protection servants, animal welfare
experts, epidemiologists, field workers, IACUC (Institutional Animal Care and
Use Committee) representatives, concerned citizens) should have the opportu-
nity to participate actively and directly in advanced planning and communication
vis-à-vis emergency preparedness strategies. Disaster planning will be bolstered
by these sources of local and specialized knowledge who are familiar with the
day-to-day activities and patterns of behavior of various community members
who care for, depend on, and/or use animals, as well as with knowledge of the
animals themselves. Collaboration is particularly important to create spaces for
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dialogue about positions that are ethically defensible, well-informed by science
and local knowledge, and empirically relevant. Effective disaster communica-
tion is needed to prevent unnecessary abandonment of animals and minimize
public panic and to reduce viral spread through effective physical distancing of
animals. Public engagement can lead to clear communication of the risks aimed at
minimizing disruptions to companion animals, wildlife, laboratory animals and
livestock. It should also clearly highlight the interventions being deployed, how
practicable they are for laypersons to follow and delineate how animal health and
welfare will be advanced. Effective disaster communication will also highlight
how priorities for resources and community services are allocated by related
officials and disaster management teams and their ethical bases.
3. Strengthening Systems of Information Sharing, Surveillance, Scientific
Research, Management and Training: Disaster managers should have up-to-date
information concerning the numbers of animals and their whereabouts (e.g., a
vulnerabilities database) andbe responsive to generate the best available scientific
evidence that contextualizes animal welfare in the referred disaster. Reference
animal health and well-being research centers are essential for providing reliable
information rapidly for the disaster management team, without only prioritizing
the welfare of humans. Also, they should have the contact information of the
responding/local veterinarians and related services and/or have access to the
same real-time data as veterinarians and other collaborators who have jurisdic-
tion to act regarding animals and their welfare (e.g., strike team or depopulation
leaders) on the ground. Data management—that is data collection, organization,
interpretation and dissemination about disasters—is an increasingly important
asset. How data informs the practices and procedures adopted by the official
epidemiological services should be reviewed carefully to enhance systematic
ethics assessment and judicious priority setting, ideally by an interdisciplinary
team. Technologies that mitigate and prevent animal disasters should also be
included in any disaster management plan.
4. Community Outreach and Proactive Contact: Appropriate public involvement or
civic engagement on animal issues can promote understanding and acceptance of
necessary public health measures. Disaster managers and response teams should
identify andmap community assets and be in contact with communities so that in
turn they can help identify and reach vulnerable populations and isolated groups,
especially since disruptions to transportation and telecommunications are likely.
Core procedures should consider how risk communication with the public and
stakeholder involvement should be coordinated and how best to stockpile and
ensure equitable and effective use of equipment and supplies.
5. Cultural Sensitivity and Attitudes Check: Disaster managers and responders
should not over-generalize beliefs and attitudes or base emergency prepared-
ness on untutored or unexamined assumptions concerning how animals might
be vulnerable during the disaster or how they are valued (e.g., as largely moral
subjects or commodities). Treatment of animals during a crisis should occur
in a manner that minimizes animals’ pain and distress as much as is practicable
under the circumstances. Public perceptions of the humaneness of the procedures
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used to handle or terminate animals are important for the success of a disaster
management campaign and/or tomitigate the emotional and psychological toll of
depopulating animals en masse by field personnel such as strike team members
and veterinarians, when doing so becomes necessary, and efforts should be made
to educate and gain public support.
6. Reflection, Review and Reform: Upon resolution of the emergency situation, it
is important to review the humaneness and effectiveness of procedures involving
the treatment of animals during the disaster in order to enhance future procedures
and processes and minimize negative outcomes to animals. Doing so will reveal
unintended biases regarding outcomes to animals, people and the environment
and strengthen future policies and strategies, including improving on crisis stan-
dards of care. It will likely enrich understandings of the institutional expressions
of social, moral and species inequities shaped by structures of power and politics
that drive discourses of animal issues in the Anthropocene.
With the onset of the Anthropocene, humans have unwittingly created the conditions
for an increasing amount and severity of disasters. In thinking further about the
seemingly irreversible nature of how human beings have changed the planet, we owe
it not only to our fellow human beings, but also to our fellow non-human animals
to be prepared to deal with these calamities. Humane and respectful treatment of
animals during disasters requires, amongst other things, the coordinated action of
different professionals, informed by animal welfare science, and a reconsideration
of the attitudes of a diverse set of stakeholders towards the moral status of animals.
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Chapter 14
The Decisions of Wannabe Dog Keepers
in the Netherlands
Susan Ophorst and Bernice Bovenkerk
Abstract Dogs have for long been humans’ best friend, but the human–dog rela-
tionship can be problematic. A mismatch between dogs and their keepers can lead
to welfare problems for both; for example: breeding for a specific look can result
in health and welfare problems and importing dogs from other countries can lead
to zoonoses. In our view, many of these problems could be avoided if wannabe
dog keepers reflected better before deciding to obtain a specific dog. Attempting to
influence this decision, however, assumes that we know what the right choice is. In
this chapter, we discuss three cases: pups with pedigrees, pups without pedigrees,
and adult dogs from (foreign) shelters. We show that, in each case, certain moral
assumptions are made whose legitimacy can be problematised. We conclude that the
decision about what dog to obtain is not a straightforward one and that it is often
difficult to establish what is actually the right choice. However, we also pinpoint
certain improvements that can be made to the current system and make a number of
suggestions that make the right choice the easier choice. AsAnthropocene conditions
may lead to the domestication of an increasing number of wild species in the future,
this analysis may support reflection on the ethical implications of domestication.
Terms like keeper and owner of animals are controversial with respect to the autonomy of animals.
We deem keeper to be more neutral than owner. As we discuss the role of people in their desire to
keep a dog in their life, we choose to use this term in this chapter. Owner is used only in the term
ownership for lack of a suitable replacement. Although human companion might be a better term, it
might give rise to confusion as we are focusing on the moment at which a human decides to obtain
a certain dog.
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14.1 Introduction
As dogs are one of themost successfully domesticated species over the longest period
of time, they are the quintessential example of the Anthropocenic animal. A long
period of mutual influence has provided us with a lot of experience and knowledge
regarding dogs; we could even say that humans and dogs have been domesticated
alongside each other. From living side by side for mutual benefit in hunting and
protection, to modern-day circumstances where the dog in Western countries seems
totally dependent on humans, the human–dog relationship gives rise to discussion
on domestication and its boundaries. Because of their long history of domestication,
dogs provide an interesting illustration of the human–animal relationship and its
multiple ethical challenges in the Anthropocene. The domestication of dogs could
even be regarded as a paradigm case for the challenges that human–companion
animal relationships face in the Anthropocene. As argued in the introduction to
this volume, changing habitats and climatic circumstances lead to formerly wild
animals increasingly becoming liminal. The next—perhaps inevitable—step may be
the future domestication of currently wild species (see also the chapter by Palmer
in this volume). Following Swart and Keulartz (2011), we view domestication as
a gradual process; most animals lie somewhere on the continuum between wild
and domesticated. As criteria for domestication, we take firstly the degree to which
animals have adapted to their human environment and secondly the degree to which
they are dependent on it. The more animals have adapted and the more dependent
they are on humans, the more domesticated they are. Their level of dependence and
adaptation has consequences for their agency, although these consequences are not
clear-cut. For example, animals that are very dependent but not well adapted—such
as a zoo animal—are frustrated in their agency, as they have little influence over
their own life but likely do feel the need to express wild behaviour. Many dogs, on
the other hand, are both very dependent and very well adapted. In contrast to wild
dogs and stray dogs, companion dogs usually do not have the possibility to shape
their own life, as their decisions are limited about, for example, where to live with
what companions and with what conspecifics to mate. On the other hand, the fact
that dogs are so adaptable means that they have learnt to express their agency in
different ways, and they are very capable of conveying their wishes to their keepers.
It is no coincidence that recent literature on animal philosophy often focuses on the
human–dog relationship (Hearne 2016; Haraway 2007); dogs’ adaptability and long
history of domestication have enabled communication and collaboration between
humans and dogs. For these reasons, we want to reflect on the lessons that can be
learned from this ‘successful’ domestication story.
The human–dog relationship has undergone several changes: from living side by
side for mutual benefit in hunting and protection, to the breeding of dogs specifi-
cally as workers, to modern-day circumstances where in Western countries dogs are
primarily kept for their company and in order to confer status. All these situations
have given rise to their ownmoral problems, leading to discussions on the justification
of domestication and its boundaries. Problems faced today, for example, include dog
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health and welfare problems due to breeding for exaggerated looks, biting incidents,
zoonotic diseases as a result of the importation of dogs, and health and welfare prob-
lems as well as a lack of socialisation of dogs in illegal breeding operations. In our
view, many of these problems stem from the way in which people decide what dog
to obtain and could be avoided if this decision moment was influenced. Of course,
more ethical problems follow once one obtains the dog. Is one allowed to spay the
dog for example?What should be done when the dog becomes ill and has to undergo
a costly operation? Under what circumstances is one allowed to euthanise a dog?
However, these problems are not the topic of this chapter, as they do not stem from
the decision moment and can therefore not be influenced in the same way.
There are 1.5 million dogs in the Netherlands. As this number has been more or
less consistent over the last decade, to maintain this number of dogs in society, with
an average life expectancy of 10 years, each year a decision is made 150,000 times by
humans to bring a new dog into their home. Of this number of dogs, Neijenhuis and
Hopster (2017) established that 65%were born in the Netherlands, of which 26% had
a pedigree. Of the remaining 35%, 16% were imported and 19% not registered—the
latter being illegal in the Netherlands, which has had a mandatory identification and
registration system for dogs since 2014. Different considerations by humans lead to
different choices about dogs, each giving rise to its own ethical problems.
In the following sections, we discuss these choices and relate them to views
expressed by animal ethicists on dog ownership in particular or pet ownership in
general. Pups with pedigrees, pups without pedigrees, and adult dogs from (foreign)
shelters form the cases that feature in these sections. At the end of this chapter, we
discuss what can be learned from the perspective of different choices by humans
and the steps forward that can be made in the interest of both dog and human. We
show that, in each case, certain moral assumptions are made whose legitimacy can
be problematised. We conclude that the decision about what dog to obtain is not
a straightforward one and that it is often difficult to establish what is actually the
right choice. This is important to realise, because if many of the problems that we
encounter with dogs originate from the moment of the decision to obtain a specific
dog, and if we want to somehow steer this decision moment in the right direction,
we need some perspective on what that right direction is. By discussing different
motivations for obtaining a specific type of dog and problematising these, we aim to
make wannabe dog keepers reflect more on the implications of such a decision.
14.2 Animal Ethicists’ Views on Dog Ownership
Numerous animal ethicists have engaged in the discussion regarding problematic
aspects of dogs as companion animals. The ideas of a number of influential scholars
are used in this chapter to show the variety of ideas on this topic. What they all share
is that they have a view on animal welfare. In nearly all animal ethics theories, the
central idea is that we should not harm animal welfare and that we should promote
positive animal welfare. However, ethicists from different theoretical backgrounds
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may hold different views on what welfare entails. For example, some define welfare
as having pleasant affective states, others focus on the ability of an animal to
carry out species-specific or natural behaviour, and yet others hold a broad view
of welfare as well-being over the course of the animal’s whole life (see Bovenkerk
and Meijboom 2013). Moreover, the significance that is attached to welfare differs
between different theoretical frameworks. For example—generally speaking—for
welfarists, the only criterion to determine correct treatment of animals is the effects
on their welfare, whereas Kantians also take considerations beyond welfare into
account, and ecocentrists contend that a certain amount of suffering is simply part
of an animal’s life. This implies that, if a good decision about obtaining a dog is
dependent at least partly on dog welfare, determining the right decision will be
dependent on what moral theory one holds and how one defines welfare.
Utilitarian philosopher Peter Singer (1973) sees no problem about keeping dogs
as companion animals as such, as long as suffering is avoided. He does not differen-
tiate between domesticated and wild animals; all animals have an equal interest in
experiencing enjoyment and avoiding suffering. This obligates the keepers of dogs
to treat them well and prevent them from being harmed. In contrast, legal scholar
Gary Francione (and Garner 2010) thinks that pet keeping in general is problematic,
as it depends on the idea that pets are human property. The assertion that pets are
property suggests that they are things and condemns them to being mistreated, but
animals are clearly not things. As animals have moral and legal rights in his view,
and beings with rights should, most fundamentally, not be treated as human property,
we should not keep pets. In this view, the purposeful breeding of puppies should be
abolished, and with that the practice of keeping dogs as companion animals will die
out eventually. In the meantime, we should only adopt dogs from shelters and treat
themas equal companions rather than ‘slaves’. Francione is opposed to domestication
as this violates animal rights and makes animals thoroughly dependent on humans.
Domesticated animals ‘are dependent on us for everything that is important in their
lives: when and whether they eat or drink, when and where they sleep or relieve
themselves, whether they get any affection or exercise’ (Francione 2012). This view
contrasts with the idea of scholars such as Stephen Budiansky (1992) and Baird
Callicott (1992) that domesticated animals have hypothetically signed an unspoken
‘domestication contract’. In Budiansky’s view, dogs initiated their own domestica-
tion; by choosing to associate with humans, they have gained many benefits and this
has given them an enormous evolutionary advantage. However, both Budiansky and
Callicott argue that, when animals in a specific situation are made worse off than they
would have been in the wild, or when the relationship between humans and animals
has been undermined bymaltreatment, the contract has been broken by humans and a
domestication contract can no longer serve to justify these practices. They think that
this is the case mainly in relation to the way in which livestock are raised and do not
appear to have a problemwith the domestication of dogs. Clare Palmer (1997), on the
other hand, rejects the notion of a domestication contract, as a contract presupposes
informed consent, which is something that animals cannot give. Moreover, even if
the ancestors of currently living animals had voluntarily entered into a domestication
contract, this cannot be assumed to still hold to this day.
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In Palmer’s view (2010; Sandøe et al. 2015) then, we cannot justify our treatment
of domesticated animals by assuming a domestication contract. The fact that we
have domesticated animals gives rise to special obligations towards them. According
to her contextual-relational ethics, there is a difference in humans’ duties towards
domesticated as compared to wild animals. Whereas a laissez-faire attitude towards
wild animals is warranted, we have special obligations towards companion animals,
livestock, or laboratory animals, because we have brought them into the situation
in which they find themselves and they are dependent on us for their well-being.
In fact, by domesticating them, we determine not only their freedom of movement
and possibilities to make decisions for themselves, but even their genetic make-up.
These actions of ours give rise to a moral commitment to take special care of their
well-being.
This commitment is further elaborated regarding dogs by Kristien Hens (2009),
who also argues from a relational-ethical perspective. She views the human–dog
relationship as a reciprocal one; a relationship that is enabled by the fact that both
human and dog are social animals. She argues, in contrast to Francione, that dogs are
not treated as things or tools: ‘It is questionable whether the relationship dog-human
would have been so successful if they were merely man’s tools…. it is more than just
one ofmaster versus slave’ (Hens 2009, 6). Therefore, ‘if wewant to think of a proper
ethic towards dogs, we must do so in the context of the dog and its specific niche,
which is the human world, not using some vision of the dog as a wild animal’ (Hens
2009, 5). Because dogs are ‘natureculture’ animals and we have decided to have a
relationship with them and take them into our homes and families and in effect make
them part of our communities, we have additional responsibilities towards them over
and above our general responsibilities towards all sentient animals. Not only does
she deem caring for the emotional and physical welfare of dogs as the responsibility
of humans, but also sees special responsibilities, such as ‘ensuring a bond of trust,
which should not easily be broken’ as part of the commitment (Hens 2009, 3). Dogs
in her view, then, have an interest in maintaining a good relationship with humans
and in being part of the human community. Special obligations to which this gives
rise include, for example, the creation of dog parks, teaching schoolchildren how
to handle dogs, and having strict government regulations on breeding.1 The special
obligations also extend to the moment of choice to obtain a particular dog; in Hens’
view, this should be done only after thorough reflection. Moreover, simply taking a
dog to a shelter before the holiday season would violate the relation of trust between
dog and human.
Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka (2011) give a political turn to this relational
and rights-based ethic: domestic dogs should be seen as individual agents with basic
rights and citizenship rights, as they are already part of our society. As we brought
them into our world by domesticating them, we owe them full inclusion as it is
just as much their world as ours. Contrary to Francione, these authors do not see
1Despite the focus on special responsibilities towards dogs on the basis of their place in the family
and mixed community, she argues that there are limits to these responsibilities: we do not have the
same responsibilities towards dogs as towards our children for example.
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the dependency of domesticated animals as necessarily undignified; for them, what
matters is how we respond to dependency. Dependency should not necessarily be
regarded as a weakness, but as a basis for a good relationship: ‘If we don’t view
dependency as intrinsically undignified, we will see the dog as a capable individual
who knows what he wants and how to communicate in order to get it – as someone
who has the potential for agency, preferences, and choice’ (Donaldson and Kymlicka
2011, 84). Different individuals in the human–animal relationship should be able to
realise their own versions of the good life, and this means that dogs should be given
the opportunity to make important choices for themselves. Such a choice could also
mean that a dog no longer wants to live with a human family. The good life for a
specific dog could be to become a stray dog and find a new pack outside a human
family.
Finally, the good life is also central in Martha Nussbaum’s capabilities approach
(2006). According to this approach, justice demands that each individual is treated
with respect for his/her dignity and flourishing. Each individual has certain innate
capabilities and the good resides in the opportunity that the individual has to utilise
those capabilities, as this is what makes the individual flourish. In order to find out
what constitutes flourishing for an individual, one must create the opportunities for
the individual to live up to his/her species norm. As dogs have co-evolved with
humans for millennia, their species norm is different from that of wild dogs or
wolves; a flourishing life for them entails their having possibilities for choice and
for cultivating their capabilities, and this means that they need to be trained and
disciplined to a certain extent by human guardians, just like human children. Just
likeDonaldson andKymlicka, Nussbaum extends her theory of justice to the political
realm. Although not giving a definite list, she suggests a number of capabilities that
must be respected for animals to be able to flourish and that lead to political principles.
Life and bodily health are obvious capabilities that must be met. Furthermore, she
argues that, in the capabilities approach, animals are entitled to bodily integrity.
For example, their bodies should not be ‘mutilated’ out of aesthetic motivations
(Nussbaum 2006, 395). To the extent that they are capable of it, animals are entitled
to make their own choices, receive suitable education or training, play, have room
to move around, and have access to a variety of activities. They should also be able
to form attachments to, and express love and care for, human or non-human others.
Legally, animals should be granted political rights and the legal status of beings with
dignity (Nussbaum 2006, 399). Finally, they have the right to the integrity of their
habitat, either wild or domestic.
Against the background of animal ethics theories regarding domesticated animals,
and dog keeping in particular, we next look at different practices in which dogs are
obtained and point out a number of challenges in each case. We first discuss pups
with pedigrees, then pups without pedigrees, and finally adult dogs from (foreign)
shelters.
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14.3 Pedigree Pups
As people who choose to bring a pup with a pedigree into their home often use
the pedigree to legitimise the consciousness and the deliberation of their decision
(Bovenkerk and Nijland 2017), we start with an explanation of what a dog pedi-
gree entails. The Fédération Cynologique Internationale (FCI) is an international
organisation consisting of members and contract partners in 94 countries, with one
organisation per country being allowed to join. It recognises 346 breeds, which are all
assigned to countries, mostly based on heritage, which are responsible for drawing
up a standard for the characteristics that the breed should have, in terms of appear-
ance, movement, and behaviour. A pedigree is a document that proves that the breed
to which the dog belongs has a certain heritage, consisting of pedigree dogs from
the same breed. In the Netherlands, this entails DNA testing for all pedigree dogs to
verify that the pedigree is correct. Members (kennel clubs) can attach conditions to
a pedigree, but this is not obligatory. In the Netherlands, requirements for a pedigree
are based on the general welfare of the brood bitch, e.g. the age of her first and last
litter and the time needed between consecutive litters. For just a few breeds, there
are specific requirements in terms of health, without which a dog cannot receive a
pedigree. The majority of breeds do not have such requirements however.
What ethical considerations play a role in the case of pedigree dogs? As Francione
wishes to abolish dogs as property, a pedigree dog is certainly not an option for him,
as the pedigree is proof of heritage, but also a registration of ownership. One of
the rights of dogs that can be seen as violated in pedigree dog breeding is the right
to choose their own mate for propagation. In most instances, the dog and the bitch
are put together by humans, often without at least the bitch having much say in the
matter and being held during the act. An analogy can be made with the purposeful
breeding for predictability in offspring and genetic screening in humans, which are
subject to ethical and legal discussion. When it comes to embryo selection, Dutch
society struggles with the topic (De Haan et al. 2010). Dutch legislation condones
embryo selection for the benefit of the embryo itself. This makes it possible to screen
for invasive genetic diseases and to abort the embryo if it carries such a disease. It
is prohibited, however, if anyone else is the beneficiary, such as a sibling who could
benefit from stem cells of the embryo to fight his/her own disease, or parents with
certain wishes with regard to their progeny. Grey areas arise where multiple parties
benefit. If we transfer this stance to dog breeding, the rule should be that selection in
dogs should only be done if the dog is the direct beneficiary of the practice. As the
dog stands to gain nothing by being the best hunter, the fastest, or the best example of
the breed standard, and this is for the most part just beneficial to humans, the practice
of dog breeding certainly is not in accordance with rights that are similar to those
of humans. This is where Donaldson and Kymlicka (2011) also have problems with
the practice of pedigree dog breeding. For them, it is very important that animals
can exhibit their own agency, and this includes being able to decide themselves with
whom to mate. For Nussbaum, presumably such breeding would be allowed only if
it respected dogs’ capabilities and led to their flourishing. This may be the case if the
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selective breeding is carried out to enhance a dog’s capabilities—for example when
negative side-effects of prior breeding decisions are reversed—but not for harmful
aesthetic reasons.
As Singer, Hens, and Palmer emphasise humans’ responsibilities towards dogs,
albeit to different degrees and for different reasons, another subject for discussion is
the necessity to keep dogs safe and prevent them from harm. As the issue of pedigrees
in the Netherlands depends on certain rules regarding the well-being of the brood
bitch, pedigrees can be said to contribute to the safekeeping of dogs.
To obtain a pedigree, a dog must stem from parents from the same breed. This
limits the possibilities of propagation. Not only is the dog’s freedom to choose a
mate for propagation limited by this practice, but pedigree breeding also increases
the risk of hereditary diseases, which can be caused by breeding in a limited gene
pool.
As some of these diseases, such as heart conditions, cancer, hip dysplasia, or
epilepsy, cause suffering throughout the dog’s life or shorten its life expectancy,
dogs are not protected from harm in these instances.
On the other hand, pedigrees can be used to prevent hereditary diseases.Apedigree
is a registration, which can also be used in health testing of dogs. The test results
are connected to the pedigree of the tested dog and can then be traced back in a
database. As some diseases are breed specific, DNA tests for certain conditions can
vary for different breeds and therefore the ancestry of the dog is relevant. By using
the information from these databases and checking for genetic closeness, choices in
breeding can be made that diminish the risk of hereditary diseases. The pedigree in
itself is not a guarantee of this, but the use that the breeder makes of possibilities to
prevent the pups being harmed determines whether this goal is met. In other words,
depending on how breeders and kennel clubs use their pedigrees, the registration
system can be used either to guarantee healthy dogs or have harmful effects.
The standards for each breed are the guidelines for dog-show judges to assess
the dogs. Also, breeders’ interpretations of these standards play a part in how these
guidelines work out in actual dogs. This has led to alterations in the appearance of
many breeds over the years (McGreevy and Nicholas 1999), with the exaggeration
of certain traits causing health and welfare problems to the dogs. Examples of this
include an emphasis on broad chests, which cause problemswithmovement andwith
natural delivery, or problems in breathing for brachycephalic dogs, such as French
Bulldogs. In these instances, surely harm is done to dogs, and the dogs’ interests
are not protected by dog-show judges, breeders, and buyers.2 These excesses in dog
breeding have given rise to an ongoing moral debate about where we should draw
the line when changing the genetic make-up of companion animals, analogous to the
debate that has been going on about selective breeding and genetic modification in
livestock. This debate has focused not only on resulting health and welfare problems,
2However, it is not so easy to use ethical theory to explain why harm is done to these dogs, as
the changes to the dogs have been made before the dogs were born and therefore one cannot say
that a particular individual has been harmed. For a discussion on this application of the so-called
non-identity problem to dogs, see Palmer (2012) and Bovenkerk and Nijland (2017).
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but also on other ethical concerns. For example, some argue that extreme breeding
violates dogs’ integrity, that it objectifies or commodifies dogs, or that it is unnatural
(Bovenkerk and Nijland 2017). On the other hand, a recent Danish study (Sandøe
et al. 2017) shows that keepers of some breeds find that the problems that their
dogs encounter are actually a reason for their strong bond, probably because the dog
needs so much care and attention. Hens, in particular, emphasises the importance
of the bond between dogs and their keepers. She probably assumes that this bond
will primarily have advantages for the dog. The tension between dog welfare and
the strong bond—as experienced by humans—in this situation establishes that this
is not necessarily the case.
Historically, dogs were selected for function (e.g. hunting, guarding) and the
dog’s appearance merely needed to support this function. With large parts of these
functions being taken over by newer developments (such as the meat industry and
security cameras), the focus has shifted from function to appearance (Lindblad-Toh
et al. 2005). This does not mean that all behavioural traits have vanished, as they are
still present in the dogs today. It is a shift from an emphasis on function, with the best
hunting dog being the most wanted, to appearance, where the dog that best looks the
part is most popular in breeding. This entails a risk of humans choosing a certain
breed, based mainly on appearance, without realising that the original function of
the dogs requires them to roam around freely for hours on end, hunt other animals,
be aware of others (including humans) entering their domain—needs that cannot
necessarily be met in a dog’s everyday life in the Netherlands.
As the information on the dog’s heritage is guaranteed by the pedigree, this also
contributes to the predictability of the dog’s behaviour. It is sometimes argued that
people have a better chance of finding a dog that is compatible with their circum-
stances when they choose a pedigree pup than it is when they choose a pup without
a pedigree.3 However, as the information in breed standards on behaviour is very
limited—e.g. 15 of the 434 words in the Golden Retriever standard (FCI 2009)—
one could question whether people can rely on this information. Obviously, more
information is needed to evaluate compatibility. Breeders may be able to provide this
information, as they are knowledgeable about the breed, at least as an experiential
expert, but are not required to do so in order to be able to sell puppies with pedigrees.
As dogs with pedigrees are more expensive than dogs without pedigrees, there is
a chance that the motive to make money will override informing prospective buyers
on subjects that would possibly prevent them from buying a puppy of a certain breed.
Singer would argue on this subject that humans’ differing interests must be weighed
against each other (earning a living versus living with a suitable dog) and this then
must also beweighed against the interest of the dog (living in conditions where not all
the dog’s needs are met). The outcome of this weighing is not clear-cut. For Hens, the
possible endangerment of the formation of a bond of trust between human and dog
by withholding information weighs heavily, and she therefore condemns practices
that put financial benefits before the human–dog bond. Palmer draws a line between
commercial and non-commercial dog breeding, with pedigree breeders falling into
3Based on interviews carried out by Bernice Bovenkerk and Hanneke Nijland in 2015 and 2016.
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the category of non-commercial breeding most of the time, because of the limited
number of litters that they are allowed to produce in order to obtain a pedigree for
the dogs. The commercial aspect in itself does not seem to cause her concern, but
the emphasis on profit over animal welfare does.
If we look at the ethical acquirement of a dog and deem it most important to
prevent harm to the dog, obtaining a pedigree dog does not have to be ruled out.
On the other hand, pedigree dog breeding does not necessarily support the ethical
acquirement of dogs either. The full potential of pedigrees to contribute to the well-
being of dogs is currently not met. If the pedigree served more than is currently the
case as a quality mark for adhering to dog welfare, testing on hereditary diseases,
and informing prospective buyers, more problems in the breeding and keeping of
pedigree dogs could be overcome. It is, however, important for wannabe dog keepers
to realise that the pedigree at the moment is not in all cases a mark of good dog
welfare.
14.4 Pups Without Pedigree
As only a relatively small proportion of the dogs acquired in the Netherlands have
a pedigree, it is also interesting to look at pups without a pedigree. Maybe they will
turn out to be the more ethical choice when people want to share their life with a
dog.
Pups without pedigrees can be dogs from a breed that is not registered with the
FCI and therefore not entitled to a pedigree. These dogs can have the advantages of
a pedigree dog with regard to the predictability of, for example, size and personality
as an adult, but registration does not even have the basic requirements that a pedigree
has. One is therefore dependent on the reliability of the breeder. Mostly, these are
breeds created by selection not so long ago. Examples of these new breeds or designer
breeds are the Labradoodle and the Miniature Australian Shepherd, but the Pitbull
also has no FCI registration. The problems encountered with pedigree dogs may
also exist with this type of dog and maybe even more so as the trustworthiness of the
registration papers ismore questionable.Although the latter is debatable, as theDutch
Kennel Club is not monitored by the Dutch government either, at least procedures
have for long been in place regarding self-control and upholding the rules.
Pups without pedigrees can also be pups from pedigree dogs, where the breeder
did not apply for a pedigree. In most instances, a pedigree being too expensive and
people not wanting to ‘pay for a piece of paper’ is given as the reason for not applying
for the pedigree. It cannot be ruled out, however, that an important reason may also
be to avoid the minimal requirements of a pedigree in terms of dog welfare. As in this
case dogs’ heritage is not confirmed by a pedigree, one can also question whether
other breeds or untraceable dogs are in the ancestry of the pups. Dogs that look very
similar to pedigree dogs but do not actually have a pedigree are called look-alikes.
As these dogs are bred from the same gene pool as the pedigree dogs, most genetics-
related problems in pedigree dogs will also be found in look-alikes. One could argue
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that the lack of testing and information on problems in certain lines of a breed might
even enhance the problem. A study by Van Zeeland and Beerda (2015) showed that it
is impossible to determine whether problems are more severe in dogs with pedigrees
or in look-alikes, because of the lack of registration of pedigrees by veterinarians
and the lack of control on the reports by dog keepers, who consider the dog to be a
pedigree dog even if the dog does not actually have a pedigree. From the perspective
of people acquiring these puppies, the money argument is mostly used to warrant
this choice. There are people that find it ridiculous to spend a lot of money on a dog.
Although the money transaction is proof of the dog being considered property and
therefore not regarded as an ethical choice according to Francione, there is not much
difference between paying a large and a small amount of money. As caring properly
for a dog also involves at least feeding and veterinary costs, one can argue that not
being willing to spend money on the ‘purchase’ of a puppy does not bode well for the
intentions towards proper care of the dog after the puppy has entered the household,
which can also be costly. As people tend to be more involved with a purchase when it
involves a larger amount of money (Bauer et al. 2006), one could argue that a lower
price for a dog can have a negative effect on the considerations made before getting
a dog. A large number of the puppies in this category are distributed through illegal
dog traffickers and so-called puppy mills, which are notorious for the deplorable
state in which bitches and puppies are kept, with diseases and even premature death
as a result (Radstake 2016). Here, certainly, people’s responsibility towards dogs is
not honoured and dogs suffer; this makes these practices reprehensible in the eyes
of all animal ethicists.
Then there are the pups that look like originals, whose background can only be
guessed. These are the dogs that are commonly referred to as mutts or mongrels.
Despite these not very flattering names, positive traits are attributed to these dogs as
they are said to be strong and healthy, often in comparison to pedigree dogs (Patronek
et al. 1997). As a longer life expectancy in combination with fewer health problems is
in the interest of the dog, this might be a preferred choice when a person is obtaining a
puppy. As dogs nowadays are not normally free-ranging animals in the Netherlands,
with rules for keeping dogs on the leash in most areas, dogs have little chance of
meeting a mate without their keepers’ interference. In the old days, dogs would just
roam to nearby farms when there was a bitch in heat, but these ‘accidental litters’—
from a human perspective—are rare these days. In Kymlicka and Donaldson’s work,
the fact that humans make the procreative choices for dogs is already problematic.
Keeping dogs on leashes can, however, also be seen as an instrument to keep dogs
safe. In densely populated countries like the Netherlands, many more dogs would
fall victim to traffic accidents if they had more freedom. Also, other animals would
be at risk from dogs hunting.
With lots of dogs being castrated, especially when dogs and bitches are kept
in the same household, there is an increasingly small chance of dogs in the same
household procreating. The number of puppies born out of free encounters between
dogs is not registered, but it is surely nowhere near the number needed to fulfil the
demand for companion dogs. Then there are the encounters between dogs that are put
together by their keepers. There are few such deliberate non-pedigree litters, although
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they might solve some problems that arise with pedigree dogs. In 2017, a Dutch
foundation, Dier & Recht (Animals & the Law), known for lawsuits against pedigree
dog breeders, launched an initiative called Cupidog. Cupidog aims to bring healthy
dogs and bitches of different breeds or unknown descent together to create healthy
puppies that are brought up under good conditions. Amongst the candidate dogs on
the Cupidog website are dogs that are obviously of breeds that carry major problems.
Cupidog aims for healthy puppies by ensuring that a dog will never be mated to a
dog comprised of 50% or more of the same breed and by having every combination
approved by a committee of two veterinarians. Interestingly, the majority of dogs
enrolled in this service are male. The similarity with dating services for humans is
remarkable, as male clients also predominate on those dating websites. In the case
of Cupidog, obviously the dog does not choose to be put on the website, and no
information is provided on the sex of the dog’s keeper. It might be interesting to
investigate the extent to which idealised online identities are portrayed of the dogs
on Cupidog, as is found to be the case with human dating sites (Hancock et al. 2007).
In the Cupidog case, a reason for the overrepresentation of males might be that the
female dogs’ keepers are expected to care for the puppies and might also take into
account the risk for their bitch in delivering a litter, whereas the male dogs’ keepers
might see their dog as a great candidate to produce offspring or want to cater to their
dog’s sexual urges. For the keepers of male dogs, Cupidog involves no risk or work
for the human and therefore might be an easier choice.
Although the health of mongrel dogs is used as a reason to favour these dogs
when a puppy is being chosen, it cannot be ruled out that the low purchase cost of
these dogs is also relevant to dog buyers. Cupidog sets the price for pups from litters
that they mediate at between e500 and e700. This is lower than for most pedigree
dogs, but higher than for dogs from a shelter or what people are used to paying for
a non-pedigree dog. This might be another reason—besides the lack of potential
mother dogs—why this initiative is not taking off with a flying start. As in the case
of look-alikes, it is not very promising if humans are not willing to pay these prices
when the costs of keeping a dog are much higher than the purchase cost and it may
mean people pay less attention to the decision of getting a dog (Bauer et al. 2006).
Another aspect of mongrel pups is the uncertainty about what they will grow
into. Pedigrees provide an estimation of the character and size of the dog, as also is
largely the casewith non-official breeds and look-alikes, but amongrel dog can easily
surprise one. Thismight lead to an adult dog that does not suit one’s situation, and this
can be detrimental to the welfare of both dog and human. From Hens’ perspective,
in these instances the dog should remain in the situation, as the bond between dog
and keeper should be respected and preserved at all times. It can, however, be argued
that it is not in the dog’s best interest to be kept in inappropriate circumstances.
This predicament is caused by the unpredictability of how a puppy will turn out as a
mature dog. Althoughmongrel dogs, then, give people less control over the outcome,
it could be argued in their favour that the need of humans to be in control over and
‘manufacture’ nature is in itself wrong and should not be encouraged (Bovenkerk
and Nijland 2017). Dogs could, however, be the victim of mismatches and not in
a position to alter their circumstances as their keepers might be. Responsibility in
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Palmer’s terms is a leading concept here. The dog’s best interest should prevail in
these situations and guide decisions on the dog’s future.
In sum, acquiring a dog without a pedigree is, again, not necessarily a good or a
bad choice. On the other hand, there is no ethically sound argument for purchasing a
dog that stems from illegal dog trafficking or a puppy mill. This pleads for stronger
regulations and enforcement of these regulations to ensure (breeding) dogs’ welfare
and discourage current practices. The option of obtaining a dog this way is simply
a bad choice. This is not necessarily the case for non-pedigree look-alikes or new
breeds. Here, the same arguments hold as previously put forward for the pedigree
dogs: a registration system could be used to enhance dog welfare and eliminate some
of the problems encountered in dog breeding. On the basis of ethical arguments, the
original dogs are a promising choice, as long as they can be distinguished from pups
from puppy mills or illegal dog trafficking. Favouring this option is not, however,
carefree either. Considerations about possibilities to match the demand with the
offer while still guarding the boundaries of welfare and dog rights are challenging.
Creating awareness of the costs of dog keeping and the expectations regarding the
dog will prove to be just as challenging.
14.5 Shelter Dogs
Most dogs mediated by animal shelters are adults. Sometimes, a pregnant bitch is
brought into a shelter and delivers her pups there or in a foster home. Sometimes,
puppies are found as strays and brought to animal shelters. Sometimes, puppies
are confiscated from puppy traffickers and taken in by shelters. The majority of
confiscated, stray, and relinquished dogs, however, are adult.
As taking in a shelter dog does not require deliberately bringing new dogs into the
world, it is a practice that Francione condones as the proper solution for fading out
the practice of keeping dogs as property. Most shelters do not offer the opportunity to
buy a dog, just to adopt. This may be seen as an option to avoid the ‘dogs as property
issue’. Unfortunately, there still remains an ‘owner’, which in the case of shelter
dogs is the shelter itself, even if the dogs are adopted out. One could argue that the
possibility of putting dogs into shelters makes it easier for people to carelessly buy
new dogs and therefore perpetuates this situation. In Francione’s vision, it should be
prohibited to keep dogs, and getting a dog from a shelter would be just a temporary
solution for dogs that have already been brought into this world. Even though in
Hens’ view it is morally problematic to take a dog to a shelter, she also prefers
people obtaining their dogs from shelters over breeding, in particular purebred dogs.
She suggests that shelters should employ dog behaviourists in order to match the
right dog to the right person (Hens 2009).
People who want a dog from a shelter can be motivated by a number of reasons:
wanting to save a dog in need, to save money as shelter dogs are less costly to obtain
than most puppies, wanting an older dog that is already housebroken, obedient, or
calmer, or wanting an adult dog to avoid a mismatch. Dogs’ welfare is an argument
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for people wanting to save dogs from the shelter and could also be an argument for
people wanting to avoid a mismatch, as mismatches can be the source of welfare
problems.
The current situation in Dutch shelters shows that the ‘save the dog argument’ is
not particularly strong as an exclusive argument. This would entail people choosing
to adopt the dogs that are most unhappy in the shelter situation or have been there
for the longest time. Instead, people leave the long-stay dogs in the shelter, as the
smaller and younger dogs or dogs of popular breeds get out of the shelter more
quickly (Dierenbescherming 2018).
The ‘saving argument’, then, does not seem to be the decisive argument for a lot
of people.
It could also be that people whose priority is to save dogs choose to get a dog from
a foreign, mostly South or Eastern European, shelter. In the Netherlands, this has
become a common option that has been growing in recent years (Radstake 2016).
A reason given for choosing a foreign versus a Dutch shelter is the situation within
these shelters. As Dutch shelters are mostly governed by the Dutch Society for the
Protection of Animals (Dierenbescherming), basic welfare for dogs in the shelters
is guaranteed, and euthanasia of shelter dogs is not common practice and is carried
out only in very specific circumstances. In countries like Spain and Greece, shelters
are mostly private initiatives run on tight budgets and have to provide shelter for too
many dogs, leading to deplorable situations. Originally, tourists brought back stray
dogs and shelter dogs from their holidays, but nowadays 130 organisations mediate
between foreign shelters and Dutch people looking for a dog (Radstake 2016). As
the willingness to save dogs is given as an important motivation for adopting a dog
from abroad, it is important to take a closer look at this situation.
The main problems with foreign shelter dogs seem to be their lack of sociali-
sation and potential health risks (Buckley 2020). As the Mediterranean countries
have a different climate, different diseases exist there, for example because they are
hosted by parasites that thrive on those weather conditions. Brucellosis and rabies
are examples of zoonotic diseases that can be transferred from dogs to other dogs and
to humans. Blood testing before adoption can help to prevent problems, but not all
diseases can be tested for definitively, and some have long incubation times, which
may lead to false-negative results (Fox et al. 1986). So far, no large outbreaks of
diseases brought into the country by foreign shelter dogs have been reported, but,
with the increasing number of this type of dog entering the country, this could quite
easily happen. Besides the health risks for Dutch dogs, therefore also risks for Dutch
people must be taken into account; dogs from foreign shelters form a potential public
health risk.
It is not always easy to distinguish the origin of the dog. Cases are known of Dutch
shelters bringing in dogs from foreign shelters to meet the demand for smaller and
younger dogs (de Joode, n.d.). Instances have also been reported of organisations
with just a commercial motive pretending to save foreign shelter dogs (Van Niekerk
et al. 2014). These organisations play into the positive dog-saving image of the
legitimate rescue organisations, when their practice is actually plain dog trafficking,
often also without proper procedures followed and health precautions taken. People
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are therefore advised to check dogs’ vaccinations, microchips, and the organisation’s
legitimacy. This requires extra action on the part of wannabe dog keepers, and it is
uncertain to what extent they will actually follow this advice when the easy option
is to fall in love with a sweet dog or give into the urge to save an innocent animal
from life on the street or from a terrible shelter.
Manyof the dogs in foreign shelters have led stray dog lives before being sheltered.
This means that they are not used to living in a house, are used to lots of freedom
to roam around, are used to being on the constant lookout for food, are wary of
humans, and so on (Pal et al. 1998; Udell et al. 2010). Looking at this situation from
a human point of view, the dogs might be suffering in these circumstances, with
hunger, danger, and illnesses always lurking. This would require action on welfare
grounds according to Singer and, in the case of abandoned dogs, also to Palmer.
From Donaldson and Kymlicka’s perspective, domesticated dogs have the right to
food, shelter, and medical care. But what should be done about dogs’ right to make
their own decisions, to freedom, and to execute their agency? One could argue that
the freedom that these free-ranging dogs enjoy is of great value (Majumbder et al.
2014; Paul et al. 2016) and is at risk when they are adopted out to the Netherlands.
Dutch society is totally different than what the dogs are used to, and dogs that are
adopted in theNetherlands out of such different circumstances certainly lose freedom
and can have behavioural problems (Dietz et al. 2018). Moreover, the capabilities
and interests of dogs that have formed attachments to other stray dogs and perhaps
formed packs with them are not respected when they are suddenly taken out of their
environment. In Nussbaum’s view, this could be problematic, because capabilities
are at least partly formed by one’s relationships. This situation can cause a lot of
anxiety in dogs that is by no means beneficial to their welfare or flourishing. On the
other hand, in contrast to Donaldson and Kymlicka, Nussbaum does not distinguish
clearly between domesticated dogs, who are part of our communities, and wild or
stray dogs, who for Donaldson and Kymlicka have the right to have their sovereign
communities respected. Nussbaum would be less hesitant to take in stray or wild
dogs, as long as this does not interfere with their flourishing. Despite good intentions
and professional help, however, there is often little that can be done to correct for the
dog’s bad or different start, as dogs’ socialisation period ends at around four months
of age (Freedman et al. 1961).
One might argue that there are similarities between adopting dogs and adopting
children from other countries. Problems with attachment and adjustment have also
been said to be issues in the adoption of children from other countries (Post 2008).
However, there have also been reports to the contrary, as most children show a
lot of resilience and the effect of growing up in poor circumstances may be even
more negative (Juffer 2008). As the socialisation of dogs and humans differs and the
‘window’ for dogs to be socialised closes at an early age (Serpell and Jagoe 1995), the
analogy between human and dog fails in this respect. Still, in the last decades, the view
on adopting children from foreign countries has changed. Whereas saving children
from detrimental circumstances was considered a noble action not so long ago, the
current vision is that problems with human trafficking are prevalent in adoption
procedures (Post 2008). Because of this, there is a tendency to leave children in
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the area from which they originate and provide care there. Obviously, this does not
solve the desire for children of people who are unable to conceive children, but the
children’s welfare should take priority, and this has led to a decreasing number of
children from other parts of the world being adopted in the Netherlands (Slot 2008).
This can be compared to dogs, because, in the case of importing foreign shelter dogs,
there is also mention of dog traffickers profiting from the transaction (Stray Animal
Foundation Platform 2018). It would be beneficial to the dogs to remain in their
country of origin and receive help there to ensure better living conditions for them. If
anyone wanting to adopt a foreign dog did so without actually bringing the dog to the
Netherlands and just supported it financially throughout its life, it would certainly
make a contribution to the dog’s welfare.
Adopting a dog from either a Dutch or a foreign shelter can be a better choice
if prospective adopters look carefully into the organisation providing these dogs.
Clear rules and quality characteristics are not easily found by the wannabe dog
keeper, so improvements are necessary. Determining the suitability of the dog for
the adopter’s situation is another topic that can be easily trivialised and should receive
more attention.
14.6 Discussion
Aswehave seen, ethical challenges exist in every choicewhenadog is beingobtained.
As we define a good choice as a choice where at least the welfare of the dog is served
and the welfare of other dogs and animals (including humans) is not harmed, one
can wonder whether there is such a thing as a good choice of dogs. In Francione’s
view, abolishing altogether the practice of keeping dogs is the only option. The other
animal ethicists that we discussed are less dismissive of the domestication process
as such and the opportunities for dogs to experience good welfare or to flourish,
although different ethicists use different definitions of welfare, and in practice these
opportunities often fail to materialise.
However, all three channels/scenarios discussed provide options to better protect
thewelfare of all concerned. In the current situation, there is ample room for improve-
ment in the dog-breeding system, with its forced mating, harmful breed characteris-
tics, and restricted gene pools. On the part of the people wanting a dog, this entails
careful consideration to determine what is in the best interest of all involved. This
requires self-control at the moment of decision making about a specific dog. As
Berkman et al. (2017) show, self-control is a value-based decision-making process
in which people weigh up different aspects. In this process, easy choices are given
more weight than difficult ones. Factors like the time it takes to acquire information,
the effort it takes to process the information, or the financial costs can be barriers to
making right decisions. Currently, agencies that want to improve decision making
regarding dogs put a lot of emphasis on information that people should acquire
before making their decision about a dog. With such an overload of information, it
is not strange that people fall victim too easily to processing arguments such as nice
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memories of the dogs they used to have, the example of the dog next door, or a cute
appearance.
Solutions can be found in multiple directions. One direction is the possibility
of governmental control, possibly delegated to neutral controllers, on for example
pedigrees and shelter licences (including more stringent breeding standards towards
better health and welfare), an obligatory waiting period to enable people to do their
research before bringing a dog home (which is currently standard practice in many
Dutch shelters), or even the obligation to obtain a licence before being allowed
to obtain and keep a dog. In a study by Packer et al. (2017) on the purchase of
pedigree dogs, over a third of the respondents testified that they would do more pre-
purchase research the next time they wanted to purchase a dog. Another direction is
the possibility of different sectoral organisations implementing these measures. This
has proved difficult, with sectoral organisations being dependent on support from
their members, who may have different interests, resulting in slow change processes.
The third direction lies in influencingwannabe dog keepers. If people aremade aware
of the consequences of bad decisions and are facilitated in making the right choices,
this could be an essential step towards better dog welfare. As we have seen in the
work of Berkman et al. (2017), the key is to make the good choice the easy choice.
This requires the information to be presented in such a way that it can be easily
accessed and processed by the wannabe dog keeper, and it may also entail a better
infrastructure for dog acquisition practices. One could think here, for example, of
making it more difficult to obtain a dog through less trusted channels, such as internet
marketplaces. This is not possible for an individual to achieve without the assistance
of all other parties. Moreover, it helps when wannabe dog keepers have positive role
models or a social network that enables them to reflect on their decision. After all,
the dog that someone has often becomes part of that person’s identity, and a positive
role model will help to shape an identity that matches well with the dog’s welfare. An
integrated approach towards sensible dog keeping is therefore the most promising
route.
Humans’ special responsibility towards dogs, in Palmer’s and Hens’ views,
warrants the investment in these types of integral solutions. As dogs’ welfare is
served with this approach, an integral solution also complies with Singer’s view.
Moreover, in an integral approach, potential mismatches are avoided and guided
choices are beneficial to the relationship between dog and human, as emphasised by
Hens. The political solutions set out above would be supported by Donaldson and
Kymlicka as well as Nussbaum.
What remains is the discussion on ownership and property. This is an issue that
cannot simply be overcome by changing names or constructions such as adoption
rather than ownership. Recognising that dogs cannot be seen or treated as a tool or
an ornament, and therefore need advocates on their behalf, is a step on the route
towards solutions that constitute a good choice, as already sketched. This seems to
be the closest we can get other than abolishing companion animals altogether. After
all, we can wonder how realistic the abolishment of animal domestication is. The
destiny of many currently wild animals may be to become domesticated as a result
of Anthropocene conditions. Human and animal habitats are becoming more and
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more intertwined, and animals are facing challenges to their survival consequent
to changing climatic and environmental conditions. In order to help them survive,
we may have to resort to technical and other interventions that may cause them to
lose a measure of wildness (see the chapter by Palmer in this volume) and become
more liminal or even domesticated. If an increasing number of animals become
domesticated, we shall be facing challenges similar to the ones sketched in this
chapter. Reflection on the pitfalls of dog keeping, and in particular the question of
what dog to obtain,may shed some light on the challenges faced in theAnthropocene.
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Chapter 15
Comment: Animals in ‘Non-Ideal Ethics’
and ‘No-Deal Ethics’
Erno Eskens
Up until the seventies of the last century the idea prevailed that we should gradu-
ally improve animal welfare in husbandry systems and animal testing facilities, by
focusing on a humane treatment of animals. But already in 1892 the idea emerged
that more efforts were necessary. Henry Salt published Animals’ rights considered
in relation to social progress, a book in which he stated that animals needed to be
seen as legal persons. In the nineteen seventies this idea caught on. Activists and
ethicists embraced a more radical discourse on animal rights. They started to argue
that animals should be given fundamental rights and that the exploitation of animals
should be declared illegal. Abolitionist ethicists (like Francione 2000) demanded a
complete stop of animal use on these grounds. The animal movement and animal
ethicists have ever since been divided on this matter. This chapter is about this divi-
sion, and more particularly on the dilemmas that the shift in thinking from ‘humane
treatment’ to ‘animal rights’ brought about for the so called ‘non-ideal animal ethi-
cists’; i.e. those who stuck to the idea that we can improve animal welfare gradually
by appealing to standards of human decency.
15.1 Non-ideal Animal Ethics and the Meat Industry
In this part of the book we have come across multiple chapters written by philoso-
phers who favour an incremental approach to animal welfare. Most prominent is the
American philosopher Paul Thompson. He regards himself a ‘non-ideal ethicist’. The
phrase is catchy. A non-ideal ethicist according to Thompson is someone who does
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not reach for themoon. He deplores the effort of animal rights activists and—ethicists
who keep on trying to abandon the use of animals in themeat industry. It is basically a
waste of time, since the strategy of the animal rights advocates is simply not working.
An appeal to justice or fairness is simply too weak to actually protect animals in the
ever growing animal industry. Nobody is able to beat the system that abuses animals,
so, Thompson states, the best way is to accept the situation and to protect the animals
as well as we can, within the abusive husbandry system. Thompson favors ‘non-ideal
ethics’, that is, ethics that strives for what is attainable, not for what can be regarded
as an ultimate outcome of fairness.
Non-ideal animal ethics, Thompson states, is more effective than any radical
rejection of husbandry will ever be. “Many arguments for veganism, for example,
hold that no form of animal agriculture is morally acceptable, but this does not
logically vitiate the question of how the lives of animals living in these systems
could be made better.” Thompson has a point here. Principles do harm if they lead
to a neglect of the actual animals in their actual situations and conditions. If we
reach for the moon we easily lose sight on the possibility of earthly progress. The
risk of abolitionism is that it sets welfare standards in such a manner that no farmer,
politician or consumer can ever meet them, which takes away the inclination to move
in the desired direction altogether. And let’s be honest, most people will in fact ignore
the call of justice. How many of them will ever become vegan?
Thompsonhas a point. Focusingon an incremental improvement of animalwelfare
will enable farmers, politicians and civilians tomake small steps in the right direction.
Andfinally, step by stepwemayormaynot reach the bigger goal: the end of all animal
abuse. Thompson adds that we do not have to sanctify the system,whilemaking small
improvements: “Inquiry into thewelfare of animals aims tomakemorally compelling
improvements in quality of life. It does not presume that improvements in welfare
justify the continuation of these systems, on either animal welfare or environmental
grounds.” So non-ideal ethics can reject exploitation of animals in theory, while at the
same time using every opportunity for practical improvement of the lives of animals.
I question Thompsons assumption on this point. I doubt whether we can grad-
ually improve the welfare of animals within the system without at least implic-
itly justifying it. For can we actually reject the system as a whole and still ask
for slightly better living conditions? Let me explain this dilemma by recalling the
case of the Dierenbescherming, the Dutch equivalent of the British RSPCA. This
moderate animal advocacy movement—the biggest in the Netherlands—introduced
a three-star rating system for meat in supermarkets. Stars printed on the packaging
ever since indicate the animal welfare level under which the meat is produced. The
introduction of the stars was advertised as a ‘major breakthrough’, since starless
meat was since seen as ‘bad’. Supermarkets became hesitant to sell it, and most
of them switched to one star meat, in order not be accused of animal abuse. The
Dierenbescherming thereby succeeded in setting a new minimum requirement for
meat quality inmost supermarkets. Indeed amajor improvement for the lives ofmany
animals. But once introduced, the stars became a hindrance for further improvement.
The Dierenbescherming now started saying one star meat wasn’t all that good. It
advised consumers to buy meat with at least two stars. But most consumers were
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satisfied with just one. They felt legitimized to buy poor quality meat, since it was
obviously approved by the Dierenbescherming—it even had a star!—so why should
they buy better meat? The supermarkets did not feel inclined to change their policy
either. The Dierenbescherming now has a warning on its website that says the star
system ismeant formeat eaterswho usually buy the cheapestmeat. Others apparently
are to ignore the stars.
Another example of stagnating progress due to non-ideal solutions, occurredwhen
the Sophia Foundation for the Protection of Animals suggested to improve the cages
of chimps that were held for animal testing in the Biomedical Primate Research
Center (BPRC) facility in theNetherlands. The facilitywas under fire of animal rights
activists who pleaded for a complete shutdown of the animal testing lab. Politicians
were considering doing so, since the activists had a large following. But the small
improvements the Sophia Foundation proposed to the cages, and funded, sanctioned
the continuation of the testing facility.1 It send the message to politicians that the
situation just needed improvements and basically was under control. The BPRC,
on the verge of bankruptcy and of being closed down, remained open (Meershoek
2005). These examples of non-ideal ethics in practice—and there are many more
to be given—show the predicament we are in. On the one hand we like to applaud
even the smallest welfare improvements—of course we want to better the life of
chimps—yet, on the other hand in the eye of politicians and the broader public we
do justify the system if are to go in that direction.
And there is a second problem. If we publicly welcome welfare improvements,
yet at the same time more privately take an abolitionist approach to the system as a
whole (something Thompson proposes), we can justly be called ‘opportunists with a
hidden agenda’. Many farmers see animal activists and non-ideal ethicists this way.
Why should they consider adjusting their stables, cages, barns and machines, if they
can predict that the minute they do so, animal activists and animal philosophers like
Thompson will be back at their doorsteps?
The life of European chickens is a showcase example of this dilemma. Activists
and ethicists have often successfully advocated better living conditions for the
millions of chickens in European countries. But they kept on coming back with
more demands. The minute the battery cages were improved, they asked for even
bigger cages. The minute the cages where renewed, the activists demanded perches
for chickens to sleep on and more room so they could spread their wings. Again the
farmers were forced to make new cages. And then our non-ideal activists wanted to
alter the cages again. They now needed to change into more open spaces with options
for the chickens to go outside in the open air. How frustrating for all involved.
As we speak, the Dutch farmers block streets in the Netherlands with their trac-
tors to force politicians to no longer continually change the playing field. They
are sick and tired of incrementalism, which forces them to constantly reinvest in
their business. Meanwhile the non-ideal ethicists are tired too. They are constantly
1On the 17th of October 2000, one day before a joint meeting on strategy by several animal welfare
organisations, the Sophia Foundation donated money to the BPRC to make alterations in the cages,
thus preventing bankruptcy for the BPRC.
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more or less rightfully accused of a lack of integrity, and they struggle with their
conscience, since they actually do have ideals, which they constantly, for the better
good, suppress during their negotiations with farmers, politicians and supermarkets.
Non-ideal philosophers do the same as they write their carefully crafted papers, in
which they give hints, but mainly avoid to say what they actually think. Adhering to
ideals while not putting them on the foreground, turns out to be hard.
15.2 Non-ideal Animal Ethics and Disaster Management
A third problem that follows from non-ideal ethics can be found in the chapter by
Andreia De Paula Vieira and Raymond Anthony. They show how to improve the
situation of animals during natural and man-made disasters. “Disasters are emergen-
cies endured by people and animals and can be induced by natural or anthropogenic
agents”, they state. So it concerns a wide spectrum of events, ranging from floods and
firestorms to toxicological crises, barnfires and even terrorist attacks.Next the authors
delineate “six ethical stewardship caretaking aims for emergency preparedness and
response.” Their recommendations fall under the following categories: “Respect and
Humane Treatment, Collaboration, Information, Community Outreach and Proac-
tive Contact, Cultural Sensitivity and Attitudes Check, and Reflection, Review and
Reform.” The capitals underline the importance of these virtues, I guess, but as we
shall see they are somewhat misleading.
Inmost cases the bestway to protect animals during these emergencies, the authors
state, is to focus on humans: “Framing a disaster in terms of public health emergency
preparedness and response helps to highlight the adequacy of the infrastructure
involved in advancing equity, inclusion, community relationships and galvanizing
necessary political will.” Putting the emphasis on human decency, and appealing to
people of good will, is an essential characteristic of ‘non-ideal ethics’. It often works
out fine, but it has its limitations. This becomes clear if we look at a current disaster.
As I am writing this, most of Europe is in a semi-lockdown due to the coronavirus.
On the news we see hundreds of trucks stranded at the Polish border. Many of them
transport livestock. The expectation is that most of the animals will perish in the next
couple of days. A disaster, that draws a lot of attention. Non-ideal disaster ethicists
encourage people and authorities to help the animals. And anyone with the slightest
bit of decency hopes, of course, that their appeal will be successful. But there is a
downside to this strategy of hope. It ultimately is an appeal to decency and charity.
These events—animals suffering during transportation, will occur regularly if we do
not fight the system as a whole. If we continue on this path we will need a lot of
charity, and of course this is a scarce thing.
In ethical texts the appeal to charity is often hidden in a language of apparent
deontology. Things must change, non-ideal authors state. Andreia De Paula Vieira
andRaymondAnthonywrite for example: “In the event that depopulation is necessary
(such as during the 2014-2015 Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza Outbreak in the
US) adherence to strong ethical standards and procedures, and state and federal
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laws should take precedence as a way to ensure that as much consideration as is
practicable is given to respect the welfare of the affected animals.” But notice how
the deontological terminology of ‘should’ and ‘ethical standards’ is framed in awider
perspective of softening phrases like ‘as much consideration as possible’. That is,
as much as is possible within the general idea of a ‘humane treatment’ of animals.
By humane treatment of animals we usually mean that the way animals live should
match up to human decency standards (and therefore not necessarily to the standards
of the animals themselves). If they do not, man is required to help animals in distress,
by helping out and showing some mercy.
Non-ideal animal ethicists regard human decency a first requirement. The idea
that animals should be able to live up to their own standards and deserve that their
interests are being taken seriously, comes only second. And this is worrisome, since
the primary focus on human dignity and decency, ultimately steers our attention away
from the main principles of justice. In the chapter by De Paula Vieira and Anthony
this results in a definition of a disaster which is human, all too human. Disasters are
seen as ‘emergencies’. Apparently they regard disasters as states of exception, as
deviation of daily routine. What humans generally regard as decent and acceptable
can therefore not be seen as a disaster. Those things belong to normality. So epidemics
amongst chickens and pigs in barns are marked as disasters, while husbandry as such
is not. Husbandry is normal. This normality—loads of neglected chickens and pigs
in barns—is more or less taken for granted, since this is business as usual. De Paula
Vieira and Anthony seem to be struggling with this point, as they note about disaster
ethicists: “They are challenged to extend the humanitarian impulse directly to animals
while doing so within the constraints of the human-centric world.” So they would
like to question normality, and in fact they do in a sense, but at the same time one gets
the impression they first accept it as a given—as fate. What are you going to do about
it? And by accepting this fate, the authors ultimately divert us from the underlying
question: isn’t livestock farming itself the real disaster that needs a disaster plan first?
All of the so-called animal disasters—zoonoses, problemswith cattle during trans-
portation, endangeredwild life—are in the end results of a gross injustice: the discrim-
ination of animals on irrelevant grounds and the enslavement of animals in husbandry
systems, zoos and other facilities. Especially animals in husbandry are prone to lead
a disastrous life: short, nasty and brutish. They spend their lives in darkened, foul-
smelling, unhealthy barns and end up prematurely in the slaughterhouse. In these
circumstances zoonoses, accidents, neglect and other ‘disasters’ are bound to occur.
By framing these conditions as exceptions—as if they normally do not occur—and
by declaring only the worst situations an emergency, these regular occurring events
become framed as mere irregularities. And of course, they are not, since they are to
be expected.
Why do the authors not mention the real disaster? Why do they try to manage a
big disaster by focusing on its side effects? Probably, because they left philosophy
and switched to a more practical and political mode of thinking. They are trying
to convince farmers, consumers, politicians and everybody else involved to show
some mercy, and they can only do so by pointing at the side-effects, while ignoring
the fundamental rot in the system as a whole. Pointing at these facts would make
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negotiations and appeals difficult. It is somewhat understandable. It is difficult to
kindly request politicians, farmers and others to change their behavior, while calling
them fundamentally unjust at the same time.
Thompson and the other non-idealists will of course not agree with me that
husbandry (including the so called CAFO’s) is the real disaster. “Unlike David
DeGrazia,” Thompson writes, “I believe that the lives of animals in CAFOs are
worth living, but like the majority of animal welfare scientists contributing empirical
findings for husbandry ethics, I believe that their lives could be significantly better
than they currently are.” It reminds me of a fur breeder I once met in the Dutch
parliament building at a hearing. He told me the skins of his animals look fine, so
it must be clear to anyone that they lead a more than decent life. So his fur trade
was not immoral. ‘They wouldn’t look like this, if they weren’t happy.’ Of course
to make animals happy, you have to do more than keeping their skins healthy. The
rhetorics of Thompson’s chapter is somewhat similar. He points at the fact that the
animals lead a live worth living. Well, yes, but this is just like pointing at the skins
in the fur trade. It simply is besides the question. Perhaps every life is worth living.
The question is, however, whether it is fair to treat them this way. In non-ideal ethics
we are constantly being diverted away from this question.
I recall the seventeenth-century Dutch slave trader Willem Bosman. He truly was
the non-ideal ethicists of his time. Bosman (1703) wrote a short instruction guide
for improving the welfare of the enslaved during their shipment to the Americas.
Bosman advises us to abstain from unnecessary violence and particularly to be kind
to women while branding them, ‘since they usually tend to be so tender’. Reading
this, we feel uncomfortable. Yet, this is non-ideal ethics in practice. It is dealing with
side-effects while turning a blind eye to the real disaster. Willem Bosman tells us his
slaves look healthy too. And we should acknowledge, he might say, that these slaves
do have aworthwhile life, while we have amoral obligation to improve their situation
gradually. Of course Bosman is playing a villainous rhetorical trick on us, dodging
the real question whether the situation is acceptable altogether. All non-ideal ethics
have this flaw.
15.3 Non-ideal Ethics and Ethnographic Animal Studies
I suspect we can also find it, somewhat hidden, in the chapter by Leonie Cornips and
Louis van den Hengel. They describe research on communication by young cows in
husbandry systems. Cornips and Van den Hengel basically observed young cows for
several months, a method they call ‘ethnographic observation’. The phrase shows
they apparently used observatory techniques common in the study of indigenous
people, by noting all behavior, utterances and other sounds. “We have elaborated a
posthumanist conception of language as a distributed effect of multiple interacting
bodies in order to foreground the fluidity through which a cow, a calf, calves, a
wheelbarrow, a farmer, an iron feed fence, a lock, the clattering of bars, sounds of
chewing, sounds of puffing, sounds of urinating, the smell of food, urine, feces, other
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bodies in proximity or distance, movements up and down, become relationally entan-
gled with one another and, crucially, with the anthropological machine of industrial
animal production.” They describe how cows bang against the bars of their cages
in certain manners. This behavior belongs to a refined communication system. The
cows certainly succeeded in developing a meaningful language, Cornips and Van
den Hengel conclude. They call this ‘place making’. By this they mean that animals
are able to make the world their world by communicating with others.
Cornips and Van den Hengel state that cows turn out to be “intelligent, social,
speaking beings, linguistic agents who even under poor conditions form rich and
complex relationships with the world to make it a meaningful place.” I like studies
like these; since many people still see animals as dumb creatures, research like this
can be used to improve the situation of animals. Yet, it has something troubling too.
Let us go back for a while to our comparison with slaves. Suppose Cornips and Van
den Hengel were to embark on a slave ship in order to do their ethnographic study
on the use of language there. What would we think when they would report back
that they found the slaves to have developed a rich language in ‘poor conditions’
and that they thus succeeded in place making? We would condemn the fact that they
did not pass a harsh verdict on the system as such. Calling it ‘poor conditions’ is an
understatement. It suggests that the conditions can be made richer, better, by making
improvements. And of course this is not the case, since animals in cages will never
be able to communicate as they would like to.
Again we are diverted from the real questions. The authors should have started by
saying that animals ought to live a different,moremeaningful,moreworthwhile life.
They should have condemned husbandry in a clear manner. Only after having done
this, they could report their research without the loss of moral integrity. My point is
not that we should refuse research in ‘poor conditions’, nor that we shouldn’t give
advice to improve the poor conditions, or to prevent further disasters; the point is
we can only justify research in husbandry systems and that can only justify advising
farmers to make small changes, if we undoubtedly distance ourselves from the gross
injustice first. So yes, we can favor incremental progress. A small step in the right
direction is a small step in the right direction. But it is simply wrong, to favor
incremental progress, if we dodge the fundamental questions and forget who we
are—philosophers. Justice first, politics second, if you ask me. It is much less tiring
than taking thousands small steps and debating and regulating each of them while
having a bad conscience.
15.4 Towards a No-Deal Animal Ethics
So what is our way out here? Well, there are no easy solutions to our problem. Either
we deal with the devil, or we call the devil by his name and perhaps don’t deal at
all. If this is the case, we are caught up between a really not ideal ‘non-ideal ethics’
and an idealistic ‘no deal ethics’. Having said this, we may start looking for a stance
that bridges the gap between these two approaches. The first thing to do, however,
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is to accept that this society brings about people who do harm to animals, since
speciesism (i.e. discrimination on the ground that one belongs to a certain species)
is common and stands in a long tradition. The devil here is not some evil genius, he
is just a type of person that is produced by this society and we should alter society if
we want to prevent devilish things. The second is to acknowledge that no-deal ethics
(animal rights ethics) has its problems too. It too leads to tiring situations. Think of all
the activists and ethicists who fundamentally oppose animal testing. They convene
every once in a while in front of the facilities. Outside, in the cold, not achieving
much, except expressing their ideas and emotions and often fruitlessly demanding
the shutdown of these facilities.
And let’s face this too: no-one has a clear vision of the ideal situation. All animal
rights activists talk about rights, but most of them cannot explain what they entail
in detail. A growing number of thinkers, including myself, plea for political repre-
sentation of animals, yet no one seems to know how to organize it. How do you
represent ants, snakes and lions in politics for example? Of course, some attempts
have been made to clarify things. The Australian philosopher Peter Singer (1975)
started in the seventies by pointed out that animals are discriminated on the mere
fact that they are animals, while some animals are actually quite similar to us in
many respects. The American thinker Tom Regan (2004) pointed out that animals
are ‘subjects of a life’, and therefore deserve consideration on their own grounds.
They should be not be treated as means but as goals in themselves. And from the
late ninety’s, philosophers started thinking about political representation of animals.
(My book Democratie voor dieren [2009], in which I suggested we should regard
animals as citizens and give them full citizenship rights, only to take away those
which are not useful, is part of the search for a new animal friendly politics). The
Dutch philosopher Eva Meijer (2016) later pointed out that animals do actually have
a (political) voice. Most animals use symbols and are quite eloquent. They indicate
what they like or dislike. Donaldson and Kymlicka (2011) meanwhile developed a
social philosophy and a political system for animal groups. They ascribed different
social rights to different types of animals.
So the search for the clearer picture of the ideal way to treat animals has led to
the rise of multiple approaches, which often are competing with one another. The
ultimate image still is a bit blurry, yet all these developments in philosophy and
society (the rise of veganism and animal rights advocacy) show quite clearly the
general direction we are moving in. There is a general aspiration for justice, in which
interests of animals are to be taken into account. The idea that this search for justice
will lead to an ideal outcome, has never left some of the philosophers. The British
philosopher Robert Garner (2013) for example tries to get a clear vision of the ideal
situation, by starting with the fact that all animals, human and nonhuman, have a
‘sentient position’ in this world. Taking this as a starting point, Garner evokes ‘the
veil of ignorance’, a thought experiment first proposed by John Rawls (who refused
to apply it to animals, unfortunately) in his 1971 book Theory of Justice. Imagine
you will be born sentient but you do not know under which conditions you will be
born. Perhaps you will be born as a baby inWashington, or, as a stray dog in Istanbul
or a piglet in a barn somewhere in the Netherlands. How would you like the world,
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into which you will be born, to be organized? If you place yourself in the position of
others, you will be forced to take the interests of that sentient position into account,
and will reach a fair judgement on how to weigh all these different interests. The veil
of ignorance is of course a highly debated thought experiment. I won’t go into the
details here, but despite all skepticism, I think it is clear the thought experiment at
least invites us to be fair and more empathic with other beings.
Empathy is something vegans usually have in abundance. Most of them share
the ideal of a world without pain or discomfort for animals and humans alike. This
is a strong ideal—so strong it is hard to live up to. It is practically impossible not
to hurt animals. Even in your coleslaw there are small animals that won’t survive
dinner. Considering this, some vegans drop out and say: ‘Well you have to draw a
line somewhere. This is where I’ll draw it.’ It usually means they are not willing to
proceed any further in the direction of the ideal.
The case of the vegans shows us that strong ideals can wear us down. Therefore
I tend to advice new vegans to take it slowly. Take it one big step at the time, but
always keep in mind the direction you are going. Keep in mind that you can and
will never again accept the normality of meat eating or dairy consumption. You will
not even accept that there is a tiny bug in your coleslaw. But it is ok to fail in your
attempt to live up to your ideals. If you are ‘a sinner’ once in a while, fine, we all
are in a sense, but never accept it as a normality. Never settle permanently for any
non-ideal way of living. It may seem hard to do. But ignoring the real disasters in
ethics and in our daily lives—meat eating, speciesism and animal enslavement—is
even harder in the end, since it messes with our logic, our conscience and the moral
foundations of our politics.
The answers I tend to give to vegans (and myself for that matter) is basically the
answer I would suggest to ethicists. Try not to run from the real questions or from
the ideal of justice. Stay on track by moving in the right direction. Be critical and
alter your own behavior as much as possible, while being forgiving to those who fail
once in a while. The whole aim is to keep up the spirit, to be as clear as possible that,
despite the manifold roads ahead of us, we are moving in one direction, and to live
up to one’s conscience as much as possible. Deal with the demands of fairness. It is
a doable strategy in daily live, and it may be too in ethics in general.
Perhaps this ‘direction approach’ can bridge the gap between incrementalistic
non-ideal ethics and the no-deal ethics of the abolitionists. In contrast to non-ideal
ethics it does not accept any normality, since it embraces a vision of another world,
yet in contrast to animal rights idealists, it is pragmatic too, since it accepts failure
as long as we make ‘the biggest step forward at this point’. I guess moving forward
ourselves, and demanding of others to do the same, is the best way to proceed.
And, since we are philosophers, we shall never stop moving, since this is simply
not what we as philosophers and ethicists do. Ethics is part of philosophy; part of a
restless discourse, as it is favors continuous wonder and reaches constantly for better
arguments.
As thinkers, we cannot hide behind any law, any tradition, any given situation,
or any accepted standard of ‘humane treatment’. Judges in our legal system may
perhaps do so, since they have to deliver their verdicts within the boundaries of the
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law and the legal tradition. As philosophers, our task is to dig deeper and to define
what criteria have to be met in laws and traditions. We can state, for example, that
the containment of animals in cages, is under most circumstances a malum in se, i.e.
as something that is accepted by the law, but can still be seen as a crime, since it
violates basic moral standards and entails a gross disregard of those involved. It may
not be forbidden, but it certainly should be. And we are moving in this direction.
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Stray Agency and Interspecies Care:
The Amsterdam Stray Cats and Their
Humans
Eva Meijer
Abstract This chapter discusses the Stichting Amsterdamse Zwerfkatten
(Amsterdam Stray Cat Foundation, afterwards SAZ), who work with and for stray
cats. In their practices and views they challenge common assumptions about cat
subjectivity and agency, the cats’ right to a habitat and social relations, as well as the
idea that there is a strict difference between cats and humans. Their approach offers
an alternative way of thinking about cat agency and human agency, networks of cat-
human relations, sharing the city with cats, and working towards more freedom for
cats and humans. In the chapter I examine these relations from the perspective of
agency, care, and politics, and investigate whether or not this can function as a model
for building new communities with other animals, which centres their agency.
16.1 Introduction
Invisible to most, Amsterdam is home to many stray cats. These cats are neither wild
nor domesticated: they live close to humans but usually do not depend on them.1
Depending on their location and the humans in that area, their living circumstances
can be anywhere on a spectrum between fairly precarious and fairly comfortable.
Their lives may be more dangerous than those of companion cats, yet they also expe-
rience a larger degree of freedom, understood not only as the capacity to roam freely
but also to make choices about where to live and with whom, and more generally
how to lead one’s life. Still, it is often assumed that companion cats are better off than
stray or feral cats, and that cats living on the streets should be rescued, neutered and
adopted by humans (Srinivasan 2013). Because they challenge dualisms between
1I use the word stray instead of feral or semi-feral to translate the Dutch ‘zwerfkatten’, which can
refer to abandoned house cats, semi-feral and feral cats.
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nature and culture, domesticated and wild, many humans see them as out of place,
or as not really belonging in the city (Van Patter and Hovorka 2018). They do not
belong to a human, as domesticated animals do, but are also not understood as native
to a certain area, such as for example deer or songbirds. Most of the Amsterdam stray
cats are descendants of house cats from Amsterdam, who carved out their own lives
in the city, have learned to negotiate its risks, and built relationships with one another.
Assumptions about these cats as either belonging or not belonging in the city, and
about human duties towards them, are usually based on the view that cats, like other
animals, are categorically different from humans and that humans are hierarchically
above them. The city belongs to the humans who built it, and other animals are
seen as companions, guests or pests, but, perhaps with the exception of songbirds,
not as rightful inhabitants. Interconnected with this is the fact that the cats, as other
nonhuman animals, have no formal legal or political rights.
In this chapter I discuss the work of the Stichting Amsterdamse Zwerfkatten
(Amsterdam Stray Cat Foundation, afterwards SAZ), who work with and for stray
cats. In their practices and underlying ideals they challenge common assumptions
about cat subjectivity and agency, their right to a habitat and social relations, as well
as the idea that there is a strict difference between cats and humans. They empha-
size cat agency, and have a non-anthropocentric view to cat-human relations, which
shows us new ways of sharing the city with cats, and working towards more freedom
for cats. I volunteered at the SAZ for a year and his paper is based on informal
conversations with other volunteers and members of staff, written statements from
the website of the SAZ (www.saz.amsterdam) and their biannual magazine Swieber,
and my observations of cat-human interactions.
My aim in this chapter is not to provide a theory of just cat-human relations, or
to develop a cat ethics for the Anthropocene. The chapter should be understood as a
case study that draws on insights from political philosophy, ecofeminism and animal
studies more broadly, to investigate what happens at the SAZ, and how their practices
and views relate to mainstream ideas and practices. I focus specifically on agency
and interspecies relations. In the first section I discuss the work of the SAZ in more
detail. Section two zooms in on agency, discussing stray cat and human volunteer
agency, and interconnections between these. The third section builds on these ideas
about agency and relationality and turns the focus to interspecies care at the SAZ,
and in the city of Amsterdam. In section four I move to the politics of the SAZ and
the Amsterdam stray cats. The conclusion investigates what lessons we can learn
from cat-human relations at the SAZ, in the context of establishing better relations
with the other animals with whom we share our cities and households.
16.2 The Amsterdam Stray Cat Foundation
The SAZ have been working for and with the stray cats in and around Amsterdam
since 1994. They ‘trap, neuter and return’ (TNR) the cats who are toowild to adjust to
a life in a human home, and they socialise those who show interest in interacting with
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humans. Once these cats are used to humans, they are taken to shelters in the area
from where they can be adopted. The SAZ also assist stray cat colonies in the city,
making sure they are fed and watched, and receive healthcare if needed. They make
sure all TNR cats are looked after when they are released back into their habitats,
and they provide help for humans who take care of stray cats in their gardens or in
parks near their homes by supplying food and winter homes, so called iso-boxes, for
the cats.
They focus not only on stray cats: a large part of their work is offering financial
support to humans who cannot afford veterinary care for their cats. In this context
they also offer more general help to humans and cats in need, and are a last resort
especially for those who need immediate help. They for example provide shelter for
cats in cases of domestic abuse, or take over their medical treatment if their humans
cannot provide the appropriate care. They also started a food bank for companion
animal food. Those practices are documented in a biannual magazine and on social
media, aimed at promoting better cat-human relations, and often drawing attention to
the cats’ perspectives on matters. They influence city policies with regard to dealing
with stray cats, and developing neutering programs.
When the SAZ started in 1994, there were many genuinely feral cats in
Amsterdam. Currently, most of the cats on the streets are either lost or abandoned,
which is largely because of their TNR work and neutering programs. The SAZ see
neutering companion cats as the most efficient way of reducing stray cat suffering,
and run campaigns to convince humans to neuter their cats. In these and other efforts,
they treat humans similar to the cats, sometimes adopting a slightly paternalistic atti-
tude: humans need to be educated and/or nudged into having their cats neutered
and taking good care of them. This attitude is also adopted with regard to financial
help with medical issues. In summer, cats often fall from balconies, because they are
playing or chasing birds or insects, or because they are old, or simplymake amistake.
The SAZ will take care of these cats when necessary and pay for medical bills, but
they will also visit the house and check if the balcony is fenced before humans get
their companions back.
The SAZ receive a small amount of money from the municipality for their TNR
program and neutering campaigns; the remainder of their activities are paid for by
private donations and funding from animal welfare organisations. Only two of the
humans who work at the SAZ are paid, both receiving the minimum wage. One of
these humans cleans the cages, and the other is in charge of daily management. Most
of the work however, including cleaning, socializing cats, administration, driving on
the ambulance, and catching cats, is done by volunteers. Many of these volunteers
have ‘a backpack’ as the Dutch say, usually referring to psychiatric problems, though
some have physical disabilities as well.
I applied for a cleaning job at the SAZ after my cat companion Putih died in the
summer of 2016, and was soon promoted to the office, where I answered phone calls,
did administrative work, and applied for funding. In the year I worked at the SAZ, I
got to know the other humans who worked on Tuesdays quite well, as well as some
of the cats who stayed in the socialization kennels for a longer period of time. I was
struck by the attention for cat agency I witnessed, and found out there are many
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invisible networks of care in the city of Amsterdam, formed by humans who look
after stray cats, and often vice versa.
16.3 Degrees of Agency
Cat agency plays a major role in how the SAZ functions, both with regard to human
behaviour and with regard to how different procedures are set up.2 Catching cats,
taking care of themafterwards, socialising the oneswho show theywant be socialised,
releasing the others; all of this is done inways that the cats co-determine, even though
the power relations are not equal.
With feral and stray cats this works as follows. Before cats are caught, they are
usually fed for a while at a certain time, in a certain place—both of which the cats co-
determine. The cats are then caught, either because they allow humans to touch them,
or, usually, by placing a cage at the feeding place. After they are caught they are taken
to the SAZ headquarters, where they receive a health check and are neutered, and
then aremonitored for a while to see if they show interest in socialization. Sometimes
it is immediately clear that they do not—experienced volunteers have developed an
eye for it—at other times this needs more time. Cats often determine working hours
of SAZ’ volunteers, and of humans feeding cats, as well as cleaning techniques, and
other SAZ procedures.
Cat agency also influences the lives of humans caring for them in the city. Many
of the humans who call for assistance have adapted to having cats living in their
gardens, and are willing to put great effort into caring for them or helping them. The
cats brought them in this position: they normally take the first step in the relation by
choosing a place to live, and picking specific humans to interact with.
While cat agency is taken seriously by the SAZ—paying attention to and
respecting cat agency is one of the first things new volunteers learn—, cats have
no official rights, and their political voice is not recognized by larger society. There
is a gap between recognition of their agency at the micro-level, and official institu-
tions and procedures. This is not a matter of all or nothing: cat agency, for example,
does influence interaction with the city council from a distance, because of the habi-
tats that the cats choose, and through the humans who advocate for them. They are
informed and influenced by their relations, and sometimes negotiations, with the
cats.
Nevertheless, the cats have no real voice inmany of the decisions that concern their
lives. Interestingly,many of the humans volunteering at the SAZexperience the same.
They often complain that they do not speak the language of official institutions, which
may lead to problems in their personal lives, and can also affect the effectiveness of
their advocacy for the cats. In fact, many of them are more fluent in ‘cat language’
than in formal Dutch. This is partly due to a class difference: most volunteers at the
SAZ have received no higher education and come from poor backgrounds, in contrast
2For similar observations, see Alger and Alger (1997, 2003).
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to volunteers who work for private funds and government employees. It is also due to
their neurodiversity.Manyvolunteers identify as autistic, having personality disorder,
suffering from depression, or simply as ‘crazy’. While their different perspectives
sometimes lead to conflicts between volunteers, or between SAZ volunteers and
outsiders, it also provides the organisation with valuable knowledge about groups
of humans that are seen and treated as difficult by other organisations and official
institutions. In fact, one of the great strengths of the SAZ is that they assist humans
frommarginalized groups, such as for example animal hoarders, psychiatric patients,
incarcerated people, victims of domestic violence, and homeless people, if they need
temporary or permanent help with their companions, offering shelter or medical
care. These humans are often not too eager to interact with official institutions such
as governmental organisations or even larger animal welfare organisations, but they
trust the humans at the SAZ, or come to trust them after a while.
Humans have certain advantages in anthropocentric societies, but not all humans
have them to the same degree.3 At the SAZ there are many different relations
between humans and cats, in which humans and cats exercise agency, and have
their specific strengths and weaknesses, some of which are connected to being part
of a specific social group, while others are individual. With agency I do not refer
to the Kantian rational interpretation of this concept, but neither to object-oriented
positions (Bennett Benett 2010; Latour 1993): it should be understood as relational
and situated. Cats and humans enable each other to act in certain ways, and influence
one another in a variety of ways (see also Bovenkerk and Meijer in this volume).
16.4 Networks of Care
Human care plays an important role in the lives of many of the stray cats. Outside
cats are provided with food and healthcare, which is especially important when they
get older. Cats in the socialization program receive quite a lot of care when they
are at the SAZ, which continues after they are adopted. Kittens sometimes require
intensive medical care, and they are usually placed in foster families.
The cats also take care of humans. Stray cats can provide their chosen humans
with responsibility, a goal in life, mutual habits, and often also company, as many do
at some point connect with the humans (often elderly females, sometimesmales) who
care for them. The volunteers who work at the SAZ have similar experiences. Cats
interact with them, which leads to special relations with certain humans.4 Caring
for cats can for certain humans be helpful in itself. Being a volunteer creates a
responsibility, and asks for them to be physically present, which means getting out
of bed and going to the SAZ. The daily manager of the SAZ plays an important role
3See Taylor (2017) for a broader discussion of the interconnections between constructions of
disabilities and animality.
4These cats are usually not cute at all, they often do not like humans, cannot be touched or
approached, which can make the care difficult and demanding, but rewarding as well.
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in this. If someone is for example depressed and in bed all day, she will call them and
ask to bring in fish for a cat that has trouble eating. Humans will often feel obliged
to come in for a specific cat, or because the cats generally need them. This can make
a large difference in the lives of individuals. In casual conversations about the cats
and their role in their lives, they often express feeling a special connection to the cats
because they are outsiders too.
The SAZ also creates a culture of care, which transcends individual interactions.
This is perhaps most visible at the SAZ headquarters, where volunteers are taught
how to care for cats, through education and written rules, and cats learn to care for
humans and one another. Care is not just feeding cats or keeping them safe. It can
also involve play, for example. Younger cats especially often begin their contact with
humans in the form of play—touching comes later. Similarly, black humour is for the
humans an important tool in dealing with hardships in their own lives and the cats’
lives. This culture is also found outside of the SAZ headquarters, in the network of
humans who care for stray cats in the city. Not only do individuals take care of the
cats, they know one another and work together to provide this care. They keep an
eye on neighbourhood cats who have homes and make sure they are treated well, and
they keep an eye on each other. The cats of course also form communities, in which
they sometimes care for one another. Females in colonies for example sometimes
share the care for kittens, including nursing.
Building on care ethical views Lori Gruen (2015) argues that there is a normative
component to our entanglements with other animals: in order to do justice to those
that we are connected to, we have to develop a kind of caring perception—an entan-
gled empathy—that is focused on attending to the wellbeing of others. Developing
empathy in this manner is a process in which both cognition and emotion have a role
to play. With stray and feral cats one needs to pay attention, because otherwise you
can get scratched or worse, and at the SAZ their perspective is brought to the front.
Humans who start working there learn to be perceptive from the other humans, and
from the cats; new cats learn from other cats and humans. Humans are often seen as
givers of care, and other animals as recipients of care. The SAZ show that this is not
necessarily the case, and that there are many different types of relationships possible.
Recognizing that humans and cats at certain times depend on the other challenges a
binary opposition between humans on the one side and cats on the other, with regard
to agency and care. At the SAZ cats and humans are treated similarly: they are taken
seriously as individuals, and attended to in special ways if necessary.
16.5 Cat Politics
The political position of the Amsterdam street cats is currently ambiguous. They are
treated better than certain other inhabitants of the city, such as rats or pigeons, and
perhaps even certain humans groups, such as illegalized refugees. Cats have a better
reputation than pigeons or rats, who have traditionally been negatively stereotyped
and are often unjustly associated with disease (see Meijboom and Nieuwland in this
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volume). Many humans more or less accept the cats’ presence, and often do not even
notice them. When there are problems, education can play a role: once humans learn
that cat colonies are looked after and the cats are neutered, they tend to accept them.
At the same time however the cats do not have political or legal rights, similar to
other nonhuman animals, which makes their situation precarious and means they
depend on the goodwill of humans for fair treatment. While current legislation in the
province of Noord-Holland favours TNR over killing stray cats, this is up for debate
in other provinces and could change.
The SAZ’ attitude towards the cats reflects this ambiguity. Cat subjectivity is taken
seriously—all cats are treated equally and seen asworthy of care and consideration—,
and cats are treated as social beings who should have a place to live, opportunity to
form relations with others, and lead a life that is good for them. They however do not
argue for cat rights, and the cats’ rights to life, bodily integrity, and autonomy are
not always recognized, which seemingly contradicts their commitment to cat agency
and subjectivity. This is most visible in their approach to euthanasia and neutering.
Older TNR cats who have lived in a certain habitat for a long time often depend
on one human to take care of them. When this human dies and there is no one to take
over the care, euthanizing, or, less euphemistically, killing, the cats is sometimes
considered to be the best option. Old cats usually cannot settle in a new territory
because they are too fragile, or be adopted by humans, because they are too wild.
Living at the SAZ causes them great distress, and while this can be a temporary
solution, it is not a permanent one. Similar problems arise with cats who are ill and
need long-term treatments, who are permanently injured, or who have long hair,
and who are too afraid of humans to live with them. Ideally, cats from these groups
should have the chance to move into cat villages, where they can live at a distance
from people but are regularly checked on by humans who have experience with wild
cats. There are however not enough spaces in these cat villages for all cats, and when
the waiting lists are long, older cats are sometimes killed. In the case of humans we
would find this unacceptable, and create spaces where they could stay. This is of
course part of a larger framework in which nonhuman animals’ lives are not valued
in the same way as human lives, but the SAZ are an actor in this system.
Another example of violating cats’ bodily integrity and autonomy is neutering.
The TNR program is based on neutering, and the SAZ run a program that allows
humans with low income to neuter their companion cats for free. Their main reason
for promoting neutering is reducing cat suffering. They rescue hundreds of stray
kittens every year, many of whom are ill, and argue that shelters are full of cats
who deserve to be adopted. Furthermore, intact males often fight—in cities, their
territories often overlap—and it could be argued that females are better off if they
are not constantly pregnant or with kittens.
Under current circumstances the SAZ’s neutering programs can indeed probably
be defended for the simple reason that they do reduce cat suffering in cities. There is
however a more principal question of whether or not humans are ethically allowed
to intervene in cats’ lives and bodies in this way. This more principal question of
whether humans have a right, or even a duty, to neuter cats deserves more space
than I have here (see also Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011; Palmer 2013; compare
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Narayanan 2017; Srinivasan 2013). It is however interesting to note that in the case
of euthanasia and neutering the SAZ never mention what the cats want, or discuss
whether or not this is problematic with regard to their bodily integrity, but instead
simply assume that humans know best and are allowed to intervene.
16.5.1 Stray Cat Rights
These tensions bring us to the question of stray cat rights. The SAZ do not advocate
for universal cat rights, but they do argue for specific kinds of legislation in relation
to stray cats, for example in discussions with the city council and the province, and
they promote what they see as good cat-human relations through their (social) media
channels. Even though they do not use the language of rights or justice—they will
speak of belonging, care, or being kind instead—, their underlying ideas correspond
with Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka’s (2011) views about denizenship rights for
liminal animals.
Donaldson and Kymlicka use a citizenship approach to conceptualize the rights of
different nonhuman animal communities, based on their relations to human political
communities. Domesticated animals are conceptualized as citizens, who form inter-
species communities with humans. Wild animals are sovereign communities, who
prefer to stay away from humans and who are capable of taking care of themselves.
Not all animals are wild or domesticated, and for those in between, Donaldson and
Kymlicka introduce a third category. Liminal animals do not desire close relations
with humans, but they do seek out human settlements for safety, shelter or food,
and can have different types of interactions with humans. While most SAZ cats can
indeed be seen as liminal, their relations with humans vary. Some street cats are
domestic cats, who after a few days or weeks, or even hours, remember how nice it
was to live inside a house. Others are feral and show a strong desire to get away from
humans; they will try to escape and fight for their freedom if necessary. Between
these poles we find shy cats, cats who after months of attention suddenly decide to
try to trust humans, cats who usually like humans but remain unpredictable in their
behaviour and therefore cannot be adopted, and many others.
According to Donaldson and Kymlicka (2011, Chapter 3), the different relations
between groups of human and nonhuman animals are connected to different sets of
rights. Liminal animals should, in addition to the basic negative rights all nonhuman
animals should have, be awarded denizenship rights. These are the right not to be
stereotyped negatively, to participate in reciprocal relations, and the right to a habitat.
These three rights capture what the SAZ advocate for. The SAZ have influenced
public opinion of stray cats and continues to do so; in the 1990s, they were seen as
pests and now the image humans have of them is much more positive. Promoting
better cat-human relations, based on reciprocity and mutual consent, in cat-human
households and in cities, is also one of the key aims of the SAZ. This is interconnected
with arguing for the cats’ right to a habitat: the SAZ argue that the city is their home
too.
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16.5.2 Democratic Agency
One of the key features ofDonaldson andKymlicka’s theory is their focus on political
animal agency. Wild and liminal animals express political agency in different ways,
for example through resisting oppression or leaving a certain territory. Domesticated
nonhuman animals exercise democratic agency in relation to humans. They should
not only be the recipients of rights or citizenship, but should be seen as political
agents who co-shape communities, and whose voices should be taken into account
in taking political decisions.
More specifically, they develop an account of ‘dependent agency’ in the case
of domesticated animal citizenship. They distinguish three necessary features of
exercising democratic agency, which in their opinion also apply to domesticated
animals: the possibility of having and expressing a subjective good, the capacity
to comply with social norms through relationships, and the capacity to participate
in shaping the terms of interaction (2011, 104). To further conceptualize this, they
turn to recent work in disability theory, and investigate parallels with theories that
focus on how humans with severe mental disabilities can exercise agency through
relationships that are based on trust. Exercising this dependent agency would, in
the case of domesticated animals, mean that they communicate their standpoints to
humans they know well and trust, and who know them well, who then communicate
these to other humans. Domesticated animals have a right to be represented socially
and politically through this form of interaction.
At the SAZ cats and humans exercise agency in different ways and to different
degrees, and can depend on other cats and humans in a multitude of ways. Some
cats and some humans live their lives without much help from others and prefer
distance from them; others need more care, or prefer close relations. Politically,
relations also do not follow the species line neatly. In the model that Donaldson
and Kymlicka propose, the nonhuman companions depend on humans for social and
political representation. At the SAZ humans speak up for the cats in official contexts,
yet many humans at the SAZ also cannot or do not want to express themselves
politically in this way. Furthermore, the cats act politically in other ways: they claim
and defend their territories, resist captivity, vote with their feet, or cooperate with
humans. While these acts differ from human political acts, they are meaningful and
may have further political effects (see Meijer 2019 for a longer discussion on animal
resistance).
16.6 Cat-Human Relations at the SAZ as a Model
for Future Interactions
The SAZ’s approach to stray cats can perhaps best be described as pragmatic. While
they take seriously cat agency and subjectivity in many contexts, they restrict it at
other points, as I discussed in relation to euthanasia and neutering. Furthermore, in
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ethical judgments they focus solely on cats and not on the wider environment. They
feed the cats animal products, such as meat and fish,5 and do not consider the impact
of cat colonies on other liminal animals, such as rodents or songbirds.
While the first issue can be solved by feeding the cats vegan diets, the second
question is more difficult to answer. Thinking about sharing communities and cities
with cats raises the question of intervention in their predation behaviour (Donaldson
and Kymlicka 2011; Palmer 2013), since individual animals and populations may
suffer from their presence. In some places stray cats are seen and welcomed as rural
working animals, providing ‘rodent control’ (Van Patter and Hovorka 2018), while in
other places there is growing public concern over their impacts on songbirds (ibid.).
This latter concern is often interconnected with a discourse and world view that
relies on a distinction between nature and culture, and sees feral cats as intruders
who are not native to certain areas and do not belong there. Taking issuewith catswho
kill songbirds but not minding them killing mice and rats is furthermore speciesist.
While the question of predation is an important ethical question to consider in living
with companion cats, and in supporting stray or feral cats, simply blaming them for
the loss of wildlife is too easy. More empirical research is needed, into the relation
between feeding cats and their hunting behaviours, human influence onwildlife—for
example with regard to the effect of pesticides on insects and birds—, and differences
in hunting and killing behaviours of companion cats and feral cats. More research
into the moral and political standing of liminal animals is also needed, and this does
not just apply to cats, but also rats, mice and birds.
While there are ethical and political challenges with regard to the SAZ’s policies
and practices, certain aspects of their work can serve as an inspiration for developing
new relations with other animals. As a conclusion to this paper I will discuss these
in three areas: forming ecologies of care, sharing the city, and interspecies resistance
practices.
16.6.1 Ecologies of Care
Relations between humans and groups of liminal animals are often framed in terms
of conflict. Humans usually see themselves as the dominant party, both in terms
of rationality and of power. As we saw, the SAZ problematizes assumptions about
power relations between humans and cats, and humans’ right to space.While humans
make certain decisions, cats know what is best—for them or the human opposite
them—in other cases, and this wisdom needs to be recognized. Instead of focusing
on eradicating city cats, or establishing stronger borders between cat colonies and
humans, they accept that interactions and relations are inevitable, and do not aim to
domesticate all cats. They work towards creating better relations, offer care where
needed, and recognize that care goes two ways: helping cats can help humans. In
5Many volunteers also eat animals, though this is slowly changing because of some vegan volunteers
who are creating awareness.
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this way, the SAZ not only challenges the epistemic dichotomy between humans and
other animals, but also offer another framework, one of care and not conflict.
Throughout the city of Amsterdam we find different networks of care in relation
to stray cats: between cats, cats and humans, colonies and caretakers, socialized
cats and volunteers, between different volunteers, between passers-by and cats in
need. This is not always in perfect harmony: conflicts often occur. But care is not
simply soft and sweet: it means taking responsibility for others also when that is
difficult, and it can even involve making difficult decisions about life and death
for others. Humans share cities and rural areas not only with cats, and relations and
encounters with songbirds, mice, rats, seagulls, foxes and other animals are similarly
often unavoidable. Focusing on care instead of conflict can be the first step for starting
something new and perhaps even solving problems with co-existence (seeMeijboom
and Nieuwland on rats in this volume).
16.6.2 Sharing the City
Recent work in political philosophy (Cooke 2017; Hadley 2005; Milburn 2017)
problematizes the assumption that humans automatically have all rights to the land
they share with other animals, by arguing for nonhuman animal land rights, habitat
rights, or territorial rights. Humans gave themselves a right to the land, but that is
not the same as having a right to that land (Meijer 2019). The idea is not just that
other animals belong in their habitats, have a right to their territory and should have
access to the means they need to sustain their existence: it also imposes limits on
human expansion, and even raises the question of giving land back to the animals
who lived there in the first place (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011).
Cities are seen as a product of human activity, and therefore as belonging to the
humans who built them and not to the other animals who lived there before, or who
came to live there when humans did. Jennifer Wolch (2010) sees a lack of nonhuman
animals in urban theories and practices. This is related to the fact that cities are seen
as human spaces, and the fact that urbanisation is based on a view of progress that
favours culture over nature, which leads to exploitation of nature. To address this,
she argues, we need not only to acknowledge and foster the presence of those other
animals in cities, but also to build new relations with them.
Stray cats are not wild, and do not fall on the side of nature or wilderness, but
are also not domesticated and living within human culture. They contest physical
boundaries, by forming their own communities within city borders, often trespassing
on land that belongs to individual humans and companies—they like courtyards,
parks, big gardens, and industrial areas—, and symbolic borders, by invading a
culturally human space (Van Patter and Hovorka 2018). Colonies have their own
habits and norms, and the cats have their own maps of the city (compare Barua
2014). The cats know their habitat is theirs, even when humans do not recognize
this.
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Understanding cities as places that humans share with many others may mean
humans need to make more space and take a step back. This however does not have
to be a sacrifice: building new relations with other animals, attending to them and
engaging with them differently can instead enrich one’s life and lead to a deeper
sense of connection with the world around you.
16.6.3 Interspecies Resistance as the Foundation for New
Relations
New relations are not a matter of all or nothing, and are not formed in a utopian
setting far away from daily realities. They can and do begin here. The SAZ shows
us alternative ways of interacting with cats, in which power relations are flexible
and cat agency is recognized. Some of the SAZ practices, such as caring for a group
that no one cares about, can be seen as forms of resistance in a world that disregards
nonhuman animal lives.
Michel Foucault (1998, see alsoWadiwel 2016) conceptualizes everyday practices
that challenge power structures as forms of resistance, which is a helpful way of
looking at these cat-human relations. Similar to the ecologies of care I mentioned
earlier, these patterns could perhaps best be described as ecologies of resistance, in
which cats and humans resist oppression. The humansworking at the SAZ sometimes
describe their work in terms of resistance, to indifference and hostile attitudes to cats,
and they take pride in being disobedient. They also often call themselves crazy and
describe themselves as being literally from the streets, and it seems as if they take
pride in being like the cats.
Their struggle and resistance is not aimed at large societal reform, and their acts are
at timesmorally inconsistent. There are also often conflicts between this organisation
and other animal shelters and organisations; they fight over resources and principles.
But the SAZ does manage to bring about small, and sometimes big, changes in the
lives of many cats and humans, they changed how cats are viewed and treated in
Amsterdam, and they are a last resort for humans and cats who have nowhere else
to go. With this they offer a glimpse of new interspecies relations, co-shaped by the
cats.
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Abstract Rats are often despised. In what way does such aversion affect moral
deliberation, and if so, how should we accommodate any distorting effects on our
normative judgements? These questions are explored in this chapter with regard
to recent proposals in (1) the ethics of pest management and (2) animal political
theory. While ethical frameworks and tools used in the context of animal research
can improve moral deliberation with regard to pest management, we argue based on
psychological factors regarding the perception of rats that before implementing these
methods in either animal research or pest management, one needs to ascertain that
rats are owed genuinemoral consideration.With regard to animal political theory, we
identify three issues: truth-aptness, perception, andmoralmotivation. To complement
as well as address some of the issues found in both animal research ethics and animal
political theory, we explore compassion. Starting from compassion, we develop a
pragmatist and interspecies understanding of morality, including a shift from an
anthropocentric to a multispecies epistemology, and a distributed rather than an
individual notion of moral agency. We need to engage with the experience of others,
including rats and those who perceive these animals as pests, as well as pay attention
to the specific way individual agents are embedded in particular socio-ecological
settings so as to promote compassionate action.
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Since the world was, he has gnawed;
Of his wisdom, of his fraud
What dost thou know
In the wretched little beast
Is life & heart
Child & parent
Not without relation
To fruitful field & sun & moon
What art thou? His wicked cruelty
Is cruel to thy cruelty
Ralph Waldo Emerson
17.1 Introduction
Amidst human-dominated landscapes rats, both the brown (Rattus norvegicus) and
black rat (Rattus rattus) are found in abundance. This particular co-existence of
species can be found across history. Neither fully wild nor domesticated, in-between
nature and culture, they are considered liminal (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011).
When they do venture away from human presence, the impact of rats can rever-
berate throughout landscapes, affecting whole ecosystems and species—though, as
we should add, this pales in comparison to anthropogenic impact. Moreover, rats
and humans alike display tremendous capacity to adjust and adapt to prevailing
circumstances: modern urban space is home to both of them.
Any cross-species similarities have not kindled affection, as rats are one of the
most despised creatures by humankind. Disease, destruction, disturbance, and death
have become closely associated with their species:
the Norway Rat is undoubtedly hated and feared by more people and in more countries in the
world than is any other animal. These people see in it a filthy animal, destroyer of property,
spoiler of food, carrier of bubonic plague andmany other terrible diseases, attacker of human
beings, particularly defenseless babies. (Richter 1968, 403)
We could offer a litany of frightful depictions of both brown and black rats to make
our case, but we believe that the sentiment expressed just now suffices, and still holds.
Aversion to rats is furthermore reflected in the way humans treat them. Slow-acting
poison, neck-breaking spring traps, and body-fixating glue traps are some of the
methods used in pest-management.
Such strong aversion in perception and the use of harsh measures appears to
starkly contrast with the idea that human beings owe moral consideration to these
non-human animals (henceforth “animals”). Indeed, rats are paid scant attention in
moral and political philosophy, with some notable recent exceptions that we will
discuss this chapter. Nonetheless, if moral concern is premised on being sentient—
whichweassume to impose a compelling sufficient condition formoral concern—rats
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are clearly among those who are owed direct moral consideration. So, despite the
aversion that colors the way in which humans generally perceive rats, we need to
take them seriously in our moral deliberations and actions.
Here, we explore this tension betweenmoral consideration and adverse perception
by looking at recent work in moral and political theory, starting with (1) proposals to
extrapolate the methodology of ethical assessment of animal research to the field of
pest management, to (2) then look at the political turn in animals ethics. Both hold
great potential to improve human interactions with liminal rats but are not without
issues themselves. One of the main problems for both accounts is the way in which
moral agency is vulnerable to adverse perception of the rats subject of moral consid-
eration. Moreover, the political turn in animal ethics (resulting in a field which we
will call animal politics) is, in addition to the issue of adverse perception, confronted
with a tremendous gap between theory and current treatment of animals, lack of
moral motivation, and the skeptical question which political account of interspecies
co-existence is true. These issues are probably more challenging when it comes to
rats. In that sense, if philosophers would succeed in safeguarding ethical treatment
of liminal rats, there appears not much in the way of accomplishing genuine inter-
species justice. We believe that compassion provides the most promising route for
doing so.
17.2 From the Lab to the Liminal
An historical account of medical development in the twentieth century would be
radically incomplete without rodents such as the brown rat, Rattus norvegicus. Still,
today, much of preclinical research continues in its reliance on rats as models for
studying human disease.
Parallel to the rise of the “lab rat”, the second half of the twentieth century
witnessed an emergence of moral concern for animals, spurred in part by the
burgeoning field of animal ethics that has thrown out its nets across the sundry
and often separated human-animal interactions that characterize modern societies.
Within the context of animal research, following up on discussions on the subject
between, amongst others, Peter Singer and Tom Regan, a variety of ethical frame-
works have been developed to engage in ethical deliberation regarding the exploita-
tion of animals for the sake of research goals. As such, it provides a resource for
other practices of animal treatment. Some suggest applying these frameworks to the
context of pest management based on the principle of consistency (Meerburg et al.
2008; Yeates 2010). The implementation of the principles of refinement, reduction,
and replacement paired with a structured way of weighing harms and benefits could
greatly improve the management of animals that are regarded as pests (Meerburg
et al. 2008).
Apart from the obvious benefits of implementing ethical scrutiny and general prin-
ciples where reflection is found lacking, perhaps we need to ascertain that this type of
ethical deliberation is apposite for dealing with liminal rats. To do so, let’s unpack (a)
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the ethics of animal research in itself as well as (b) applying it to liminal rats. To start
with the former, some would argue that the harm-benefit analysis between protecting
human health and harming animals resembles something akin to a life-boat situation,
where the only chance of survival is to throw one individual overboard, boiling down
to the choice of saving a human or an animal life. But perhaps such ametaphormisses
the point, as it is not clear that animals are in such a relation to human patients.1 As
Anders Schinkel (2008, 56) puts it,
The animals are not in the lifeboat at all, until we take them on board. In reality, there is no
proper analogue for the benefit the animals in the lifeboat would receive if human beings
sacrificed themselves. Sick people that die ‘because’ no research has been done on animals
do not sacrifice themselves for the animals. What happens is that human beings, like all
creatures, fall ill sometimes. If it is serious, they may die. All this does not affect the lives
of animals, so long as we do not make it so. To begin with, there is no lifeboat. Research on
animals constitutes the lifeboat itself; only when we see research on animals as part of the
initial situation— when we accept this as given—can we say that there is a lifeboat, that it
is us or them.
In that sense, the harm-benefit analysis of animal research ethics is already biased
towards humans as animals have often nothing to gain from the exchange. More
accurately formulated then, it generally involves an “animal harm – human benefit
analysis”. The central moral issue is whether the use of animals in research for a
human benefit can be justified, not who to sacrifice of those with similar interests at
stake.
What justifies the combination of harm-benefit analysis and the three princi-
ples? The three principles (reduction of numbers of animals, refinement to decrease
suffering, replacement in terms of alternatives) impose a constraint that can be
supported by many, without touching the central moral question of whether it is
justified to harm animals for the benefit of humans. Rather, they assume that this is
the case, pointing towards opportunities to ameliorate the harms involved. So, the
question most pertinent is: how does one justify harming animals for the benefit of
humans?2 For now, let’s assume that animal research ethics in terms of harm-benefit
analysis and the three R’s proves sound. How does this translate to the context of
liminal animals that are perceived as a threat to human interests?
A first thing to flag is the variety within animal research and management of pest
animals. Theneed for, respectively, knowledgeor controlmeasures differs in strength.
Some research is more important than other research. Similarly, some conflicts with
liminal rats are more serious than others. In both cases an assessment of the weight
of interests and potential harms is warranted, so a systematic harm-benefit analysis
appears valuable for the management of conflict with liminal rats. The two also
differ from each other. While research animals are wholly dependent and vulnerable
1And we could question the added value of such lifeboat-deliberation as thought experiment in the
first place (Donovan 2006).
2Note that the ethical assessment does leave room to reject any invasive research involving rats.
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in relation to humans, liminal animals are under the influence of human beings and
sometimes even rely on human activity for their survival but remain undomesticated.3
As long as we restrict ourselves to situations where the interests of liminal animals
and humans conflict, the model of ethical assessment used in animals research could
work; assuming that the aforementioned concerns about animal research ethics itself
have been successfully addressed. It does, however, not tell us anything about the
way we should configure our relations with liminal rats apart from the conflicts that
could arise. Moreover, some conflicts only arise precisely because a broader outlook
is lacking. Do humans have any obligations towards liminal rats beyond the negative
duties of not harming them unnecessarily (inflicting suffering, depriving of life)?
And if so, how should we implement such imperatives in our lives? So, while the
model of animal research does provide certain opportunities to improve our treatment
of liminal animals in situations of conflicting interests, its scope is rather narrow in
the light of the inextricable nature of human-liminal animal co-existence. Moreover,
if we would restrict ourselves to conflicts with liminal animals and develop ethical
frameworks for this purpose specifically and only, then we may inadvertently bolster
negative associations like fear and disgust already attached to these animals.4 Before
looking at a model for co-existence, we need to address the ways in which rats are
perceived and how this affects moral judgments regarding their fate.
17.3 How Fear and Disgust Impair Moral Judgment
Associations like fear and disgust can run deep. When Albert Camus wrote his book
La Peste, published in 1947 and generally interpreted as an allegory about the emer-
gence of fascism, he did so by reference to rats and their supposed role in spreading
diseases like bubonic plague.5 In the book, both in literal—as harbingers of disease,
suffering, and death6—as well as in metaphorical sense—infesting society with
3Part of the ethical assessment of animal research could pertain to the conditions in the lab that
shape rat’s lives, whereas this does not directly or only in part applies to liminal rats; their lives are
heavily shaped by human action but not determined to the same extent as their lab counterparts.
4A similar mechanism is at work in the increase of attention for wild animals in the context of
infectious disease emergence (Stephen 2014). The sort of attentionmatters. Aswild animals become
associated with disease reservoirs, the dependencies and vulnerabilities of their own health stay in
the background. Only a partial representation of them, as participants within disease ecology of
zoonotic disease (pathogens that jump species boundaries from animals to humans), make their
appearance on stage. So not only are they reduced to their role in the emergence of disease, they
only capture the interests of researchers if they play a role in the emergence of diseases that affect
humans (zoonoses) or their interests (for example, economic interests related to diseases that affect
livestock production).
5https://www.theguardian.com/books/booksblog/2015/jan/05/albert-camus-the-plague-fascist-
death-ed-vulliamy. Accessed 23 March 2020.
6See Dean et al. (2018) for a challenge of the hypothesis that rats were the primary vectors during
the Second Plague.
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authoritarianism and exclusion/extermination of “the other”—rats signify misery;
a mingling of fear and disgust.
Aversion appears to cut even deeper than mere fear for infectious disease. The
aversion for certain liminal animals, especially rodents, could have evolutionary
roots. Jonathan Haidt and Jesse Graham (2007, 116) argue from an evolutionary
perspective on human psychology that “(d)isgust appears to function as a guardian
of the body in all cultures, responding to elicitors that are biologically or culturally
linked to disease transmission (feces, vomit, rotting corpses, and animals whose
habits associate them with such vectors)”. Aversion to rodents could prove valuable
to protect human health if these animals are indeed associated with the threat of
infectious disease. Perhaps humans are hardwired to dislike certain animals.
Nevertheless, there is some plasticity to disgust. Disgust is, like taste, relative to
one’s cultural setting and background.We could learn to overcome primal disgust for
certain foods, such as durian fruit,7 that would almost without question instill disgust
if we encountered it at a buffet being previously unaware of its existence. Perhaps
we would have liked durian if we were acquainted with its taste from early age
on. The other way around, people can learn disgust. In addition to primary objects
of disgust, where the emotion of disgust functions as a “guardian of the body”,
“in most human societies disgust has become a social emotion as well, attached
at a minimum to those whose appearance (deformity, obesity, or diseased state),
or occupation (the lowest castes in caste-based societies are usually involved in
disposing of excrement or corpses) makes people feel queasy” (Haidt and Graham
2007, 106). Does disgust as social emotion affect our beliefs about rats? It is not
much of a stretch to take seriously the possibility that in addition to the evolutionary
hard-wired disgust of rats, disparaging social representation—in part most likely
driven by this evolutionary backstory—further fans the flames of aversion.8 This
is all the more relevant considering the possibility that disgust works as a “moral
magnifier” (Ivan 2015). When we are confronted by a moral problem, requiring
ethical judgment, there is some indication that the emotion of disgust could throw
us off guard, doubling down on our negative dispositions regarding the situation at
hand.
Whereas liminal rats are generally associatedwith filth and disease, those in the lab
are perhaps freed from the adverse associations of their con-specifics “out there” but at
the same time objectified as epistemological resources, asmodels for humandisease.9
Or perhaps there are different perceptions in play alongside each other. While some
point out that “advantages of rodents include their small size, ease of maintenance,
short life cycle, and abundant genetic resources” (Bryda 2013, 207) make for a great
7Durian fruit can be found in various countries in Southeast Asia and generally people either hate
or love its scent. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Durian. Accessed 23 March 2020.
8Moreover, “having a rat problem” is associated with stigma itself (Van Gerwen and Meijboom
2018).
9Are the sorts of ethical reflection with regard to animal research structured in a way to arrive at
trustworthy judgments, and are they truly attuned to the suffering inflicted on individuals? Or do
the number of animals and the way they are described and brought to the attention of those making
the ethical assessment foreclose or otherwise heavily sway intuitions?
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“animal model”, aversion could very well explain why, since the beginning of the
twentieth century, rodents, and not dogs, have become a primary “animal model”
for invasive research. Narratives about animals have significant power to structure
human action (see also Robin et al. 2017). The way perception affects our moral
psychology often remains hidden in the background, and because these “are not
always introspectively accessible, even a moral action can take place against the
background of unconscious, non-virtuous tendencies of cognitive response” (West-
erhoff 2017, 299). Given explicit aversion regarding rats, there is at least work to
be done in unraveling human perception and its effect on moral judgment, so as to
ascertain that moral psychology and its dynamics do not hinder fair assessment of
the interests of rats involved, liminal or lab. As we will discuss now, these concerns
also plague models for co-existence.
17.4 Rat Politics
While animal research ethics provides a source for an ethics of conflict resolution
between liminal rats and humans, animal politics builds upon the work in human
political theory. The most prominent and recent example is found in the work of
Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka (2011), who develop a theory of denizenship for
liminal animals.10 Such political accounts go beyond mere conflict as they aim to
establish the ground-rules for human-liminal animal co-existence. Whereas animal
research ethics substantially but modestly sets new standards, animal politics ambi-
tiously ups the ante by speaking in terms of moral rights and justice. Such justice
will not come easy, considering (1) the way in which humans have subjugated non-
humans throughout history, something apparently ingrained in culture at large, and
(2) the way in which economic and self-centered interests have become institution-
alized and vested (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011, 252). Political philosophy can
help to engender novel perspectives on animals, but we need to be careful not to get
carried away, as
(d)eveloping new and expanded theories of animal rights may be intellectually stimulating
and challenging, but can it make any difference to real-world campaigns and debates? We
are not optimistic about the prospects for dramatic change in the short term, and we certainly
have no delusions that one can somehow change the world simply by articulating better
moral argument ... [which] ... are notoriously ineffective when they run so fully against the
grain of self-interest and inherited expectations. (ibid.)
Compounding these concerns, the language of justice may prove insufficiently
persuasive with regard to rats due to their liminal status and association with disease,
10This is part of a three-way distinction of groups of animals, a delineation that determines the
extent and existence of positive obligations to animals in addition to universal basic negative animal
rights. Next to understanding liminal animals as denizens, domesticated animals become citizens,
and animals in the wild are best understood as members of sovereign wildlife communities. Group-
membership of individual animals differentiates specific rights and obligations, resulting in three
distinct and political understandings of human-animal interaction.
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fear, and disgust. If animal politics has to work against the grain of institutionalized
anthropocentrism and egoism, any theoretical defense for a species so often despised,
however compelling in itself, will likely fail to capture the public imagination. Up for
the challenge, several political theorists (including Donaldson and Kymlicka) have
begun to look into the factors that motivate individuals to act upon philosophical
theory. Perhaps this search also provides a way to take liminal rats seriously in moral
deliberation.
17.5 Failure of Imagination
Before looking at liminal rats specifically, why does the vast majority of people not
live up to the tenets of animal ethics and politics? Perhaps it is due to “failings and
limits of the imagination” (Cooke 2017, e4). Imagination provides a portal to approx-
imate the experience of others. A failure of imagination renders one ignorant of the
needs and interests of others, paving the way to moral inertia. Arguments emerging
out of animal ethics and politics require fertile soil, which is why, according to Steven
Cooke, we need to identify and promote the social conditions that shapemoral imagi-
nation “as a precondition for non-human animals to be properly recognised as beings
owed justice for their own sakes” (ibid.).
Not any sort of imagination will do. Conservative works of art and fiction, Cooke
argues, probably often hamper the kind of imagination needed to recognize the enti-
tlements of animals. More specific, we assume that the work of, say, J.M. Coetzee
serves as a progressive example of cultivating imagination attuned to ethical interac-
tion with animals. Distinguishing conservative from progressive works of art is not
sufficient, however, as the latter could in reference to individual freedom unhinge
individuals from the collectives that form the sometimes-unbeknownst fabric of their
lives.AmitavGhosh, for example, painstakinglymakes the case in his bookTheGreat
Derangement, published in 2016, that those anointed with the task of imagination
(novelists in particular) too often overlook a collective more-than-human imagina-
tion due to their preoccupation with autonomous individuals, all the more unsettling
given the immense ramifications of climate change.
Will imagination indeed motivate moral agents to act justified or just towards
liminal rats? Granting some level of epistemic access to the experience of others—
walking a mile in their shoes—could prompt consideration. While imagination
plays a role, we should perhaps not overstate is ability to spur agents into morally
praiseworthy action, nor expect it to dispel all negative associations that cloud our
judgements. The sort of imagination matters.
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17.6 Sympathy for the Rat
If imagination is not sufficient in and of itself, what is? Let’s distinguish between
different ways of relating to the experience of others, including (1) sympathy, (2)
empathy, and (3) compassion. Although none of these can be articulated in any
undisputed sense, we understand sympathy as the ability to relate to the suffering of
others. While it attunes one to the other, this engagement could remain rather cogni-
tive, predominantly based and geared toward one’s own suffering—“I would suffer if
that would happen to me!”—and lacking in motivational impulse (Bloom 2017, 59).
To improve upon imagination, narrowing the motivational gap, we need something
more. Empathy goes further as it involves the ability to feel (approximately) what
others feel, so more affective, making “it possible to resonate with others’ positive
and negative feelings alike — we can thus feel happy when we vicariously share the
joy of others and we can share the experience of suffering when we empathize with
someone in pain” (Singer and Klimecki 2014, r875).
Empathic concern can weigh heavily on one’s shoulders, possibly resulting in
empathetic distress, a state of suffering because others suffer. Such distress can lead
one to turn away from the suffering of others in order to relieve suffering or result
in overall fatigue when one continues to remain in the grip of empathy. So while
empathy can spur individuals into action, it could do so primarily out of one’s wish
to stop the experience of empathic distress rather than an other-regarding act out of
beneficence (Halifax 2011). There are further reasons why various theorists see in
empathy a shaky foundation for fostering moral action. Whereas empathy links one
to the other, it does so in ways that could actually hamper genuine moral concern.
Empathy falters in the face of collective suffering, as “a single individual can evoke
feelings in a way that a multitude cannot” (Bloom 2017, 127). Moreover, empathy
can strongly bias moral concern to the suffering of those near and dear (e.g. ibid.;
Gruen 2013; Kasperbauer 2015).
Avoiding the pitfalls of empathy, some put their trust in compassion instead.
Whereas empathy involves feeling (approximately)what the other is feeling, compas-
sion interweaves the awareness of suffering of others with the motivation to alleviate
it: “In contrast to empathy, compassion does not mean sharing the suffering of the
other: rather, it is characterized by feelings of warmth, concern and care for the
other, as well as a strong motivation to improve the other’s wellbeing. Compassion
is feeling for and not feeling with the other” (Singer and Klimecki 2014, r875).
Don’t we need the empathetic ability to feel what the other is feeling in order to
jump in action? No. If “I see a child crying because she’s afraid of a barking dog. I
might rush over to pick her up and calm her, and I might really care for her, but there’s
no empathy there. I don’t feel her fear, not in the slightest” (Bloom 2017, 64). Feeling
for rather than feeling with allows compassion to become rational, as Bloom puts
it, informing our reasoning and deliberation without too much of a danger of falling
victim to the perils of empathy. Compassion makes one susceptible to the suffering
of others in a different way altogether compared to empathetic distress. Whereas the
latter is preoccupiedwith oneself, inciting negative feelingswith possible detrimental
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consequences for one’s health and wellbeing, compassion turns towards others (both
in terms of affect andmotivation)with feelings of kindness or even love, giving rise to
wholesome benefits for those who act compassionately (Singer and Klimecki 2014).
Compassion attunes one to the suffering of others, prevents empathetic distress, and
could perhaps help to bridge the motivational gap bothering animal theorists.
17.7 Compassion: A Stepping Stone?
The potential of compassion to motivate people to care about and alleviate
the suffering of others cannot but entice moral and political theorists. Cheryl
Abbate (2018, 45; emphasis original) argues that we should view compassion as
a “prerequisite to being just. And if we have a duty to act justly towards animals
(human and nonhuman), as the philosophy of animal rights holds, it follows that we
have a duty to fulfill the prerequisites of being just”.
One needs to foster compassion in order to act in accordancewith justice. Compas-
sion becomes a stepping stone for political theory inmaking sure that themoral agents
are able to abide by its principles. Here we could wonder whether there is more to
compassion beyond being instrumentally valuable in facilitating just action. Abbate
herself asks whether we should reserve a key epistemic role for compassion in our
moral inquiries given its tremendous moral potential. A reason for rejecting this
suggestion, as she argues, is to point out that compassion does not help the “lifeboat
deliberator” we encountered earlier in this chapter. If one finds oneself in a lifeboat,
pondering the question who to throw overboard, the following question appears diffi-
cult to answer: “Who should I show compassion to: the laboratory mice or the sick
children?” (ibid., 41). This is why, while hesitant to attribute a more substantial role
to compassion in moral inquiry, Abbate instead claims that: “If moral agents have a
duty to treat animals justly, and if being compassionate is necessary for moral agents
to act justly, then moral agents also have a duty to cultivate compassion” (ibid., 45–
46; emphasis original). Animal rights theory sets the standard, and compassion helps
individuals to make it happen. If liminal rats have rights, we should foster compas-
sion in order to act in accordance with the demands of their entitlements. This could
help to overcome the strongly negative and biased outlook many humans hold with
regard to rats.
Abbate’s imperative raises two questions: (1) how does one cultivate compassion
and (2) is it true that moral agents have a duty to treat animals justly? To start with
the former, Buddhist philosophy offers a rich source of contemplative practices,
some of the specifically geared towards cultivating compassion. “Metta bhavana, or
loving-kindness practice”, as Abbate explains, “typically involvesmeditation-related
techniques that foster feelings of benevolence and kindness for all beings, human
and nonhuman” (ibid. 44; emphasis original). Several research studies support the
claim that fostering compassion results in more prosocial and altruistic action (e.g.
Singer and Klimecki 2014). Abbate also highlights humane education, referring
to the initiatives of both Jane Goodall and Marc Bekoff to foster compassion and
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respect for life trough training and education in various sorts of settings. Meditative
practice, together with humane education, can help to cultivate compassion, creating
the conditions for moral agents to ascertain animal justice.
So it appears there is a way to foster compassion, so as tomake individuals attuned
to the suffering of liminal rats and inclined to help. But to return to our second
question: What if people remain unpersuaded by animal rights theory? Abbate starts
from the assumption that animal rights are theoretically convincing enough to jump
into the facilitating potential of compassion. However, if indeed the problem of truth-
aptness raises its head, the motivation to foster compassion could turn out question-
begging. What if one is not convinced by the imperatives derived from animal rights
theory, or on the fence about which theory proves sound? The instrumental reason
to engage in compassion then loses much of its grip. Do we indeed first have to see
the truth of animal rights theory to then develop our compassionate capacity in order
to act in accordance with it?
Fleshing out the relation between compassion and rights-theory is helpful at this
point. Should we indeed regard compassion instrumental to the demands of justice?
Are there other ways of drawing the links, and how do these stack up to this claim?
One could distinguish between at least three perspectives on this relation. As Abbate
has it, (1) animal rights theory delivers the moral imperatives putting compassion
in place as a psychological condition to get moral agents to do the right thing.11
Others (2) understand the relation more in terms of opposition, endorsing either
compassion or justice. The rift between care-ethics (Luke 1992) and rationalistic
ethics (Singer 2011) comes to mind. At the far side of the spectrum, we find those
who put compassion at the center, not at the disregard of rights-theory per se but
providing the possible ground for such arguments to arise (Garfield 2001).
Is compassion the handmaiden of animal rights?We argue that putting compassion
front and center comes with particular virtues, especially with regard to human
interactions with liminal rodents. What are these virtues? Let’s first identify several
challenged faced by animal rights theory:
(1) any specific animal rights theory is vulnerable to the challenge of truth-aptness.While this
is not the place to discuss the issues raised by error-theorists, anti-realists, relativists and the
like, as long as there is widespread disagreement on whether one particular political theory
of animal rights has correctly identified the true way to guide human-animal interaction, a
gap between theory and practice appears difficult to bridge by reference to truth.12
(2) the language of rights, entitlements and impartial requirements appears especially ineffec-
tive with regard to animals who have become almost inseparable from adverse associations
shaping human perception.
(3) finally, in line with the previous concern, and apparent in the attempts to make moral
agents inclined via imagination (see Cooke 2017) or compassion (see Abbate 2018) to act in
accordance to the precepts of animal rights theory, there is a problem of moral motivation.
Moreover, rights theory builds (implicitly or explicitly) upon the idea of autonomous agency
and the ability to transcend one’s culturally and in other ways shaped behavior based on
arguments primarily.
11Like Cooke who takes moral imagination as a social condition for endorsing animal rights theory.
12See DeGrazia (1996) for an approach to animal ethics that tries to accommodate this concern.
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How does compassion navigate these issues? Below we will outline a notion of
morality that requires endorsement of claims by individuals across species divides.
Understanding morality in terms of interspecies engagement is less vulnerable to
sceptic concerns, requires humans to develop clear and unbiased perception of liminal
rats, directs us to compassion, and likely motivates humans in the process.
17.8 Compassion: Cornerstone of Interspecies Morality
For any sentient being, suffering is an inevitable part of one’s life, and undeni-
ably undesirable in a primordial way. In a sense, moral systems and morality in
general appear fundamentally dependent on the existence of suffering, attested for
example by the guiding strength of non-maleficence and beneficence withinWestern
moral philosophy, and the often central role of compassion in for example Buddhist
philosophy.13
Wehave already encountered away to infuse animal politicswith ideas originating
from Buddhist philosophy; i.e. Abbate’s rendering of loving-kindness meditation as
a way to foster compassion, which in turn functions as an imperative for moral
agents so as to be able to act in accordance with animal rights theory. This approach,
however, is vulnerable in terms of its starting point. What if one, on a theoretical
level, doubts the validity of right claims of liminal rats? The reason to foster one’s
compassion evaporates if not for the sake of motivating moral agents to acknowledge
animal entitlements not only in theory but also in practice. Are there any reasons to
take compassion more seriously apart from its instrumental value?
Why should we start from compassion? Here, we limit ourselves to two particular
ways in which compassion can emerge. First, compassion can arise out of a way
of seeing reality as fundamentally interdependent. Rather than seeing oneself as
an individual, unhinged from the interspecies fabric of life, we could lessen the
grip on ourselves, cultivating compassion in the process (Garfield 2001). Here, the
moral imperative of compassion follows from ametaphysical realization of reality as
radically interdependent, including oneself. In this sense, compassion is intimately
tied up with one’s perception of oneself. We need to ask ourselves whether there
is “something very special, very independent about the self, something that could
justify the distinction between my suffering or well-being and that of others as a
motive for action” (Garfield 2015, 90). The less one attaches to a strong independent
notion of self, the more one opens up to suffering of others, including other sentient
beings such as rats.
But we need not go metaphysical. Some see the imperative to alleviate suffering
not to arise primarily from a metaphysical realization, or derived from ethical theory,
but as a task right in front of us. Rather than offering a solution of how to deal with
13Of course, compassion is found in many other traditions and religions, including Christianity,
Taoism, etc. Here we follow up on the thread that connects to Buddhist philosophy so as to
complement Abbate’s angle.
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the moral complexity of everyday live, the quest for truth in metaphysics and ethics
could cloud our moral perception, numbing us so that we do not recognize the moral
salience of suffering and the compassionate presence it calls for (Batchelor 2012).14
Instead of falling into metaphysical dispute, or fervent theorizing, we should face
sufferingwhereverwefind it and simply address it as best aswe can (Glassman 2003).
Of course, theorizing can be useful in fostering moral action, but when it fails to do
so, it becomes superflouos or even detrimental to achieving moral goals. Indeed, this
aligns with pragmatists, who largely opt out of protracted ethical discursive dispute
as well as the opposition between absolute truth and full-blown skepticism. Rather
than continuing to ponder the question of justification, they usher each and every one
towards the moral imperatives right in front of us.15
If pragmatism indeed dodges the charge of truth-aptness, haven’t we then lost our
moral bearings, let alone compassion as a guiding force?Whereas some pragmatists,
perhaps most famously Richard Rorty, dismiss the notion truth altogether, we do not
think there is a need for them to do so, if we hold that
engaging in genuine moral inquiry – searching for principles and for particular judgements
which will not be susceptible to recalcitrant experience and argument – requires that we take
our beliefs to be responsive to new arguments and sensibilities about what is good, cruel,
kind, oppressive, worthwhile, or just. Those who neglect or denigrate the experiences of
others because of their gender, skin colour, or sexual orientation are adopting a very bad
means for arriving at true and rational beliefs. They can be criticised as failing to aim at truth
properly. (Misak 2002, 104)
We can salvage legitimacy of our moral claims, as CherylMisak proposes, by putting
them to the test across a wide range of individual experiences, so as to aim at truth.
Such a pragmatist account of morality aims at truth by means of its methodology,
buttressing certain basic moral claims on the condition that they have been endorsed
across a diversity of individual human experience. This will not get us absolute truth,
nor sway all sceptics, but neither is required from a pragmatist perspective.
Of course, among other contingent characteristics such as age, we should add
species toMisak’s list of “gender, skin colour, or sexual orientation” aswell. Note that
this goes beyond the recognition of individuals as recipients of mere moral concern.
The methodology sets down the conditions for an interspecies morality. We uncover
what we should do in interspecies engagement, consulting and approximating the
14Secular Buddhists, including Stephen Batchelor, have interpreted Buddha’s teachings as tasks
rather than metaphysical truths to avoid the pitfalls of ongoing theoretical dispute. Buddhism,
on this reading, involves a rather pragmatist attempt to address the inevitable and unmistakable
suffering that permeates all sentient life. Of course, this is not the place to engage in exegesis, nor
provide a comprehensive overview of the many different strands within Buddhist philosophy, or the
various commitments to compassion across cultures throughout history. The reference to Buddhist
philosophy provides a distinct perspective on compassion, again, further exploring the connection
that Abbate draws between current animal politics and Buddhist philosophy going back all the way
to the teachings of Buddha himself.
15Several authors, including William James himself, have recognized affinity between Buddhist
philosophy and pragmatism (e.g. Scott 2000).
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experience of other sentient beings as best as we can.16 It will certainly not always
be clear what should be done, though deliberation is not always necessary as there
will be many situations where a compassionate outlook readily informs us what to
do. As issues become more complex and diverse, however, insufficient endorsement
is expected, which requires us to tread carefully, and/or allow for pluralism. Such
an approach builds morality from the ground up, again and again putting normative
claims against the test, requiring robustness and awareness of a diverse range of
perspectives before letting such claims guide our moral interactions (Misak 2002).
Buttressing moral claims in line with the methodology, remarkably, gets us on
track towards compassion, as it requires individuals to consult the experience of
others (human and non-human) before endorsing amoral claim and act on it. Perhaps
it is easier to determinewhich claimswould be rejected by individuals across species,
rather than to determine what they genuine would want. We anticipate that at least
significant suffering will be vetoed across sentient species. It is hard to fathom the
possibility that others endorse one’s claim to inflict suffering upon themor reject your
assistance to alleviate suffering if feasible. Of course, this goes both ways. We would
want others to not inflict suffering upon us nor turn away from our suffering if they
could easily help us. Not being made to suffer would appear to garner endorsement
from sentient beings if we would (be able to) consult them. The requirement of inter-
species experiential endorsement invigorates anymoral agent to not only imagine but
also engagewith the other’s perspective. In requiring engagementwith the experience
of others, this perspective on morality fosters compassion in the process. Moreover,
as far as we can trust interspecies inquiry only when pursued as Misak (2002: 155)
advocates “as far as it could fruitfully go”, engagement with the experience of others
avoids the empathetic pitfalls identified earlier.
17.9 From Anthropocentric to Multispecies Epistemologies
Seeking endorsement requires an effort to approximate the experience of others as
best as we can. Many epistemic issues arise in trying to bridge species boundaries—
or even intra-species ones. We cannot get to a subjective, first-person perspective
from an objective stance.17 What do we know (e.g. Donaldson and Kymlicka 2016)
about the capacities of animals to make choices in a certain socio-ecological setting?
These are concerns at a rather cognitive level, susceptible to empirical informed
16See also Clemens Driessen (2014) for the idea of animal deliberation. Josephine Donovan (2006)
argues for a dialogical development of care ethics. The work of Donaldson andKymlicka is rife with
examples of acknowledging and promoting animal agency, so that humans can reasonably infer,
from carefully reading their behavior, what animals truly want. Eva Meijer (2019) goes beyond
behavior by investigating language from a multispecies and interspecies perspective. See Kate
Manne (2017) for the idea of bodily imperatives, where the normative content and force is believed
to reside in the vulnerability of being embodied. All these examples could very well fit within the
idea of building an interspecies morality based on interspecies experiential endorsement.
17See Nagel (1974).
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reasoning and research. We also need to address the more affective challenges that
could hinder our ability to cross the species barrier. Some animals elicit disgust, fear,
or any other sort of outright aversion that, as we have already indicated, could bias
moral judgment. On the view of morality outlined just yet, these aversions not only
distort ourmoral judgments but prevent genuinemorality from coming into existence
in the first place. Aversion for rats could (a) negatively affect our deliberations about
them as moral subjects, and (b) make us rather unwilling to explore what they really
want as participants in developing an interspecies morality. So, we not only have a
moral but also an epistemic reason to uncover the aversions that color the way we
perceive rats. It is why we need to go beyond anthropocentric epistemology and turn
towards a multispecies version instead.
A clear view paves the way for genuine moral concern and to open up our minds
to rat agency.18 Strong feelings of aversion are not the only thing that distorts our
perception. Less obviously, scientific modeling of rats also shapes the way we see
rats. As epistemological models, they are viewed in terms of how they shed light
on the intricacies of human health and disease.19 Despite swaths of data, knowledge
about rats often drifts atop underlying currents of human interests and perspectives.
We fail to genuinely know rats, as we investigate themwithin the self-imposed limits
of their preordained usage (Despret 2015).
In the field of pest control research, a similar epistemology is present albeit with
a notable difference. Where in medical research the rat functions as a model for
humans, in pest control research there is a genuine interest in the rats for the animals
that they are. Nonetheless, such knowledge about rats is readily turned against them.
In response to poison- and bait-shyness in rats—respectively the avoidance of food
containing poison and avoidance of food free from poison of the sort previously
encountered as containing poison—researchers developed baits containing slow-
acting anticoagulants (substances that prevent blood from clotting) in order to sever
the association between eating something and developing illness due to internal
bleeding (Naheed and Khan 1989). As a result, rats die a slow and excruciating
death. Another example: rats apparently map their environment in terms of predatory
risks, which is why “(r)odent management could be more efficient and effective by
concentrating on those areas where rodents perceive the least levels of predation
risk” (Krijger et al. 2017, 2396), ironically, there where the rats feels most safe. As a
third example, the inescapable sexual attraction of pheromones excreted by the male
brown rat proves fatal for those female rats who cannot withstand the allure of the
synthetic counterpart of these pheromones used to lure them into traps (Takács et al.
18While evolutionary history appears to underpin human aversion for rats, and these associations
could very well prove difficult to overcome, the phenomenon of black rats considered as holy
creatures at the Karni Mata Temple in Deshnoke, India, gives us a reason to be hopeful about the
possibilities of replacing overtly negative associations with at least more positive ones. https://en.
wikipedia.org/wiki/Karni_Mata_Temple. Accessed 23 March 2020.
19Whether pre-clinical animal research indeed provides a soundmethodology for developing human
health interventions is highly questionable due to the myriad biological differences between species
(e.g. Greek and Menache 2013; Pound and Ritskes-Hoitinga 2018).
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2016). Again, knowledge about rats cannot be separated from the human interests to
control them.
All the more striking, considering the above, is the lacuna of knowledge about
liminal rats in the urban context. While one of the species studied most extensively
in medical research, rats remains elusive in their urban setting. Precisely there where
rats are perceived as a problem, ecological knowledge is scarce. Why is that? One
reason could be that
(u)rban rat ecology […] remains vastly unexplored because these animals are cryptic, crepus-
cular, difficult to identify, and hazardous to handle. Additionally, the high-rise buildings that
block satellite link-ups, underground sewers and subway tunnels, and rebar enforced concrete
covered landscape make it difficult—if not impossible—to track urban animals using tradi-
tional radio telemetry. Consequently, there are few ecological studieswith free-ranging urban
rats. (Parsons et al. 2015, 1)
In addition to the fact that obtaining knowledge about rats in an urban environment
is difficult, perhaps the lack of research interest is in part due to the lack of perceived
urgency and relevance. As long as the perceived problem is addressed in terms of pest
management and conflict there is no need for further scientific research to improve
upon the practice.20 The lack of knowledge about liminal rats hinders development
of policy to address human-animal co-existence. Whereas rats are generally asso-
ciated with threats to health, it is difficult to quantify an acceptable level of risk.
As common in policy making, one has to decide in the face of uncertainties and
incomplete knowledge. Still, the predicament of such decision-making does require
one to ascertain whether enough has been done to gather information—and, getting
back to the point of interspecies morality, whether rats themselves would endorse
the measures taken.
What about research that shows that rats giggle when tickled (Panksepp and
Burgdorf 2010), release another rat from confinement to share a piece of chocolate
(Bartal et al. 2011), or come to the rescue of a distressed conspecific (Sato et al.
2015). All of this research strives to highlight its relevance to understanding human
social behavior, while incidentally illuminating rat empathy in the process. Of course,
this type of research raises questions of moral legitimacy. Even if we would like to
know more about rats unperturbed by any other interests, developing a multispecies
rather than anthropocentric epistemology, moral concerns restrict the possible ways
of getting to know each other. Still, we can learn from what we already got while at
the same time thinking about new ways for interspecies engagement. Rats rescuing
each other to share chocolate could tell us something about the evolutionary shared
characteristics across species, shedding light on human social behavior. However,
rather than seeing the ingenuity and empathetic concern displayed by rats primarily
as proxies for human counterparts, or turn these capacities against them, these find-
ings can help us to establish a clear view of rats, and, furthermore, seeing how rats
themselves would endorse compassionate action.
20Of course, ecological approaches to liminal rodent management do demand more research into
the urban ecology of liminal rats.
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Whereas an anthropocentric epistemology is geared towards using or eradicating
rats, a multispecies epistemology helps to envision new perspectives on co-existence.
It escapes the boundaries of howwe ordinarily see our shared landscapes by trying to
approximate theway inwhich rats and other animals see reality.Whereas interspecies
morality disavows invasive animal experimentation as a way to know animals, multi-
species epistemology requires that we go beyond the human perspective in order to
acknowledge the manifold other ways in which other individuals, including those
from other species, experience the world. It requires that we shift perspective and see
the urban environment as an animal collective embedded in myriad socio-ecological
interconnections. Rats are remarkable inhabitants of urban and human-dominated
landscapes, and as apparent from the discussion above, humans need to do much
more to really get to know the rat’s perspective, especially considering that morality
demands endorsement across the species divides.21
17.10 From Philosophical Deliberation to Compassionate
Engagement
What do metaphysical disputes, skewed perception of animals, and wavering moral
motivation tell us philosophers? These concerns are even more pressing with regard
to (liminal) rats and taking them seriously in moral consideration: theories remain
provisional in terms of their specific moral and political status, anthropocentric epis-
temologies cloud human perception, and rats are unlikely candidates to benefit from
uncertain moral motivation. Fostering compassion could remedy these concerns.
By means of contemplative practices and humane education, we might develop a
less biased view of rats, getting familiar with their experience of the world, and
extend our compassion based on the recognition that their suffering is not categor-
ically different from those of other sentient beings, ourselves included. However,
the moral imperative for autonomous agents to foster compassion through loving-
kindness meditation perhaps assumes some sort ofmoral privilege. Whereas being a
competent moral agent already sets a substantial standard, a requirement to engage
in such contemplative practices even ups the ante.
In addition to personal growthbymeans of contemplation, compassionushers us to
look at the situation at hand in all its complexity. We need to acknowledge individual
and situational differences regarding capacity for compassionate action. Some people
21What about the gap between “is” and “ought”? Are animals not locked within the domain of
“is”? Perhaps ‘the problem’ as Steven Shaviro aptly puts it ‘is not to derive an “ought” from an
“is,” but to see how innumerable “oughts” already are … nonhuman animals do continually ascribe
value to things, and make decisions about them—even if they do not offer the sorts of cognitive
justifications for their value-laden actions that human beings occasionally do … (o)ur own value
activities arose out of, and still remain in continuity with, nonhuman ones—as we have known at
least since Darwin. We perpetuate anthropocentrism in an inverted form when we take it for granted
that a world without us, a world from which our own values have been subtracted, is therefore a
world devoid of values altogether’ (2015, 24; emphasis original).
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are naturally endowed with a caring demeanor, whereas for others compassion does
not come easy. Some are nudged by their social environment, whereas others have
to swim upstream in waters inimical to compassionate action. If we put compassion
front and center, we need to carefully consider where someone is coming from so as
to foster compassionate action as best as we can. Here a difference between a justice
and compassion approach becomes apparent. As the former will speak to the will
of individuals to live up to the imperatives of theory, or else they are blameworthy,
the latter will primarily look at the situation at hand in order to spot opportunities to
promote compassionate action.
One of the ways in which to foster compassion is, as we have argued, to genuinely
engage with the other. In engagement with the experience of others and taking this
inquiry “as far as it could fruitfully go” (Misak 2002, 155), we develop an awareness
of suffering across the boundaries of species. An interspecies view of morality in
terms of engagement is not merely cognitive, but also socially interactive. Reflective
deliberation, imagination, and individually cultivated compassion (for example by
means of meditation) indeed provide important building blocks for moral engage-
ment but remain insufficiently imbedded in social interaction. Considering that our
perception of the world and our moral agency emerges out of social interaction, it is
perhaps too much to expect individually-oriented practices to dramatically improve
moral action. Notwithstanding the relevance of philosophical reflection, the arts, and
contemplative practices, we furthermore need forms of engagement like humane
education, as Abbate emphasizes, and other ways of engendering genuine interest in
the experience of others, so as to know what we should do.
Moreover, shifting our emphasis in morality from deliberation to engagement, we
can inform our method by various insights frommoral psychology. What does it take
for individuals to act with compassion? Rather than relying on individual willpower
alone, we should explore supporting socio-ecological conditions of compassionate
action. Such a perspective can help us track compassion determinants: what socio-
ecological factors affect the ability of individuals to perceive and actwith compassion
when confronted with liminal rats? And how do we bring such an approach to bear
on the management of human-rat relations?
Preventive approaches to human-liminal rat conflicts emphasize an ecological
awareness so as to take measures that avoid future conflict as much as possible.
Knowledge about the ecology and behavior of liminal rats here can function as
a way to open up the minds of people to understand the inevitability of conflict
when ecological processes are ignored in the management of the human-liminal
rat interface. In addition, we suggest, professionals in the field of “pest manage-
ment” could play a role asmultispecies epistemologists in promoting compassionate
human-liminal rat interaction. They could do so by, in addition to (a) communicating
knowledge that fosters ecological awareness with the aim to prevent future conflict,
also via (b) certain narratives and other communicative approaches to make others
engage with the lived experience of individual rats. In doing so, they could clear
up any overtly negative associations attached to the rats in question and motivate
clients to take an interspecies approach to their moral decision-making. Insights
from psychology could help at this level to promote a compassionate outlook. While
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we should be careful not to put all responsibility on the shoulders of these individuals
at the danger of forgetting the various forces shaping human-rat interactions (legis-
lation, availability of animal welfare compromising measures, dynamics between
service-providers and clients in a market-economy, etc.), both in terms of conflict-
negotiation and co-existence mediation, these professionals do play a key role in
shaping interactions between humans and liminal rats.
17.11 Conclusion
As James Albrecht (2004, 25) interprets RalphW. Emerson’s poem, “the rat is ‘cruel
to thy cruelty’ – that is, ‘wicked’ and cruel only when defined as such from a narrow
anthropocentric perspective”. We have argued that moral perception is vital in ascer-
taining genuine moral consideration, which puts the onus on those making moral
judgments about the fate of (liminal) rats to critically evaluate the way in which
negative associations color the way in which they perceive these animals. Moreover,
being one of the most despised animal species across human cultures, rats can be
considered a litmus test for moral philosophers and animal politics. If people take
the interests of rats seriously in moral consideration, then nothing would appear in
the way of a genuine just interspecies society. In that way, thinking about and with
rats could engender a novel perspective on morality; as something that emerges out
of engagement across species-divides, with an emphasis on fostering compassion.
We need to compassionately engage with the experience of others, including rats and
those who perceive these animals as pests, as well as pay attention to the way we are
all embedded in particular socio-ecological settings so as to promote compassionate
action. Rather than viewing compassion as instrumental to attaining animal rights,
instead we should view elaborate theoretical accounts of interspecies co-existence
are ways of expanding moral imagination and fostering compassion.
It is up to philosophers, among others, to find ways to promote and facilitate
moral actions that are robustly endorsed across species. Indeed, Buddhist philosophy
provides a valuable insight for its general devotion to compassion, and we have
indicated a way forward based on this insight in line with pragmatist inclinations.
Perhaps compassion lacks the epistemic role in guiding specific moral action but we
have argued that in the specificity of our lives and moral problems, we should tread
carefully anyway. In other words, the “lifeboat-deliberation” is not necessary better
off in the possession of theoretical knowledge, considering earlier discussed concerns
about the truth-aptness such moral claims. The buck stops somewhere, perhaps such
that “(w)hen we are faced with the unprecedented and unrepeatable complexities of
this moment, the question is not “What is the right thing to do?” but “What is the
compassionate thing to do?” (Batchelor 1998, 48).
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Chapter 18
Interpreting the YouTube Zoo: Ethical
Potential of Captive Encounters
Yulia Kisora and Clemens Driessen
Abstract YouTube hosts a vast number of videos featuring zoo animals and humans
actively reacting to each other. These videos can be seen as a popular genre of
online entertainment, but also as a significant visual artefact of our relations with
animals in the age of humans. In this chapter we focus on two viral videos featuring
captive orangutans interacting with zoo visitors. The interpretations of ape-human
interactions arising from the extensive number of comments posted to the videos are
ambivalent in how they see the animals and their assumed capabilities. We argue
that the YouTube Zoo could figure as a snapshot of human-animal relations in late
modern times: mediating artificial conditions of animals suspended between the wild
and the domestic,while offering a screened account of a deeply surprising interaction.
The chapter shows the potential of close interactions between humans and animals
to destabilise or reinforce the neat divisions between the human and the animal. It
also shows the ethical potential of these interactions to either reinforce or question
common practices of dealing with wild animals.
18.1 Introduction
The very first video posted on the video sharing platform YouTube was uploaded on
the 23rd of April 2005, at 8:27 pm (CET) by Jawed Karim. He named it: ‘Me at the
zoo’. In this video, Jawedwas filmed standing in front of an elephant enclosure in San
Diego zoo, saying: “All right, so herewe are in front of the, uh, elephants, and the cool
thing about these guys is that, is that they have really, really, really long, um, trunks,
and that’s, that’s cool, and that’s pretty much all there is to say”. The elephants in
the background remain seemingly unimpressed with Jawed or his comment, as they
casually consume hay scattered next to the fence separating them from the visitor
area. Nothing else happens in this video, similar to many other online mementos of
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zoo visits that can be found on the internet. Nonhuman animals (hereafter “animals”)
are lying down or pacing, serving as an exotic background to a family and friends’
day out.
As an alternative to this somewhat dull representation of captive animal lives,
YouTube hosts innumerable videos of ‘funny zoo animals’, featuring lions and otters,
polar bears and lamas, chimps and giraffes and many others. Different as these
animals are, the videos follow a similar plot: animals and humans actively react to
each other in an apparently unexpected and highly entertaining manner. It triggers
viewers’ curiosity and entices them to come forward, comment and vigorously defend
‘the right’ interpretation of what is happening in the videos. Some videos go ‘viral’,
gain millions of views, shares and comments, reaching viewers across continents
and over the years. With the global reach of YouTube of 1.9 billion monthly active
viewers in 91 countries (in September 2019) these videos have become, without a
doubt, a popular genre of online entertainment.
Yet they are more than that. In line with literature (Driscoll and Hoffmann 2018),
films (Bousé 2000;Burt 2002) andvideogames (Driessen et al. 2014)YouTubevideos
can be seen as a curious artefact of our relations with animals, an emerging cultural
genre imbued with power to (re)configure the ways we see and relate to animals. Or,
as philosopher Vinciane Despret argued, “the proliferation of these videos attests not
only to new habits but to the creation of a new interspecific ethos, of new relational
modalities, that at the same time construct knowledge” (Despret 2016, 195).
The fact that some of these videos take place in a zoo deserves a closer examina-
tion due to a heavily laden history of zoos as places of human-animal engagement.
Defining human against animal and culture against nature has been one of the most
powerful ordering practices in Western culture. Metropolitan zoos have played a
crucial role in this process of self-definition. As Anderson (1995) argued, “zoos are
spaces where humans engage in cultural self-definition against a variably constructed
and opposed nature” (Anderson 1995, 276). In the interpretation of critical scholars,
zoos are hosting disaffected visitors staring at pale representations of animals, thereby
reinforcing essentially violent, unjust and unequal relationships between humans and
animals (Acampora 2010; Malamud 1998).
To (ethically) analyse human-animal relationships (in zoos and beyond),
we commonly rely on binaries such as human/non-human, wild/domestic,
natural/unnatural etc. (Bovenkerk andKeulartz 2016). However, these notions can be
contested by drawing on what are in practice messy engagements, calling for more
contextual ethical analysis (Palmer 2010). In this case, zoos can be investigated as
spaces productive of peculiar types of interactions, resulting from the proximity
between humans and what are generally considered to be ‘wild’ animals (Kiiroja
2016; Park et al. 2016).
If we believe that YouTube as a medium has something to offer in terms of ethics
and production of knowledge about (zoo) animals we need to look closely at the
character of the documented interaction between human and animal. If human-animal
relationships are produced and re-configured in the process of visual representation
(Burt 2002), what can YouTube videos tell us about the ways we relate to animals,
especially in relation to traditionally meaningful categories of animal/human and
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wild/domestic? And what does the phenomenon of these videos’ immense online
popularity mean for early twenty-first century mediated wildlife and for the figure
of the animal in contemporary society?
In an attempt to answer these questions, this chapter discusses two YouTube
videos together with multiple comments of their viewers. The videos feature zoo
orangutans and have jointly gained more than 70 million views and 22k comments,
indicative of their global reach and capacity to trigger reactions of the online public.
They document one interaction (not compilations thereof) so we were able to relate
the comments to the interaction, and they have inspired multiple interpretations.
We have paid special attention to the conversations in the branches of comments,
treating them as a ‘focus group’ of a kind. AsWemelsfelder et al. (2000) have shown,
it can be a suitable approach to interpret animal behaviour qualitatively by arranging
for their interpretations to be shared and discussed. Here we tentatively extend this
approach to the YouTube comments section, not to establish the true interpretation
of the meanings of certain animal behaviours or to assess their welfare, but primarily
to show how processes of interpreting can be thoughtful and deliberative, drawing
on a range of considerations, and having particular implications for discussions on
human-animal encounters and zoos.
We have attempted to present an overview of YouTube viewers’ narratives related
to human-animal relations, focusing on the comments that explicitly attempt to inter-
pret orangutans’ behaviour. Below, we will highlight the details of the filmed interac-
tion that grasped attention of the viewers and prompted them to discuss the featured
beings as animals, either as representatives of species or as particular individuals.
Based on that, we will discuss the ambivalence of zoo orangutans’ status in rela-
tion to categories of human/animal, culture/nature, domestic/wild, and the ethical
implications this ambivalence seems to carry.
As social scientists we believe there is no such thing as a neutral, ‘merely descrip-
tive’ position with regard to contested phenomena and institutions such as the zoo.
Besides concerns about malpractice and the welfare of zoo animals, there is a broader
debate about the legitimacy of holding wild animals captive, involving a range
of arguments that have been extensively put forward elsewhere (Acampora 2010;
Bovenkerk 2016; Keulartz 2015). Being aware of the critiques, in our research we
try to look at the practicewithout condoning or promoting it, or trying to offer ‘recipes
for justifying moral positions and producing logically straightforward moral argu-
ments’ (Driessen and Heutinck 2014, 6). Like Irus Braverman in her in-depth investi-
gation of workings of the institution of captivity ‘Zooland’, we would like to position
ourselves ‘on the fence’: being driven by curiosity and ambivalence regarding what
happens in zoos, without seeking to revert to judgments or position ourselves as
inherently pro or against the institution itself (Braverman 2012). With Braverman
we are aware that this is not only a shaky but also not a neutral position, as it—quite
literally—is a position afforded by the institution of captivity and the fences it erects.
Nevertheless, we feel that this vantage point can be productive to get a sense of the
intricacies and ambivalences in the relationships between animals and humans that
emerge under captive conditions.
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The videoswe focus on are available onYoutube under the respective titles ‘Clever
orangutan makes a fair-trade with human’ and ‘Monkey sees a magic trick’. We
strongly advise you to watch the videos now and come back to reading once you
have done so.
18.2 Interpreting the YouTube Zoo
The video ‘Clever orangutan makes a fair-trade with human’ was posted on YouTube
by Vitaly R. in August 2016. Within less than a year it gained 6,982,528 views and
almost 4000 comments. Later the video was probably sold and re-posted from the
account of Rumble viral, a ‘live viral video tv show’ on YouTube, and racked up
as many as 25,882,723 views and 7,208k comments (as of December 2019). In the
beginning of the video, a man throws something to an orangutan, who is sitting
across the moat with his hand open in a begging gesture. The man then stretches
his arm towards the orangutan, asking him (in Russian) to give something in return.
The orangutan looks around, reaches for a melon rind on the ground and throws it
directly into the hands of the human. As the man thanks the orangutan in English,
the cameraman suggests the man to throw the item back to the orangutan. After the
man does so, the orangutan catches it, but immediately tosses it into the bushes.
The description goes: “During a trip to Bali, Vitaly R. decided to throw a few treats
towards an orangutan. To his surprise, his newfound friend decided to repay himwith
a treat of his own!”
The first detail that has drawn attention of the viewers is the fact that the orangutan
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glances sideways before throwing the rind. Visitors feeding animals is considered
by the zoo community as a ‘perplexing’ problem (Bitgood et al. 1988). No wonder,
that in the very beginning of the video, we see and hear a passing zookeeper asking
Vitaly not to feed the orangutan. The camera tilts, and we see Vitaly disappointedly
walking away from the moat, but the cameraman encourages him to proceed ‘Let’s
do it, they are gone’. Vitaly quickly looks around before throwing his item to Jacky.
Although there is no sign saying ‘don’t feed the tourists’, Jacky also looks to the left
and to the right before launching the item. The commenters pick up on these ‘furtive’
glances:
– LOL I love how the orangutan also looks around to see if the guards are watching
before he throws the banana’. (User Adolf)
– Watching if there’s no snitches or zookeepers around. (User rondle berik)
– Exactly, they would have ruined the fun (User Anthony O’Brian)
The discussion of these glances speculates on a broad variety of assumptions about
orangutans’ cognitive and emotional processes. Is it merely mirroring of Vitaly’s
behaviour? Is he aware of the illegitimate character of their interaction? Or is he
mocking Vitaly’s behaviour, in an act of meta-communication about the meaning of
throwing the rind? Soon enough via several commenters ‘an orangutan’ becomes
a personality: commenters identify him as Jacky, a male orangutan who is 30-
something years old and resides in Zoo Bali. We also learn that throwing items
at visitors is a habit that Jacky might have adopted from keepers who would ‘chuck’
(in words of one of the viewers) food at him. He learned to use it for his own means,
namely, to communicate his discontent with visitors passing by or taking photos
while not giving anything in return. The story we are looking at turns from ‘a zoo
visitor feeding a zoo animal’ to ‘Jacky throws stuff at visitors to tell them they are
not welcome’ and even ‘Jacky throws stuff at visitors when they are not looking to
entertain himself’.
i had an encounter with that same monkey when i was in bali…… so he was throwing poo
(with excellent accuracy) but he would ONLY throw when we weren’t looking. so funny.
one point i turned around as he was throwing it, he had his arm in the air, stretched above his
head, filled with poo…. but because i was looking he relaxed it behind his head as if nothing
was happening….. very funny. (User matt ward)
Throwing objects at visitors is an issue more widespread among zoo chimpanzees
and is generally considered to be a sign of stress (Martin 2008). We can speculate
that zookeepers may have tried to prevent Jacky from throwing things at the visitors
(at least a few viewers recall being warned about Jacky’s habit by the zoo staff).
Yet, as we’ve seen, some commenters have instead interpreted the habit as a specific
communication medium between Jacky and the visitors. Understood in a context
of a complex interaction with layered meanings, it actualises anecdotes that distin-
guish Jacky from other animals in zoos and give him a biography and an individual
character.
One of the dominant interpretations of Jacky’s behaviour in the video, as well as
the description of the video itself, emphasizes the economic nature of the exchange
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between the human and the orangutan. Viewers assume that what Vitaly threw was
a treat, as Jacky immediately ate it. The item he throws back looks to many as a
banana, so the situation reminds of a treat for a treat fair deal. Yet when Vitaly
returns ‘the banana’, Jacky tosses it into the bushes (which viewers ascribe to a
deliberate intention, not a failure to throw properly), effectively stopping the inter-
action. Viewers wonder if it was Vitaly who failed to understand the meaning of
the situation and respond accordingly and was therefore ‘punished’ by Jacky with
stopping the exchange:
He [Vitaly] should have just kept the fruit and pretended to eat it throwing it back was kinda
of an insult he was honestly paying for the treat he was giving (User MrSnapy)
Who is more fair in this case? (User La Nomia)
The second video with a (taxonomically misleading) title ‘Monkey sees a magic
trick’ was published on December 2015 by Dan Zaleski (US). The video gained
more than 3,000,000 views within three days after the original publication date, and
became a headliner on news outlets such as the Daily mail, Time, Metro etc. As of
December 2019, it has 56,480,311 views and 14,926 comments, making it one of the
most popular zoo animal videos in YouTube history. The video starts with a close-up
of a young orangutan behind glass. We see a man sitting down on a concrete step
next to the glass. The orangutan (female orangutan fromBarcelona zoo named Jinga,
as we later find out from the comments) makes herself comfortable, as she sits down
and puts one of her hands underneath her chin. The man places a cup on the step and
demonstratively lowers a lychee into the cup, as the orangutan follows it with her
eyes. The man then closes the cup and shakes it behind the step, removing the lychee.
He then demonstrates the empty cup to the orangutan. She looks at it intently for 3 s
and bursts into open-mouth laughter, falling on her back (ROFL-type, in YouTube
vernacular). The camerawoman and the man are laughing out loud. After 15 s the
orangutan sits up straight again, while the man puts the lychee back in the cup and
the woman behind the camera comments: “You’re crazy guy”. The video ends as
the man lifts the lychee again and the orangutan follows it with her eyes, seemingly
eager to watch the trick anew.
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Jinga’s response to the ‘magic trick’ has proven to be puzzling for the viewers.
Her visceral reaction seems to suggest, for many, that she understands the trick
and finds it amusing, which leads them to praise her ‘almost human’ intellectual
capabilities. For others, the primitivity of the trick makes the one who falls for it
‘stupid’. Alternatively, other viewers observe kind-hearted and polite nature of Jinga
in the fact that she appreciates the trick despite its basic level. In other words, the
interpretation of the situation goes on to represent Jinga not only as an individual of
a certain species with certain capabilities, but as a relational being joyfully engaged
in a social situation.
– The best part is the obliging, polite attitude of the orang to watch the trick, like a
loving grannie with a 7-year old grandson. (User anthro2)
– My thoughts exactly. The orangutan was thinking “I’m not stupid, but I’ll laugh
at this to make you happy” (User Mind Speaker)
And again, in a fierce debate on possible explanations of the orangutans’ behaviour,
personal knowledge of Jinga as an individual comes to play an important role. A
commenter who introduces herself as a Barcelona zoo keeper describes her as an
extraordinary intelligent and fun-loving personality.
She was born in the zoo six years ago. Her name is Jinga and she definitely understands
each situation and game you show her. When she plays with her little brothers she always
makes the same funny face and she starts rolling on the floor. she is legit having fun here…
Normally they aren’t that intelligent but this one right here is by far the most intelligent
member of the group, smarter than her mother even. She can do leggo and a lot of things and
she is always the first to understand and solve problems or games that we show her! (User
Maria Castilla)
Aswe have seen, the two videos feature different interactions and evoke various inter-
pretations speculating onmental and emotional capabilities of orangutans. This raises
the question of how we can make sense of the videos and viewers’ reactions to them
if we see them as a distinctly telling type of engagement with the animals.We suggest
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that the YouTube Zoo could figure as a deeply ambivalent phenomenon indicative
of a new phase in human-animal relations in late modern times: mediating artificial
conditions of animals suspended between the traditional categories of human/animal,
nature/culture and wild/domestic. This screened account of a deeply surprising inter-
action may not merely contribute to the commodification of an encounter but also
has an ethical potential to transform our view of animals and our ways of relating to
them. We will discuss this in detail below.
18.3 YouTube Orangutans Unsettling Binary Concepts
Apes are among themost charismatic animals, appreciated by zoos for their ability to
attract visitor crowds (Carr 2016). This is of course not accidental, considering that,
as Corbey puts it, “our fascination with apes is only rivalled by our rebuff of apes:
<humans tend to feel somewhat baffled by the paradoxical experience of recognizing
something human in them, while at the same time tending to deny any identification
with these beastly creatures>” (Corbey 2005, 7).Whenever an act of interpretation of
ape behaviour occurs, it is not only scientific accuracy that is at stake.YouTube videos
trigger comments that expose a constant and unsettling negotiation of categories or,
if you wish, social orderings, in which we try to fit orangutans. Interpretation of
animal behaviour is indeed an exercise in negotiating the human-animal divide, with
both scientific and ethical implications.
Although none of the commenters interpret the actions of the orang-utans in the
video as explicitly aggressive or dangerous, some of them point towards the alleged
physical strength of the animals and graphically describe vicious ways in which they
would have used it if given a chance. Some of these comments might have a note
of irony to it, especially in the case of Jinga, whose peaceful outlook contradicts the
alleged bloodthirsty intentions. Jacky’s carefully calibrated strength does not appear
to indicate aggression either. Seemingly puzzled by observing the somewhat weird,
not easily explainable, but apparently peaceful interactions that the wild animals
engage in, viewers warn each other that the glass wall and the moat separating
animals and zoo visitors are the only boundaries that keep the former from ripping
various body parts (the arm/neck/head/ears etc.) off the latter. “Be careful though,
these ones can bite your face off” warns user Robin.
It is not surprising that some viewers see in Jacky and Jinga nothingmore than ‘just
animals’, given the long-standing tradition of Cartesian understandings of animals
as mechanical and subsequent reductions of animal behaviour as instinct-driven.
Reproducing the rather low opinion of animal emotional and mental capacities,
which can be considered widespread in our species (De Waal 2019), they focus on
significant absences and deficiencies in capabilities, which makes orangutans less
than human. Along these lines, interpretations that put forward explanations more
complicated than those based on instincts and aggression are dismissed as amateurish
and fallacious. Jinga’s laughter is considered to be an anthropomorphic projection;
the orangutan is not laughing, some viewers insist, but gapes ‘its’ mouth in terror,
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triggered by something ‘it’ cannot explain. It only looks like laughing to humans not
trained in interpreting orangutan behaviour, they conclude. Probably unknowingly,
viewers comply with the canon of animal sciences that demands a strict separation
of vocabularies for referring to human and nonhuman animal behaviour. Those who
dare to speak about animal behaviour in terms of intentions and feelings risk being
accused of anthropomorphism (in the past this even happened to Darwin himself)
(De Waal 2019).
YouTube comments suggest that seeing captive animals might normalise the
captivity for some viewers. While academic literature discusses various justifica-
tions for animals being held in captivity (Bovenkerk 2016), the one that seems to
play out most in the comments is based on the assumed superiority over animals
that gives humans the right of doing what they see fit. In this moral stance, the
difference in cognitive capabilities justifies the difference in the treatment of human
and non-human animals. Comments justifying the captivity for human entertainment
tend to interpret the behaviour in a rather simplistic way, presenting an animal as
an aggressive beast operating on instincts. Seeing Jacky and Jinga as, first and fore-
most, animals, triggers discussions of many ways in which animals are less than
humans and how that is exactly why they are kept in zoos. Rationality, conscious-
ness, technology and language skills are mentioned as uniquely human capabilities
that orangutans (in this context repeatedly referred by the commenters as ‘monkeys’)
wouldn’t even dream of having. Thousands of comments attest animals (the species
is often not mentioned) as aggressive and ‘stupid’, which explains the strict division
between ‘us’ on this side of the cage and ‘them’ behind the bars. Importantly, in
line with this reasoning it is human entertainment as the goal of the captivity that
gets picked up and justified, as the viewers seem to be oblivious to the conservation
claims of contemporary zoos. The animals’ inferiority not only justifies the captivity,
but also attests to the inability of animals to fully comprehend the lack of freedom
and thus suffer from it.
An animal does not have the same level of intelligence as us. They (and that includes
monkeys) are incapable of forming complex thoughts an consider variables. They act solely
on instinct. Saying humans do that too is cliché and just not true. Some act on instinct more
than others, but everyonewill consider the variables at some point again. These animals don’t
mind, as long as they have food, space, toys and the chance to socialize. (User MetroVerse)
Yet contrary to the mid-twentieth century way of looking at animals as displaying
primitive behavioural patterns as units of evolution, there has been a recognition of
a need for a broader vocabulary (Despret 2016). Unease about mechanistic descrip-
tions of apes’ behaviour has been expressed by, among many others, famous field
primatologists, such as Jane Goodall, Diane Fossey and Barbara Smuts, as well as
more traditional primatologists with a preference for experiments and observation
in controlled environments, such as Frans De Waal. It has become apparent that
sometimes, especially in the case of apes, denying any similarities may be more
unscientific than acknowledging them (Weiss et al. 2012). In fact, the fear of anthro-
pomorphism itself has been charged as a construct culturally specific to Western
science (Allen et al. 1994). Mechanomorphism (or anthropodenial) (De Waal 2019)
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is beginning to be recognised as a fallacy no less serious than uncritical anthropo-
morphism. Similarly to this development in primatology, and in contrast to some
commenters describing orang-utans as primitive and less than human, others high-
light their intellectual, emotional and moral capabilities. Although some viewers
might attribute fairness, sense of humour and self-awareness to orang-utans lightly,
or even as a joke, in many cases these hypothesised explanations cannot be easily
dismissed as anthropomorphist projections, since many of them seem to be in line
with research on orangutanminds. Jacky’s ‘furtive glances’ can actually be explained
by his awareness of himself and others (Shillito et al. 2005). His fair trade—by calcu-
lated reciprocity, readiness to exchange goods and services “based on weighing costs
and benefits when giving or returning favours and keeping track of them over time”
(Dufour et al. 2009, 172) or, indeed, perception of fairness (Bekoff 2004). Jinga’s
reaction to the magic trick might have something to do with her understanding of
object permanence (Rooijakkers et al. 2009), while laughing-out-loud can be a play
reaction (Davila Ross et al. 2008), indicative of what humans would call ‘having a
good time’. Indeed, “the knowledge of animals survives in places where academics
would never want to tamper” (Hearne 1994, 176)—even on YouTube.
‘Almost’ human behaviour and a looming realisation that they are “smarter than
we think” (as User Dario Pavlovic puts it) seem to destabilise some viewers’ views
on what orang-utans are. They recall our common evolutionary background, wonder
whether the distance between species is actually as big as usually thought and contem-
plate whether supposedly ‘unique’ human qualities are actually unique. That leads
to a discussion of orang-utans in terms of categories such as ‘a beast’, ‘a thing’ or ‘a
person’, exemplified in the following branch of comments.
– I wouldn’t hug that thing, pffft LMAO, I’m dying. (User Truth)
– It’s not a “thing” it’s a person (User Golvan)
– It’s certainly an intelligent beast, but I wouldn’t call it a person. (User Truth)
– Person definition: a human being, adult or child (User Robin)
– Fine, a non-human person then (User Golvan)
As the renowned primatologist Jan van Hooff once admitted, “studying apes creates
an ‘empathic unrest’ because they evoke ‘the subjective appreciation of animals
as experiencing, judging, and striving beings’, begging interpretations of their
behaviours in terms of subjective valuations and calculated intentions” (Van Hooff
2000, 126, cited in Corbey 2005, 7). Starting to wonder about subjective experiences
of orang-utans and meanings of their behaviours, some YouTube viewers seem to
fall prey to the same uncomfortable condition as primatologists, closely observing
their subjects. Arguably, they may be just about to display ‘the nobler instincts of
inquiry’, with the absence of which Malamud so poignantly charged zoo visitors
(Malamud 1998, 225). In this process, the human-animal divide starts to shift: while
for some the category of an animal pre-determines their explanation of orang-utans’
behaviour as instinctive and primitive; for others the observed behaviour and exposed
capabilities serve as a springboard for seeing beyond the human-animal divide and
recognising Jacky and Jinga as non-human persons. The status of orang-utans as
non-human persons seems to make the spectator position less comfortable. As the
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intellectual, emotional and social capabilities of the animals come to the fore, the
viewers also start to question the legitimacy of their captivity: ‘animals this smart’
or ‘animals who can laugh’ cannot be held captive.
They’re unnervingly smart, and seem to understand us better than we’d like. Makes me feel
like a creep watching them, because just a short time with them and you realise they’re pretty
much another person. (User Tails Clock)
If they can understand and emote like that wth are they locked up for our pleasure? (user
Marie Watson)
While zookeepers may routinely treat their animals as persons and individuals (Park
et al. 2016), zoos in general seem to have a complicated relationship with portraying
their animals as persons to the public. For example,Artis Zoo in theNetherlandsmade
headlines in 2016 when its director announced that their animals are not going to
be given public names anymore so as to escape humanising them: “Giving animals
a name blocks our educational message. (If) the public focuses on the name, we
will not be able to tell other stories. Also: they are not domestic animals, they are
wild animals”.1 In general, zoos have become cautious of any practices that might
make their animals seem a ‘human in an animal skin’ (Mullan and Marvin 1999),
trying to avoid charges of anthropomorphism and Disneyfication that can undermine
the scientific image of contemporary zoos (Carr 2018) as well as their credibility
as conservation and education actors. Contemporary zoos have been fighting for
distancing themselves from expositions of curiosities, aiming to gain the status of a
scientific institution. It has become important for them to use the scientific discourse
in talking about their animals, presented as wild ambassadors of species (Anderson
1995; Braverman 2012). Thus, close interactions with animals have become a thing
of the past with many zoos (Carr 2018). Similarly, seeing Jacky and Jinga as wild
animals, YouTube viewers disapprove of such intimate encounters. They argue that
it would be right for the orang-utans to interact in the nature with their conspecifics
rather than with humans.
At the same time, in contrast to the dominant zoo discourse that frames animals as
species ambassadors and genetic material to conserve (Anderson 1995; Braverman
2012), animals in the YouTube videos are boisterously described by commenters as
subjects with biographies and personalities. While the focus on species aspires to
nurture conservation awareness, talking about zoo animals as individuals seems to
generate an interest in the animals as subjects, with intentions towards and experi-
ences of their situation. These interpretations de-centre the experience of the human
(‘we are in front of, uh, elephants’). Instead, they foreground the animal’s experience
(what is it like for the animal to live in this situation?), their perspective (what is he
or she thinking or feeling about this interaction?) and their capabilities (what do they
know, and what are they capable of?).
This raises the question, whether recognising orangutans by name disturbs their
wild image, and whether it can indeed be disruptive for conservation narrative that
orangutans as species are part of. The ‘wild’ imagery of zoos has been subjected
1The translation from Dutch is ours, source: https://www.metronieuws.nl/binnenland/amsterdam/
2015/11/dieren-in-artis-nu-zelf-een-naam-geven.
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to criticism, as they have been ‘exposed’ as a purely cultural institution (Anderson
1995; Grazian 2012). Based on this, critics have argued, the educational promise of
the zoo to teach their visitors about nature does not hold true. While it is hard to
contest that the zoo world has everything to do with our culturally established ideas
about nature, we might argue that abovementioned critique of zoos might result from
a rather rigid understanding of culture and nature as two distinct poles, a view that
Sarah Whatmore has famously criticised in her Hybrid Geographies (2002). It can
be argued that in the age of Anthropocene the infamous zoo fence in practice may
not be so strict and impermeable. With the ever more intensive active biopolitical
management of wildlife in conservation practices (Biermann and Mansfield 2014;
Srinivasan 2014), in situ and ex situ conservation can be seen as a gradual rather than
absolute distinction (Bovenkerk and Keulartz 2016). Especially so for orangutans,
who increasingly live in institutionalized conditions also in what used to be their
home range (Parrenas 2018).
The peacefulness of the interactions and the positive experiences (in the case of
Jinga—even fun) that the orangutans seem to enjoy while being captive, together
with a belief that apes are ‘intelligent enough’ to enjoy interactions with humans,
justifies their captivity as a better way of living than outside of captivity under the
conditions of poaching and habitat loss. These interactions are not deadly for them,
as interactions in the wild would be, viewers claim, demonstrating familiarity with
orangutan conservation discourse, with a hint of western superiority (the locals don’t
know how to deal with the local wildlife) and critique of capitalism (big corporations
are ruining the habitats).
– Yes but still better than having to survive their homes being felled and then being
stoned by villagers scared of them. At least here they are safe and looked after.
(User ladyjbriritsh)
– Sad to see that adorable creature in a cage but glad to see it laughing, that was
really funny. I would rather like to see something like above than the animal being
poached (User Melina)
In line with the conservation discourse, the commenters urge each other to check
the household products for the presence of palm oil, a leading cause of orangutan
extinction. The imagery of Jinga, conducive to this type of responses, bears similarity
to imagery of orangutans used inGreenpeace promotional videos. For example, in the
animated video “Rang-tan”, part of the campaign #DropDirtyPalmOil, a child finds a
young orangutan in her own bedroom. The story of disturbance caused by the Rang-
tan in the girl’s bedroom (“She throws awaymychocolate and howls atmy shampoo”)
is mirrored by Rang-tan’s story of humans destroying her home (“He destroyed all of
our trees for your chocolate and shampoo”). The video ends with Rang-tan and the
girl embracing, as the girl promises to ‘spread her story far and wide’. What seems
to be implied here is that we, as urban dwellers, are ignorant of our involvement in
suffering of wild animals and responsibilities to change that. The context of Jinga’s
video is more complicated and multi-faceted than that of the animated video, and we
can wonder if it conceals the uneven power relationships of having wild animals in
captivity, separated from their authentic nature and environment, replacing it with
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joy from observing a de-contextualised ‘funny’ animal. Or can it still present an
opportunity to relate and recognise the responsibility we as urban dwellers have for
orangutans as species?
To sum up, YouTube frames orangutans as beasts and non-human persons,
wild animals and individuals. These orderings expose the shifting understanding of
orangutans in the context of opportunities of wider publics to be exposed to intimate
lives of wild animals via online resources. Apart from a site of mindless entertain-
ment, YouTube can function as a platform for discussing the latest developments in
ethology, and extend understanding of our responsibilities towards wild animals and
their (captive and wild) environments. In the last section before drawing conclusions,
we would like to tease out the entertainment value of the videos and their potential
to enable a more explicitly moral gaze.
18.4 The YouTube Zoo: Increasing Encounter Value
or Enabling a Moral Gaze?
Zoo-based animal celebrities have played a double role for the image of zoos in the
last few years. On the one hand, they undoubtedly increase the ‘encounter value’
of captive charismatic animals, thereby contributing to the appeal and economic
viability of the zoo and animals as ‘lively commodities’ (Barua 2015; Collard and
Dempsey 2013;Haraway 2010). Knut the polar bear, famous enough to share aVanity
Fair cover with Leonardo di Caprio, made millions of euros for Berlin Zoo (Giles
2013). On the other hand, zoo celebrities have opened a gateway for many uncom-
fortable discussions about certain practices of zoos and their justifiability in general.
The case of Marius in Copenhagen Zoo can be seen as a spectacular demonstration
of how conservation logic and popular culture logic collided and caused a public
shock. While for the zoo the giraffe seemed to have been a representative of a gene
pool and hence killable as not having enough value, for the public an animal, with a
name and personality, could not be killed. YouTube videos of Jacky and Jinga, while
functioning as a viral online entertainment phenomena, also seem to trigger a moral
gaze—that is, questioning the conditions of captivity that made them possible in the
first place.
While, as we’ve mentioned earlier, ethologists are fighting over the correct inter-
pretations of apes’ behaviour that would put them not too close to the humans, but
not too far either, popular culture has always been quick to capitalise on tensions
between closeness and distance for comic effect. Morphological and psycholog-
ical proximity to humans have accounted for apes’ popularity as entertainment and
especially comedy performers: “The intelligence, enthusiasm, and attractiveness of
young pongids (chimpanzees, gorillas, and orang-utans) has for decades made them
popular performers in a variety of entertainment fields (Morris and Morris 1966,
cited in Allen et al. 1994). Thousands of laughing emojis posted in response to the
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videos represent the same-old human reaction to apes, “a sign of recognition but also
of unease with the uncomfortable closeness” (De Waal 2019, 17).
Jacky and Jinga do not disappoint their viewers. “My favourite video ever”, they
exclaim, “this video made my day!” The videos seem to therefore promote zoos
as places where animals are having fun, and animals are fun themselves. It would
probably not be wrong to assume that for some viewers the videos might become
a reason to visit a local zoo in search for interaction. As we read the comments in
which commentators lament that they didn’t get to see orangutans being so fun, we
can’t help but recall the infamous regret of Berger that animals in zoos are gener-
ally disappointing (Berger 2013). Unlike the disinterested, mechanically scanning
animals described by Berger, the YouTube orangutans are readily responding to
human actions, thereby satisfying what the visitors are truly looking for—an oppor-
tunity to be reacted to by the animals (Rosenfeld 1981, cited in Woods 2015). Given
that, the videos present a dream-coming-true visit—not only seeing, but also being
seen by the other. As Cahill argued in his YouTube bestiary, “this desire for animal
attraction frequently serves as a narcissistic affirmation, that each of usmerits the rapt
attention of animals. It is not enough to reduce animal beings to their “to-be-looked-
at-ness” as displays in a zoo, we must also force them to take interest in us” (Cahill
2016, 277). Yet there seems to be more going on than tickling human narcissism.
In the YouTube videos it is the orangutans who seem to have the upper hand:
Jacky chucks whatever he is being ‘fed’ in the bushes, and Jinga does not perform
for the public, the public performs for her. This switch of roles seems to suggest
that the joke is on us, humans: we are the ones, who are less fair and have rather
primitive ideas of what other animals, and orang-utans specifically, might be capable
of. Similar to animal trainer and philosopher Vicky Hearne’s account of orang-utan
comedians, we can suspect that what is mocked here is the ‘importance and state’ of
humans rather than behaviour of the animals. Or, as Vinciane Despret noted earlier in
relation to YouTube animal videos in general, we are laughing not at animals but at
ourselves, as the animals do something surprising, something we thought they were
unable to do (Despret 2016). In addition, the frame of captivity creates a bittersweet
impression for some viewers: they are entertained by the animals, and amazed by
their very being, and find it disturbing to notice their captive condition. As some
commenters reluctantly note, humans involved proceed to see the next exhibit, while
the animals are left behind. The lack of symmetry in these relationships (Driessen
et al. 2014) puts the viewers at unease, contributing to the empathic unrest.
18.5 Conclusion
The videos function as an online artefact of human-animal relations in the age of
humans, highlighting the ambiguous nature of the encounter and its potential to
expose existing assumptions about animals inherent in human-animal relationships.
To conclude, we shall elaborate on how the videos trigger the shifts of established
categories that frame our relationships with animals and what role zoos play therein.
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Firstly, the tensions that arise in the comments in regard to the attribution of
cognitive and emotional capabilities to Jacky and Jinga reflect ongoing negotiations
of how people understand the human-animal divide. In line with the long-standing
tradition of anti-anthropomorphism (in turn critically labelled asmechanomorphism)
and overall sobriety in sciences interpreting animal behavior, some viewers inter-
pret orangutans as lacking complicated capabilities and therefore merely less than
human. Others, however, employ a broader vocabulary to tease out the meanings and
emotions behind the actions and reactions of Jacky and Jinga. This emerging genre
of Youtube animal videos, powered by ubiquitous access to cameras and endless
sharing possibilities, seems to have remarkable potential to flesh out emotional and
cognitive capabilities of animals. Jacky, fully aware of zoo rules and demonstrating
accurate aiming skills and grasp of a social situation, and laughing Jinga who seems
to love being entertained, provide a powerful demonstration of mental prowess and
individual character. With the arising empathic unrest exemplified by many online
commenters, the videos help establish practices of interpreting animals as intelli-
gent individual characters who can have meaningful encounters with us. At the same
time, these entertaining videos can be seen to justify the existing uneven power
relationships and normalise them. The vicarious encounter between the orangutans
and the viewers thus appear as deeply ambivalent, as it both reinforces and desta-
bilises a human-animal divide (Oakley et al. 2010). Secondly, the comments reflect
a tension between the tendency to comprehend orangutans as wild animals and the
proximity of the encounter that seem to push them more in the category of familiar
individuals. We’ve argued that while it is a tendency of zoos to portray their animals
as wild, seeing orangutans as individuals might be indicative of a recognition of
muddled boundaries between nature and culture and therefore raising a necessity for
rethinking our ways of relating to animals. It can also result in stripping the context
and flattening the conditions that made captivity possible. Yet at the same time it
may position orangutans more firmly in the web of responsibilities experienced by
humans and therefore contribute to their conservation.
Finally, we would like to reflect on the role of videos for our view of zoos. Zoos
have undergone a significant historical transformation, from private animal collec-
tions of curiosities and exotic beasts, to centres of family entertainment with far-
reaching conservational and educational aspirations. This transformation is reflected
in the way zoos represent their animals—from captive beasts or humanised chimps
drinking tea (Allen et al. 1994) to naturalised ambassadors of endangered species
(Braverman 2012). Can these YouTube videos be seen as an online remake of the
chimp tea party, a throwback to the past, when zoos were more overtly about enter-
tainment? Or can the celebrification of animals, or appreciating them as particular
individuals, be a way of entering a discussion on how captivity and its conditions
need serious revision/justification? The videos seem to play along increasing the
encounter value, while triggering a moral gaze. This emphasises how the morality of
keeping animals captive in zoos is something that is not self-evident and needs to be
discussed. It also emphasises that looking closely at captive animals and what their
interactions with us may mean may not just be entertaining, but required, on moral
and political grounds.
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Looking closely at human-wildlife encounters of the kind found and recorded in
the zoo could be also relevant in relation to semi-domesticated or acculturated groups
of wild animals, that are not confined in an institution, but increasingly folded into
practices of encounter and value (Barua 2015). More and more research on animal
capabilities and the increasing emergence of difficult cases in conservation practice
due to climate change and other human-induced planetary changes (Palmer 2010;
Parrenas 2018), shows that the ethics of relating to non-human animals in the age of
humans can not be seen as a self-evident set of rules. Instead it requires an empirical
investigation, in which encounters can play a role, when we make an effort to engage
in and interpret them.
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Chapter 19
Wild Animals in the City: Considering
and Connecting with Animals in Zoos
and Aquariums
Sabrina Brando and Elizabeth S. Herrelko
Abstract Connecting people with nature is a powerful concept that opens doors
for relationship building and conservation messaging. The roles of wild animals in
the city (e.g., in zoos and aquariums) and how we interact with them—and vice
versa—must evolve along with our theoretical discussions and animal management
practices in order to advance the field. While taking into consideration the long
history of animals in captivity, where we are today, and were we should go in the
future, this chapter reviews animal welfare and its ethical frameworks, human-animal
interactions and its effect on both animals and people, wildness in zoos and how
we perceive different states of origin, compassionate education programs and their
efforts to instil empathy and empower people to become agents of change, and the
power of modern technology in providing real connections with artificial means. In
this ever-changing world, living responsibly together has never beenmore important.
19.1 Introduction
Professional zoos and aquariums (henceforth zoos) can function as a powerful
connection between humans and non-human animals (henceforth animals) and the
naturalworld, aswell as playing critical roles in conservation, education, and research
programs. These human-animal connections and relationships introduce opportuni-
ties to explore the different interactions that can occur and evolve, with the animals
in the zoo as well as urban wildlife. Wild animals housed in zoos in cities around
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ongoing debates. Through our combined work of 44 years in zoological facilities,
we aim to provide the reader with a behind-the-scenes view of professional zoos and
acquaint them with some of the theoretical concepts zoos consider when assessing
the opportunities and challenges of connecting people to animals, and we reflect on
whether what animals like to do and what we think they ‘should’ be doing might
be very different things. This chapter proposes that professional zoos are places
where: Animals can experience optimal wellbeing and provide opportunities for a
variety of connections with humans and other animals; people, including staff and
visitors, can exhibit empathy by considering animals from an individual perspective,
including the conflicting or contradicting situations these scenarios might create;
and language and procedures used to describe and manage animals should reflect a
commitment to the 24/7 across the lifespan approach (Brando and Buchanan-Smith
2018) and consider the dynamic social environments in zoos, including the concept
that additional approaches going beyond today’s standard may be needed.
Animal welfare1 is defined as “an animal’s collective physical, mental, and
emotional states over a period of time, and is measured on a continuum from good
to poor” (AZA 2020a). When considering the primary components of welfare, the
Association of Zoos and Aquariums’ (AZA) Animal Welfare Committee further
explains this as “an animal typically experiences goodwelfarewhen healthy comfort-
able, well-nourished, safe, able to develop and express species-typical relationships,
behaviours, and cognitive abilities, and not suffering from unpleasant states such as
pain, fear, or distress. Because physical, mental, and emotional states may be depen-
dent on one another and can vary from day to day, it is important to consider these
states in combination with one another over time to provide an assessment of an
animal’s overall welfare status.”
Humans are animals too, but for the purpose of this chapter we will apply the
terminology used in animal welfare science when referring to interactions, bond and
relationships of humans with other animals as human-animal interactions (HAI) and
human-animal relationships (HAR). HAI in zoos can be diverse, including the expec-
tations people have of these interactions, from personal and friendship perceived
bonds, to the idea that we should hardly interact with animals we deem ‘wild’.
The ways in which people interact and the expectations they have of free-ranging
wildlife on zoo grounds sometimes differs from that towards the animals housed
within the zoo. These differences highlight opportunities to ask new research ques-
tions within the field of HAI. Although HAI research in zoos is relatively new, it has
been present in the companion animal and agricultural fields since the 1980s, each
with a different focus: companion animal research focuses on its impact on humans
whereas agriculturally-based research focuses on the impact to animals (Hosey and
Melfi 2014). The need for additional zoo-based research is essential for a better
understanding of experiences on both sides of the interaction.
1The terms “animal welfare” and “animal wellbeing” have both been used over the years (Moberg
2000, 1), to describe the state of the animal, and are used in this chapter interchangeably.
AZA. (2020a). Animal Welfare Committee. https://www.aza.org/animal_welfare_committee.
Accessed 29 March 2020.
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Zoos also play a crucial role in being a new home and safe haven for confiscated
wildlife from the illegal trade and rescue. The roles of zoos today are many, with the
increased pressure on the natural world and wild animals and the continuing trend of
people migrating to cities and urban areas. The role of zoos can be to provide a place
where people can connect with animals and nature, be education and conservation
focussed, as well as to consider the lives of other animals and our relationship we
have with them.
19.2 Animal Welfare
Zoo professionals and laypersons alike have questions about animal welfare: Can zoos
promote optimal welfare for the animals in their care? Are zoos providing opportunities
for choice and control over the environment and activities? Those who oppose captivity
speculate that animals cannot experience optimal welfare no matter what is done for them.
What do we know and what evidence can be provided to address animal welfare concerns?
How do we navigate the different ethical frameworks on what animal welfare entails?
We have an ethical responsibility to provide animals in zoos with environments that
allow them to experience good welfare (Brando and Buchanan-Smith 2018). Zoos
have seen a significant evolution, today promoting optimal welfare from “cradle-
to-grave”, birth to death (Seidensticker and Doherty 1996) and 24/7 across lifespan
(Brando and Buchanan-Smith 2018). This approach is in stark contrast to how zoos
started, most as menageries approaching the keeping of animals like a stamp collec-
tion, with little understanding and regard for animal welfare and lacking a science,
education and conservation approach. The ability to challenge the status quo through
the reviewof emerging scientific evidence and ethical considerations and frameworks
(DeMori et al. 2019) remains necessary and forms an important aspect in the process
of changing long-held beliefs or practices. Being professional is to continue to ask
if this is the best that we can be, if this is what is in the best interest of the animal
24 h a day, seven days a week. Professionalism entails an ‘animal-first’ approach,
and striving to achieve the goals of education, research, conservation and recreation
goals (Brando and Coe 2020).
Contemporary animal welfare thinking is approached from a holistic perspective
and encompasses physical, behavioural and psychological aspects, and is increas-
ingly emphasizing the promotion of positive states and the centrality of the animal
feelings (Wemelsfelder et al. 2001;Wemelsfelder 2007;Mellor and Beausoleil 2015;
Mellor 2016; Veasey 2017; Brando and Buchanan-Smith 2018). Welfare pertains
to the individual; positive or negative welfare is not something we can give to
animals, but something they experience based on the circumstances in which they
live. Through a holistic approach, professional zoos are responsible for providing
care and environments which promote optimal welfare for all animals.
Many accredited facilities such as the Smithsonian’s National Zoo, Lincoln Park
Zoo, and Chester Zoo, as well as a few unaccredited but contemporarily operating
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zoos,2 are highly functioning conservation and education organisations, with many
in- and ex situ programs and projects. Change is a dynamic and necessary aspect to the
running of a modern zoo, and there is always room to improve, hence the importance
of staying up to date with the latest developments in education, conservation and
animal welfare. It is important to note that most zoos in the world are not accredited
by a one of themajor regional accrediting bodies, and thereforemanymalfunctioning
and bad facilities exist.
Different yet collaborative tools for animal welfare assessments, combining
natural history and species needs, as well as tailoring programs to individuals
advances optimal welfare. Some facilities have also stopped housing certain species,
not necessarily because they think it cannot be done well, but also because species
needs may outweigh the location parameters or facility resources. A universal animal
welfare framework for zoos (Kagan et al. 2015), and an animal welfare risk assess-
ment process (Sherwen et al. 2018) can be used to identify risks and determine
priorities.
Professional zoos endeavour to provide animals with meaningful choice and
control to meet their own needs and preferences. The potential benefit of choice
and control have been well described long ago by Chamove and Anderson (1989)
and Snowdon and Savage (1989), later by Brando (2009), and recently by Allard and
Bashaw (2019). There is considerable empirical evidence that not having control of
one’s environment leads to behavioural and physiological problems (e.g., Mineka
and Hendersen 1985; Perdue et al. 2014). Thus, a common goal of these approaches
is to allow animals far greater control (or agency) over their own lives with less
dependence on caregivers (Brando and Buchanan-Smith 2018; Coe 2018; Allard
and Bashaw 2019). Several studies show that simply having meaningful choices,
whether or not they are acted upon, is rewarding to animals (e.g., Owen et al. 2005;
Leotti et al. 2010; Kurtycz et al. 2014).
We can provide many different environmental enrichments, which are planned
and designed according to certain goals (e.g., increasing space use, species-specific
behaviours such as climbing and jumping) however, we must be OKwith the choices
the animals make. Some activities such as playing with plastic toys or old telephone
books or being trained to sit on a scale for weighing are not natural but can be used to
reach behavioural and animal care goals that are still very enjoyable and engaging for
animals. Artificially presented habitats and objects are regularly prohibited, based on
the argument that these environments and enrichment negatively affect conservation
and education efforts. However, considering the data proving this are lacking (e.g.,
Perdue et al. 2011; Jacobson et al. 2017) and artificial items are often successful in
enriching animals’ lives (e.g., reviewof touchscreen activitieswith apes byEgelkamp
andRoss 2019),we believe zoos should focus on the potential benefits for animals and
opportunities to help visitors understand the link betweenbehavioural goals reflecting
animals’ natural histories and their interactionswith artificial items. Educators, signs,
2Zoos may opt out of accreditation processes for various reasons, yet still show contemporary
practices based on latest science and best practices.
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talks by care staff and other means could be used to convey to the public that non-
naturalistic activities can promote positive wellbeing, that animals enjoy them and
while they do not naturally play with phonebooks in the wild, the message that we
should protect and conserve animals should not be jeopardized by a rejection of
artificial items.
The natural versus the unnatural is a debate which has been ongoing for decades,
and we want to make the argument that all items and activities which are enriching
an animals life are suitable for the animal, natural or not, and should not conflict
with connecting people to animals and nature. In these circumstances, if we consider
animals to be agents (i.e., have agency), we should let the animals decide if something
is enriching or not. This is the challenge for professional zoo staff: identify activities
that are meaningful for animals that can simultaneously help make connections to
other zoo goals. It is our moral obligation to promote optimal welfare for animals in
our care for many reasons, but as it relates to HAI, the most important reason might
be because we find active and engaging animals the most interesting to watch and
easiest to learn about.
This is not to say that choice and control is an all or nothing concept that could be
used to rationalize omitting tasks that optimal well-being is reliant upon (e.g., vacci-
nations and medications). The concept should be used proactively, yet judiciously.
When a choice is provided, it should be meaningful to the animal, and the animal
care staff must be ready to accept whatever choice the animal selects. If we provide
an animal with a choice of two non-preferred social partners, does it really count as
a meaningful choice to improve their welfare experience? Yes, it would mean they
have an opportunity to control this segment in time, but if both choices potentially
lead to negative outcomes, does that feel like control? If an animal is not feeling well
and the option is to take medication or not, how long would not choosing to take the
medication serve an animal’s welfare before it becomes a significant problem?
Professional animalwelfare programs today strive to operate on an evidence-based
approach as set out byMaple andLindburg (2008) for the “empirical zoo” and include
evidence-based animal welfare programs (Melfi 2009). These programs reflect best
practice processes of care and conducting research, including the importance of
good human-animal relationships and interactions (Hosey and Melfi 2012). Choice
and control should also revolve around human-animal interactions and relationships,
including staff, the general public and others who interact or are in the direct or
indirect space of the animals.
19.3 Human-Animal Interactions
Zoo professionals and laypersons alike have questions about HAI:What types of interactions
and relationships do we find at the zoo? What do animals think about staff and/or visitors?
Howwell do visitors deal with choices animals make, such as not interacting with or looking
at them? What is the effect of the human gaze or demand on the animals? What type of
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relationships with animals do zoo staff want? What do animals want from the people around
them?
There are many formal and informal ways to discuss HAI and HAR, from the more
formal evidence-based to the idiosyncratic, from the animals’, staff members’ or
individual visitor’s perspective. HAI and HAR can be viewed from exchanges that
people directly have with animals, such as during a feeding session in the children’s
farm between children and goats, the play bout between a young chimpanzee and the
person on the other side of the window, or the relationship between the care staff and
the animals, engaging in hide and seek, and voluntary care behaviours like weighing
and shifting from one area to another.
In the book ‘Animals in the Age of Humans (2016), Brando discussed the concept
described by Gruen as ‘wild dignity’, and that our making animals look ridiculous or
our portraying them as something different than what they are, violates this dignity.
According toGruen animal dignity needs to be dynamic, i.e., adapted to the individual
animal, and is only valuable when it is expressed and recognized as contributing to
the well-being or flourishing of that individual. Giving animals more choice and
control through environmental complexity, enrichment and animal training, as well
as interactions with people might not be ‘natural’ but might serve a meaningful
function in restoring some of the individual’s agency and therefore ‘wild dignity’.
‘Wild dignity’ only comes into play when animals are taken out of their wild
context and put into the human context. It appears, then, that for Gruen, the basis
of the attribution of wild animal dignity rests in our own attitude: When we change
animals’ species-specific behaviours and take away the control of their own lives, we
dominate them and thereby we violate their dignity. The challenge here is that this
is assumed without regard to what the animal in question experiences. Therefore,
when housing captive wild animals, we need to consider and respect their needs and
preferences, and what contributes to and interferes the least with their ‘wild dignity’.
This can concern behaviours that we might find off-putting and consider indecent
from a human perspective, for example, masturbation or aggression that animals
engage in (killing prey) or are important to maintaining social relationships. It is
important to note that an animal can have good welfare, but still his or her ‘wild
dignity’ can be violated, to acknowledge that meeting both welfare needs of animals
and respect their wild dignity creates tension and might not be possible.
This concept also has relevance for how wild animals are portrayed to the public,
housed, or used in the various activities offered by zoos, such as shows, presentations,
and interactions. Gruen writes, In contrast we dignify the wildness of other animals
when we respect their behaviours as meaningful to them and recognize that their
lives are theirs to live. Although there will be restrictions to life in captivity, the
concept of ‘wild dignity’ can serve to identify conflicts between human expectations
versus animal needs and preferences and to propose ways to mitigate them (Brando
2016). Should contemporary zoos focus more efforts on facilitating agency and less
on howwe think animals should behave, to enquire what it means to be, or to be ‘truly
wild’? If animals can never be returned to the wild, to what extent should captive
wild animals have agency over their life?
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Professional zoos consider thewide variety ofHAR from the animal’s perspective.
Braverman (2012) notes that at the zoo, direct physical contact is prevented between
the animals and visiting public using moats and fences. Many of the barriers are
not only in the interest of the visitor, but many actually exist to protect animals
from inappropriate feeding, touching, and other harmful behaviour. Physical barriers
should not only be seen as protecting staff and the visiting public but can also as a
form of privacy and barrier for the animals to use to their liking.
Caregivers who are sensitive to the possible impacts of insufficient flight distance,
or few or no opportunities to view someone approaching around a corner or in the
surrounding area, will interact in ways that try to offer animal choice and control.
Developing positive HAI and clear ways of communication are needed for new and
well-designed environments, and urgently needed in circumstances where animals
have limited agency, such as in smaller spaces and/or social groups, when they do not
have access to complex environments, choice or control. While these circumstances
should be avoided where possible, sometimes for reasons of law, weather, health and
safety reasons, smaller areas may be part of an animal’s environment. Well-designed
habitats provide different micro-environments with complexity, with choices for
animals to decide where they want to be, what they want to do, and who they want
to do it with (e.g., Herrelko et al. 2015). This includes different fixed and flexible
structures, vistas, different climatic zones to sun, bathe or be in the shade, species-
appropriate social groups as well as opportunities to hide and find shelter or quiet
areas. Designing environments in ways that animals have choice and control and
allow for visitors to observe the animals without disturbance and disruption are key
factors in professional habitat design (Bonnie et al. 2016; Brando and Buchanan-
Smith 2018). Well-designed habitats can also allow animals to watch humans, to
interact with them in a safe manner, and for the animals to disappear out of sight.
While some animals actively avoid eye contact with visitors, others may seek it
out. Some zoos provide information on how to behave in these different scenarios,
e.g., when a gorilla looks your way, with content such as “nod and lower your head,
glance away [and] don’t stare! Crouch or kneel down, so the gorilla is above or across
from you, this posture puts them at ease” (Braverman 2012, 79). Animals who do
not look for visitor or staff visual interaction, might not feel comfortable doing so
from a species perspective, like many primates avoiding the human gaze as they also
avoid gaze between group members depending on hierarchy. Or even when these
behaviours can be learned, they might just not be interested in connecting with you
in this way. Some animals are very interested in visual contact and looking at you
or others, positioning themselves so they can see better, or actively trying to get in
your field of vision.
Even when animals cannot see visitors, but visitors can see them, people are
interested and concerned about the implications for animals. This concept of ‘big
brother is watching you’ is an interesting discussion to have with staff and public,
withmany people understanding that none of uswant to bewatched all the time. Even
the discussion on whether if animals disappear out of sight, it is OK to then watch
them on camera and screens is engaging as some members of the public mention
that they feel like they are spying on the animals, while other think it is OK as the
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animals do not know that we are watching. In a sense this falls in the same category
of animals performing in shows behaviours like dancing or being a pirate. Some
think this is fine, as the animals do not know, while other say we should not ridicule
animals (Brando 2016; Brando et al. 2018). These thoughts and feelings towards
animals point to people being interested and concerned what we do to and ask of
animals, regardless of the welfare impact it has on the animals.
From a welfare perspective it is fundamental to understand how other animals see
us (Hosey 2013; Hosey andMelfi 2012). The ability to behave and interact appropri-
ately in relation to a variety of species is crucial for navigating captivity and the field.
For animal care professionals, their ability to provide safe and productive manage-
ment practices relies on the relationships built with animals. If they are not seen as a
benefit to the animals (e.g., as food provider, someone who appropriately responds
to their behavioural cues), the ability to create opportunities for optimal welfare
decreases. Creating positive relationships and engaging in positive interactions can
also elicit inter-species play and communication (for a reviewand examples on animal
play see Brando and Burghardt 2019). In the book Smiling Bears, Else Poulsen tells
a story of the specific nesting behaviour of one of the polar bears she cared for; when
preparing his sleeping place, he separated some materials out from others and left
it next to his nest. She would only remove what he put aside, and it seemed these
interactions created a form of mutual understanding and communication between
her and the bear.
Of course, scientific evidence-based understanding of the effects of interactions
on animals are important in order to behave appropriately and effectively towards the
animals promoting choice, control, and positive wellbeing. However, relationships
and interactions can be subtle and complex with regards to individual preferences
of the animals and the people who care for them. To date little attention has been
given to the qualitative aspect of these interactions, including the thoughts and feel-
ings people have towards the animals, and perceived friendship or bond, a topic
which is still controversial in zoos. While many zoos will acknowledge the bond that
exists between staff and animals, some may consider this to be anthropomorphic and
inappropriate between humans and wild animals.
HAI opportunities such as touch tanks and animal feeding demonstrations are
other, low-tech immersion techniques where visitors physically share the same space
as an animal, even if just with their hands. Immersion, and specifically hands-on
activities, are wildly sought after by the public, e.g., Shedd Aquarium’s Stingray
Touch exhibit, an exhibit that is only open five months out of the year, reaches
400,000 visitors annually (Ruppenthal 2018; Shedd 2019), and has been linked to
increased knowledge about aquatic life and perceived likelihood that participants
would make an effort to protect aquatic species (Ogle 2016). While these activities
are very popular with the general public, the challenges zoos face are safeguarding
animal welfare for fragile animals such as sea stars and small fishes. As one of many
of the activities offered in zoos, the touch tank is an example that revolves around
something we do to animals (i.e., entering their space) and behavioural and health
assessments should be made to help facilitate an optimal welfare experience for the
animal. Research on human health parameters shows that the touch tank is similar to
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nature experiences; mental stress decreased, but similarly to an exciting event, heart
rate increased (Sahrmann et al. 2016). Beetz et al. (2012) suggests that animal contact
plays a role in reducing perceived stress in humans because it activates the oxytocin
system, informally referred to as the “cuddle hormone” (see Shamay-Tsoory and
Young 2016 for commentary on advances in the study of oxytocin).
While the purpose of outreach, education and interactive programs with hands-on
experiences may be laudable and enjoyable for visitors, it has the potential to present
a conflict (i.e., animals may not enjoy the interaction) or a contradiction (i.e., people
touching and taking photos with animals in the zoo, which would be discouraged in
nature). For these reasons, professional zoo staff are trained to select animals who
exhibit traits that thrive in these environments (e.g., have a personality which is open
and inquisitive, who tolerate being touched and handled, and stay calm with loud
noises and sudden events). It is not always easy to manage how people interact and
handle animals, and while most animals are purposefully desensitized to these types
of interactions and people are informed on proper etiquette prior to the encounters,
there is the potential for the unknown. This is why staff must be trained to identify
signs of stress and empowered to end encounters when animals signal it is time
through their behaviour.
Animal welfare scientists are exploring the program animal3 world to identify best
practices. An evidence-based approach will help clarify needs for standard operating
procedures related to program animals that spend extended periods in environments
that may limit their range of movement, provide them limited choice and control,
and require them to live in species-atypical social groups. Animals typically selected
as program animals tend to be small and easy to handle, such as guinea pigs, taran-
tulas, bearded dragons and chameleons, which does not necessarily make them the
best candidates as they are often considered prey species, as they might need more
habituation and safe havens, or less manual handling.
While there is much research showing that being in nature and interacting with
animals is positive for human wellbeing, there is little empirical evidence on whether
touch tanks and interactive programs (Brando and Buchanan-Smith 2018) also have
a positive influence on animals; and existing publications largely focus on phys-
ical health. For example, a study of the physical health of cownose rays showed
that health parameters were comparable for individuals in a visitor accessible touch
tank or in an off-exhibit system with minimal human interaction (Johnson et al.
2017). Some complementary behavioural research exists for similar human-animal
interaction experiences (for a detailed review, see Sherwen and Hemsworth 2019).
Research suggests visitor-feeding programswith captive giraffes serve as enrichment
for animals that could lessen the foraging needs linked to oral stereotypies (Orban
et al. 2016) and more recently in a penguin-visitor experience, researchers found
that encounters did not disrupt colony behaviour, particularly when it came to affil-
iative or aggressive behaviours (Saiyed et al. 2019). Of course, in these scenarios,
3A program animal (or ambassador animal) is defined by the Association of Zoos and Aquariums
as “an animal whose role includes handling and/or training by staff or volunteers for interactions
with the public and in support of institutional education and conservation goals” (AZA 2020b).
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management plans surrounding the activities are likely to play a significant role;
not all touch tanks and visitor-interaction programs are equal. Even with safety and
welfare protocols in place, if visitors do not follow the instruction well-being could
be compromised (a review of concerns and recommendations, specific to aquatic
animal touch tanks, is available online: see Dogu et al. [2011]).
Webelieve this area of research greatly deserves attention so thatwe can have addi-
tional quantitative data to support policy development.Multiple zoos have introduced
animal-first approaches to welfare; each with their own perspective: (1) NZP/SCBI
(Moore et al. 2013) presented their Animal First approach as a proactive take on
communication channels to provide a safe environment in which animal care staff
may identify and address welfare concerns. (2) Lincoln Park Zoo (LPZ) (2019) intro-
duced their “animal-first” philosophy with changes in programming for ambassador
animals. Programs are only deemed to be an “animal-first” program if animals are
deemed to have choice and control in participating in an activity, can remain in the
comfort of their habitat, and the program is to the benefit of the animal.
Zoos want to avoid that visitors freely feed animals (unsupervised) because it is
deemed not good for the animal’s welfare. However, the animal might actually enjoy
or encourage it.” Kisora and Driessen (in this volume) describe the content of a video
of an orangutan interacting with a member of the public, and while the person and
the animal ‘know’ that this is not acceptable behaviour, the video clearly shows that
both parties have an interest in the continued interaction.
Big cats in zoos can be seen to ‘hunt’ smaller children along the window, or
ambushing them, a behaviour which is sometimes discouraged by zoo staff (as it
could scare the public or potentially hurt the animal if they run into the glasswindow),
sometimes it is encouraged, however, as both parties run and seem enjoy the activity.
Chimpanzees have been seen to ask visitor or staff what is in a bag by pointing at it,
others sit with their back to the window steeling glances while others sit up high and
away. Orangutans clean the windows with a cloth and scoop nesting materials in a
bucket like they see the care staff do. What animals like to do versus what we think
they ‘should’ be doing might be very different things.
19.4 Wildness in Zoos
When considering howwell people translate information from the screen to theworld
in which they live, we put forward another concept: Is it important to be truly wild? If
an emotional connection to an animal in a zoo is real, does the location of their birth
(e.g., in situ, ex situ) matter and or affect perceptions? Public perception can be split
based on experience versus perceived notions. Reade and Waran (1996) discovered
that zoo visitors had positive perceptions as well as a greater awareness of key topics
within animal care science than the general public.
The fear of wild animals becoming ‘less wild’ in zoos is a concern raised by
the zoo and conservation field, when considering a potential loss of behavioural
diversity necessary for survival in the wild (Rabin 2003) and a potential decrease of
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reintroduction success. Many wild animals in zoos today do not encounter stimuli
relevant to life in the wild, however, most zoos do not reintroduce their animals
to the wild. As such, the debate on what stimuli these animals should be exposed
to in order to maintain species-specific behaviours is complex and ongoing. One
particularly relevant example that should be discussed is when stimuli could cause
a temporary decrease of wellbeing, e.g., exposure to a predator to maintain social
cohesion and hiding behaviour.
What does wildness mean in a zoo context? In general, zoos speak of wild animals
as animals who are not domesticated. They probably make the distinction between
wild and domesticated animals because many zoos also house domesticated animals
such as horses, cows, goats, sheep, and rabbits, and feed domesticated farm animals to
the wild animals. Some zoos will not formally train the animals to participate in their
daily care as they advocate a ‘hands off’ approach as ‘wild animals should stay wild
and not have too close interactions with people’. Zoo professionals knowledgeable of
animal learning and training know that animals learn all the time, and that there is no
such thing as a ‘hands off’ approach. However, how the animals are habituated and
desensitized to people, situations and objects, what type of behaviours they engage
in, and howmuch room there is for the animals to choose what they want to do differs
between zoos and their philosophies on what is acceptable and appropriate.
As described above, HAI and HAR might create conflicts between the goals of
different programs within a zoo, such as animal welfare, education and conservation.
Relationships might be experienced by the animal as desirable and positive, while
from an education and conservation perspective it might be undesirable seeing a
wild animal interact with a member of the public or staff member, including e.g.,
hand feeding, as the educational and conservation message likely revolved around
wild animals being wild, to respect them in the wild, and to refrain from interacting
and handfeeding them. Animals who are in conservation programs with the aim
of reintroduction are in a different role than exhibit animals who will live their
lives in the zoo. Our relationships with them can be fundamentally different than
with animals who will not be exposed to direct human contact. Nevertheless, we
must remember the importance of visual context for endangered species. As Ross
et al. (2011) discovered, even showing pictures of chimpanzees alone versus near a
human or in a typical human environment (e.g., office) negatively influences peoples’
perceptions of their endangered status and their appeal as a pet.
When animals are not to be reintroduced but have an endangered status it may
be important from the point of view of the conservation message to still portray
them as wild which may create a tension between ‘being or looking wild’ versus the
impression of ‘being domesticated’.
Summing up, animals with different roles (e.g., program animals) have different
relationships with humans and requirements we should consider, e.g., they should
not live in fear or anxiety of humans and they should have choice and control over
their environment and what happens to them. Animals who are truly going to be
released need to maintain their fear for humans, and to be fit and independent for life
in the wild and will have a different program and trajectory.
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Whether for release or to serve as ambassadors for their species, it is clear that
roles are assigned by people, it is not the animals who have chosen their role. This
is a responsibility that contemporary zoos take seriously, outlining specific criteria
for each role. In the past, an animal which did not have a suitable social group might
have ended up in the ambassador animal or education area, but today staff make these
decisions with careful consideration of each animal’s personality and capacities.
Interactive programs such as ambassador and education programs, as well as
shows and presentations have evolved to include more choice and control for the
animal, with bird presentations having birds fly into a larger arena (or not if they do
not want to), and goats and dolphins having areas to retreat to if they do not want to
interact with the public. At any given moment in a program, or when animals do not
‘show up’ or ‘have left the building’, care staff and educators take the opportunity
to highlight the relationship the care staff has with the animals. It is the animal’s
choice to participate or not, and they have some control over the activity as such
that they can leave if they are bored, not interested, or tired. It is a moment to
talk about how we build relationships through play, positive reinforcement, varied
activities, and the intrinsic value of choice and control. Most people understand, find
it funny, and pretty cool that animals are choosing what they want to do, that they
have their own individual ways and decisions. It sheds another light on the animals
than the standard information of weight, distribution range and scientific name, and
also opens up opportunities for visitors to experience empathy to better understand
animal perspectives.
Cultural effects may dictate how care staff interact with, train, and manage
animals. For example, with a long history of Asian elephants employed as working
animals, many may utilize the traditional range-country management tool of an
ankus or bull hook. A different cultural approach is the movement in professional
zoos to work in protected contact, where care staff are separated from elephants by
barriers. In these scenarios their tools of the trade are different, relying mainly on
relationship-building and positive reinforcement-based animals training techniques.
For a long time and in many environments, Asian elephants were chained
overnight in outdoor yards due to a lack of funds and elephant-proof housing.
Now with better materials, a deeper understanding of sleeping behaviour and social
dynamics, and a change in housing conditions, onemight propose that elephants who
are under less pressure and control of humans and voluntarily participate in their own
care (e.g., protective contact), and gain more agency and ‘wild dignity’.
19.5 Compassionate Education Programs
Education programs which aim to encourage and instil compassion, empathy and
kindness, and to empower younger (and older) people to become active agents for
animals and the environment, can be called Compassionate Education Programs.
An example of such programs in zoos is showing people how to help animals in
their neighbourhoods by drawing comparisons on zoo grounds, such as building safe
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frog crossings in their community for similar frog species to those kept in the zoo,
or for native frog species living around the zoo as (urban) wildlife. Education of
caring for and connecting to animals does not have to be for exotic animals only,
some zoos house rabbits, a common companion animal in households today and
another animal in the city. They have housing and information which models good
rabbit environments that allow the animals to perform species-typical behaviours,
e.g., hop, stretch, and socialise. Compassion education programs thrive within and
outside of zoos to connect people to nature. Roots and Shoots, for example, is a non-
zoo-based program which envisions “a healthy planet where people live sustainably
and in harmony with animals and our shared environment”.4
Compassionate education programs can also teach children to break away from
animal stereotypes. For example, snakes are not slimy, and spiders are not scary but
should be admired and protected. Studies report that having animals in the classroom
improves children’s learning outcomes (Trainin et al. 2005) and participation in
interactive programs and petting zoos produces positive cognitive and/or emotional
impacts on the welfare of humans (e.g., DebRoy and Roberts 2006; Sahrmann et al.
2016).
The types of interactions experienced in a zoo can shape how people interact
with animals outside of a zoo. For example, a structured program which informs
people how to behave around a type of animal they are not familiar with may set the
tone for animal interactions outside of that program. People who learn to observe
and respect animals tend to interact differently and are more understanding of the
choices animals make (e.g., approaching a stranger or not), than those unaware of
behavioural cues.
Structured programs aiming to safeguard the safety of the animals, staff and
public might miss out on the flexibility, free interpretation and space of unplanned
or orchestrated activities. This tends to arise from a risk-aversive perspective and
inhibits activities such as spontaneous play. An example of this is in creativity and
play sessions with animals in training, where animals are asked to create something
new, invent a game, or choose what to do, where to go, or identify food and item
preferences. These activities can even surprise the care staff, as what they think
animals want and prefer does not always align with what animals choose when given
the opportunity.
It is important to note that animals are not the only ones with preferences, visitors
have preferences, too. How visitors choose to experience environments or types of
programs and activities differs from person to person. They can choose to go alone,
with the family, or only have the opportunity to go in the weekend or school holidays.
These choices can affect the type of experience they will have, either quiet or busy.
The visitors of a zoo aremany and each differs in interest, attitude, and conduct. Some
are quiet and interested in watching animals, volunteer at the zoo for enrichment and
behavioural observations, and help with education programs. Others will come for
quick entertainment and picnics on the lawn. Some are zoo members who frequently
visit and feel a personal connection to their favourite animals, while others come
4See https://rootsandshoots.global. Retrieved online February 23, 2020.
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once or twice a year without much connection. We mention this not only to posit that
people experience zoos as connection points with the natural world in different ways,
but also as a parallel to help the reader identify and compare their own interests and
needs with that of other species.
19.6 Real Connections with Artificial Means
The various ways in which people connect with animals prompt us to wonder if the
type of connection matters. In the age of the Anthropocene, where many species
are going extinct, will connecting people to nature help in the conservation and
protection of animals? Could computer simulations and ‘experiences’ through video
or other artificial means, replace our in-person connection to nature? If the emotion
associated with a connection is real, does it matter if the content was real (i.e.,
living animal versus computer-generated imagery, CGI)? Digging deeper, does it
matter if the connection with a real animal happened to be an individual not born
in the wild? Based on what we know about the long-term impact of atypical life
histories on animals such as performer chimpanzees (Freeman and Ross 2014), we
are fortunate to live in a period when films rely on CGI animals instead of animal
actors. Recent movies, as well as holograms used in circuses and some zoos created
lifelike experiences whichmay provide another opportunity for people to view, learn,
and enjoy animals and their stories (e.g. Guangzhou Zoo’s virtual reality exhibit in
China).
In films we become emotionally invested in non-human animals in a variety of
forms, even when not real or remotely realistic. From fearing a devious octopus-
humanesque sea witch in the Little Mermaid (cartoon), to admiring the wisdom
and optimism of Falkor, the Luckdragon, from the Neverending Story (animatronic
puppet), and cheering forAslan, the talking lion, to comeback to life in theChronicles
of Narnia (CGI), we easily experience a range of emotions. Ourminds appear to cross
the barrier of reality and still remain emotionally invested the concept of believing
in the stories told by animals, represented by fictional characters, the mission of the
film and storyline.
Given what we know about perceptions of conservation status for primates (Ross
et al. 2011; Leighty et al. 2015), context is important. Do these characters, even when
exhibiting limited species-typical behaviour, trigger misinformed judgements? Do
the emotional connections we make with realistic characters transition into caring
about animal welfare and conservation? What is the impact of digitally simulated
wilderness? Natural history documentaries delve into the animal world in ways
some of us can only dream: Following the sardine run along the South African
coast (Nature’s Most Amazing Events: The Great Tide, 2009), witnessing Darwin’s
beetles lock horns in competition for mates (Life: Insects, 2009), or experiencing an
extremely close encounter with playful mountain gorillas (Life on Earth: Life in the
Trees, 1979). Mike Bossley suggests that the ‘Attenborough effect’ (Bulbeck 2005),
may influence viewers, where incredible films like these set a tone and expectation
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for tourists in terms of how close they may get to animals or how active animals will
be when they see them. The effect reaches beyond the in situ environment; it affects
expectations in zoos as well, ranging from realistic to unrealistic, e.g., how close
one can get to an animal, or how many different behaviours can be seen in a short
period of time. There is scant literature on the topic, but Silk et al. (2017) reviews
the risks and benefits of harnessing the power of Hollywood to positively affect
conservation challenges. They propose a framework to mitigate negative impacts by
focusing on biodiversity conservation impact, behaviour change, engagement with
film industry, and raising audience interest and awareness. We also recommend an
impact assessment. Without incorporating metrics to identify the success or failure
of these endeavours, the questions will still exist.
Zoos strategically collaborate with each other to maintain genetic diversity and
population sustainability for at least one hundred years. These animals represent
the same species as their wild conspecifics, but behavioural differences are present.
No matter how much skill has gone into training zoo animals (e.g., to voluntarily
participate in their own healthcare by sitting for radiographs or receiving voluntary
blood draws), their connection with a human should not be confused with domesti-
cation. We consider these animals to fit somewhere in the middle of the continuum
from wild to domesticated (e.g., Swart and Keulartz’s specific care model, 2011).
The ambiguity of where most zoo animals fall on the continuum raises questions
about assessing welfare. We often rely on comparing zoo animal behaviour to that
of wild conspecifics, but is a wild animal the appropriate measuring stick to identify
“normal”? We are reminded again that context is important. Zoos provide carefully
crafted programs for each individual to address medical, nutritional, environmental,
and behavioural needs. For example, if food is provisioned, they do not need to hunt
or forage, and if that means they do not need to patrol miles and miles of land in
search of their next meal, they will likely walk less in zoos. If there is a difference
in the behaviour between a zoo animal and a wild animal, it does not specifically
mean there is a compromise in welfare (Veasey et al. 1996). Behavioural flexibility
plays a significant role in an animal’s ability to thrive in differing environments,
including zoos. Their innate ability to adapt is strengthened when professional zoos
can support their needs with care staff who exhibit the patience, knowledge and
capability to build relationships, identify preferences and appropriately respond to
each individual’s needs.
19.7 Conclusion
In this chapter we provided examples and insights into how animals in zoos are cared
for, not just focusing on how humans interact with animals, but also on how animals
interact with humans. We highlighted historic changes in approaches to care and
choice and control, as well as in the complexity of animal habitats. We discussed
evidence-based animal welfare programs to understand how animals see us and how
we promote, monitor and assess well-being, as well as elude to more elusive bonds
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and interactions animals and humans have with each other, and the conflicting or
contradicting situations or views to which this can lead.
Insight from conservation psychologists indicates that visitors want to know two
things when visiting a zoo: How are the animals taken care of in the zoo and what
are we doing in the wild to save them (Fraser, personal communication)? More
importantly, they identified that if visitors do not think we take good care of our
animals, they are not willing to listen to our conservation stories. Animal welfare is
the key determining factor to connecting with zoo visitors and potentially inspiring
behaviour change. In order tomake this happen, professional zoos today need to have
advanced animal care and welfare programs, incorporating the latest best practice,
rooted in science and evidence-based approaches.
An indicator of peoples’ connections with animals is how they respond to news of
the death of a beloved zoo animal. When Inuka, the only polar bear in Singapore Zoo
was euthanised due to age-related ailments, the zoo communicated information about
this difficult decision to their visitors ahead of time. This allowed an opportunity for
visitors to say their goodbyes and hundreds of people came to see Inuka one last
time. He died surrounded by the people who cared for him.5 Terrible tragedies such
as the recent fire in a zoo in Germany killing many primates highlighted the public’s
sadness for the animals who lost their lives, and concern for the staff who had to
deal with this dreadful accident. Hundreds of candles, flowers, cards, and messages
where left on social media, through the mail, and at the gates of the zoo. There is no
shortage of stories zoo staff can tell of zebras running to them when they walk over,
the chimpanzeeswho line up to be groomedwith a soft brush through the fence, or the
fishes who gather in front of the window when feeling the vibrations of the footsteps
of their carer. There are many examples of care staff creating remembrance gardens
for those who have passed, have photo collages in their lockers, and buy treats and
toys with their ownmoney to spoil the animals in their care. These examples above of
joys and sorrows give us insights into the relationships care staff and the public feel
they have with the animals in the zoo. In this ever-changing world where people and
animals are living closer to one another, and interacting more and more, inspiring a
world to live responsibly together has never been more important.
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Animals: Towards the Zoöpolis
Lauren E. Van Patter
20.1 The Urban, the Animal
We are living in the age of the urban, with the majority of the planet’s human popu-
lation now inhabiting cities. Urbanisation creates novel challenges for many animals
who are either driven out of these ‘human-dominated landscapes’ or forced to adapt to
drastically different conditions to survive. There are pressing questions about what it
means to coexist with other species amidst the precarity of life in the Anthropocene,
in which the urban is both a central driver and outcome (Amin and Thrift 2017;
Ruddick 2015).
Cities are predominantly constructed in our imaginaries, policies, and practices
as uniquely human spaces—in opposition to ‘nature’ or ‘wilderness’—and thus are
distinctive contexts in which to discuss animals. Counter to modernist bifurcations
of culture/nature, urban/rural, and domestic/wild, we need to recognize cities as a
porousmatrix of landcover typeswith transposed infrastructural networks and habitat
corridors which create opportunities for the circulation of animals into and around
the city (Amin and Thrift 2002).
Discussing urban animals becomes more challenging when we trouble under-
standing of the ‘urban’ alongside a recognition of the vast heterogeneity of ‘The
Animal’1? Urbanization and all it entails has drastically different import for the
bear and the crow. Does the snail differentiate between the farm field and the city
park? For many, the assumption remains that the urban is an ‘unnatural’ dwelling for
wild animals—a space of danger. But the success of many species—even those as
1As Derrida (2008) famously delineates.
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unlikely as leopards2—is a testament not only to animals’ resilience and adaptability,
but to the very real opportunities often afforded by this heterogenous space we call
the urban. In landscapes otherwise dominated by agriculture, cities may provide
oases of greenspace (parks designed for aesthetic or recreational purposes, riparian
corridors, and renaturalized urban natures) amidst vast areas of insecticide-treated
monocultures. Within such urban-rural matrices, where is the ‘natural’ landscape
in which animals belong? We need to find new ways of conceptualizing and caring
for ‘recombinant ecologies’ (Barker 2000), wherein our assumptions about the neat
divides between the natural and unnatural, the feral and the wild, the native and the
exotic/invasive are reconfigured in Anthropocene environments of globalization and
urbanization.
This in part involves asking how animals make a living within cities, either with
our help—as with intentionally provisioned species such as songbirds—or in spite of
our best efforts to ‘manage’ them—aswith ‘nuisance’ or ‘pest’ animals like rats. This
is both a spatial question, stemming from our judgements about who does or does not
belong in certain spaces and howparticular animals should live, but it is also an ethical
question, in terms of what rights other-than-humans might have to the city, and what
responsibilities we might have to promote, or at least not impede, their flourishing.
Despite the challenges posed by the dominant anthropocentric design and ethos in
cities, animals survive, inhabiting their own rich ‘storied’ worlds (van Dooren and
Rose 2012), which raises questions about how they experience and know the city
(Barua and Sinha 2019), and what animal-friendly cities might look like. Moving
towards multispecies spatial justice—towards the Zoöpolis—means recognizing the
many nonhuman Others who live alongside us in our shared urban ecologies, and
developing creative solutions aimed at flourishing in the more-than-human city.
In this chapter I briefly consider the politics of spatial access within three settings
of animal encounters—the home, the zoo, and the street/park/margins—and reflect
on three avenues that merit further engagement in thinking towards the Zoöpolis:
‘articulating with’ animals; making visible relationalities; and re-storying the city to
imagine otherwise.
20.2 Urban Animal Encounters and the Politics of Spatial
Access
Spatial inclusions and exclusions in the city have long been a concern of animal geog-
raphers, who have explored the expulsion of farmed animals from the urban sphere
(Philo 1995), the border practices which keep wild ‘intruders’ from the space of the
home (Power 2009), and the fostering of very particular forms of animality, human-
animal relations, and nature, within cities (Griffiths et al. 2000). Although the city is
usually thought of as a primarily human space, many animals are welcome within its
bounds. The most obvious are domestic ‘pets’, which in modern cities are valued for
2See Braczkowski et al. (2018).
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companionship and often made to fit within visions of the heteronuclear family and
neoliberal individualistic and consumerist cultures (McKeithen 2017; Nast 2006).
Certain species ofwild animals are also embraced, enrolled in the production of biodi-
versity and valued for their aesthetic benefits or contribution to ecosystem services.
These welcomed wild animals are expected to remain in ‘natural’ areas and are
subject to biosecurity measures when they engage in practices viewed as disruptive
or dangerous, enter spaces in which they are deemed not to belong,3 or come to be
viewed as ‘pests’ due to perceptions of overpopulation or association with filth and
disease.4 Overall, contentions around the ‘place’ of animals in modern cities raises
questions about who belongs and where. Encounters within diverse spaces of the
home, zoo, and streets/parks/urban margins are subject to their own complex affec-
tive and political dimensions, with animals disciplined in the production of particular
modes of value and visions of nature and culture.
20.2.1 The Home
Within the home, we find intimate relations of companionate cohabitation. Urban
‘pets’ are increasingly seen as members of the family, a status at odds with socio-
legal/capitalist operations wherein animals remain property—commodities able to
be bought, sold, traded, used, and disposed of with little regard (Instone and Sweeney
2014; Pallotta 2019). But home is more than a physical space, it encompasses
particular relations of companionship that stretch outwards into the broader realm
of anthropogenic urban public space, with associated contention in the case of
domestic animals’ spatial access. For example, debates surround whether or not
canine companions should be given their own space in the form of designated
dog parks, which arguably represent urban planning’s response to more-than-human
agencies and corporealities (Urbanik andMorgan2013).Or the contradictionwherein
dominant understandings of environmental responsibility increasingly dictate that
domestic cats be confined indoors, while at the same timewe are increasingly finding
it morally indefensible to bar animals such as chickens raised for food from having
access to the outdoors and the opportunity to exercise natural behaviours. But these
debates around spatial access are part of a larger landscape of negotiated borderlands
which make visible the porosity of the domus, as the wild are invited in as exotic pets
(Collard 2014), ingress against our will by burrowing under our porches or into our
walls and ceilings (Power 2009), and the domestic leaks out from under our control,
becoming stray or feral.
3For instance raccoons in daycares (Pacini-Ketchabaw and Nxumalo 2016) or cougars in suburbs
(Collard 2012).
4Such as cormorants in Toronto (Sandilands 2017), or pigeons in New York (Jerolmack 2008).
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20.2.2 The Zoo
Zoos are another space in which animals are made to live within the city, with
contention surrounding the purpose of the Modern zoo: Do they exist primarily for
entertainment, conservation, or education? For the benefits of individual animals,
species, or ecologies, or ultimately to serve human interests, reinforcing our
supremacy? As Brando and Herrelko highlight in their chapter Wild Animals in
the City: Considering and Connecting with Animals in Zoos and Aquariums, debates
surround: what constitutes ‘natural’ or ‘wild’ versus ‘unnatural’ behaviours in these
situations of confinement; the implications of this for zoos’ conservation goals which
include reintroductions—for which animals are required to be maintained as suffi-
ciently ‘wild’; and the inherent tensions between providing for animal welfare versus
purported conservation and educational aims.
Alongside these concerns are layered considerations surrounding public engage-
ment, perceptions, and expectations.AsKisora andDriessen point out in their chapter
Interpreting the YouTube zoo: ethical potential of captive encounters, what is most
often sought by the zoo-goer is “a dream-coming-true visit—not only seeing, but also
being seen by the other”. Proximate encounters, even touching and handfeeding, may
be afforded at zoos, but are discouraged in the case of animals in ‘thewild’, potentially
sending mixed messages to the public about appropriate interactions and boundaries
with wildlife (Brando and Herrelko).
Our relationships with wildlife take shape not only through proximate encoun-
ters, but through complex media ecologies, which enrol diverse actors, including
zoos. The ways we come to know about, and our expectations for relating to,
animals and ‘nature’more broadly, are increasingly shaped through ‘spectacular envi-
ronmentalisms’, highlighting the currency between the dramatic and the everyday
(Goodman et al. 2016). Within these ‘fabulous ecologies’ (Howell and Taves 2019),
the boundaries and purpose of the zoo are increasingly blurred, as ‘electronic zoos’
create virtual encounters through advances in surveillance technologies,withinwhich
animals live digital ‘second lives’ (Adams 2020) with limited opportunities to shape
recounted narratives about Nature (Davies 2000). A more expansive understanding
of the ‘zoo’ takes into account that various animal bodies are cultivated for particular
encounters in the service of entertainment, and/or the (re)production of particular
visions of Nature. Furthermore, it is important to consider the dispersed spatiali-
ties and temporalities of encounter, as the immediacy of the zoo travels through
virtual networks, bringing animals into the spaces of homes,workplaces, theatres, and
pockets around theworld.As discussed byKisora andDriessen,within such ‘Youtube
Zoos’, the ambivalence surrounding boundaries between animals as familiar indi-
viduals versus autonomous wildlife, and the ways in which their virtual represen-
tations both challenge and reinforce assumptions about and unequal relations with
animals, come to the fore. In user-generated venues of online videos and commen-
tary, the meaning of animal encounters can be contested. Digital technologies and
connectivity trouble the boundary between public and personal spaces of encounter,
as the ‘Youtube Zoo’ opens up the private lives of animal celebrities to discussion
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and debate. Consequences of such negotiated meanings ripple out to shape lived
encounters between people and animals—domestic, zoo, wild, liminal—throughout
the city.
Materially, zoos represent unique spaces, bubbles designed for certain valued
animal bodies within cities, with architecture that promotes wellbeing and/or
encounterability, fostering particular affective atmospheres and encounter value
(Barua 2017, 2019). Within these spaces charismatic species—cherished megafauna
fetishized as the epitome of ‘wild’ nature—are accumulated, lively commodities
in the currency of rare genes (Lorimer 2015). Alongside considerations of animal
welfare, labour, and multispecies relations of power lie questions about the role,
function, and implications of the zoo as simulacrum of nature (Braverman 2015):
Which Natures do zoos conserve, and for whom?What is the value of ex situ conser-
vation in the context of ever-disappearing ‘natural’ habitats?What is the relationship
between captive animals in zoos and the wild animals which may share their genetic
makeup, but which lead vastly different lives, embedded in vastly different experi-
ences, memories, and relations which, arguably, are core to what it means to be that
animal5? Such questions illuminate the biopolitical realities of these quintessential
spaces of ‘wild’ encounters within the city, wherein animals are “not only confined
and subdued…but also interpreted and classified” (Anderson 1995, 283).
20.2.3 The Streets/Parks/Margins
In the streets, parks, and ‘marginal’ (Gandy 2013) city spaces, we encounter ‘liminal’
stray, feral, or wild animals who negotiate their own existences, often counter to
human intentions. These unintentional or spontaneous spaces and beings, and in
particular the feral and synurbic, transgress expectations around who should be
using natural versus anthropogenic spaces and resources, and who should be making
a living autonomously versus through dependency on humans. Feral animals are
domesticated animals who have ‘gone wild’, in that they are no longer under human
care—or at least not in the traditional sense of ‘belonging’ to one particular owner or
household. Synurbic species are wild animals that thrive in cities (Luniak 2004), like
racoons, rats, crows, and seagulls. Both types of animals transgress nature/culture
divides: the feral by escaping the realm of culture, becoming unruly, indepen-
dent, and wild; the synurbic by crossing boundaries from nature into culture—into
cities—disrupting our expectations of the safe, tame, ordered space of the human.
Urban animals are often both materially and discursively invisible. Materially,
behavioural patterns are shifted to avoid attracting notice, for instance, through
becoming increasingly nocturnal (Gaynor et al. 2018). Discursively, they are back-
grounded, dismissed, or devalued as ‘common’, ‘pest’, or ‘trash’ animals (Nagy
and Johnson 2013). Liminal animals are often pitied, with assumptions about their
5As discussed by Evernden (1985) in the case of gorillas, and Whatmore (2002) in the case of an
African elephant.
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inevitable poor quality of life as they eke out an existence in such an ‘unnatural’
manner. But the heterogeneity of livelihood opportunities experienced by synurbic
and feral/stray/street animals defies simplistic assumptions about their lives and prac-
tices (Meijer, this volume; see also Van Patter and Hovorka 2018). They are also, at
times, celebrated, their transgressions, resistances, and agencies in coshaping urban
spaces and relations with humans indicating to some the resilience of nature.6 But, as
Meijer emphasizes in her chapter Stray agency and interspecies care: TheAmsterdam
stray cats and their humans, these relationships are inherently unequal, as despite
animals having a degree of choice in the spaces they occupy, resources they access,
and proximity to or avoidance of humans and other species, we ultimately have the
power to discourage, remove, or destroy unwanted or ‘nuisance’ individuals and
populations.
The city takes shape through myriad more-than-human relations within diverse
spaces, from the porous home, to the ambivalent zoo, and the liminal urban inter-
stices. Alongwith considering these urban ‘animal spaces’, it is important to consider
the politics of knowledge through which belongings are negotiated, and the ‘beastly
places’ of material animal lifeworlds.7 In terms of the former, this involves attending
to theways inwhich power operates in themaintenance of expertisewhereby ‘nature’
becomes intelligible in particular registers. For instance, in the chapters contained
herein, who can legitimately interpret the actions and motivations of Jacky and
Jinga?What happens when cat caretakers and more powerful agencies or institutions
disagree about what is best for cats, or for the community? Or when practitioners
and theorists are at odds about zoo animals’ lives, needs, and welfare? In terms of the
latter, our lack of knowledge about animals’ ecologies and lived realities can present
limitations for coexistence, and foregrounding their experiences, knowledges, and
practices is key to engaging with challenging questions of shared life in the Zoöpolis.
20.3 Towards the Zoöpolis
Over two decades ago Wolch (1996; Wolch et al. 1995) advanced that realising the
Zoöpolis8—the imagined city of multispecies cohabitation and belonging—requires
that we take animals seriously as legitimate matters of concern within urban policies
and practices. A number of interventions have advanced approaches which work
towards this, for instance: a ‘cosmopolitics’ in which space is made for diverse actors
to participate in a politics that resists narrow nature/society binaries (Hinchliffe et al.
2005); an understanding of ‘commoning’ as a more-than-human practice through
6See, for example, Montford and Taylor (2016).
7See Philo and Wilbert (2000), who formulate this distinction.
8The term is alsomobilizedbyDonaldson andKymlick (2011) to advance a political theoryof animal
inclusion within urban governance frameworks through a model of citizenship for domesticated
animals and denizenship for ‘liminal’ animals who live around humans but not in direct relations
of companionship.
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which the needs and benefits of diverse urban inhabitants are negotiated (Cooke
et al. 2019); and an ‘ethics of conviviality’ which demands that we “findmultiple, life
enhancing ways of sharing and co-producing meaningful and enduring multispecies
cities” (van Dooren and Rose 2012, 17). But many questions remain to be addressed,
and in the remainder of this chapter I reflect briefly on three avenues that merit further
engagement in thinking towards the Zoöpolis: ‘articulating with’ animals; making
visible relationalities; and re-storying the city to imagine otherwise.
20.3.1 ‘Articulating With’ Animals
The Zoöpolis requires an approach to urban policies and practices in which animals
“bring their own politics of recognition” (Narayanan 2017, 488). But attending to
animals’ ‘political voices’ (Meijer 2013) presents challenges in terms of how we
typically interpret, represent, and engage with animals. For instance, Meijer high-
lights that there are often inherent tensions within practices of care enacted for urban
animals, including paternalistic assumptions about what is ‘good’ for them (such
as sterilization in the case of feral/stray animals9). In asking questions about what
matters to animals and how they want to live, we need to shift away from speaking
for more-than-human Others, and towards experimental and generous modes of
articulating with them (Giraud 2019; Haraway 2003).
As Nieuwland and Meijboom point out, methodologically, we need to attend to
“the urban environment as an animal collective” by engaging “multispecies episte-
mologies”. For instance, Barua and Sinha’s (2019) etho-geographical approach asks
what animals’ knowledges and practices can tell us about life in the city, and the
material, ecological, and phenomenological dimensions of urbanization. By fore-
grounding animals’ experiences and lifeworld, we can begin to take seriously more-
than-humanmodes of inhabitation and claims to space. In so doing, wemove towards
seeing “urbanisation not as something merely going on in cities, but as a process
where dense traffic in commodities and materials transforms lifeworlds of humans
and animals, with asymmetric and often disturbing effects” (Barua and Sinha 2019,
1174).
20.3.2 Making Visible Relationalities
The Zoöpolis require a ‘politics of sight’ (Hunold 2019)10 wherein we learn to see
the city as legitimate habitat for many more-than-human Others embedded in rich
social and ecological relations. As delineated by Nieuwland and Meijboom in their
chapter “Eek! A Rat!”, being sensitive to particular animals’ circumstances and ways
9See also Srinivasan (2013).
10Drawing on Schlosberg (2016).
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of life can be ameaningful starting point for compassionate action. But, as the authors
note, compassion and care can be thwarted by the potency of affective dimensions—
such as visceral responses of disgust or fear—which are central to the ‘terrain of
killability’ (Gillespie and Collard 2015, 15) that constitutes our relations with many
urban animals. In overcoming these barriers to coexistence, there is value in both
pragmatic attention to suffering, and a metaphysics of interconnection. Only by
realizing the complexity of ecological interconnectedness—that we are all in this
together—can we hope to create futures of flourishing amidst the threats of global
crises like climate change, zoonotic pandemics, and extinction.
Rather than focusing narrowly on conflict mitigation, we need to make visible the
‘ecologies of care’ and resistancewhich permeate the urban (Meijer). Rethinking care
for the more-than-human city involves attending both to animals as individuals, and
as relationally-embedded within complex socio-ecological networks. For instance,
the intersections between individuals or groups of humans and animals are often
ignored when we consider urban animal management policies and their implications.
AsNarayanan (2017) discusses, close relationships of the urban poorwith street dogs,
who provide security and companionship, means that programs to ‘manage’ these
dogs often adversely impact the most marginalized human inhabitants of cities as
well. Similarly, Meijer notes the shared precarity of particular animals (stray/feral
cats) and the humans with whom they often associate (e.g. homeless, neurodiverse,
and economically disadvantaged individuals). It is imperative to carefully consider
the ways in whichmore-than-human identities, differences, and inequalities intersect
and are (re)producedwithinmultispecies relations of power (Hovorka 2019).Making
visible these relationalities within complex colonial-capitalist realities requires that
we resist oversimplifications and grasping for tidy answers. Though no easy task,
we have a responsibility to ‘stay with the trouble’ (Haraway 2008) and work to
make visible the violent histories and ongoing injustices and dispossessions in the
post-/settler colonial city. The Zoöpolis requires that we unlearn the anthropo- and
Eurocentric frames throughwhich the city is typically understood, with their “erasure
of existing kinship relations that have been nurtured for generations” (Porter et al.
2020, 10).
20.3.3 Re-Storying the City to Imagine Otherwise
Working towards the Zoöpolis requires that we ‘re-story’ the city, imagining ‘as
well as possible’ multispecies futures (Puig de la Bellacasa 2017) amidst the shared
precarity of the Anthropocene. One way in which to do so is by attending to the
lives of animals to weave a different narrative of urban life, one with the poten-
tial to envision “flourishing landscapes of coexistence, rather than battlescapes of
violence” (Narayanan 2017, 488). Engaging in such exercises of ‘imaging otherwise’
recognizes the interconnected nature of our imaginings, understandings, thoughts,
emotions, and practices, and their implications for material worldly becomings
(Walker 2013).
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How can we imagine the city otherwise, as a “co-emergent world based on inti-
mate human-more-than-human relationships of responsibility and care” (Bawaka
Country et al. 2016, 470)? We need to think carefully with ‘care’ in its asymmetrical
reciprocities (as Meijer notes, “cats also take care of humans”) and its messiness
and noninnocence (Puig de la Bellacasa 2017). Chrulew (2011, 139) notes that the
“caesura between the overloved and the unloved, between the politics of life and
death, bios and thanatos, brings into stark relief one of the central ethical questions of
our time: how shouldwe love in a time of extinction?”Within the city—in the zoo, the
home, and the streets/parks/margins—this ‘caesura’ plays out dramatically: with the
hyper-visible overloved—doted upon ‘fur babies’ and carefully cultivated spaces of
‘biodiversity’—and the made-invisible unloved—intensively eradicated ‘pests’ and
surplus stray/feral bodies. Thus, central to re-storying the city is confronting these
inequalities and the challenging questions surrounding what it means to love, to care,
to ‘live well’ with more-than-human Others in a time of planetary urbanisation.
Imagining theZoöpolis requires an openness to “riskyworldings” (Haraway 2008,
27) in which outcomes and optimal approaches and configurations remain uncertain.
It involves asking questions which include: Can we think of wild animals as compan-
ions, as Haraway (2008) suggests, but in ways that are attentive to the tensions of
space, boundaries, and remaining responsible for the futures that are created through
situated relatings?Canwe be open to the recombinant ecologies of theAnthropocene,
and rather than gazing into the past and clinging dogmatically to divisions of ‘native’
versus ‘exotic’ or ‘invasive’, ask ourselves what opportunities arrivant species may
offer, what we can learn from other animals about living together, and what our
responsibilities to these new configurations might be; as Reo and Ogden (2018)
suggest, drawing from Anishinaabe teachings and practices11? Can we think of feral
or stray animals as legitimate and valued components of urban socio-natures, as Srini-
vasan (2019) advances, moving towards non-dualistic understandings of belonging
in the multispecies city? Imagining the city otherwise—as a place of more-than-
human belonging—requires “a speculative commitment to think about how things
could be different… attached to situated and positioned visions of what a livable and
caring world could be” (Puig de la Bellacasa 2017, 60).
20.4 Conclusion
This chapter has briefly considered the spatial and politico-ethical dimensions of
multispecies urban cohabitations within three settings: the home, the zoo, and the
street/park/margins. Cities are heterogenous spaces composed ofmyriad actors, most
11Reo and Ogden (2018) discuss the concept of ‘aki’ within the Anishnaabe land ethic, which
denotes the “cosmological sense of the sacredness of place”, wherein teachings “hold land as
sacred and as the embodiment of Creation, as are all the living beings such as plants and animals,
as well as water, stones, and supernaturals” (1446). Within such an understanding, “the agency of
plants and animals, as persons, relatives, nations and teachers, are all central to how [Anishnaabe]
make sense of introduced species” (1445).
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of whom are not human, and are routinely made invisible within urban planning and
policies. Despite this, everyday practices reveal intimate interconnections of care and
violence, discipline and transgression.Urban animals becomeemplaced conceptually
and materially within dominant visions of what the city, the animal, and nature ought
to be.
But urban animals also shape spaces and relations according to their own needs
and lifeways. Addressing the pressing questions of coexisting with other species in a
time of planetary urbanisation requires that we see the city in a new light: as a space of
multispecies cohabitation and possibility. This chapter briefly advances three avenues
that could help in thinking towards the Zoöpolis: ‘articulating with’ animals, making
visible relationalities, and re-storying the city to imagine otherwise. It is crucial
that we continue working towards new understandings of urbanization and animals
in the Anthropocene which foreground multispecies justice and opportunities for
co-flourishing in the more-than-human city.
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Should We Provide the Bear Necessities?
Climate Change, Polar Bears
and the Ethics of Supplemental Feeding
Clare Palmer
Abstract This paper considers whether we have any moral responsibility to offer
supplemental feeding to wild animals who have lost food access due to climate
change. It takes as a particular case the situation of some individual polar bears who,
over the next decade, are likely to be threatened with abrupt loss of food access due to
changes in sea ice, potentially causing starvation. The paper argues that, as is implied
by most positions in animal ethics, there are ethical reasons to assist individual polar
bears by supplemental feeding. However, there are also good reasons to hesitate, and
to consider potential harms both to bears and to other animals, as well the loss of
wildness value that may be involved. From some ethical positions, the likely harms
involved make euthanasia ethically preferable to supplemental feeding. But on other
plausible ethical arguments, these likely harms are not decisive. We need to know
more about the possible effects of supplemental feeding of polar bears. So, the paper
concludes that when the first bears are threatened by abrupt loss of food access, a
trial of supplementary feeding should be considered in consultation with relevant
native peoples.
21.1 Introduction
Pied flycatchers arriving in the Netherlands from migration go hungry because their
migration is not shifting early enough tomatch evenmore rapid shifts in spring insect
peaks (Both et al. 2006). Rain falls on snow in the Arctic tundra in winter, freezing
into an ice sheet and making it impossible for reindeer to break through the ice to
1See this news story in The Guardian, February 24, 2019: https://www.theguardian.com/enviro
nment/2019/feb/25/decline-in-bogong-moth-numbers-leaves-pygmy-mountain-possums-starving.
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the browse below (Forbes et al. 2016). Massive declines in bogong moth numbers
in Australia, a vital food for breeding mountain pygmy possums, seem to be leading
possum litters to die from starvation in their mothers’ pouches.1 All these instances
of wild animals losing food access seem to be related to climate change. They are
ways in which human emissions of greenhouse gases are making life harder and
causing suffering to members of at least some wild animal species.
Dowe have anymoral responsibility to respond to such suffering? If so, what form
do these responsibilities take? Should we euthanize animals if a painful, drawn-out
death seems inevitable?Or shouldwe try to help at least some of these animals, where
we can, by attempting to restore food access patterns, or by offering supplemental
feeding?
Proposals to assist wild animals made hungry due to climate change, however,
raise a host of ethical (not to mention practical) challenges. One inevitable effect of
assistance would be to bring wild animals into new relationships with humans. This
may in itself be regarded as a problem, since it could be perceived as making wildlife
less “wild”. And even ethical positions that, in principle, accept that there’s reason
to assist wild animals undergoing food access difficulties due to climate change are
likely to diverge in terms of whether and how to assist—or whether to euthanize—in
particular cases (see Palmer 2019).
In this paper, I will focus on one case of climate-induced food access problems: the
situation of some individual polar bears over the next decade or two, who are likely to
be threatened with abrupt loss of food access, potentially causing starvation. Should
we help these bears? In particular, should we offer them supplemental feeding?
Some of the ethical issues raised by starving polar bears are unique. But this
case also raises a number of more general ethical questions about supplemental
feeding in the context of climate change, relating to multiple possible harms (to
the animals receiving supplementary feeding, to other animals, and to humans) as
well as benefits, to concerns about the loss of animals’ agency, and about the loss
of the wildness or naturalness of animals or places. I’ll argue here, as is implied by
most positions in animal ethics, that there is at least ethical reason to help individual
polar bears by supplemental feeding, with the goal of avoiding their suffering and
death from starvation and the possible extirpation of entire wild bear populations.
But it’s also clear that there are good reasons to hesitate, and to consider alternative
actions—including euthanasia—in the case of polar bears. And alongside ethical
concerns about individual animals, there are also worries about the creation of what
Arctic scientists Derocher et al. (2013) call “semi-managed bear parks”, which are
likely to reduce the amount of wildness value placed both on bears and their Arctic
environment.
Unfortunately, this situation presents a choice between only bad options. As I’ll
suggest, on some ethical views, euthanasia will normally look like a better choice
than supplemental feeding; but on other ethical views, we need to knowmore thanwe
currently do about what would actually happen if bears are fed, both in terms of short
and long term harms, and wildness impacts. So, I’ll end by tentatively suggesting
a feeding trial, where the first bears facing this desperate situation are fed, and the
results carefully assessed and monitored. But this suggestion also raises problems,
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since in many cases, polar bear habitat is shared with native peoples; feeding the
bears without engaging the humans that live nearby presents potential justice issues.
So, as I’ll conclude, any attempt to put some form of this suggestion into practice
also requires the meaningful participation of local native communities at an early
stage in the consideration of such a proposal.
21.2 Some Basic Premises of This Paper
This paper rests on several assumptions. First, I’ll assume that climate change is
anthropogenic. Second, I’ll also accept that humans are not just causally respon-
sible, but also morally responsible for climate change. I’ll base this conclusion (for
simplicity) on Nolt’s (2011) argument: We are morally responsible for a harm when
(1) We can cause or prevent the harm, (2) We can recognize it as morally significant,
(3) We can anticipate it with some reliability, and (4) We can act in less harmful
or more beneficial ways. Nolt maintains that while not all of these four conditions
held in the past with respect to climate change, this is no longer the case, at least in
industrialized countries. We know we are causing climate change; we can see that
its effects, not only on humans but also on non-humans, are morally significant; we
have a reasonable idea of what is likely to happen, and we can do something about
it. Of course, the details of how this moral responsibility is distributed over human
nations, populations and individuals over time and space, are contested, as is deter-
mining who has responsibilities to do what as a result. I do not have space to try to
untangle these important but complex matters here. For now, while recognizing this
as an over-simplification, I will merely claim that “we” are morally responsible for
climate change and for the harms it causes.
The particular harms I’ll be discussing here are those caused by climate change
to individual polar bears. The focus here is not on the possible extinction of the polar
bear species; indeed, it seems likely that some populations will, in fact, persist into
the foreseeable future.2 I’ll assume what’s fairly uncontentious—that polar bears are
sentient—and that the wellbeing of sentient animals matters morally. More contro-
versially, I’ll interpret the wellbeing or welfare of sentient animals in terms of their
subjective experience—what happens to them matters to them in terms of how it
feels; in particular, they have an interest in not suffering. I include as an aspect of
subjective wellbeing the expression of agency, in the sense of animals being able to
direct their own bodies and activities, pursuing goals and making choices about what
they do, and having motivational states (such as wanting things) (see Steward 2009).
There are, I should note, other interpretations of animalwelfare. On a perfectionist
view, things can matter for animals’ welfare even if they are not experienced by the
animal itself—in particular, the performance of natural behaviors, such as hunting.
On this view, if bears could not perform natural behaviors, this would matter for
their welfare, even if the bears themselves experienced no negative feelings as a
2See Palmer (2009) for a discussion about whether the polar bear species can be harmed.
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consequence. It might be argued, for instance, that they have lost something central
to their identity (Hettinger, pers. comm.) However, this is not the interpretation of
welfare I am adopting here. While it may be reasonable to argue that there’s a loss of
wildness value to us, in some sense, if bears can no longer perform natural behaviors
owing to human-derived constraints, if this loss is not experienced negatively by
the bears themselves, it does not (on my account) mean that their welfare has been
impacted.
Climate change also raises what’s known as the non-identity problem in the
context of wild animals. The non-identity problem draws attention to the possi-
bility that climate impacts could play such a significant role in wild animals’ lives
that any particular genetic individual would not have existed, but for the influence
of a changing climate. For instance, suppose a male polar bear only tracked and
mated with a particular female bear because melting ice forced him into an area he
would not otherwise have visited. The particular bear cub that resulted would, in
part at least, owe his or her existence to the melting ice brought about by a changing
climate. The problem then would be in saying later on, if that cub was starving due
to climate change, that he or she had been “harmed” or “unjustly treated”. After all,
had climate change not existed, this particular cub would not have existed either; the
mother would have had some other cub with a different father, or no cub at all.
While this is an interesting and important problem, and it will pose challenges for
thinking about climate justice both for future people and animals, I won’t consider it
in any detail here. Polar bears are relatively long lived (they can live for up to 20 years
in thewild); their solitary nature and dispersed populationsmean that whomateswith
who is much less chancy than among some other wild animal populations; and the
changes I’mconsidering are abrupt. Purves andHale (2016), in contrast,maintain that
a polar bear doesn’t live long enough “to perceive the effects of climatic change that
are the consequence of actions performed during its lifetime”. In terms of this paper,
though, (a) most individual bears currently in existence and coming into existence
would exist or have existed as particular genetic individuals without climate change,
i.e. climate change has not yet been identity-affecting; and (b) the relevant changes in
Arctic ice are likely to happen very swiftly, so that the individual bears will be made
abruptly worse off by climate change—the likelihood is one of sudden emergency,
rather than gradually unfavorable changes (though those are happening too). So, for
now, I’ll set the non-identity problem to one side.3
Finally: one likely objection to the premise of this paper is that responsive strate-
gies such as supplemental feeding fail to target what’s really important: that we
reduce greenhouse gas emissions, thereby reducing the amount that the planet will
warm, and so (among other things!) lessening impacts on wild animals. Of course,
this is the ideal strategy. However, while a slowing of emissions increases may be
within reach, significant overall global drops in emissions are not likely any time
soon. And, even if such drops occurred, there would still be a time lag before any
benefit was felt in terms of the preservation of sea ice. As Gardiner (2013) notes, the
3It’s also the case that much of what’s said here, relating to reducing animal suffering from climate
change, would work cast in impersonal terms, not just individual-affecting terms.
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effects of climate change are backloaded. It is possible that some form of geoengi-
neering might change the situation, but this is not near at hand either. We are locked
into a warming climate for the near future. And that’s enough to make it very likely
that the polar bear suffering I’ll be considering here will be triggered. Decisions
about assisting individual polar bears are likely to face us within the next decade or
so, whatever happens to global greenhouse gas emissions in the near term.
21.3 The Situation of Polar Bears
There are around 26,000 polar bears in total across the Arctic, with sub-populations
(scientists have designated 19 of these) across Norway, Alaska, Greenland, Russia
andCanada. The bears live and huntmostly on sea ice. It’s because of this dependence
on Arctic sea ice that they are threatened by climate change across their circumpolar
range, but especially in the Canadian Arctic Archipelago (IUCN Red List 2015).
One of the most striking effects of climate change so far has been the unprecedented
melting of sea ice, and this has already had effects on some (although not all) polar
bear populations.
Polar bears use sea ice as their base from which to hunt ringed and to a lesser
extent bearded seals, their main prey and food source (Stirling et al. 1993). If there’s
no ice, bears find it very difficult to hunt. In the summer months, when sea ice has
alwaysmelted out to some degree, some bears come onto land, while others move out
onto the pack ice further from the shore; some bears currently swim between shore
and pack ice (Pongracz and Derocher 2017). While bears are on land, if there’s no
sea ice, there’s no access to seals. So bears mostly fast, living on their own stored fat,
and what they can scavenge in terms of birds’ eggs, whale carcasses left from native
human communities’ hunting, and other food from human communities (potentially
leading to bear-human conflicts).
The looming problem for bears, however, is that sea ice is melting out earlier
and re-forming later. Those bears that are on the land are already forced to live off
body fat for longer periods. As the pack ice is further from the shore, it will become
increasingly difficult, dangerous and exhausting to swim to and from it, and bears
will effectively have to stay on land and fast until the sea ice forms again. Difficulty
in finding sufficient nutrition over the lengthening summer has already resulted in a
significant worsening in the body condition of bears in some populations (Stirling
and Derocher 2012). But as the Arctic warms disproportionately to the rest of the
Earth, in a year that is likely approaching, sea ice is likely to melt out too soon
and re-form too late for some bears to survive the fasting period involved. Polar bear
scientistsDerocher et al. (2013), in a controversial paper I’ll drawon in several places,
conclude: “Malnutrition at previously unobserved scales may result in catastrophic
population declines and numerous management challenges” (Derocher et al. 2013,
370). So, what—if anything—can and should be done to meet such “management
challenges”?
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21.4 Possible Responses to Abrupt Polar Bear Starvation
Derocher et al. (2013, 368) propose several possible “proactive conservation and
management options” for polar bears in the event of “sudden negative population-
level effects”. It’s worth noting that these scientists’ concern is not primarily for the
welfare of individual polar bears (though occasionally this worry is suggested in
their paper), but for the persistence of polar bear populations and the avoidance of
human/bear conflicts that may threaten either human safety or species conservation
goals. However, while the scientists’ emphasis may be on species conservation, in
this case, the strategies to protect species also appear to be the only plausible ones
available to assist individual bears as well. Since I have no special expertise in
polar bear management, I’ll confine this discussion to the suggestions outlined in the
Derocher et al.’s (2013) paper:
(a) Cessation of existing bear harvests to help promote population persistence.
(b) Diversionary feeding: feeding bears to move them away from human commu-
nities. Risks to bears include disease and parasites from foodstuffs, and these
risks are particularly problematic if wild food from other ecosystems is used.
(c) Supplemental feeding: providing bears with “sufficient short-term energy to
help individuals survive periods of food deprivation” (Derocher et al. 2013,
372). This also poses risks of disease, and may just postpone bear extirpa-
tion, as well as being costly and logistically difficult. But the authors consider
there will be cases where this is one of the most plausible strategies avail-
able: “we believe supplemental feeding will be a conservation option for some
populations” (Derocher et al. 2013, 372).
(d) Translocating animals either into temporary or long-term captivity in local
facilities or distant zoos, or into alternative wild habitats. Any kind of captivity
would probably need to become permanent, the authors note, given the nature
of the threat, while translocation into new habitat, according to the authors,
is very risky to the bears, not least because bears show “strong geographical
fidelity”. The authors “do not advocate this as a viable conservation alternative”
(Derocher et al. 2013, 373).
(e) Intentionally euthanizing starving bears: This “may be the most humane
option for individual bears that are in very poor condition and unlikely to
survive” – and, they argue, guidelines need to be developed to clearly identify
such bears (Derocher et al. 2013, 373).
(f) Do nothing: The authors reject this as a conservation option, but it’s clearly
what they fear as the most likely scenario, unless the alternative options are
widely discussed in advance of an abrupt starvation event occurring.
Looking at these five options: (a), reducing or ending bear harvest is not a way of
responding to individual starving bears, so is not directly relevant here. Derocher
et al. (2013) are largely negative about (d), captivity/relocation, as being risky, short
term, difficult to scale up and unlikely to be successful, so I will not discuss relocation
options here (although this does not mean that translocation/captivity could not be an
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effective strategy in other species where food access has been negatively impacted).
This leaves (b), (c), (e) and (f). I’ll focus on these here. There’s no obvious reason not
tomerge (b) and (c) and consider supplemental feeding that’s also diversionary; I will
consider option (e) euthanizing bears (probably by shooting them) as a potentially
“humane” alternative; and assume that (f) is the default situation. So, in a situation
of abrupt starvation, should we offer supplemental, diversionary food to the bears?
21.5 Ethical Reasons for Supplemental
Feeding of Starving Bears
From a number of different ethical positions, we have reason to feed bears starving
due to climate change. Some of these positions are rights- or justice-based; others
are based on beneficence; and yet others are based on environmental values.
Justice-based arguments, of the kind I have previously defended (Palmer 2010,
145) take something like this form:Polar bears are sentient animals, and their lives and
wellbeing matter morally. Climate change—for which humans are morally respon-
sible, following Nolt’s argument above—threatens polar bears with severe suffering
and death. What’s more, polar bears have gained no benefits from the production of
the fossil fuels that have led to climate change (indeed some individuals may have
been additionally harmed by oil and gas extraction or transportation). So, the severe
impacts of climate change on bears look like a distributive injustice, in terms of the
infliction of morally significant harms on sentient beings that have nothing to gain
from the process that produced the harms.
One particular version of this argument is based on animals’ rights. So, it’s
frequently argued that climate change violates human rights. Caney (2010), for
instance, maintains that climate change violates basic (negative) human rights not to
be deprived of life, of food and water, or of health. If sentient animals have similar
basic negative rights, then climate change can violate animals’ rights too (an argu-
ment specifically made by Pepper [2018]). The polar bear case, after all, is exactly a
case about deprivation of access to something very basic—food: a deprivation that
leads to a decline in bear health and ultimately to death; exactly the concerns of
negative rights theories.
One need not defend a rights argument, however, to see this as an injustice or,
at least, a wrongful harm, as I have argued elsewhere (Palmer 2010). Either way,
this injustice or rights violation cannot be halted any time soon, given the nature
of climate change. So, the next best option is to try to mitigate the effects of the
injustice or rights violation by offering rectificatory assistance to the animals worst
affected. Although rectificatory justice has not, as yet, been widely discussed by
animal ethicists, especially in the context of climate change, such discussions as
there are have indeed argued that negative impacts of climate change may warrant
rectificatory responses. I have argued, for instance, (Palmer 2010) that where sentient
animals suffer from climate change, special obligations of assistance are created.
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Milburn (2016)maintains that onNozick’s entitlement theory of justice, since climate
change arises as a result of human appropriation, it violates animals’ rights, creating
a state of injustice that can only be remedied if every individual animal negatively
affected by climate change were compensated in ways that leave them no worse off.
Pepper (2018) argues that, in the context of climate change, moral agents have a
“general duty to facilitate adaptation” where climate change threatens wild animals’
basic rights. On all these arguments, we have reasons or duties to assist polar bears
in this situation.
In a slightly different justice argument, Donaldson and Kymlicka (2011, 2017)
propose that sentient wild animals should be recognized as members of self-
organizing, sovereign wild animal communities. The purpose of designating these
communities “sovereign” is to protect them from human incursion—for instance,
by human colonization, displacement, and “spillover harms” such as environmental
pollution. (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011, 157) Climate change is, on this view,
also an injustice; it’s a human incursion into sovereign communities that undermines
“the ecological fabric they [wild animals] depend on” (Kymlicka 2014). Applying
this to the bears’ case would suggest that in causing bears to starve, anthropogenic
climate change both violates the rights of individual bears, and the boundaries of the
sovereign wild community.
For Donaldson and Kymlicka, though, this does not necessarily mean that if we
can’t realistically stop an unjust incursion (as in this case) we should assist the wild
animals concerned as a matter of rectificatory justice. These wild communities are,
after all, supposed to be sovereign. Attempts to assist should not undermine the
sovereignty of the wild community. So, for Donaldson and Kymlicka, in the bears’
case,whilewe clearly have reason to assist, whetherwe should actually do so depends
on the kind of intervention, and how sustained and continuous it would be.
A second group of views in animal ethics focus on duties of beneficence rather than
justice. They maintain that what matters is just relieving and reducing wild animal
suffering, whether the origin of the suffering is human or not. As Horta (2015) puts
it, the moral relevance of animal suffering “gives us reason to conclude that we
should intervene in those cases where it is feasible, in order to reduce the disvalue
suffered by nonhuman animals”, although only in “cases in which we can reduce it
[suffering] as a whole, not in some isolated way that reduces disvalue for some in
ways that trigger processes that result in more suffering elsewhere”. This seems to
have a fairly simple application to the bears case: Since bears are clearly suffering,
and since feeding them would, at first glance anyway, seem likely to alleviate their
suffering,we clearly have reason to feed them.The question, though, iswhether doing
so would “trigger processes that result in more suffering elsewhere.” I’ll return to
this question below.
Lastly, there are ethical views that emphasize the value of wildness or natu-
ralness. One particularly sophisticated version of this view has been proposed by
Hettinger (2018), who develops a principle of ‘Respect for an Independent Nature’
(RIN). However, even if the primary principle here is RIN, animal suffering still
matters. Indeed, Hettinger says: “wild-animal suffering too is intrinsically bad. And
its badness does give us a moral reason to consider alleviating or preventing it.” So,
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this also sounds like a beneficence-based reason for alleviating or preventing wild
animal suffering. Certainly, relieving wild animal suffering could be in tension with
the principle of respect for an independent Nature; in the case of the polar bears,
we might expect supplemental feeding to be ethically problematic on the grounds
that it compromises naturalness. Hettinger’s position, however, is more nuanced.
While “preserving naturalness value typically outweighs the importance of allevi-
ating animal suffering,” he notes that some interventions can relieve suffering while
causing little loss in naturalness value, and also that “some intentional human influ-
ence on nature can lessen human impact overall, as when we remove the first few
members of a human-introduced invasive species before it has time to spread” (2018,
69). So, on this view, we do at least have reason, based both on beneficent responses
to the intrinsic badness of animal suffering, and the potential loss of wild populations
in natural places, to offer supplemental feeding to starving bears. The ethical concern
here is the degree to which doing so would cause loss of naturalness value overall.
From almost all positions in both animal and environmental ethics, then, there’s at
least reason to assist the bears by offering supplemental feeding, whether on the basis
that their starvation would be an injustice (as I have argued elsewhere) or a rights
violation, or because we generally have duties of beneficence to relieve suffering
where we find it. Almost anyone who thinks that sentient animals are morally consid-
erable, and that their suffering matters, will agree. However, this isn’t to say that all
things considered feeding polar bears is the right thing to do. Assistance may cause
further suffering to bears or to other animals. It may undermine the autonomy of wild
animal sovereign communities. Or it may reduce overall naturalness or wildness, and
thereby fail to respect independent nature. So, what do we need to know to reach an
all things considered view?
21.6 Ethical Reservations About Feeding Bears
First, we should consider what supplemental feeding would require in a sudden
starvation event where, for at least one bear population, sea ice forms so late that
bears won’t make it through the summer. It’s likely that, initially, this event will
be short, it won’t happen every year, and only some populations of bears will need
feeding for a week or two. In this case, food could be air-dropped to the bears on a
one-off basis. However, given continuing sea ice loss, after a few years, supplemental
feeding is likely to involve more populations, every year, for longer periods, possibly
amounting eventually to many or all bears in some populations requiring feeding for
several months each year.
Clearly, feeding polar bears in this way would reduce or remove their suffering
from hunger. And we’ve already seen that there are ethical reasons to prevent serious
bear suffering from hunger due to sea ice loss. However, significant ethical reserva-
tions about assistance also exist. Here I’ll look at two major ethical worries: Would
feeding bears cause more suffering, or additional harm/injustices to bears or to other
sentient animals? And: Does loss of the sovereignty of wild animal communities,
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or the loss of wildness/naturalness, involved in creating what Derocher et al. (2013)
call “semi-managed bear parks” outweigh ethical reasons for assistance?
21.6.1 Would Feeding Bears Harm the Bears Themselves?
Studies of human intentional supplemental feeding across a range of wild species
show mixed benefits to wild animals’ welfare; the balance of benefits and risks
depends on the nature and purpose of the supplemental feeding, and how consistent
andwell controlled it is. Dubois and Fraser (2013), in awide-ranging review of publi-
cations on supplemental feeding, argue that supplemental feeding can be hazardous
to the animals being fed, as well as leading to potential harms to other animals and to
people. They argue that some managed conservation projects such as, for instance, a
project that restored the Mauritius Kestrel, use supplemental feeding to good effect,
in terms of both conservation and animalwelfare. Butmany other instances of supple-
mental feeding, in particular where opportunistic and uncontrolled, and especially
where associatedwith tourism, can havewide-ranging negative effects on thewelfare
of members of the assisted populations. Dubois and Fraser ultimately recommend
that supplementary feeding should only be undertaken in cases where the feeding
could be carefully controlled, is intended to benefit populations, and may improve
animal welfare (Dubois and Fraser 2013, 984).
This description, though, matches pretty closely what we would expect supple-
mental feeding of polar bears to look like. It would need to be controlled; it would
support the continuation of bear populations that may otherwise be extirpated; and
the primary goal, as discussed here at least, would be to improve the welfare of
individual bears. But still, there are risks to the bears from being fed. One obvious
risk is of conflict with human beings, if feeding brought bears into humans’ orbit,
increasing threats to people. However, I’ve already suggested that feeding would
need to be diversionary as well as supplemental—i.e., it would need to be located
away from human communities to avoid generating human/bear conflict (DeRocher
et al. [2013] suggest it should be placed by helicopter). In some Arctic communities,
diversionary feeding of bears is already occasionally used,4 and ways of preventing
conflict between bears, and between bears and other species, have been devised; so
this risk may be manageable. Another risk is that disease could spread between bears
at feeding stations; and while this risk can be minimized, it can’t altogether be elim-
inated (a feline leukemia outbreak in endangered Iberian lynx was connected back
to feeding stations: Palomares et al. 2011). Another worry may be that while feeding
bears has the effect, in the short term, of reducing their suffering and keeping them
alive, in the long term it may change bears’ behavior in ways that reduce their welfare
by limiting agency or increasing suffering, if the fed bears were no longer able, or
willing, to hunt for themselves. I’ll discuss this worry in more detail later. But it’s
4See https://polarbearsinternational.org/research/research-qa/why-are-managers-not-feeding-
polar-bears-in-the-wild/. Accessed 23 March 2020.
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still worth noting that unlike most of the cases of supplementary feeding considered
by Dubois and Fraser, without supplemental feeding, these bears will starve and die.
The bears’ suffering is acute, and their need is urgent, even though with feeding their
futures are also uncertain.
21.6.2 Would Feeding Bears Harm Other Sentient Animals?
Polar bears are predators, “the most carnivorous of all bears” (IUCN 2015). They
are adapted to eat extremely high levels of fat—much more so than most other
carnivores—and they eat very little plant matter. Their primary food source is ringed
and bearded seals; they will scavenge on whale carcasses, and sometimes eat fish,
walruses or birds’ eggs (in fact in Norway a new problem created by hungry bears
unable to catch seals is that they are eating goose eggs, and so depleting goose
populations by up to 90% [Hoffman 2017]).
This raises two kinds of concern about harm to members of sentient species other
than polar bears. One direct concern is: Given their highly carnivorous natures, what
should they be fed on? And another, more indirect, concern is: If we save the lives of
bears, and they go back to preying on seals, aren’t we allowing (or even responsible
for causing) harm to seals?
Both these concerns are difficult to address, given that the motivation for the
feeding here is to help sentient animals, either because reducing suffering is in itself
a goal, or because humans are morally responsible for causing polar bear suffering.
But if the worry is just about suffering, it isn’t species specific; the suffering of
members of other species also must be important, if we are to be consistent.
Let’s begin, then, with the food itself. It needs to be nutritionally adequate, espe-
cially if used for longer periods. It must include very high quantities of fat; no
nutritionally adequate alternative to animal products currently exists, or is likely to
exist on the timescale required, i.e. in the next ten years. So, realistically, feeding
bears now means feeding them with other animals (as zoo polar bears are currently
fed). The two most plausible alternatives are feeding them with seals that are killed
and air-dropped, or using polar bear chow developed for zoo polar bears (although
chow is currently only recommended as 50% of a bear’s diet in a zoo—it is normally
supplemented by raw meat and fish [Lintzenich et al. 2006]).
So: first, should bears be fed with seals? This would require the killing of ringed
seals, thus harming them or violating their rights, depending on the philosophical
perspective taken; although it probably could be donewithout causingmuch suffering
to the seals actually killed (though there may be stressful effects on the seals that
remain). On some moral views, including most rights views, killing wild seals to
feed bears would be absolutely unacceptable in principle. In addition, doing so could
be interpreted as attempting to compensate for an ongoing injustice to one group of
animals by harming a second group of animals to benefit that first group. However,
Abbate (2016) tentatively proposes, in the context of a rights view (she draws on
Regan [1984], but other rights views might work here too), that where animals are
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victims of injustice—as the polar bears are in this case—it may be justified to harm
other animals in order to fulfil our duty to the victims of injustice. But even if this
argument works in some cases, it seems problematic in the case of feeding polar
bears ringed seals.
Recent research suggests that populations of ringed seals are also threatened by
climate change. They give birth in lairs protected by snow roofs, so that bears can’t
easily see them. However, as snow and ice melt out earlier due to climate change, the
snow roofs on ringed seal lairs are collapsing, exposing pups to bear attacks.Although
bears kill these exposed seal pups, the pups are still too small to have nutritional
value to the bears, and sometimes bears don’t even eat them (Stirling 2017). Climate
change, then, is making ringed seal pups more vulnerable to attack, and preventing
many female seals from successfully raising pups. So, it seems reasonable to say
that ringed seals are also being harmed by anthropogenic climate change, or that
they too, like bears, are in a state of injustice. And it certainly seems problematic to
try to compensate one set of victims of injustice by killing another set of victims of
injustice (Derocher et al. [2013] may in fact be gesturing at this by commenting—
somewhat elliptically—that “There are also ethical questions around killing one
marine mammal species to supplement the diet of another”). Abbate (2016) argues
that, from Regan’s rights view at least, if it’s absolutely necessary to feed an obligate
carnivore who is a victim of injustice withmeat from another animal, it’s better to kill
wild animals than to use the products of animal agriculture. Although wild animals
are harmed by being killed, she claims, they can still be treated with respect; their
entire lives are not instrumentalized, as the lives of agricultural animals are. However,
she also maintains that animals who are victims of injustice—like the ringed seals
in this case—should not be killed to feed other victims of injustice. So, there seem
to be serious ethical obstacles to using ringed seals to feed bears. While harp seals
would be an alternative, and would meet Abbate’s criteria, since they don’t yet seem
to be negatively affected by climate change, they would need to be brought in from
different ecosystems. Derocher et al. (2013) rule out this possibility on the grounds
that there’s a high risk of importing disease and parasites to the bears by feeding
them harp seals from other ecosystems.
The alternative option here is polar bear chow. Current commercial chow, formu-
lated especially for polar bears, includes fish meal and a high proportion of extruded
pork fat and bone meal. The fish meal is made from menhaden, wild fish high in
fat, normally used for fish oil and fishing bait. On Abbate’s terms, as wild fish,
the menhaden don’t have instrumentalized lives, and they aren’t obviously already
victims of injustice like ringed seals. So, using menhaden would at least be some-
what ethically preferable to using seals (perhaps, also, on some views, menhaden
may be regarded as having fewer complex psychological interests than polar bears,
and so being of less moral significance; but then, on the other hand, more of them
would need to be used). The pork fat and bone meal in the chow is almost certainly
derived from parts of pigs that humans don’t eat, rendered into animal by-product,
and would otherwise be used for fertilizer or feeding other animals in pet food. So,
pigs would not be directly killed to feed bears, although of course the production of
bone meal and meat byproduct is part of the meat industry. So, while the production
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of bear chow may be somewhat ethically preferable to killing seals, obviously it still
involves harm to other animals.
Let’s move on to the secondworry: Suppose we feed the bears for a period of time,
achieve the goal of keeping them alive, and then they go back out hunting again—
and killing ringed seals. Should we be worried about the predation of bears that have
been kept alive by us? The answer here depends on the ethical approach taken. For
those theorists primarily concerned with wild animal suffering in general, the bears’
continued predation hooks into a more general deep unease with predation (see for
instance, McMahan 2014). Cowen (2003), one such theorist, even maintains that
“we should count negative impacts on carnivores as positive features of … human
policy” and rejects subsidizing “the propagation of carnivorous wild animals”. From
positions like Cowen’s, then, helping predators is in principle unacceptable, since
predators will inevitably go on and cause suffering. The best option here, then, of
the options above is (e). We should euthanize the bears and end their suffering, and
at the same time, prevent them from causing suffering to seals by future predation.
However, we should not be too hasty here, since we can’t be sure that euthanizing
polar bears would actually reduce seal suffering; the effects of removing members
of one predatory species are unpredictable. Seals may suffer from other causes, or
become too abundant for available resources; and in any case, seals are themselves
predators causing suffering. Trying to estimate the broad-range effects of euthanizing
polar bears rather than feeding them to reduce overall suffering thus runs into huge
epistemological difficulties, as Delon and Purves (2018) point out. So, it may be that
in this case, from the suffering-reduction view, it’s just best to look at the immediate
suffering with which one is faced—the starving bears—and deal with that particular
problem, rather than trying to work out what the down-the-line impacts on wild
animal suffering overall would be.
For justice theorists, a somewhat different conundrum is presented. Rectificatory
justice to polar bears may, after all, look like an injustice, or a responsibility for harm,
to the ringed seals that later become the surviving bears’ prey. After all, if humans
had not helped these bears, these seals would not be bear prey. This raises difficult
questions for justice-based approaches (questions that are also, of course, found in
human justice cases, for instance where reparations to one group that has suffered
an injustice leaves others, who have not themselves caused harms, much worse off).
How far one should be concerned about this is contested in the human case—for
instance, there are significant disputes about how far indirect effects of rectificatory
interventions should be counted as part of the intervention itself. In addition, in this
case, it might be argued that the bears’ continued predation, in effect, just restores
the status quo for the seals. After all, supplemental feeding means that the same
number of bears are out on the ice preying on seals as would have been there had the
anthropogenic climate threat of sudden starvation not arisen. It’s not as though we
have been breeding additional polar bears with a view to having them attack ringed
seals for some purposes of our own! Nonetheless, from some justice perspectives,
feeding bears is unjust to the particular seals that are preyed upon by human-saved
bears, and this may be a decisive ethical factor in decision-making.
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So, some of those deeply concerned about justice or suffering reduction for
sentient animals, may consider that there are very strong reasons not to offer supple-
mental feeding. The cost to other sentient animals of feeding bears is too high, either
in terms of increasing overall animal suffering (despite reducing it for polar bears)
or causing new injustices to other animals, even while rectifying injustice to polar
bears. The consequence is, though, that some polar bears, in a reasonably near year,
will very likely starve to death. All those who take this kind of ethical view would
recommend shooting bears (or euthanizing them in some other way, if that’s more
painless) as preferable to letting them starve. Shooting them ends their suffering, and
would then be the best we can do for them in terms of rectificatory justice.
From some ethical positions, this conclusion seems definitive. However, I want
to continue to explore the possibilities here a bit further. There do also seem to be
reasonable ethical positions focused on individual sentient animals that could still
defend feeding bears as the best of a set of bad options. For instance, someone
taking a rectificatory justice view could argue that feeding bears polar bear chow
can be justified, despite harms to other animals, because we are dealing here with a
non-ideal situation where there are only “imperfect solutions to horrific problems”
(Emmerman 2014). With respect to what is actually fed to polar bears, intensive
animal agriculture and fishing for wild menhaden is also not going away any time
soon, and the vast majority of people will not be vegetarian or vegan. Nor will their
dogs and cats. In this context, why pick out polar bears—obligate carnivores, unlike
people and dogs, at least—whom we have already unjustly deprived of the ability
to feed themselves, and insist that they should starve or be shot since they can’t at
present eat vegan? This potentially adds a further layer of injustice to the ones from
which the bears are already suffering by, as it were, picking them out for conditions
that aren’t generally insisted upon for our companion animals. Add this to the view
that feeding bears chow to enable their survival just returns to the status quo in
terms of subsequent seal predation, and such a justice position is not firmly decided
against supplemental feeding. Similarly, on a beneficence view, if bears were fed on
fatty animal by-products, so not causing additional suffering to intensively farmed
animals, and it was accepted that the outcomes for overall suffering that would result
from feeding bears were incalculable, then there would at least be a possible ethical
case for supporting feeding bears on polar bear chow for the times in the near future
when sea ice has not yet formed.
21.7 The Problem of “Semi-Managed Bear Parks”
So far, I’ve only considered supplemental feeding of bears with respect to justice,
harms and suffering to individual animals. I’ve suggested that from some ethical
positions, concerns about these factors would support euthanasia over supplemental
feeding, but that from other perspectives, the door is not entirely closed to supple-
mental feeding. But these were only some of the values with which I began the paper:
I also mentioned naturalness/wildness values, bear agency, and what Donaldson and
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Kymlicka (2011) call “sovereign wild animal communities”. And with respect to
these values, we’re not yet out of the woods. One of the issues Derocher et al. (2013)
raise is that a supplementary feeding programmight result in commitment to a “semi-
managed bear park model if habitat conditions continue to decline.” Wouldn’t the
existence of such “bear parks” challenge naturalness values, the agency of bears, and
the “sovereignty” of wild animal communities?
21.7.1 The Worry About Naturalness Value
Let’s start with wildness or naturalness value, taking Hettinger’s (2018) idea of
“Respect for IndependentNature” as paradigmatic of this view. To recap, naturalness,
Hettinger says, “involves an overall judgment of the degree of independence of an
entity from humans, that is, of the extent to which a being is autonomous vis-à-vis
humanity.” Clearly, anthropogenic climate change has reduced naturalness in this
sense. But it has not entirely eliminated it, so that “anything goes”. We can still
treat animals in ways that are problematically more “unnatural” than others. So,
Hettinger (2018, 78) comments: “For example, that anthropogenic climate change
has dramatically increased the rate of interbreeding between Grizzly Bears and Polar
Bears does not mean there is no naturalness left to protect in our treatment of them or
their ecosystems. This impact would not undermine the unnaturalness of relocating
Polar Bears from the Arctic to Antarctica, even ignoring the negative consequences
this would have on penguins and other southern species.”
So, how would feeding the bears relate to this idea of naturalness value? First, it’s
important to note that Hettinger’s concern is aboutwhat’s likely to protect naturalness
best overall. So, a temporary intervention that would wash out, with the purpose of
protecting long-term naturalness, would overall be a good thing. However, feeding
the polar bears is unlikely to be temporary—that’s why there’s a concern about semi-
managed bear parks. Some bears may become dependent on people, potentially in
the long term, for significant parts of the year. This does look like a major loss of
naturalness value, and suggests that if naturalness value is a priority, we should not
feed polar bears—independent of any concerns about what they are actually fed on.
However, Hettinger (2018) doesmention one case that leaves the door ajar to justi-
fying feeding starving polar bears on the basis of naturalness value. When discussing
an (imagined) case of geneticallymodifyingmembers of an animal species, theAmer-
ican pika, in order to prevent extinction from climate change impacts, Hettinger
(2018, 69) notes that if the pika were not modified “it is arguable that it [the extinc-
tion] would give us a much greater impact on nature than we would have with our
rescue attempt.” So, the impact of anthropogenic species loss on naturalness value
could be greater than the impact of a human intervention to save the species, even a
long-lasting intervention like genetic modification.
Paralleling this case, then, we could see feeding polar bears as one way of keeping
bears on the landscape. An Arctic landscape that retains polar bears may be regarded
as more natural than an Arctic landscape that lacks them, even if human intervention
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is required to keep them there. (This may depend on whether landscape naturalness
is understood more in terms of composition, that is what kinds of things are present,
than history, that is how things got to be or to remain on a landscape.)
However, the bear case is potentially more naturalness-undermining than the pika
one. First, the pika intervention aimed to avoid extinction; but here we are talking
about feeding some individual bears for the bears’ sake, not because they are the
last bears (although certainly particular bear populations in particular places could be
lost, and thiswould be a big human impact on those landscapes). And second, the idea
of modifying the pika was to allow them to go on living their normal pika lives, not to
live in semi-managed pika parks. I’m not sure what semi-managed bear parks would
look like, but if they involved human structures (beyond feeding stations), human
populations, tourists etc. then they are likely to undermine naturalness values more
significantly. In this sense, while a short-term intervention for a couple of weeks,
preventing bears from starving and helping them back out onto the ice, is likely to
enhancenaturalness value overall, if feeding becomes long termand institutionalized,
and bears can no longer hunt from sea ice much at all, feeding bears is likely to
diminish overall naturalness value.
21.7.2 The Worry About Bear Agency and Longer Term
Vulnerability
Earlier in the paper, I defined agency in the context of sentient animals as about the
subjective experiences involved in being able to direct their own bodies and activities,
to pursue goals and make choices about what they do, and to have motivational states
(such aswanting things). Oneworry about “semi-managed bear parks” is that feeding
bears over time may constrain their agency, creating negative experiences, and in
doing so also making them more vulnerable to other threats later on.
First, it’s worth noting: Climate change itself creates a major restriction on bears’
agency in this sense. Bears can no longer use sea ice to hunt seals for significant
portions of the year; and sea ice is the main arena of bears’ activity—where they
make choices about when and where to hunt and so on. Bears’ inability to pursue
these characteristic behaviors in their own individual ways presumably causes them
stress and distress.
Unlike climate change, supplemental feeding does not intrinsically restrict bears’
agency. Indeed, in one sense it offers them an opportunity to satisfy their hunger that
they won’t refuse, so long as the food is palatable; they will choose to eat it. But there
is a deeper worry about agency here: that supplementary food will eventually make
bears dependent on human beings for provision, and will harm them by depriving
them of the ability to make future choices. This is unlikely to happen initially, if
bears are just fed for a week or two, and then, when ice forms, feeding is withdrawn,
forcing the bears back to the shore and to hunting seals. However, if, as warming
continues, feeding is extended to a month or several months, dependence is more
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likely to follow, possibly becoming year-round (although at the moment we just
don’t know what effects more extended feeding of wild bears would have on their
behavior).
As Donaldson and Kymlicka (2011) rightly argue, being dependent is not intrin-
sically a bad state. However, in the context of wild polar bears, dependency raises
questions both in terms of agency and further future vulnerability. In particular,
it makes bears more vulnerable to human policy changes—for instance, if those
sponsoring the feeding decide that feeding bears costs too much, or that preserving
naturalness value in Arctic landscapes is more important than feeding bears in semi-
managed bear parks. And so, feeding now might in principle lead to less expression
of bear agency and more bear suffering in future.
I say “in principle” though, because we mustn’t forget the context here. If there’s
no supplementary feeding, these particular hungry bears have no choices at all, either
now, or in the future, because they’ll starve. As Horta (2015, 118) notes, “remaining
alive is a condition to enjoy autonomy”. Seen from that perspective, feeding may
be better in that, at least, bears retain their lives, and some ability to express agency
(after all, not every choice that a bear makes is about what it’s going to eat)! So,
even though climate change and supplemental feeding likely do mean reduced bear
agency, as their lives are more constrained than they would otherwise be, from the
perspective of these particular bears, given the intensifying pervasiveness of climate
change, we can reasonably imagine that supplemental feeding is what they would
choose, were they able to understand the nature of the choices involved.
21.7.3 The Worry About Sovereign Communities
Alongside concerns about individual animals’ agency, Donaldson and Kymlicka’s
political account of our relation to wild animals also includes a concern about wild
animal communities. Wild animals“should be recognized as having the right to live
autonomously on their own territories, and hence as exercising their own sovereignty”
(Donaldson and Kymlicka 2017). Human interventions to relieve suffering are
permissible if they are small scale or temporary, thus maintaining the ongoing
sovereignty of the community. However, this is unlikely to remain the situation
here. Feeding the bears might become permanent and ongoing—exactly the kind
of intervention Donaldson and Kymlicka reject: “a kind of permanent paternalistic
management in which we take over responsibility for feeding and sheltering them”
where “we are basically turning wilderness into a zoo” (Kymlicka 2014).
However, Donaldson and Kymlicka’s objections to sustained interventions focus
on fundamentally “competent” wild animal communities, where members of the
community can normally meet their own needs. But climate change in the Arctic is
changing all this. Its pervasive effect on particular places is essentially rendering the
existing wild animal community in those places “incompetent”. Ideally, of course,
on Donaldson and Kymlicka’s theory, recognition of this injustice to wild animal
sovereign communities should force humans sharply to reduce emissions, andprevent
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or at least reduce the unjust incursion at its origin. But in the non-ideal political
circumstances that currently prevail, this isn’t going to happen, and even if it did, as
noted, there’s enough warming already built into the earth’s systems for some bears
to starve in the next few years. So the question of intervention doesn’t go away.
Thekeyquestionhere seems to be: Is there anypoint,when a sovereignwild animal
community is so anthropogenically compromised that members of the community
are starving, in continuing to protect the community’s “sovereignty” by rejecting
sustained intervention? If the primary purpose of sovereignty rights is, ultimately, to
best protect wild animals, then not intervening here on the grounds of sovereignty
would seem to undermine exactly what that sovereignty was established to protect.
A ‘semi-managed bear park’ would clearly be far from ideal, and it’s obviously far
removed from the kind of independent sovereigntyDonaldson andKymlicka imagine
would be best for wild animals. But it can be seen as reducing bear suffering, making
a move towards reparation for injustice, and keeping bears alive in the face of a very
specific, severe anthropogenic threat. It might be the best among bad options, even
on their terms.
21.8 A Tentative Proposal: A Trial of Feeding Bears
Without Injustice to People
In a nearby year, if we do nothing, some polar bears in some wild populations will
starve to death because of anthropogenic climate change. We could just let them
starve, but from most of the ethical perspectives discussed here, there is at least
ethical reason to consider intervention. One intervention that can clearly be ethically
justified is to relieve the suffering of bears that are going to starve by shooting them.
The alternative is to feed them. Aswe’ve seen, while there are ethical reasons in favor
of feeding them, there are also significant ethical concerns that count against doing
so (which may be viewed as more or less important from different ethical positions):
• Risking harms to humans if bear feeding is not sufficiently diversionary
• Risking harms to bears through diseases/conflicts at feeding stations
• Keeping bears alive, meaning that they cause suffering to, and kill, seals
• Making bears’ food from sentient animals we have killed, whether these are wild
or part of industrial production
• Satisfying bears’ immediate choices (to eat!), but risking restricting future
options available to them, so also reducing bears’ agency and increasing future
vulnerability
• Loss of naturalness value through the establishment of semi-managed bear parks
• Further significant erosion of the sovereignty of Arctic wild animal communities
Two of these problems are inevitable, if bears are fed. First, bears will be fed on
other animals. And second, if feeding is successful, bears will go back out and hunt
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seals. On some of the ethical views outlined above, that just rules feeding bears out.
We should instead kill them as painlessly as possible.
But as I’ve also argued, there are views on which those two ethical concerns are
not complete blockers. From these other perspectives, we need to know more about
what would happen if bears are fed. Will semi-permanent bear parks be created in
the long-term? Will there be disease at feeding stations? Will bears become habitu-
ated and consequently more vulnerable? There are still many things we don’t know
about this situation. Perhaps feeding won’t have a significant effect on bears’ long-
term behavior; perhaps we won’t need to create semi-managed bear parks. One way
forward is to consider a trial of supplementary and diversionary feeding in the first
polar bear population that becomes seriously at risk to see how bears respond, how
quickly they return to the sea ice, and whether they come back to feeding stations
once ice has formed, or go back out to the seal hunt (and also whether other hazards
manifest themselves, such as disease outbreaks or conflicts at feeding stations that
cannot be managed). At least trying this out with one bear population could assist in
finding out more about the implications of feeding bears, and help in making better
informed choices between feeding and shooting them, as sea ice shrinkage continues
across the Arctic.
However, committing to do this raises an additional concern: justice with respect
to native communities in the Arctic that are located in areas potentially affected.
These communities have deep cultural and subsistence relationswith polar bears, and
also carry the burden of danger brought by polar bears coming into their communi-
ties. To avoid procedural injustice, any decisions about feeding bears should involve
meaningful consultation with local Arctic native peoples. The importance of such
consultation is already enshrined in the 2013 Declaration of the Responsible Minis-
ters of the Polar Bear Range States,5 which notes that polar bear conservation
should: “Engage Arctic local people in management decision-making processes and
promote the collection andmaintenance of Traditional Ecological Knowledge (TEK)
by acknowledging the important role polar bears play in the cultural heritage and
subsistence of Arctic indigenous people, as well as the role that they play in the
long-term conservation and survival of the polar bear.” However, as Young (2016)
notes, meaningful consultation and engagement with TEK is likely to be very diffi-
cult, given the ways in which native perspectives on polar bears have diverged from
“techno-managerial solutions”, especially in terms of bear hunting quotas. In prin-
ciple, though, protecting threatened polar bear individuals and local populations
by feeding, providing the feeding is diversionary, and follows from a consultative
process, may be in the common interest of polar bear scientists, conservationists, and
local native communities—as well as the bears themselves.
The hungry bears case is in some ways unique. It’s urgent, dramatic, it’s likely
inescapable, and it’s going to afflict individuals that are members of one of the most
favored, charismatic species on earth. But it’s also just one example of a case where
5Available at: https://polarbearagreement.org/resources/agreement/declaration.Accessed 23March
2020.
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climate change will require us to make difficult choices between unpalatable alterna-
tives. Whatever we do, some sentient animals are going to suffer, and interventions,
over time, will compromise wildness values. For this reason, it’s particularly impor-
tant that we think about these issues in advance. As Derocher et al. (2013, 370)
plausibly argue: “it is critical to contemplate and discuss options ahead of the need
to respond…Although some of the topics may seem radical… future conditions may
be well outside the range of past circumstances and necessitate very different actions
than today. The success of interventions will be partly determined by the degree of
advanced planning.”
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the Preference for Native Species
Ned Hettinger
Abstract The preference for native species, along with its concomitant antipathy
toward non-natives, has been increasingly criticized as incoherent, obsolete, xeno-
phobic, misanthropic, uncompassionate, and antithetical to conservation. This essay
explores these criticisms. It articulates an ecological conception of nativeness that
distinguishes non-native species both from human-introduced and from invasive
species. It supports, for the most part, the criticisms that non-natives threaten biodi-
versity, homogenize ecological assemblages, and further humanize the planet. While
prejudicial dislike of the foreign is a human failing that feeds the preference for
natives, opposition to non-natives can be based on laudatory desires to protect natural
dimensions of the biological world and to prevent biological impoverishment. Impli-
cations for our treatment of non-native, sentient animals are explored, as well as are
questions about how to apply the native/non-native distinction to animals that share
human habitats and to species affected by climate change.
Nature doesn’t care about conservationists’ artificial divide between…native and alien
species…The concept of natural has outlived its usefulness in conservation…Aliens are
rapidly changing from being part of the problem to part of the solution. (Pearce 2015b)
Their demonization says more about us and our fears of change than about them and their
behavior…This hostility is generally justified by outdated and ill-founded ideas about how
nature works…We need to lose our dread of the alien and the novel…Conservationists must
stop spending all their time backing loser species–the endangered and the reclusive. They
must start backing some winners. (Pearce 2015a, xii–xvi)
Biological invasions are fundamentally analogous to natural disasters…the annual combined
economic cost of invasionsworldwide exceeds that of natural disasters. (Ricciardi et al. 2011,
312)
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I once planted a Mimosa tree in my yard on a barrier island off the coast of the
U.S. state of South Carolina. I’d seen the trees around the island and thought their
gorgeous, showy pink flowers would make a good addition to our palms, live oaks,
cedars and wax myrtles. When I learned that Mimosa was a species from east Asia,
I was upset. I wanted our yard to fit in with the native ecosystems of barrier islands
off the Southeast U.S. coast. I believed that planting “alien” or “exotic” species was
incompatible with the integrity of our island native ecosystem. While it was true that
may Mimosas, as well as other non-natives species, inhabited our island, I did not
want to be a part of what I considered a degradation. It was like planting California
redwoods in Northern Europe or transporting Camels into the U.S. southwestern
desert: These species did not belong in those places.
Although the idea that non-natives should be kept out of native ecosystems is
strongly endorsed by most environmentalists, over the last twenty years it has been
subject to increasing criticism. “Nativists” (those with a preference for native species
and an antipathy toward non-natives) are accused of xenophobia, not only for having
an irrational fear of and hostility toward alien species, but also for being complicit
with the recent and growing prejudice against human immigrants. Nativists are also
accused of being in the grip of a scientifically uniformed conception of natural
systems, mistakenly believing that they are unchanging, tightly knit communities
whose species composition remains fixed. It is argued that in a time when human
alteration and domination of the natural world is extensive and ever increasing (“the
Anthropocene”), with consequent loss of endemic species and collapsing ecosys-
tems, we need to embrace non-natives and the novel ecosystems they create. Such
ecological novelty is a positive contribution to the only nature that we can hope of
sustaining on earth. Rather than treating non-native species as a plague to be erad-
icated (as when the U.S. National Park Service shoots Mountain Goats that have
strayed into the parks), non-native species should be seen as a part of nature and part
of the biodiversity we should be preserving.
Some scientists have even suggested that the discipline that studies non-native
species (invasion biology) constitutes a “pseudoscience” (Theodoropoulos 2003) and
should be dissolved. Critics within the field have worried about its use of misleading
war-likemetaphors and claimed that it oftenmisrepresents the behavior of colonizing
species, which are far more benign than they are made out to be (Davis et al. 2011).
They argue against “judging species by their origin” and against the presumption
of guilt, insisting instead that non-natives should be treated as innocent until proven
otherwise. In response, some invasion biologists accuse the supporters of this more
open attitude toward non-natives of engaging in “science-denialism,” analogous to
those who deny the reality of climate change, arguing that the threat non-natives pose
is undeniable (Russell and Blackburn 2017).
This essay defends the preference for natives over non-natives. While the critics
raise a number of important issues that a defender of native species must accom-
modate, their criticisms can, by and large, be successfully addressed. A precising
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definition of nativeness will be offered along with a defense of respect for indepen-
dence nature, a nature threatened by the vast spread of human-introduced non-natives.
Further, while non-natives add to biodiversity in someways, inmore important ways,
and overall, they lessen it. And while a welcoming and cosmopolitan approach to the
foreign has its virtues, so too does promoting traditional communities and unique
ways of life. Non-natives and novel ecosystems have a place in this increasingly
humanizedworld, but,more importantly, so toodonatives and traditional ecosystems.
22.2 The Distinction Between Native
and Non-Native Species
There is no agreed upon understanding of what makes a species native or not. Some
think the distinction and related concepts are hopelessly muddled, deceptive, and
should be given up (Chew and Hamilton 2011). One analysis argues that, “Without
an explicit criterion, exotic and native are problematically imprecise concepts and are,
consequently, often used inconsistently by ecologists and conservation biologists”
(Justus 2009, 413). Frequently it is claimed that designating a species as non-native
(“exotic” or “alien”) is used to manipulate public support for its removal. In an era
of anthropogenic global change, some noted scientists think:
It is time for scientists, land managers and policy-makers to ditch this preoccupation with
the native–alien dichotomy and embrace more dynamic and pragmatic approaches to the
conservation and management of species — approaches better suited to our fast-changing
planet. (Davis et al. 2011, 153)
In one of the first careful philosophical treatments of the topic, Woods and Moriarty
(2001) distinguish five possible accounts of what it means to be a native species: The
human introduced criterion, the evolutionary origin criterion, the historical range
criterion, the degradation criterion, and the community membership criterion. They
argued that no one of these was correct and instead that we should think of the idea
of native species as a “cluster concept.” In their view, none of these features is either
necessary or sufficient for being native, but the more of them a species possesses,
the more likely they should be considered native. Correlatively, they argue, the less
a species instantiates these features, the more likely it is non-native.
The most common idea is that what makes a species non-native is that it was
introduced to an ecosystem by humans. The Netherlands’ Minister of Agriculture
has defined native species thus:
I define an exotic species as a non-native plant, animal or micro-organism that is not able to
enter theNetherlands by its own efforts, but through human activity (transport, infrastructure)
and has entered nature in the Netherlands, or threatens to do so in the near future. Species that
enter the Netherlands by their own efforts, due to climate change for instance, fall outside
this definition and are not included in the policy. (Verburg 2007)
Such a definition will not do. On the one hand, this account ignores that species can
and do travel to new and radically different habitats on their own, as when ballooning
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spiders arrive on remote oceanic islands or vagrant birds get blow from one continent
to another. For example, when Cattle Egrets first arrived in South America having
been carried bywinds fromAfrica, itwas not plausible to think of themas native there.
On the other hand, the human-introduced criterion fails to allow for the possibility of
human restoration of native species, as was donewith the 1990s restoration of wolves
to Yellowstone National Park in the U.S. Wolves had been in the Park until they were
eradicated in the early 1920s. Seventy years later the Park Service transported wolves
from Canada back into Yellowstone. On the human-introduced criterion, it would
make no difference whether the park had trucked in wolves from Canada or flown in
Siberian snow leopards from Russia, both were brought there by humans and would
thus be non-native.
An almost equally popular (and problematic) idea of non-native species is that they
are species that “invade” and wreak havoc in local ecosystems. In fact, “non-native
species” and “invasive species” are often used interchangeably. Such species come
in and take over an ecosystem causing massive amounts of damage, often extirpating
local endemic species. An often-cited example are the introduction of cane toads to
Australia. In 1935, hoping SouthAmericanCane Toadswould control the beetles that
were plaguing their sugar cane crop, farmers brought in about a hundred. The toads
spread quickly, and today, they exist “from coast to coast,” sometimes in densities
of a thousand an acre. There are now an estimated 1.5 billion of these toxic critters
in Australia poisoning native animals who eat them (Crawford 2018; Slezak 2015).
Another often cited example is Kudzu (Pueraria lobata) in the U.S. A Japanese vine
imported in the early 1900s and planted to reduce soil erosion, it has a growth rate
of up to a foot a day, spreads over 200 square miles (518 sq. km) a year, and now
covers millions of acres in the southeastern United States, killing trees and shrubs
by heavy shading. Or consider that European zebra mussels, arriving into the U.S.
Great Lakes in ship ballast water, clog water intake pipes at a cost of hundreds of
millions of dollars annually.1
While it is undeniable that somenon-native species have devastating consequences
both for nature and for humans, it is a mistake to equate non-natives with damaging
invasives. For the most part, non-natives do not cause problems, either because they
quickly die out or, if they do establish a permanent presence, they do not aggressively
spread and cause problems. While not scientifically rigorous, a ballpark estimate is
the often cited “tens-rule” that claims one in ten introduced non-natives survives in
the wild and that only one in ten of these goes on to spread problematically.
Not only are many non-natives ecologically benign, but native species also can
irrupt and cause massive damage. While “invasive” suggests entering from outside,
it also can mean encroaching or infringing, and aggressively spreading from within
can also count as “invasive” in this sense. For example, the native pine beetle in the
U.S. “is currently suspected to be killing more trees than any other [insect] in North
1Why are such non-natives so successful? The science behind this success is not settled, but some of
the factors often mentioned are that the parasites, predators, and competitors that keep these species
in check in their native habitats are not present in their new home and that their new neighbors
(unlike their neighbors back home) have not developed defenses against them.
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America” (Davis et al. 2011, 153). One study titled “The natives are restless, but not
often and mostly when disturbed” (Simberloff et al. 2012) suggest that while native
species do sometimes spread dramatically, they do so less frequently than non-native
species and most often the irruption is the result of human-caused changes (such
as grazing pressure or fire suppression). So, non-natives cannot be equated with
damaging invasive species.
Nor shouldwe canwe think of natives as those that originally evolved in a location
and non-natives as those that originally evolved someplace else. For species routinely
move around and colonize new areas where they make their home for thousands of
years and thus are clearly native. Such a criterion would implausibly entail that long-
lived colonizers on volcanic islands are non-natives while species that just recently
evolved in that local are native. Or consider a species that evolved in one locale and
then migrated to other places, while dying out in its original location. The story of
Camel migration is instructive. The ancestor of the modern camel species evolved
in North America and then spread to South America and Asia. Camels went extinct
in North America when humans migrated to the continent thousands of years ago.
Depending on how strictly we use the term “species” (species per se or closely
related taxon), the evolutionary origin criterion would suggest that returning Camels
to North America would be restoration of a native species. The idea that a herd of
Camels roaming the American Southwest should be considered native species to
those ecosystems is on its face preposterous!
I suggest that we think of native species as species that have considerably inter-
acted/adapted to the local biota and abiota. Natives are tied to other residents via some
sort of interaction, whether competition (such as predation) or cooperation (such as
mutualism). Natives have influenced other natives and adapted to local climate and
landscape. Similarly, the locals have interacted with and adapted with them. Perhaps
the local abiota have been affected by their presence as well. So native species
are those that have significantly adapted to or interacted with the local biota and
abiota (and vice versa). Non-natives are species that have not significantly adapted
or interacted with the local inhabitants or abiota.2
This notion of having significantly adapted or interacted with locals is not the
same as fitting in functionally (that is, performing certain ecological functions). A
species that has never actually adapted to local species might fit in fine, but is not
native. For example, Snow Leopards in Yellowstone might serve the same roles as
wolves, but they are non-natives as they have not actually adapted with local species.
Note too that this conception of native species does not assume some ideal balance of
nature or harmony in ecosystems. Natives are those that have interacted and adapted
to each other; whether that interaction is harmonious or not, in balance or not, is left
open.
This conception of the native/non-native distinction is ecological and not
geographical. For example, the idea of a species being “native to North America”
makes no sense on my account. There are too many different ecological assemblages
for a species to have interacted and adapted with all of them. Nor is it helpful to think
2I first proposed this idea in Hettinger (2001).
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of species as native to a state or region, unless such geographical designations are
uniform in terms of their ecology.3 On this account of native species, “native to a
place” makes no sense, unless place means ecosystem.
Note also that on this conception being native or not is a matter of degree. Obvi-
ously, the extent to which a species has significantly adapted/interacted can increase
(or decrease) over time. This allows that a species that comes into a foreign habitat
can “naturalize” over time as it interacts with the locals and they interact with it.4
Camels that evolved in North American ecosystems 50 million years ago and then
moved to Asia via the Bering land bridge presumably became native in the new
desert ecosystems they inhabited for millions of years. Given uncertainty in biolog-
ical taxonomy and the looseness in the use of the concept of species–including
whether we are talking about members of the same sub-species, the same species, or
perhaps even the same genus–whether or not organisms are “native species” would
also seem to admit of degrees for that reason. For example, what if the wolves used to
restore the Yellowstone population had been from a region of Alaska with somewhat
different habitat than what existed just north of the Montana-Canadian border where
the restored wolves were captured? Or what if the restored wolves had a greater
percentage of red wolf, coyote, or even African Golden wolf (a jackal) genes that
those that previously resided there? Presumably in these cases the restored wolves
would be somewhat less native. Or consider that polar bears and grizzly bears have
increased their interbreeding due to climate change. If such a hybrid was either trans-
ported to or found itsway intoYellowstone, it seems reasonable to say it is “somewhat
native” to the Park. Additionally, because the boundaries of ecological assemblages
or ecosystems are also not always clear, whether a species is native or not, and to
what extent, depends of how one understands the boundaries of the ecosystem it is
in.
Recognizing that nativeness is a degree phenomenon helps us see that climate
change, while problematic for the concept, need not undermine it, as many seem to
think. It will, of course, put additional pressure on native species and increase the
relative abundance of non-natives. How much nativeness will survive depends on
how dramatically climates change and in what ways. In general, climate change will
lessen the degree of nativity of stationary natives as they become less adapted to
local abiotic conditions (such as temperature and moisture). Such species will also
become less adapted to the local biota insofar as ecosystems “reshuffle”:
New climates are expected to cause ecosystem reshuffling as individual species, constrained
by different environmental factors, respond differently. One tree may be limited by summer
rains that hold back seedling recruitment, for instance, whereas another species may be
limited by winter freezes that control insect pests. Some species may migrate up-latitude or
3Perhaps some generalist species are counterexamples. For example, coyotes now inhabit much of
North America (though not the arctic regions). European starlings are another similar example.
4Note that I am not using “naturalized” identically to the usual biological understanding according
to which any non-native that establishes a self-sustaining community of individuals in a new habitat
has naturalized. Note further that the possibility of naturalization over time implies that novel
ecosystems (human-caused but not maintained ecosystems with unique combinations of species or
functions) might eventually be composed of thoroughly native species.
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up-elevation, while others stay put. An ecosystem might see many species vanish—but also
new arrivals. (Fox 2007, 823)
Some native animals and plants will no longer be able to survive in their historical
habitats and sowill either have tomove or die out. In so far as ecological assemblages
shift en masse, say migrating north as the temperature rises, their component species
will remain (relatively) native. But if “reshuffling,” rather than mass migration, is the
norm, nativeness of species will dramatically decline and many native species will
become non-natives, either in their original location as their neighbors and abiota
have changed, or in their new location, as they join species to which they have
not adapted/interacted. “As climate change pushes more species out of their home
ranges and into new areas, the number of so-called invaders is likely to multiply
exponentially” (Goode 2016). There remains the possibility of naturalization over
time when and if the ecological disruptions climate change causes cease.
This account of the native/non-native distinction has some intriguing implications
for conservation policies. For example, assisted migration of endangered species
need not be exotic introduction. Species moving from an historical range can remain
native if they have sufficiently adapted to species in the new location. Thus, assisted
migration would count as native introduction when the species and abiota in the
new site are sufficiently similar to the species and abiota extant in the previous
location. Or consider the use of genetic engineering to increase the fitness of a
species. For example, to protect American pica from an increasing warm climate, we
might introduce foreign genes from more heat adapted populations or species into
the endangered pica populations. These altered picas would be more or less native
depending on the extent of their alteration.5 The preference for native species would
entail using genes from the most closely related populations, sup-species, or species.
This account also sheds light on how we might think about Pleistocene rewilding
and de-extinction. There have been recent discussions about the existence of “eco-
logical anachronisms,” that is, extant species adapted to extinct species. For example,
it is argued that the speed of antelope in the American West (over 60mph/95kmh!)
evolved and was an adaptation to cheetah like predators who long ago went extinct in
America. Ifmany species today are still adapted to extinct species, then bringing those
species back (say by cloning using ancient DNA) and locating them with many of
their co-evolved species could count as return of natives or at least “somewhat native
species.” Attempts at back breeding to mimic extinct species might also produce
somewhat native species, depending on how similar those species are to the extinct
type and how similar the extant habitat is to what once existed.
While the degree phenomenon of nativeness means there are not sharp lines to
be drawn and that borderline cases will have to be confronted, especially with the
advent of climate change, at the extremes there are innumerable clear cases of native
and non-natives on this account. Additionally, the preference for native species over
non-natives remains useful even in cases where the distinction is not clear cut.
5See Palmer (2016) for a useful discussion.
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22.3 The Prevalence of Non-Native Species
The assumption among environmentalists and others who prefer native species and
harbor an antipathy towards non-natives is that non-natives represent disvalues of
various sorts. To assess these value judgments, we need first to address some factual
questions concerning non-natives. As it turns out, getting clear on the facts about
non-natives is not straightforward for there is considerable scientific controversy
concerning them.
How pervasive are non-natives? The numbers vary widely. The U.S. Fish and
Wildlife service, citing a 2005 study by Pimentel et al., suggests there might be
50,000 non-native species in the U.S. Citing a 1999 study, it estimates that about
10% of them are invasive. Elizabeth Kolbert reports that “California alone acquires
a new invasive species every sixty days” (Kolbert 2014, 211). The Global Invasive
Species database lists 149 invasive species in the Netherlands (and 498 in the U.S.).
A recent study of recorded “established” alien species comes up with about 17,000
worldwide and ominously concludes that:
For all taxonomic groups, the increase in numbers of alien species does not show any sign
of saturation and most taxa even show increases in the rate of first records over time. This
highlights that past efforts to mitigate invasions have not been effective enough to keep up
with increasing globalization. (Seebens et al. 2017, 1)
Climate change will undoubtedly increase the number of non-natives, perhaps expo-
nentially. Given that we do not have a fixed idea on the total number of species
on earth (estimates range from 3 million to 100 million to even a trillion–only 1.7
million have been described) the relative presence of non-native species compared
to natives also cannot be determined. What we do know is that in some places they
are very widespread. One study of central European cities found that 40% of plant
species were alien (Pysek 1998). Another study suggests that “non-native plants and
birds can make up 50% or more of species in some urban, insular, and old field
environments” (Schlaepfer 2018).
While species invasion is an ancient and natural phenomenon essential for the
flourishing of live on earth, recent human-caused introduction of non-natives is
dramatically different, moving species far more rapidly and across greater distances
and barriers:
The human-induced rate not only of species extinction but also of species invasion has
increased exponentially, in concert with the exponential growth of the human population
over the last few hundred years. In addition, in more recent decades, global human travel
and commerce have increased disproportionately relative to the increase in the sheer number
of humans. Combined, these actors have produced burgeoning rates of nonindigenous species
in every ecosystem that has been monitored…Although species invasions are natural, both
the rate of their occurrence and the distances traversed by species now exceed by orders of
magnitude those of only a few hundred years ago. (Lodge and Shrader-Frechette 2003)
In short, non-native species are pervasive in many ecosystems and human-
introduction of non-natives continues at an unnatural and potentially alarming
rate.
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22.4 Judging Species by Their Origin
Should we be worried about this dramatic rise of the non-native? Many environmen-
talists are deeply alarmed. But an increasingly accepted idea is that the generalized
negative attitude toward non-natives is prejudicial. An influential article in the presti-
gious science journal Nature proclaimed that we “ought not to judge species on their
origin” (Davis et al. 2011). These critics suggest that the antipathy toward exotics
involves the problematic (and even xenophobic) attitude of assuming that what hails
from elsewhere is inherently bad. They think of the widespread efforts to control
or remove non-natives as “persecution of the new just because it is new” and ques-
tion “why our default attitude to novel biodiversity is antagonism or ambivalence”
(Thomas 2013). One prominent invasion biologist suggests “the dominant paradigm
in the field is still a ‘when in doubt, kill them’ sort of attitude” (Goode 2016).
Perhaps we should not be alarmed by non-natives if they behaved no differently
than natives. But the evidence is that non-natives tend to bemore ecologically disrup-
tive than natives. While natives can irrupt and cause ecological upheaval, they do so
less frequently than do non-natives. Non-native species are far more likely to have
ecological and socio-economic impacts than do those native species that, for various
reasons, undergo range expansions or increase in abundance to become ‘weedy’
(Simberloff et al. 2012). One study documents that non-native predators and herbi-
vores had about 2 ½ times the impact on native prey than did native consumers
(Paolucci et al. 2013), results that fit the common sense idea that native species will
learn how to handle their native predators better than those with whom they have not
interacted. Therefore:
Ignoring biogeographic origins as a mediator of impact ignores the importance of evolu-
tionary context in species interactions…The more ‘alien’ an established animal, plant or
microbe is to its recipient community, the greater the likelihood it will be ecologically
disruptive. (Richardson and Ricciardi 2013, 1463)
The defenders of non-natives can respond that “ecological disruption” is not neces-
sarily a problem, or if the disruption is negative, how harmful these impacts are is
open to question. They will argue that rather than assume a non-native will be prob-
lematic, that is, rather than approach non-natives as “guilty unless proven innocent,”
we should assess them individually in terms of their benefits and costs. Even though
non-natives are more likely to cause disruption than natives, to assume that they will
be disruptive (without specific evidence that they will be–other than their “alien”
status), would only make sense if this likelihood was quite high. Given the “tens
rule” it is not at all clear that it is.
Consider an analogywith human immigrants. Assume it true that a new immigrant
to a country is more likely to be disruptive (e.g., culturally) than a citizen. It would
only make sense to presume guilt (or to justify caution/skepticism) if this likelihood
was extremely high or if the possible disruptive behavior was severely harmful. For
example, even if immigrants present a greater risk of terrorism than do citizens,
unless this risk was high or its possible consequences major (e.g., smuggling in
nuclear bombs), it would not be acceptable to assume they will be problematic. So
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the ecological fact that non-natives are more likely to cause ecological disruption
than natives does not, w/o further evidence, justify the “prejudicial” precautionary
approach to aliens represented by the antipathy many environmentalists have toward
them. Below I provide a rationale which I think does justify such a negative attitude,
w/o specific evidence of potential for disruptive behavior.
22.5 Do Non-Natives Threaten Biodiversity?
Amajor reason behind the opposition to non-natives is the belief that they are amajor
threat to biodiversity. If it is true, as has been claimed by numerous published reports
over the last 20 years or so, that non-native species are the second leading cause
of species extinction world-wide, that would seem sufficient to justify the antipathy
toward non-natives, especially given that humans are causing a mass extinction event
on a scale not seen on the planet for 50 million years.
Whether, and to what extent, non-native species are a threat to biodiversity is
a surprisingly complicated and debated topic. While repeated numerous times in
scientific papers, environmental magazines, and news reports, the claim that non-
native species are the second leading cause of extinction (behind habitat destruction)
has been discredited and even ridiculed (“a canard,” Davis and Chew 2017 call it). It
is alleged to be based on shoddy science involving confirmation bias on the part of
both committed conservation biologists and ideological environmentalists. Matthew
Chew writes:
While carefully recounting the origin, promotion, and deployment of the ‘second greatest
threat’, I argue that its uncritical acceptance exemplifies confirmation bias in scientific advo-
cacy: an overextended claim reflexively embraced by conservation practitioners and lay
environmentalists because it apparently corroborated one particular, widely shared dismay
about modern society’s regrettable effects on nature. (Chew 2015, 1)
First asserted by E. O. Wilson in the 1990s and then rebutted by Mark Davis and
18 colleagues in their 2011 Nature paper, recent studies continue to document it. A
2016 study examined:
The prevalence of alien species as a driver of recent extinctions in five major taxa (plants,
amphibians, reptiles, birds and mammals)…Alien species are the second most common
threat associated with species that have gone completely extinct from these taxa since AD
1500…Aliens are the most common threat associated with extinctions in three of the five
taxa analyzed, and for vertebrate extinctions overall. (Bellard et al. 2016)
Mark Davis, who is a well-regarded invasion biologist, continues to dispute this
claim by arguing that most of the extinctions documented have taken place on islands
where species are far more vulnerable to non-natives than in other places. We cannot
generalize these data to the extinction threats on land or in the seas, he suggests,
because these biotas are far more resistant to competitive pressure.
A focus on species extinction alone, however, is a limited measure of the loss of
biodiversity, for individual members of species can radically diminish in numbers,
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subspecies and populations can be extirpated, and genetic diversity within a species
diminished, while the species itself continues to survive. For example, polar bears
have not gone extinct as a species, but their numbers and diversity have seriously
declined. This point, while important, must be treated with caution. For we cannot
simply assume that the loss of individual members of a native species is an overall
loss in biodiversity if they are being replaced with non-native individuals–unless,
of course, we assume that the biodiversity provided by native individuals is more
valuable than that provided by non-native ones. But this begs the question about the
superiority of native species over non-native ones.
This point is made all the more poignant by the surprisingly diverse and multiple
ways non-natives add to or promote biodiversity. For example, Britain has gained
almost 2000 non-native species “without losing anything to the invaders” (Thomas
2013). The same paper reports that, because of hybridization (which can lead to
new species), non-natives added to Britain have increased the global species count.
Thomas goes on to suggest that warming temperatures resulting from climate change
will increase regional diversity because warm-adapted species will invade more
quickly than cold-adapted species move out.
Paradoxically (given the severe biodiversity loss attributed to non-natives arriving
on the continent), Australia provides another example of how non-natives can add
to biodiversity in certain dimensions. The continent lost all of its large (over 200
lbs.) megafauna by the end of the Pleistocene. Now it is home to eight introduced
megafaunas, including the only wild population of dromedary camels in the world
(Lundgren et al. 2018). In general, 1/3 of very large herbivorous species have wild
populations outside their native ranges.While this study focuses ononly a small group
of species, namely giant herbivores, it is of interest that “the introduced herbivorous
giant megafauna of the world have restored species richness across many continents
to levels approaching the Pleistocene” (Lundgren et al. 2018, 865). Thus, if we only
worry about endangered species in their native habitats, we will miss opportuni-
ties for preserving species more widely. Of course, the focus of preserving endan-
gered species should be on preserving them in their native habitats. That they can
survive in zoos or as introduced, non-native species in other habitats is of significantly
diminished value.
Nevertheless, there are many examples of species endangered at home that are
doing well as introduced species in non-native habitats. In some cases, endangered
species are even considered invasive. The Monterey pine is endangered in California
and Mexico but is treated as a pest in Australia, and Barbary sheep, which are
endangered inMorocco, are allegedly overrunning the Canary Islands (Goode 2016).
We clearly should withhold a negative appraisal of non-native species that are also
endangered if our objection to non-natives is based on concerns about biodiversity.
As argued in an intriguing paper comparing human migrant ethics to the ethics of
non-native species, just as refugees (who are endangered in their home countries) are
accorded special status among immigrants, so endangered species should be treated
as a special class of non-natives (Switzer and Angeli 2016). One scientist argues that
the phenomenon of non-native but endangered species is widespread enough that if
non-natives were included in biodiversity indices (which they are not now, but which
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he insists they should be), it would lower the extinction predictions for some species
(Schlaepfer 2018).
Besides being endangered species in some cases, non-natives have been docu-
mented to provide numerous benefits for native species, including rare ones. In
California, non-native eucalyptus trees provide habitat for Monarch butterflies. In
Spain, non-native crayfish provide food for wetland birds, including some endan-
gered ones (Goode 2016). A striking example is introduced, non-native donkeys in
the Sonora desert of the Southwestern U.S. Where water is close to surface, they
dig wells used by up to 30 species (including trees). The scientists documenting this
phenomenon, argue that the non-native donkeys are increasing the functionality of
these ecosystems and their resilience in the face of climate change (Lundgren et al.
2018).
Many point out the obvious fact that the introduction of a non-native species
increases the local species count (by one!) (Sagoff 2000). If the number of non-
natives species arriving outnumber the extinctions taking place, species richness will
increase. In fact, because of the spread of non-natives, a general trend worldwide
is that often local biodiversity (measured by a species count) is increasing even
while overall global species numbers are in decline. “Empirical evidence points to
ecological increases in the number of terrestrial species inmost of theworld’s regions
over recent decades and centuries, even though the total number of species on the
planet is declining” (Thomas 2013). A study in the early 2000s of plants and birds
on oceanic islands found that land birds species numbers remained constant (despite
many extinctions) while plant species numbers doubled. Because those introduced
plants and birds existed in other places, there was not global increase in species (Sax
et al. 2002).
What are we to make of this tendency? At least in terms of biodiversity, increases
in local biodiversity are valuable (unless we discount the biodiversity added by non-
natives!). But if endemic species (those found only in one place) are being replaced
with more cosmopolitan species, then the local gain in biodiversity is at the expense
of overall global diversity. It seems clear that this is an overall loss in biodiversity.
Consider an analogy with human cultural diversity. European humans arrive on an
island with several distinct indigenous populations and promptly drive all but one
extinct (perhaps they inadvertently infect the locals with diseases never before seen
on the island). If enough different nationalities of Europeans arrive, the local diversity
of cultures will have increased overall. But we should not count this as an overall
increase in cultural diversity, even though there is now greater cultural diversity on
this island.6 Here is a description of the losswhen non-natives replace local endemics:
Native species have coevolvedwith one another and the physical environment, often resulting
in intricate coadaptations. Loss of native species can erase unique evolutionary histories.
Therefore, non-native species additions do not compensate for phylogenetic losses resulting
fromextinctions even if they increase overall local species diversity, becausemanynon-native
species erode diversity through local and global extinctions. Even if one is willing to offset
the current losses of biodiversity with the promise of new biodiversity as non-native species
6This fictitious example may actually fairly well represent what happened in North America with
the arrival of Europeans.
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evolve and diverge, millions of years of biological adaptation and evolutionary history would
be lost. (Pauchard et al. 2018, 2)
While the situation is complicated, the overall threat to biodiversity due to non-
native species is real and, in my judgment, significant. Citing the World Wildlife
Fund’s 2014 living planet index report, Davis and Chew (2017) claim, “More recent
assessments of biodiversity effects demote invasive species to a subsidiary role”. That
study put “invasive species/genes” as the primary threat in 5.1% of the populations
studied, while climate change was primary in 7.1% of populations (WWF 2014, 20).
The 2018WWF report lists invasive species/disease as again close to climate change
in the threat it poses to biodiversity (and for some taxa, a greater threat) (WWF
2018, 72). While true that compared to habitat degradation and direct exploitation,
non-native species play a “subsidiary role” in biodiversity loss, the negative effect
on biodiversity is close to the threat to biodiversity posed by climate change, and it
should not be ignored.
22.6 Homogenization
As with the question of whether non-native species reduce biodiversity, the related
question of whether or not they tend to homogenize the world’s ecosystems is more
complex than one might first think. However, as with biodiversity loss, in the final
analysis, this concern has merit.
Biotic homogenization occurs when extant ecological assemblages lose their
distinctiveness and become more similar. Loss of biological distinctiveness occurs
at many levels, including species similarity, similarity of functional relationships,
loss of genetic distinctiveness, and similarity of evolutionary history. While there are
other causes of biotic homogenization (e.g., when flooding joins what had been two
once isolated bodies of water), the human transport of non-native species is a major
one.
A key factor in how biotic communities get their distinctiveness is their isolation
from one another. When this isolation is overcome, mixing begins, and one gets
homogenization. Humans are intentionally and unintentionally transporting species
around the globe, overcoming the natural isolation, barriers, and distances that have
helped created the spectacular diversity of earth’s ecological assemblages. This is
a process driven by, and also similar to, the globalization of human economies and
cultures. In the human economy, quirky and distinctive “mom and pop” stores on
main street are driven out of business by the same big box stores, resulting in towns
and cities losing distinctiveness and becomemore similar. Take amajor exit off aU.S.
highway interstate and you are likely to find the same two dozen retailers, whether
you are in the Pacific Northwest or 3000 miles away in the Southeast. Analogously,
the same weedy, generalist species, tolerant of diverse ecological conditions, appear
over and over again around the world, often replacing specialist, more sensitive
species. These species are ones with “broad diets and tolerances, rapid dispersal
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and high reproduction” (McKinney and Lockwood 1999, 452). “Loser species” are
being replace by “winners”.7 Just as McDonald’s and Subways has spread all over
the world, so have dandelions and rats. Invasion biologist Julian Olden (often one to
defend non-native species) says: “From birds to plants to fish to mammals, there’s
strong evidence that things are becoming more similar” (Goode 2016). A number of
studies document that biotic homogenization is occurring, especially in freshwater
ecosystems (Petsch 2016). Some even suggest that humans “are creating a new
Pangaea by bringing all the world’s flora and fauna together” (Kolbert 2017).
Even when non-natives aren’t weedy or invasive their presence in new habitats
homogenizes by lessening floral and faunal distinctions among regions. Theoreti-
cally, non-natives introductions could decrease similarity as when two different fish
species are introduced to lakes that otherwise have the same species, or when a non-
native plant colonizes one habitat, but not another which is otherwise identical. But
this is an anomaly, if successful non-natives tend to be generalists and widespread.
Consider the phenomenon of zoos (and perhaps also of gardens). Do they increase
biodiversity or homogenize? As Holmes Rolston once pointed out, there are more
species of animals in the Denver zoo than in all of Colorado. So, in one obvious
sense, Denver, in virtue of its zoo, is much less similar to the rest of Colorado. But
because of zoos, elephants, for example, are no longer to be found only inAfrican and
Asian grasslands and forests, but are now present in any major city on the planet! I
think this is a helpful analogy for non-natives in general.While potentially increasing
local diversity (until they wipe out native species), they homogenize the world by
lessening the distinctiveness of different bioregions and assemblages.
A main rationale for rejecting the notion that non-natives simply homogenize is
to emphasize the possibility of hybridization. Just as “the mixing and blending of
cultural identities…lead to new forms of diversity” (Keulartz and Van der Weele
2009, 244) among humans, so too the mixing and blending of species resulting
from non-native introduction can lead to new types of biodiversity. In an editorial
arguing that the Anthropocene may well increase biodiversity, Thomas argues that
“Hybridization is becoming particularly important as formerly separated species are
brought into contact. The rates are astounding…Speciation by hybridization is likely
to be a signature of the Anthropocene” (Thomas 2013).
But hybridization is a double-edged sword in terms of diversity. “Hybridization
has been shown to be amajor contemporary extinction force, especially when accom-
panied by habitat homogenization, causing species declines through introgression,
genetic swamping and reproductive interference” (Richardson and Ricciardi 2013,
1463). Similarly, human hybridization can also create loss of diversity and homog-
enization. Think of the U.S. as a melting pot of peoples, homogenizing them into
“Americans.” Or what if those Jews who are committed to a distinct Jewish culture
7Some argue that we should start backing these “winners.” “Conservationists must stop spending
all their time backing loser species–the endangered and reclusive. They must start backing some
winners” (Pearce 2015a, xvi). Of course, we already are, as we are themain cause of their movement
to new habitats.
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gave up their emphasis on Jews marrying other Jews and fully integrated with other
religious cultures. Such “hybridization” would be a loss of a distinctive culture.
22.7 Naturalness Value and the Antipathy
Toward Non-Natives
We have examined two related reasons for the antipathy toward non-natives: Their
negative impact on biodiversity and their tendency to homogenize theworld’s ecolog-
ical assemblages. There is another compelling reason for this antipathy: Non-native
species seriously exacerbate the continued humanization of earthen nature. Non-
native species, when they are human-introduced, as they are in the vast majority of
cases, threaten and diminish a key environmental value, namely, naturalness. Respect
for independent nature explains and justifies the antipathy toward non-native species.
Human introduction of non-native species is a major way that humans are impacting
the natural world. That many, perhaps most, human introductions of non-native
species are unintentional does not lessen this point. Naturalness is compromised
both by intentional and unintentional human actions.
There are a host of objections to the idea that protecting and restoring natural-
ness are important environmental obligations. Here I address a few and only in a
cursory manner.8 Some will argue that humans are natural and so whatever they do
is natural, including spreading non-native species all around the globe. But by “nat-
ural” I mean the degree to which something is independent of human impact, and
clearly spreading species around the globe is a human impact. Others might claim
that there is no naturalness left to value or protect, that we are in the “Anthropocene,”
that anthropogenic climate change and global human pollution are so pervasive that
we are (asMcKibben claimed years ago) at “the end of nature” and so there is nomore
naturalness left to defend. But naturalness comes in degrees. Dimensions of nature
are more or less impacted by human activities and so defenders of naturalness value
urge us to value and protect the naturalness that remains. I have argued that we ought
to “value naturalness in the Anthropocene; now more than ever” (Hettinger 2014),
as rarity enhances preexisting value and makes it more precious. Those ecosystems
which have not been overwhelmed by human-introduced non-natives have a special
importance given their relative naturalness. Even ecosystem with significant non-
native presence have remaining naturalness of significant value.9 Naturalness can
also return over time as humanization washes out of natural systems and humans can
themselves speed along such recovery by active “rewilding,” aswhenwe remove trash
or poisons from natural systems or tear down dams. Restoration of native ecosystems
8For a somewhat more vigorous defense of the value of naturalness and respect for independent
nature, see Hettinger (2018).
9Contrast this idea with Keulartz and Van der Weele’s (2009) suggestion that the more severely
invaded an area is with non-natives, the less reason to worry about their presence.
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by removal of human-introduced non-natives often increases the naturalness of those
systems.
The connection between non-natives and being unnatural is contingent: what
matters for naturalness value is not non-nativeness itself, but the human introduc-
tion of non-natives and the loss of naturalness that introduction instantiates. Because
the vast majority of non-native species are human-introduced, this disvalue of non-
natives, while not applying to non-natives per se, applies to the vast majority of them.
Naturalness value therefore supports the “guilty until proven innocent idea” in a far
stronger and secure manner than does the assumption that non-natives are going
to cause ecological or other damage. As we have a seen, there is a relatively low
probability that non-natives will cause ecological damage (such as species extinc-
tion). While the overall negative consequences non-natives have on biodiversity and
increasing homogenization seem clear, whether a particular non-native has these
effects is not so clear. The case is otherwise concerning the unnaturalness of non-
native species. Because there is a very high probability that a non-native has been
human-introduced, rather than being “open minded” about non-natives, naturalness
supports a presumption against non-natives. So, the likely unnaturalness of non-
natives counts against the increasingly widespread attitude that each introduction
should be evaluated in its own right and in the particular area invaded (Seebens
et al. 2017). It provides a compelling response to the many who think it “unclear
why our default attitude toward ecological novelty is antagonism or ambivalence”
(Thomas 2013). The antipathy toward non-natives results from and is justified by the
overwhelming likelihood that they embody the ongoing humanization of nature. The
preference for natives over non-natives when they are human introduced is a way of
respecting independent nature. The default attitude toward the arrival of a non-native
should be negative, until it is proven that it was not human introduced.
I now examine a series of important objections to the preference for natives over
non-natives.
22.8 Is the Antipathy Toward Non-Natives Based
on Misleading Popular Ecology?
The preference for natives over non-natives is a deeply ingrained value for many
environmentalists and ordinary people as well. Critics argue that “many introduced
populations are considered harmful, not because of their ecological effects per se,
but because they challenge deep-seated ideologies about how nature should be”
(Wallach et al. 2018, 1263). Ken Thompson, the author ofWhere do camels belong?
Why invasive species aren’t all bad, claims “It’s almost a religious kind of belief,
that things were put where they are by God and that’s where they damn well ought to
stay” (Goode 2016). I think the nativists can respond, “Guilty as charged”: Respect
for nature is a “deep-seated ideology” (though an eminently justified one) and that
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the opposition to humans taking over the world and “running nature” is a rejection
of the idea that humans should play God with the earth.
It is often claimed that the antipathy toward non-natives is to be based on a set
of scientifically dubious ideas which are nonetheless common in popular ecology.
The nativists, it is claimed, believe that non-native introductions upset a balance
of nature, that ecosystems tend toward an equilibrium that non-natives disrupt, and
that change itself is a harm. Nativism based on valuing naturalness can accept that
nature is dynamic, adaptive, and in flux, and that there is no one way ecosystems
are supposed to be. Their objection is not to change as such, but only human-caused
change. Nativism based on natural value favors removal of non-natives, not to prevent
“biotic mixing,” nor for the purpose of recreating beloved historical assemblages,
but to remove or lessen human influence on ecosystems.
22.9 The Xenophobia Objection
A longstanding criticism of nativism (whether this be a preference for human or
non-human natives) is that it is based on xenophobia, an irrational fear or dislike of
the foreign and/or the unfamiliar, perhaps enhanced by feelings of superiority. It is
a common (though not laudable) human tendency to identify with a group and to
distinguishing group members with whom one feels comfortable from “outsiders”
toward whom suspicion is aimed. It is also common to form opinions of others based
on hasty generalizations and selectively-constructed stereotypes. When the foreign
enters, the fear is of contamination and the desire is to cleanse the home and make
it pure again. Critics of nativism believe that these attitudes underlie the antipathy
toward non-native “alien” species and that there is a synergy between anti-human
immigrant sentiments and the rejection of non-native species.
This criticism is perhapsmademore salient in light of recent currents inworld poli-
tics. A U.S. President argues for “America First,” spews forth harsh anti-immigrant
rhetoric (“murders, rapists, and drug smugglers are pouring into our country”) and
advocates policies to prevent and remove the “invaders” (the wall, family separa-
tion). These nationalist sentiments and anti-globalization attitudes (e.g., dissolution
of the European Union) are not limited to the U.S., nor is the xenophobia which
often underlies them. Critics charge that not only nativists in general, but also the
field of invasion biologist itself uses biased (“alien species” “exotics”) and mili-
tarist language (“invasion,” “war against exotics”) to fuel prejudicial and misleading
attitudes and environmental policies toward non-natives.
Clearly there can be synergism between biological and cultural nativism/purism.
As it is often pointed out, the Nazis had their own native plant movement purifying
the biology of their country at the same time as they purged the human race of its
supposed inferior elements. In South Africa, native-plant, gated communities cater
to “suburbanites seeking to escape the increasingly mixed and threatening post-
apartheid city…spaces that exclude problematic plants and people alike” (Ballard
and Jones 2011, 1).
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To avoid such a problematic xenophobia, we are urged to accept a cosmopolitan
approach toward human immigration and culture and welcome foreigners into
our societies. Similarly, we should accept non-native species into our ecosystems,
celebrating their rich origins, their geographical and cultural histories, rather than
persecuting them because they are not native (Kendle and Rose 2000).
The analogy between human immigration and non-native species introduction is
both instructive and potentially misleading. Biological and cultural nativism can be
mutually reinforcing, especially when the rhetoric used is similar or identical. This
can be true whether or not xenophobic attitudes underlie the rhetoric. Nevertheless,
it is important to point out that xenophobia need not underlie either type of nativism.
Consider the biological nativist’s antipathy toward non-natives species. Those
who prefer native plants in native habitats and eschew the entry of foreign species
need not fear or dislike them, nor believe they are inferior. They might think quite
highly of these species in their native habitats. For example, I don’t want camels
to roam the deserts of the southwestern U.S. But I don’t fear or hate camels; they
are neat animals! And again, I clearly admired that non-native mimosa tree when I
planted it in my yard. As we have seen, opposition to non-native species can be based
on concerns about harms to biodiversity, worries about homogenization of ecological
assemblages, or opposition to the increasing humanization of the world.
It is harder tomake the case that cultural nativismneednot bebasedonxenophobia.
People who don’t want black people, Muslims, or Mexicans in their communities
cannot plausibly say I like these folks fine in their own places, I just don’t want them
here.At least this is true if they are talking about individuals of these groups.However,
if we take cultural integrity as a value, then there are non-xenophobic reasons for
being concerned about “too much” immigration or “too many foreigners moving
in.” Mass immigration may threaten distinct and valuable ways of life. The desire to
preserve unique cultures, as the desire to preserve unique biological communities,
need not be xenophobic and can even be praiseworthy.
For example, the preservation of indigenous cultures is of significant value. Too
many natives leaving the community, or too many non-natives entering, threatens
this value, as does the ingression of western commercialism.When Southern parents
send their children to Southern colleges, when Christian parents send their chil-
dren to Christian schools, and when Jewish parents lobby their children to marry
other Jews, these practices need not (though they obviously can) be based on xeno-
phobic attitudes. Typically, they are based on desires to preserve important cultures
or cultural attributes. I now live in a small community in the Rocky Mountain West
with some wonderful small-town values: Cars stop for pedestrians, dogs are loved,
there is strong community support of children and youngwomen, and the community
is extremely supportive of an active outdoor lifestyle. If enough people from large
cities who are indifferent or antagonistic to such values moved into town it could
destroy a cultural environment of great value. My opposition to the mass movement
of such people into town is not xenophobic.
Such opposition to foreign entry is only legitimate when significant cultural
values are in jeopardy. The anti-immigrant sentiment in the U.S. is not justified
by a serious threat to the national’s culture, especially because the U.S. has always
22 Understanding and Defending the Preference for Native Species 417
prided itself a nation of immigrants. The debate about whether this nation of immi-
grants should promote assimilation (or homogenization!) for the sake of a unified
culture or embrace a multi-cultural society is in some ways similar to debates about
the importance of retaining unique biological communities in light of the concerns
about homogenization.
These are complicated issues, but it should be clear from this discussion that
biological nativists antipathy to non-natives cannot be summarily dismissed by
accusations of xenophobia or contribution to xenophobia.
22.10 The Need for Non-Natives in the Anthropocene
A particularly provocative challenge to nativism is the idea that non-native species
are increasingly essential to human and planetary flourishing. That they always have
been becomes obvious if we focus on the human food supply. Pimentel et al. (2005)
claims that “Introduced species, such as corn, wheat, rice, and other food crops, and
cattle, poultry, and other livestock, now provide more than 98% of the U.S. food
system.” A more recent study suggested that worldwide an average of 70% of food
crops were introduced from other regions (Khoury et al. 2016). But the critics are
insisting on the importance of non-natives far beyond the agricultural domain so
important to humans. It is alleged that wild nature needs them too, as indicated in
the title of this recent book by Fred Pearce: The new wild: Why invasive species will
be nature’s salvation. Pearce writes:
The more damage that humans do to nature— through climate change, pollution, and grab-
bing land for intensive agriculture and plantation forestry—the more important alien species
and novel ecosystems will be to ensuring nature’s survival. Aliens are rapidly changing from
being part of the problem to part of the solution. (Pearce 2015a, 178)
EmmaMarrismakes a similar claim in her bookRambunctious garden: Saving nature
in a post-wild world:
As the planet warms and adapts to human domination, it is the exotic species of the world
that are busy moving, evolving, and forming new ecological relationships. The despised
invaders of today may well be the keystone species of the future’s ecosystems, if we give
them the space to adapt and don’t rush in and tear them out. (Marris 2011, 109)
Even sober biologists think that:
Non-native species might contribute to achieving conservation goals in the future because
they may be more likely than native species to persist and provide ecosystem services in
areas where climate and land use are changing rapidly and because they may evolve into
new and endemic taxa. (Schlaepfer et al. 2011, 428)
We have seen that non-native species can and do contribute to biodiversity, although
in ambiguous and ambivalent ways. They provide “ecosystem services” aswhen non-
native sea grass provides a nursery and regulates water flow in places that have lost
their native habitat formers. Other ecosystem services non-natives provide include
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food, pollination, water purification, seed dispersal, and the list goes on. Obviously,
non-native species are biological creatures that can serve most all the biological
functions that native species do. In a harsher and more unstable environment, they
will more likely persist as they tend to be generalists rather than specialists and also
better competitors. By refusing to accept non-natives species as legitimate parts of
nature, the critics argue, people are blinded to these sorts of beneficial roles they can
play (Wallach et al. 2018).
I believe there is room in the conservation agenda for both a focus on preserving
and restoring native biodiversity, and occasional, though increasing, acceptance of
non-natives in the specific cases when they provide sufficient benefits.
I agree with Marris that we must go beyond “black and white thinking on non-
native species” (Marris 2014, 516). It is matter of weighing costs and benefits. It is
important while highlighting the potential benefits of non-natives to remember how
damaging non-native species can be. A few years ago, there was a report suggesting
that “the annual combined economic cost of invasions worldwide exceeds that of
natural disasters” and the authors argued thatwe shouldprepare for non-native species
invasion in ways similar to how we prepare for (other?) natural disasters (Ricciardi
et al. 2011). Perhaps this is hyperbole, but we should remember that the disasters
perpetuatedbynon-native species are for themost part not “natural,” but self-inflicted,
as humans move these species around the globe. In cases where non-natives provide
the sort of ecosystem services described above, we must weigh these biological
benefits against the potential biological costs, both in terms of loss of biodiversity
and homogenization. Even when this calculus turns out positive, we must compare
these benefits to the loss of naturalness value that the human-introduced of non-
natives involves. This is a classic case of conflict between two important conservation
values, biodiversity and naturalness. I think despite themulti-facetedways non-native
species can be beneficial, non-natives bring with them sufficient probable disvalue to
justify the generalized antipathy toward them and legitimizes the policy of treating
them as guilty until proven innocent. The burden very much has to be on the defender
of non-natives to prove they are not simply benign, but beneficial overall.
22.11 Non-Native Animals in Our Midst
In this last section I explore two related issues. First, how the conception of non-
native species applies to animals, particularly “animals in our midst.” Secondly, what
sort of implications for our treatment of animals follows from the issues raised by
the native/non-native species controversy?
As background, it should be noted (with outrage) that there has been, on average,
a 60% decline in populations of vertebrate animals worldwide in last 40 years.10
10This does not mean a 60% decline in number of individual vertebrate animals on the planet
because the sizes of the populations studied varies dramatically. For an explanation, see Brown
(2018).
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My focus will be on sentient animals (which I believe are roughly co-extensive
with vertebrates) as it is with this (relatively small) subset of animals that especially
powerful moral considerations arise and with them questions of treatment diverge in
comparison to plants (and non-sentient animals).
How to conceptualize urban and rural animals, or wild animals, that wander or are
thrust into human habitats is important in part because this phenomenon is increasing
dramatically. Humans continue to encroach on animal habitats, and in response, they
come into ours. For many, such as rats, coyotes, and song birds, human habitats
are particularly compelling, providing food, shelter, and protection from predators.
Such animals also raise interesting questions for the distinction between natives and
non-natives.
The understanding of native species embraced herein is that native species are
those that have significantly adapted/interacted with the local biota and abiota. Non-
natives are those have not done so. Being native is a matter of degree and non-natives
can naturalize over time. Applied to “animals in our midst,” this suggest that new
arrivals from habitats totally unlike the habitats they now inhabit should be conceived
as non-native. So the “Golden-headed lion tamarins, squirrel sized monkeys,” that
“came out of the disappearing coastal forests of Brazil and found a new home in
the suburbs of Rio de Janeiro” (Pearce 2015b) are not native to those suburbs. In
contrast, squirrels who have lived in Rio for generations are native to the city as
they have adapted/interacted with the flora and fauna (including humans) and abiota
(houses, streets, soil) for quite some time. And the locals (including humans) have
adapted/interacted with them. (For example, humans have developed and deployed
squirrel-proof, bird feeders.) Further, squirrels brought into Rio de Janeiro from other
cities would be more native than the monkeys, for they have adapted/interacted with
humans and human abiotic environments more so than have the monkeys (although
they might not have adapted to the particular species of flora and fauna in Rio).
Or considers the house sparrow. Although European in origin, it has adapted to
humans and human habitats world-wide and, on the conception developed here,
should be considered a native species of these urban and suburban habitats. Coyotes
in American suburbs and cities (one was seen stalking a fast-food restaurant in
Chicago!) are an interesting case. Though once widespread in America, they are just
recently returning to much of their former habitat and they and the locals (including
humans) are just beginning the mutual adaptation/interaction that will revive their
nativity.
Paul Knights has suggested a “cultural criterion” for being native to human
communities, arguing that cultural relationships humans have with species helps
ground their nativity (Knights 2008). The type of cultural relationships and associ-
ations he has in mind include having common names for the species (Jack in the
Pulpit), being used in play (buttercup under chin, bracelets made from daisies, kisses
under mistletoe), being adopted in local cuisine (berries turned into jam, fish for
dinner), being used for medicinal purposes, being used as a source for literary or
artistic expression, and so on. Although Knights distinguishes these cultural rela-
tionships from ecological relationships, for the most part these cultural relationships
have an ecological character to them. Part of the criterion for nativeness I have
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proposed includes human adaptation/interaction to the species in these human habi-
tats. Thus, these cultural relationships add to nativity, at least in so far as they involve
an ecological component. If these cultural associations between species in human
habitats and humans involves interaction/adaptation (which for the most part they
do), then such associations do add to native characterization. When a species in a
human environment is ignored by humans, this means there is less interaction and
thus a diminished claim to being native.
Human treatment of animals in general is harsh, but peculiarly harsh toward
animals perceived as non-native or animals considered to be invasive. Examples
include, laser censors that spray poison on wildcats and viral diseases used to infect
wild rabbits (Wallach et al. 2018). Sometimes species are labeled non-native as a way
to help justify getting rid of them. English farmers have objected to beaver restora-
tion on these grounds and coyotes are often tarred with the label non-native at the
same time they are being persecuted. Mountain goats judged as not native to many
U.S. National Parks are accused of “invading” the parks rather than simply begin-
ning to colonize them. Do the 200 goats that live “in and adjacent to” Yellowstone
National Park constitute an “invasion?” Yes, their presence is due to humans, their
waste changes the soil chemistry in some sites, and they may compete with native
bighorn sheep (and pass on disease to them). But is it really true that “This non-native
species poses a threat to Yellowstone’s alpine as well as bighorn sheep” (Yellow-
stone National Park 2019)? Perhaps. And perhaps they should be removed. But the
non-native species invasion language inclines the discussion toward this outcome.
I have argued in favor of antipathy toward non-native species, including the “guilty
until proven innocent” attitude. But sentient animals have a special value that other
species lack. Because of this, I think the antipathy toward non-natives should be
relaxed for sentient animal species and policies based on guilt unless proven inno-
cent should be suspended. What justifies this differential treatment is that sentient
animals–unlike insentient animals and plants–have feeling and desires. Their lives
can go well or badly from their own perspective and they can suffer horribly. Because
of these capacities, we should treat them as individuals and as having certain rights.
Most clearly, they have the right not to have suffering inflicted on them, unless
sufficiently strong justification for that suffering is presented, including the ruling
out of less painful alternatives.11 Perhaps sentient animals should even be given the
presumption of freedom of movement.
Recall that what justifies the presumption of guilt against non-natives is that the
vast majority of non-native species are human-introduced and such introduction
decreases naturalness, something I have argued is an especially important value
in our time of massive and ongoing humanization of earth. Concerns about loss of
biodiversity and homogenization are also important, but cannot be simply assumed in
the case of non-natives. Instead, they require investigation. But with sentient animals
another definitive value is added to themix.We should not shoot non-nativemountain
11For example, if gene drives can be used to sterilize populations of invasive sentient animals
threatening extinction of native species, they should be seriously considered as an alternative to
traditional mechanisms (such as poison) that involve great suffering.
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goats who stray into our national parks simply on grounds that it is exceeding likely
they are human-introduced. I do not think the loss of naturalness value this (likely)
represents is by itself sufficient to justify immediate dispatch. Their unnaturalness
will count in favor of their removal, as will their possible effects on biodiversity and
homogenization. But the burden of proof will have shifted because these species
have a special value.12 Note that with non-native plants or insentient animals (e.g.,
insects) the presumption of guilt remains and their expedited removal is permissible,
for they lack the burden shifting value that comes with the rights of sentient animals.
22.12 Conclusion
This essay has defended biological nativism and its antipathy toward non-natives.
Native species are those that have significantly adapted/interacted with local biota
and abiota. Non-natives are increasingly pervasive, their presence indicative of and
caused by massively increasing human global impact. While climate change puts
pressure on the distinction, the categories of native and non-native remain rele-
vant and important in environmental thought. There are serious concerns about and
evidence supporting non-natives’ negative impacts on biodiversity and their homog-
enization of ecosystems. However, there are numerous instances where non-natives
contribute positively to biodiversity and such contributions are likely to increase.
Nonetheless, the generalized antipathy toward non-natives is justified by respect for
independent nature, as the vast majority of non-natives are introduced by humans and
thus are part of the ever increasing and arrogant human domination of once natural
dimensions of earth. Preference for natives need not be based on prejudicial dislike
of the foreign or misconceived ideas about natural systems. Animals can become
native to human habitats and the special value of sentient animals suggest that, for
them alone, we should withhold our presumption in favor of expedited removal of
non-native species. The preference for native species over non-natives continues to
be a significant environmental value and one that is rationally defensible.
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Chapter 23
Coexisting with Wolves in Cultural
Landscapes: Fences as Communicative
Devices
Martin Drenthen
Abstract This paper argues that many conflicts regarding the return of the wolf
to the thoroughly humanized and densely populated cultural landscapes of Western
Europe rest on the dualistic idea that culture and nature are two strictly separated
realms of reality, and on the assumption that wild animals are primarily passive
beings without proper agency. Once we acknowledge wolves as beings with agency
with whom we share the landscape, we come to see that the challenge of coexistence
with wild animals such as wolves is not primarily a matter of finding a compromise
between human interests and the interests of wild animals. Rather, we have to learn
and negotiate that the landscape is a space that is interpreted and inhabited by many
different beings, with whom we are always already communicating, even if we are
not always aware of it.
23.1 Wolves Recolonizing Europe
Throughout history, many animal species have sought the proximity of humans
because of the opportunities this provided in terms of food and shelter. Domesti-
cated animals have of course been members of the mixed community of humans
and animals for thousands of years. The so-called liminal animals (Donaldson and
Kymlicka 2011)—rats, foxes, seagulls and pigeons—have found ways to flourish
in human spaces, making use of the various assets that cities provide. These non-
domesticated species have also learned to live close to humans, in some cases they
even prefer cities to the wild habitat in which they evolved.
However, in recent years, wild animals are also returning to our landscapes.
Species such as Wolf, Golden Jackal, Lynx, and Wild Cat—animals associated with
wild nature par excellence—have started to repopulate the thoroughly humanized
and often densely populated cultural landscapes of Western Europe from which they
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went extinct only a few centuries ago. The spontaneous return of these wild animals
sheds new light on the relation between humans and wild animals.
The return of the European Grey Wolf to Western Europe is surely the most
controversial example of the ‘return of the wild in Anthropocene’ (Drenthen 2015).
The wolf was eradicated in large parts of Western Europe in the eighteenth and
nineteenth century. Only small populations remained in the East and the South (in
the areas East of the former Iron Curtain, and remote parts of Italy, the Balkan
and Spain). However, due to changes in land use, land abandonment in rural areas,
increased legal protection, and the rise of more ecofriendly environmental attitudes
towards nature (De Groot et al. 2011) wolves have been able to repopulate areas
where they had disappeared earlier.
In the year 2000, Polish wolves repopulated the Lausitz region in Germany, south
of Berlin. From there, the population gradually expanded to the North-West; now,
less than twenty years later, they are recolonizing parts of Denmark, Belgium and
the Netherlands.
In 2013, the first wolf visited the Netherlands. Each following year, the numbers
of wolf sightings went up. In 2018, at least 10 wolves visited the Netherlands. In
January 2019, the Dutch government officially declared that two female wolves had
settled in the Veluwe, a large nature area in the center of the Netherlands. Only a
few months later, in May, a camera trap revealed that one of these female wolves
had a male companion, and in June it was announced that the first pups were born.
This rapid colonization—from one individual in 2013 to an entire pack of wolves
less than 6 years later—has caused a lot of debate about wolves in Dutch society.
23.2 Wolf Debates
Wherever wolves reappear, they give rise to social tensions. Most nature conserva-
tionists celebrate the return of the wolf as a success of European nature policies; they
argue that predators such as the wolf are a welcome addition to the ecosystem and
will have a positive effect on biodiversity. Many urbanites are fascinated by the idea
that the wolf again lives in this densely populated part of the world. People in rural
areas, on the other hand, are more worried that wolves will pose a danger to humans
and livestock. However, many people appear to take a rather moderate and pragmatic
approach towards the return of the wolf.
Surveys suggest that basic attitudes towards wolves among the Dutch popula-
tion have not really changed much since their arrival. In 2012, just before the first
confirmed wolf sighting in the Netherlands, a survey among Dutch citizens (Intomart
2012) found that about 45% of respondents would welcome the arrival of wolves,
while 32%were against, and 23% took a neutral position. Ever since the actual arrival
of the wolves in the Netherlands, these numbers seem not to have changed much. A
survey in December 2018, found that 30% of respondents feel that wolves should not
be restricted in their behavior, while an equally large group does not agree. However,
58% agree with the proposition that we should not chase away the wolf, but rather
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should be focusing on protecting ourselves and our livestock from the wolf (Kantar
Public 2018).
In short, the majority seems to have a pragmatic attitude towards wolves, one
that combines a willingness for coexistence with wolves with a cautious approach
to possible risks associated with the presence of predators in our landscape. They
are willing to give these animals a chance of finding a place in our landscape, and
feel that we should seek to find a form of coexistence with wolves. Yet, most people
also believe we should be on our guard for those individual wolves that cause dispro-
portional damage to livestock and pose a threat to humans and their interests (Van
Slobbe 2019).
However, in the debate about wolves, the extreme voices tend to be the loudest,
and as a result, the debate easily becomes polarized. A small group of wolf lovers
tends to romanticize the wolf. They refuse to acknowledge that the return of a large
predator in a cultural landscape can be troublesome; any problem that might emerge
will be solely to blame on humans (Drenthen 2016a). On the other side, some people
are convinced that there is no room for wolves in a densely populated country like
the Netherlands. They argue that the Dutch landscape is no longer suitable for these
animals, because the Netherlands lacks the large-scale nature areas that most people
associate with wolf habitat. Especially sheep farmers vehemently oppose the wolf;
they see wolves as a threat to their livelihood.
23.3 Wolf Predation on Livestock
Young wolves leave their parents when they are two years old. They start to roam
the landscape in search for new unoccupied habitat. Wolves can travel up to 80 km
each night, and can migrate over many hundreds of kilometers from their birthplace.
These wandering wolves try to keep a low profile while migrating through strange
wolf territory in order to prevent conflicts with settled wolves. These wandering
wolves are the biggest threat to domestic animals such as sheep. Wandering wolves
tend to see sheep as an easy ‘snack’ along the way. As soon as wolves set up a new
territory, they tend to shift their attention to wild prey such as deer and wild boar—
probably because they prefer deer to wooly sheep, but also because they prefer to
hunt away from human land. Moreover, young wolves learn how and what to hunt
from their parents, and will normally learn that wild ungulates are the preferred food
source. Yet, wandering wolves need to make a different trade-off and will not miss
out unprotected sheep as an easy meal.
Because large carnivores have been absent for so long, sheep farmers in Western
Europe abandoned the traditional methods of protecting livestock against predators
that are still in use elsewhere. In those placeswherewolves never disappeared, people
see wolves as belonging to the landscape and are used to dealing with them. They
use so-called guard dogs or flock-protection dogs to protect the flocks against wolf
attacks, and sometimes shepherds themselves stay with their sheep around the clock
(White 2019).
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In contrast, in those places where wolves went extinct, farmers abandoned the
old practices that protected livestock against predators: sheep stay behind low fences
designed to keep sheep in, but not to keep predators out. Moreover, without any
natural predators, sheep are left to roam in relatively safe hillsides,without shepherds.
Many sheep farmers only visit their livestock occasionally to check on their health. In
the mountainous regions of the Alps, for instance, farmers stopped with the practice
of full-time shepherding when large predators disappeared. Nowadays, in certain
areas, the role of shepherds has become redundant (Hollely 2018).
The return of wolves to new territories forces shepherds to change their shep-
herding practices and start protecting their sheep again. Some proponents will argue
that this should actually be a reason for shepherds to welcome wolves: wolves are
good for shepherds, because without wolves, they would not have a job.
Another positive effect of [the return of] the wolf is also that it is bringing back the shep-
herds. Shepherding has been part of Europe’s cultural landscape for thousands of years.
The increase in shepherds is now leading to the renovation of mountain huts, and increased
job opportunities in rural communities. Switzerland has just opened up a new school in
shepherding in recognition of the need for shepherds through Europe. (Hollely 2018)
Yet, it is also clear why sheep farmers inWestern Europe dread the return of the wolf,
since this change in keeping sheep, will make shepherdingmore time-consuming and
less cost-effective, thus making their life more difficult.
23.4 The Cultural Conflict About Wolves
In order to help the acceptance of returning wolves in Europe—the wolf after all is a
legally protected species—governments across Europe have come up with financial
schemes that support farmers that suffer from livestock predation; they offer financial
compensation for their losses and help with preventive measures such as electric
fencing.
Financial compensation schemes certainly help the acceptance ofwolves, but only
up to a certain point. Most farmers do not just fear the financial costs of loss of sheep
but also despise the killing of their animals by wild predators.
Wolfs do not just pose a financial risk; they also are a perceived threat to an entire
way of life. Farmers in rural areas are usually well aware of the vulnerability of their
livelihoodvis-à-vis the threats posedbyuncontrollable natural events: thunderstorms,
floods, draughts—andpredation. Part of the identity of being a farmer revolves around
the idea that the land has to be ‘worked’ and cultivated, by controlling and managing
wild nature if one is to make a living from the land.1 Living a life that consists of
facing up to the encroaching wild, farming communities typically value a sense of
independence and autonomy. Farmers take pride to be able to grow their own food
1Research shows that this attitude also translates into an aesthetic landscape preference: rural
populations typically appreciate more manicured and orderly landscapes compared to the type
of landscape urbanites like (Van den Berg and Koole 2006).
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and live a life of independence. For many of them, it is important to be autonomous
and self-sufficient, and not dependent on the government, as so many urban dwellers
are. The presence of a wolf undermines that feeling of being autonomous.
Moreover, the idea that the state will compensate for the financial losses due to
wolf predation may itself be problematic to some. The idea of getting money from
the state without having to work for it in itself does not fit well in this ideal life of self-
sufficiency (Thorp 2014). Some wolf opponents complain that too much taxpayer’s
money is being spend on the losses due to wolves, even though they are the recipients
of that money. Farmers opposing wolves do not want financial compensation; they
want their livestock to be safe from predation.
It is a commonplace that human-wildlife conflicts are in fact most often human-
human conflicts and the same applies here. It is not just the fear of livestock predation
that fuels the opposition against thewolf, but also the unease about the overall societal
movement that welcomes the wolves and argues for their protection. Those who
oppose the wolf see its return as a threat to a way of life that exists in living a life
of independence in the face of the encroaching wild, but they also feel that society
fails to take their worries seriously.
There exists a deep sense of unease among wolf-sceptics with the way that urban-
ites tend to approach the issue of coexistence with wild animals, and with nuisance
animals and large predators in particular. On Facebook accounts of anti-wolf groups
such as No Wolves,2 one can illustrate this sentiment: “City people are naïve, and
fail to see that these animals are dangerous.” “All these animal cuddlers in the city
ignore the real danger.” “These people don’t know what misery the wolves will be
bringing to us.” “Eventually they will find out that we were right and they were
wrong in trusting this animal, but by that time it will be too late.” “Only when the
first children will be killed by a wolf will they realize what they have inflicted upon
us.”
Opponents of the wolf say that the Dutch landscape is no longer suited for the
wolf, and fear that they will be forced to change their way of life if large predators
are a permanent presence in the landscape. Wolf sceptics worry that society fails
to acknowledge the fact that some of these animals can be dangerous to human
interests. More fundamentally, however, their worry is that society fails to consider
their perspective. By focusing on wolves as vulnerable animals that need protection,
society seems to ignore that living in rural areas means being vulnerable to forces of
nature that the average city dweller does not have to face.
However, rather than bringing forward what may be justified feelings, many wolf
opponents instead try to convince others by claiming that wolves do not belong in
the landscape, that they cannot be controlled, and that their impact will be mostly
negative, et cetera (Van Herzele et al. 2015). Whereas some conservationists see
the extermination of the wolf in the nineteenth century as a wrong to be undone,
some wolf opponents argue that there were good reasons to exterminate wolves in
the past and that we should try to exterminate them again today. Others argue that
the animal might have been in place in the past, but that the landscape has changed
2https://www.facebook.com/nowolvesnl/.
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since then; that it may be that the wolf once lived in these regions, but that now it no
longer belongs there. Still others claim that the wolves that are currently roaming the
landscape are in fact not at all wild wolves. Rather, so the argumentation goes, these
animals either have escaped from private zoos or have been released on purpose;
they are probably hybrids and therefore should not be protected at all. As far as the
wolf opponents are concerned, the wolf is not a native species taking back its rightful
place in its original habitat, rather it is a dangerous intruder into human space.
In an attempt to circumvent the European protection schemes, some wolf oppo-
nents are claiming that wolves did not coming back spontaneously at all, but have
been intentionally introduced by radical environmentalists. The narrative that the
wolf resurgence is not at all a spontaneous occurrence, but rather the result of a
secret introduction by environmentalists is very persistent, and can be witnessed in
many places where wolves are returning after being absent for a while (Skogen et al.
2008).
As can already be gleaned from the above, the conflict about wolves appears to
be linked with a much more general cultural conflict of worldviews. This cultural
controversy prevents a pragmatic approach to wolf predation of livestock, because in
that context, wolves become a symbol for the larger rapid changes in the landscape
that people see as a threat to their way of life and their sense of identity. The wolf can
easily become a symbol for the regional populistmovements to signify amore general
feeling of unease towards rapid disappearing of local identities and loss of control
due to globalisation and the dominance of urban elites, along with other perceived
threats like immigrants, European bureaucracy, and the environmental regulations in
general. Itmay be only amatter of time before populistmovements in theNetherlands
discover the potential of the wolf case and decide to exploit the feeling of unease
among rural voters against the urban elites for political purposes.
It seems that the legal protection schemes for wolves fuel the sense of unease
wolf opponents‚ who feel that they cannot protect themselves and their livestock
against a perceived threat. Capitalizing on this sense of disenfranchisement, some
politicians with constituents in rural areas argue that the strict European legal ban
on wolf hunting should be lifted, and the animals instead should be “managed”, a
euphemism for population control through lethal measures. In other words: a part
of the rural population is aware of its vulnerability and feels that the danger is not
taken seriously by those who see wolves as an asset to nature. Moreover, they do not
believe that it will be possible to find ways to coexist with predators with little or no
conflict.
23.5 The Stewardship Model as Underlying
Cause of the Conflict
In order to counteract human animal abuse and the instrumental exploitation of
animals by humans, both animal ethicists and conservation lawmakers have sought
to articulate principles and values that should govern human behavior with respects
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to the intrinsic value of animals. In the case of wildlife, the dominant approach is
to find ways in which wild animals can live their life in the wild, undisturbed by
negative human impacts. However, in their focus on human wrongs, animal ethicists
typically have difficulty dealing with those cases of conflict where wild animals pose
a threat to the interests of humans or their livestock.
The European Habitat Directive demands that all member states have to ensure
that endangered wild animals are in a “Favorable Conservation Status” (Epstein et al.
2015). It is illegal to hunt or disturb endangered animals.3 This idea is relatively
uncontested in case of those species that are relatively innocent and do not cause
nuisance to humans. However, in the case of recolonizing predators such as the wolf,
it is controversial, especially when these animals enter cultural landscapes inhabited
by humans.
Much of our thinking about our relationship to wildlife revolves around the idea
that animals are vulnerable and should be protected against intrusions and harms
inflicted upon them by humans. Starting from the premise that wildlife typically
lives in nature, nature protection often involves setting aside nature reserves, wildlife
sanctuaries or national parks as habitat for animals. In this model, animals are mere
passive recipients of human concern. The problem with this approach in the case of
the returning wolf is that these animals surely appear to have agency and sometimes
even pose a danger to our human interests. To those who fear its presence, the wolf
is not an innocent victim, but a potential dangerous actor.
Therefore, itwould be useful ifwe could develop an approach towolves that recog-
nizes the animal’s agency, and the fact that there can be conflicts between animals
and humans, and yet without framing nuisance animals as intruders or enemies.
23.6 Wolves as Sovereign Beings
In their 2011bookZoopolis, SueDonaldson andWillKymlicka criticize the dominant
framing of our relation to wild animals in terms of the ‘stewardship model’,4 because
that model fails to take seriously the agency of wild animals and sees them purely
as passive objects of our care. Instead, their theory of animal sovereignty recognizes
animals as having agency and acknowledges the independence and autonomy of wild
animal communities.
3Most legislation also makes clear when circumstances are not normal, and permit lethal and
nonlethal intervention, for instance when an individual animal behaves ‘unnatural’, and is showing
aggressive behavior towards humans, or is specializing on predating protected livestock.
4Sue Donaldson and Will Kymlicka criticize this dominant “stewardship model”, because even
though in this model “human access and use might be strictly limited” this is “not as a recognition
of animal sovereignty, but rather as an exercise of human management. This stewardship may be
relatively interventionist or relatively hands off, but either way the relationship is conceptualized as
one in which a human sovereign community has set aside a territory for a specific use, and to which
the human community retains the right to unilaterally redefine boundaries and use” (Donaldson and
Kymlicka 2011, 170).
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Donaldson and Kymlicka distinguish three types of animals, each with a different
relationship to humans. Domesticated animals are those animals that live in close
proximity to humans and have intense relations of interdependence with human
beings. According to Donaldson and Kymlicka, we should treat these animals as co-
citizens, that is to say, as full members of a mixed community of humans and animals
held together through all kinds of mutually beneficial relationships. Justice demands
we grand them the appropriate rights and duties that belong to being part of such
a community. The so-called liminal animals also live in the proximity of humans,
but unlike domesticated animals, they are relative outsiders to our community. They
have adapted to living amongst humans and even have become dependent on living in
our proximity (for food or for housing), but they do not have intimate and reciprocal
relationships with humans. Therefore, they do not possess all the rights and duties of
full citizens, but they do deserve respectful treatment as co-inhabitants of the place
we live.
Most relevant for us, though, is their view on wild animals: those animals who
avoid humans and human settlements, and maintain a separate and independent exis-
tence (insofar as they are able to) in their own habitats or territory. Donaldson and
Kymlicka (2011) suggest that we understand our relationship with wild animals in
similar terms as our relationship with different human sovereign communities such
as nation states. A fair relation between sovereign communities of humans and wild
animals aims at a just allocation of harms and benefits between two communities.
From this starting point, so they argue, we should recognize “that the flourishing
of individual wild animals cannot be separated from the flourishing of communi-
ties, and…reframes the rights of wild animals in terms of fair interaction between
communities” (p. 167).
This view on the relation between wild animals and humans can be useful to
our discussion of wild wolf’s comeback, because it not only acknowledges their
agency, but also makes room to think about possible conflicts between animal and
human interests. In highlighting animal communities as sovereign entities, it becomes
possible to think of our relation with wild animals in a way that is more symmetrical.
On the one hand, “the recognition of animal sovereignty limits our actions in terms of
encroaching on wild animal territory, and imposes obligations on us to take reason-
able precautions to limit our inadvertent harms to wild animals (e.g., by relocating
shipping lanes, or building animal bypasses into road construction).” On the other
hand, “it also limits our obligations in terms of positive assistance to wild animals.”5
Similarly, “it restricts the terms on which we can visit sovereign wild animal terri-
tory (or share overlapping territory), but at the same time it establishes terms for wild
animals entering sovereign human societies.” The sovereignty approach “obligates
us to respect the basic rights of animals, but also protects us from violations in return”
(ibid.).
Thinking of wild animals as sovereign entities implies that humans do not only
have duties towards them, but also allows humans to pose limits on animals as long
as these are part of a just arrangement that distributes costs and benefits fairly among
5See Clare Palmer’s Chapter 21 in this volume.
23 Coexisting with Wolves in Cultural Landscapes: Fences … 433
different sovereign communities. Thus, the sovereignty theory seems much better
equipped than the stewardship model to deal with the question of how to deal with
returning wolves in cultural landscapes in a way that recognizes the worries of those
who fear the arrival of wolves in cultural landscapes.
23.7 Parallel Sovereignties in a Shared Landscape
Even though resurging wolves do not actively seek out humans, it is inevitable that
they run into contact with humans because they are traveling across huge distances
through one of the most densely populated landscapes in Europe in search for terri-
tory (a pack needs 50–300 square kilometers). Moreover, because they are highly
intelligent andflexible animals, they succeed surprisinglywell in living in our human-
ized environments and in remaining unnoticed by most humans.6 Since wolves are
resurging in landscapes that were until recently exclusively human habitat, the ques-
tions regarding our relationship with wild wolves are of a different kind than those
with wild animals that stay in their place within “nature”.
Many problems in our relationship to nature in general and in our relation with
predators in particular, derive from a dualistic way of thinking that assumes there is a
clear boundary between “nature” and “culture”.7 Even themost outspoken opponents
ofwolveswould befine accepting thatwolves should have a place “in thewilderness”.
Problems appear when wolves show up in cultural landscapes. To many wolf
opponents, the mere fact that wolves appear in a cultural landscape is a sign that there
is something wrong with these animals. They argue that “a real wolf would never
come this way” or that “a real wild wolf would never chose to walk on a sidewalk or
use a human road or bridge.” As soon as a wolf is comfortable navigating the human
landscape, they see it as a sign that the animal must be a hybrid, an escapee from a
zoo, or intentionally introduced by “rewilding activists”. The simple fact that wild
wolves appear in cultural landscapes is in itself already undermining the worldview
that depends on a clear schematic separation of “nature” and “culture”.
It is this dualistic frame of mind—in which wilderness and cultural landscapes are
seen as two mutually exclusive domains of reality—that underlies many of the prob-
lems regarding wolves returning to cultural landscapes. For those who are against
the wolf’s return, the animal is an intruder, and the spontaneous resurgence of the
wolf means a breach in the comfortable separation between wild lands and cultural
landscapes (Drenthen 2015). However, recognizing wolves as real animals that live
in the ecological and social context of our landscapesmeans that we have to acknowl-
edge that sharing spaces with large carnivores will never be easy. We need to find
6In early 2019, a radio-collared wolf entered the Netherlands from Germany, walked all across the
urbanized center of Netherlands to finally end up and settle in Belgium, all without being noticed
by humans. See: https://www.wur.nl/nl/nieuws/Wolf-doorkruiste-Nederland-van-noord-naar-zuid.
htm.
7See Cor van der Weele’s Chapter 30 in this volume.
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a modus vivendi that allows us to live together with wolves, and that will require
some degree of management and control. Respecting wolves as sovereign entities,
and more generally respecting nature’s autonomy, also implies a willingness to live
with wild creatures, not just when they are charismatic and cute, but also when they
are a nuisance.
In reality, nature and culture are not different domains of reality, but rather two
aspects of the same reality. “Culture” is what we have designed and control, “nature”
is what we do not fully control or what constantly challenges our control. There is
always nature in the cultural landscape (and that certainly applies to thewolf whowill
see every border as a challenge) and always culture in the so-called nature reserves
(where we are not only occasionally present, but which we also manage and protect).
Our landscape cannot simply be divided into two separate parts. Those cases where
wild animals stay within a designated nature reserve are the exception. In principle,
we always live in the same landscape as wild animals; more often than not, our
territories will overlap.
Different wild animal species occupy (and compete for) the same territory, and many species
need to move large distances across territory occupied by other animals or by humans.
Sovereignty, therefore, if it is to mean anything in practice, cannot be tied to a picture of
neatly divided communities and territories. (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011, 188)
This means that we need a perspective on the landscape that acknowledges that we
inevitably share landscapes with multiple species. Recognizing justified claims of
sovereign animal communities on the landscape can be complicated. Respect for the
sovereignty of wild animals implies that we have to allow them to migrate through
our territory. Conversely, we may use our own corridors to cross their territory or
visit wild places, as long as we do so in such a way that damage to the sovereign
animal community is kept to a minimum.8 Sometimes, a strict territorial separation
will be possible betweenwilderness areas with very restricted access for humans, and
areas for humans and domestic animals that are restricted for wild animals. However,
especially in the case of species with large territories, we need to acknowledge that
our territories will inevitably overlap and thus abandon “an overly simplistic concept
of territory-like the boundaries of a national park”. Instead, to allow for “sustainable
and cooperative parallel co-habitations” (ibid., 191) with animals with territories
overlapping ours, we must think of the landscape as a “multidimensional” place.
8“Sovereignty is importantly tied to territory, since a community, especially most animal commu-
nities, cannot be ecologically viable, let alone autonomously self-regulating, without a land base
to sustain it. But sovereignty need not be defined in terms of exclusive access or control over a
particular territory, but rather in terms of the extent or nature of access and control necessary for a
community to be autonomous and self-regulating.” (ibid., 190).
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23.8 Living in a Multidimensional Landscape
Sharing a landscape with wild animals means that that landscape has become a “mul-
tidimensional” place, where several landscape features will mean different things to
different beings. Our territories may overlap in spatial terms, but we may nonethe-
less inhabit different worlds in semiotic terms. What for us is an office building or
an apartment building may appear a rock face to a pigeon or a peregrine falcon.
Similarly, wolves will interpret our cultural landscapes differently than we do.
The challenge is that these different semiotic worlds do not exist independently
of each other. We are not the only ones to define the meaning and significance of
features in the cultural landscape. These differences in interpretation may lead to
conflicts if wild animals make decisions based on different interpretations that do
not go well together with those of humans. Coexistence with wildlife is therefore
not just about finding a compromise between human and animal interests. It is about
figuring out what it means to inhabit a place that means different things for different
inhabitants.
According to Susan Boonman-Berson (2018), co-habitation between humans and
wild animals “requires that wildlife management be approached as an interactive and
dynamic endeavor that focuses on the relation between humans, wild animals and
landscape” (p. 64). She argues that such a relational perspective “implies an under-
standing of agency and subjectivity as emergent and as produced through learning in
practice and through interactions between humans, wild animals, and the landscape”
(p. 93). Both humans and animals interpret the landscape and change it—they ‘read’
and ‘write’ the landscape.9 In order to understand how these readings and writings
may interactwith each other, she introduces the concept of ‘multi-sensorywriting and
reading’. It this process, “signs (visual, olfactory, auditory, tactile), materialized in
words, signals or things, are communicated between humans, between wild animals
and between humans and wild animals through the writing and reading of these signs
in the landscape” (pp. 70–71). The communication with wild animals does not take
place directly, rather, it is itself based on material traces or signs. The shared reading
and writing of the landscapes takes place on the basis of material aspects that can be
accessed and interpreted by both humans and wild animals (p. 71).
Boonman-Berson points out that “communication with wild animals is apparent
in most traditional hunter-gatherer practices where the success of a hunt may depend
on the ability of a human hunter to ‘think like’ his or her quarry”, which “requires
years of experience in which animals are recognized as independent actors” (p. 71).
Yet, she stresses the symmetry of the situation. Humans may read traces and signs
left by animals, but animals do the same thing:
Our notion of multi-sensory writing and reading recognizes that both humans and animals
leave traces as well as trace, interpret and respond to these traces. Human writing in our case
refers not only to the use of words, such as in policy and management plans that describe
how to deal with human-wild animal interactions, but also to communication without words,
9In a similar vein, the ecosemiotic work of Morten Tønnessen (2011), clearly shows how the
semiotic relationships between humans, wolves, and sheep have shifted and changed through time.
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such as in placing fences to physically demarcate human from nonhuman spaces. Animal
reading refers to the interpretation and enactment of these human writings as they become
observable in the changingbehavior andmovements of the animals. The responses by animals
are communicated through signals or things – animal writing –, such as footprints, left fur,
faeces, and scentmarkings that indicate their presence in an area or demarcate their territories.
(p. 72)
In order to find ways of dealing with the fact that we share a landscape with other
beings, we have to understand how these other beings understand and navigate the
landscape, and how they may understand and interact with the signs that we—
consciously or unconsciously—leave behind in the landscape. Only if we can find
ways of translating one species’ interpretation into another, may we develop an
understanding of the multidimensional landscape that can help avoid unnecessary
conflicts.
23.9 Wildlife Management and the Biosemiotics
of Borders and Fences
Living together in a layered multi-dimensional landscape with potentially dangerous
predators such as the wolf, means that we will inevitably share the landscape and that
we therefore have to come up with arrangements to avoid conflicts. Luckily, there
are many alternative methods to lethal predator control that can solve the so-called
“predator paradox”: that in order to protect predators we need to protect humans
against predator impacts (Shivik 2014).
One of those arrangements is the use of fences, in particular fences that keep
predators fromattacking livestock. Sheep are part of themixed community of humans
anddomestic animals that is held together bymutually beneficial rules,with all parties
having certain rights and duties towards each other. Humans have a duty to protect
their sheep against predation and other harm. However, we also have a duty towards
wild animals as sovereign beings to make sure they are able to live their lives and
satisfy their essential needs. When wild animals predate on livestock, both duties
come into conflict.
Yet there are ways in whichwe can navigate these conflicts and try to prevent them
fromplaying out. In the case of potentially conflicting human land uses,we developed
several ways that might inspire to find solutions in our relation to wild predators as
well. For instance, in forests and other recreation areas, we developed ways to ensure
that hikers donot run into conflictwithmountain bikers and equestrians. Starting from
an acknowledgment of the different needs and desires of these different groups of
users,wedevised a network of hiking trails,MTB trails and equestrian trails that avoid
these groups fromunnecessarily bumping into each other.10 These arrangements only
10In addition to these spatial arrangements, one can also to make temporal arrangements, where
different groups use the same location at different times of day. Humans and wild animals often
use the same places at different times. Is it really such a big problem when wolves roam our streets
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work as long as each user group accepts to stick to the designated trails. There is
no absolute guarantee that all parties always abide to these rules; that would require
stationing a park warden or police officer in every remote corner of the forest. In
reality, these spatial arrangements usually also work without policing, because it is
in the interest of each party to avoid unnecessary conflict and stick to the designated
path. That only works, of course when the path design matches the needs of the
particular user group, so that there is no need to break the implicit rules. If that is
the case, we dare to trust each other, and are even willing to accept that occasionally
an individual will violate that trust. The courage to trust each other is what enables
different users to coexist and avoid unnecessary conflicts.
In a similar way, we could think of fences as means to prevent conflicts between
predators and livestock. In the case ofwolves, the problem is a lack of trust:manywolf
opponents do not dare to rely on the possibility of coexistence without policing. They
refuse to believe in a peaceful coexistence with wolves and claim that wild wolves
will always attempt to climb over or dig under fences that wolf experts considered
impenetrable to wolves.
It may be tempting to respond to this lack of trust by suggesting that fences can
indeed impose a strict border between human and sheep on one side, and wolves
on the other. In reality, however, once wolves are determined to cross a fence, most
fences will not be able to stop them. The idea that it will always be possible to keep
wolves out is based on a misunderstanding of what wolves are capable of. What is
key, however, is that even if there is no absolute guarantee, in those landscapes where
people and wolves have successfully learned to live together, most fences do seem to
work nonetheless. Apparently, in these places human culture and wolf culture have
somehow converged.
In those places where sheep farmers consistently protect their sheep with fences
that are difficult enough for a wolf to cross, wolves typically have learned to change
their behavior in response; they shift from preying on domestic livestock and focus
instead onwild prey.Youngwolves learn howandwhat to hunt from their parents, and
will also tend to ignore livestock (provided that there is enough wild prey available).
In time, a local wolf culture will develop in which young wolves are taught that it is
much easier and safer for them to hunt wild prey and leave sheep be.
Evidence points out that this process is currently taking place in the newwolf terri-
tories in Germany. Recently, in the German state of Niedersachsen livestock preda-
tion has been going down while the number of wolves is still on the rise (Wolven
in Nederland 2019). In Sweden, where wolves have been present for quite some
time now, livestock predation is relatively low due to active measures such as state
subsidies on prevention measures such as fencing. Yet, even though Swedish govern-
ment subsidizes preventive measures and refuses to compensate farmers who did not
protect livestock properly, some farmers even decide to not build fences because of
in those hours that we humans are asleep? It would mean, of course, that we would have to accept
that there are times in which particular places are not exclusively ours, that there are certain times
when we would be the ones out of place. Would it be possible that wolf and humans learn to deal
with each other by negotiating mutual temporal divisions?
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the low risk and the trouble it takes to build them. Wolves have stopped attacking
sheep anyhow (Karlsson and Sjöström 2011).11
Yet, it is also clear that in practice fences will never be a fully impenetrable
barrier that can uphold a strict separation between our cultural landscape and
their wilderness. Instead, these fences are mere communicative devices that help
parallel sovereignties navigate a multidimensional landscape and arrive at a common
understanding.
23.10 Building Communities with Humans and Wolves
There is another dimension to fences that should be mentioned here. We have seen
that one of the problems of the spatial arrangements is the lack of trust by some
parties, both a lack of trust in the possibility of peaceful coexistence with wolves,
and also a lack of trust in society to take seriously the worries of people in rural areas.
In response to this problem, in some European countries, groups of volunteers have
started to help farmers to build fences to protect their livestock.12 Typically, these
volunteers are people living in the city who want to help find a peaceful coexistence
with the wolf. They know that there may be good reasons to like the idea of wolves
returning, but also realize that the farmers will have to put up with the downsides of
the presence of wolves in the landscape. These volunteer groups help farmers and
sheep in order to help the wolf.
One of the sheep farmers helped by Wolf-fencing, Gijsbert Six, told a local
newspaper how he views the wolf’s return and the help from volunteers:
I’m ambivalent about it. On the one hand, the wolf is a fascinating animal, on the other hand
he kills sheep. And not in a gentle way, as I have seen for myself. This is quite a tough blow
when it happens to you as a sheep farmer. Yet, for thousands of years we have eradicated
everything that stood in the way. Should we also do that with wolves if their visit is not
convenient for us? As long as it’s not disruptive to society, I think we should learn to live
with it. The fact that the volunteers of Wolf-Fencing helped me easily saves me a thousand
euros in costs. Plus, I feel like I’m not alone.”13
As the embodiment of solidarity between farmers and non-farmers, the volunteering
work of Wolf-fencing and similar groups contributes to sense of community. In the
11It should be noted, though, that experts warn that young wolves, like human adolescents, do like
to experiment, and might be tempted to attack sheep anyhow if an easy opportunity presents itself.
One should prevent them from developing a taste for sheep, and make sure that any attempt to attack
a sheep will result in an unpleasant experience, such as an electric shock from an electric fence
(Reinhardt et al. 2012).
12In Germany, a group called ‘Wikiwolves’ (http://www.wikiwolves.org/) started in 2015 in North-
East Germany, and has grown ever since. Now they are active across the country (http://www.wik
iwolves.org/). In 2018, a similar group called ‘Wolf-fencing’ (https://www.wolf-fencing.nl/) has
begun work the Netherlands (building wolf-fences based on fences used in Sweden)‚ one year later
followed by Wolf Fencing Belgium (https://www.wolffencing.be/).
13https://www.wolf-fencing.nl/voor-wie. My emphasis, MD.
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end, the biggest effect of this volunteeringworkmay be that there is also a developing
mutual understanding between the city dwellers and the farmers; both groups learn
to understand the worries and concerns of the others in the process, friendships
might even emerge.14 The volunteers get to understand the fears and worries of
livestock keepers, whereas the farmers may get a better understanding of the reasons
for wanting to protect wildlife. Moreover, by working together on building fences,
both groups get to know each other better, thus a sense of community can emerge
that can counteract the feeling of being disenfranchised. These volunteering groups
and the sheep farmers who decide to accept their assistance, together built a human
culture of devotion to the very idea that living with predators is possible and a goal
worthwhile pursuing. At the same time, by building fences, they also help develop a
culture among wolves that is conducive to that coexistence.
Living with wolves of course also requires that we take into account the wolves’
way of understanding the world, their needs and behaviour, and that we are willing
to communicate with them. If we want to live with wolves, we must learn from and
about wolves, and wolves must be able to learn from us how they can live with us.
An analysis of the possibilities and limitations of the interspecies communication
can help us understand how our actions not only have meanings for ourselves but
also for the nonhumans we share the landscape with, and it can make us realize how
we have changed the world of wolves.
In the end, however, the pragmatic approach to coexistence with wolves will only
be possible if society recognizes that sharing the landscape with other beings is
somehow meaningful, and therefore considers coexistence with other beings as a
goal worthwhile pursuing.
23.11 The Meaning of Living with Wolves
Anunderstandingof the landscape as amultidimensional space should becomepart of
a broader world view that gives meaning to the fact that we co-inhabit the landscape.
The pragmatic perspective on multidimensional landscapes has to be integrated with
an overall human perspective on the meaning of coexistence with wolves, in which
all the objective features are put into the interpretative narrative context and comes
to mean something (Drenthen 2016b). We have to engage in a moral conversation
about what the current situation means and what it requires. An understanding of
the role of wolves in the landscape can make clear what the challenges are, and how
they can be met. But what is also needed is a reason why we should be prepared to
respond to those challenges in the first place. Why should we be willing to share our
14In a video clip on the wikiwolves website, a volunteer makes clear how the initial interest in
wolf protection gradually changed into an interest in shepherding, and in helping shepherds with
their problems. The aim is “to help the sheep farmers and let them know they are not alone.” Euro
LargeCarnivores (2019).
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world with these sometimes annoying animals in the first place, rather than trying to
finally get rid of them and have the world all to ourselves?
One reason might be that the world becomes more interesting and meaningful
when there are other beings present. The world would be a lonely place if we would
only encounter beings like ourselves.
A few years ago, I visited the Harz National Park in Germany, a wild remote area
located along the former iron curtain in the center of Germany. On a hike in a forest,
I met a park ranger and asked him if he knew whether wolves had already started
to recolonize the area. “Not that I am aware of”, he responded. “But while we are
talking here, they might be watching us from behind the trees. In nature, you are
never alone. In the forest you are not the only one watching, you are always also
being watched. One pair of eyes is looking in, while a thousand pairs of eyes are
looking out.”
The ranger referred to an old German saying “Der Wald hat tausend Augen”
(“The forest has a thousand eyes”) that reminds hunters that the animals that they
are hunting are aware of their presence. The saying articulates an awareness of the
landscape as a multidimensional space, inhabited by a multiplicity of species that all
have their own perspective on the world. The multidimensional landscape is a world
full of meaning and wonder, because it is not just our world but also the world of
other beings. In other words, the presence of other beings makes the world a larger,
more interesting place.
Moreover, being confronted by the existence of other beings can make us aware
of the finite nature of our own bodily existence in and perspective on the world;
other beings open, as it were, a transcendent realm beyond our own daily mundane
existence.
This idea is articulatedmore clearly by JohnBerger. Berger argues that thewaywe
usually experience the world, is habitual, and is confirming our existing worldview.
“What we habitually see confirms us” (Berger 2009, 9). However, every now and
then we are presented with something that breaches this self-confirmation, and this
sometimes happens when we encounter animals. Berger uses an interesting cinema
metaphor to explain how animals inhabit a different world than we do:
The speed of a cinema film is 25 frames per second. God knows how many frames per
second flicker past our daily perception. But it is as if at the brief moments I’m talking
about, suddenly and disconcertingly we see between two frames. We come upon a part of
the visible which wasn’t destined for us. Perhaps it was destined for night-birds, reindeer,
ferrets, eels, whales… (Berger 2009, 10)
Because the world of animals is usually inaccessible to us, and yet is not entirely
separated from us either, animal encounters can confront us with the fact that we
cannot take our normal view for granted. The realization that “our customary visible
order is not the only one: it co-exists with other orders” may be enriching: “Stories of
fairies, sprites, ogres were a human attempt to come to terms with this co-existence”
(ibid., 10) But the same experience can also be deeply confusing or unsettling. Seeing
between the frames may be an uncanny experience.
Berger discusses the enigmatic work of Finnish photographer Pentti Sammallahti,
in which dogs appear as beings that are “attuned both to the human order and to other
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visible orders” and as such they inhabit the “interstices,” the world in between ours
and theirs. As a result, in each picture
the human order, still in sight, is nevertheless no longer central and is slipping away. The
interstices are open. The result is unsettling: there is more solitude, more pain, more derelic-
tion. At the same time, there is an expectancy which I have not experienced since childhood,
since I talked to dogs, listened their secret and kept them to myself. (ibid., 10–11)
Berger suggests why it is that the presence of some animals seems to be so unsettling
to some people and fascinating to others. Berger argues that even though we can
appropriate animals by killing and eating them or by taming them, essentially they
remain alien to us:
But always its lack of common language, its silence, guarantees its distance, its distinctness,
its exclusion, from and of man. Just because of this distinctness, however, an animal’s life,
never to be confused with a man’s, can be seen to run parallel to his. Only in death do the
two parallel lines converge and after death […]. With their parallel Jives, animals offer man
a companionship which is different from any offered by human exchange. Different because
it is a companionship offered to the loneliness of man as a species. (ibid., 14–15)
Wolves may not be experts of interstices in the way dogs are, but they do have their
own distinct perspective that is different from ours. Moreover, by performing their
lives as sovereign beings independently of us, they are also putting into perspective
the human order.
The fact that our landscape is being inhabited bywolvesmay be unsettling because
it undermines the steady traditional human-centered view of the world in which all
the meanings are a given, and our view of the world is being confirmed. Yet, to those
who are open to it, the presence of these other creatures opens up a newperspective on
the world and our place in it. This may explain why the responses to the resurgence of
wolves are so extreme, and wide ranging: from deeply felt fear and hatred to wonder,
excitement and awe.
According to environmental philosopher Glenn Deliège, this ambivalence has
to do with a more fundamental characteristic of how we experience meaning alto-
gether. Deliège (2016, 414) argues that we can only experience meaning when we
are engaged with a reality that is external to ourselves:
The reality towards which we are oriented in our quest for meaning and with which we hope
to establish contact is only really external to our desires if it can negate those desires and
resist full appropriation. It is only when our quest for meaning can be denied by the reality
towards which we are oriented, that we know we are oriented towards a reality that is truly
external to us. The presence of meaning is thus premised on the possibility of its counterpart:
the denial of meaning.
Building on the work of Deliège, Mateusz Tokarski (2019, 121) argues that nature
“as a domain independent from human control, an autonomous order of existence
that follows its own purposes”, can have “an importance in human life that transcends
mere usefulness.” But Tokarski also stresses the ambivalence of experiences of the
unruliness of nature.
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There is […] a clear ambivalence in the experience of such meaningfulness of nature: the
possibility ofmeaning is dependent precisely on the possibility that wewill not findmeaning,
that the meanings we seek in nature will not be confirmed. This ambivalence is not just a side
effect we grudgingly accept. Rather, such ambivalence is intricately tied to how we come to
experience meaning. (ibid.)
In his ‘ethical guide to ecological discomforts’, Tokarski concludes that the unruli-
ness of nature appears to be a requisite for experiencing nature as meaningful alto-
gether, and that for this reason, experiences of unruly nature are evenmore significant:
“As such, ecological discomforts acquire a constitutive role in our interactions with
the non-human world” (ibid., 121.).
The analysis of Berger, Deliège and Tokarski can explain both the feeling of
unease with the presence of unruly animals such as the wolf in human landscapes,
but also the feeling of wonder and excitement that the animals evokes. But even more
so, it also confirms that living in a multidimensional landscape with unruly beings
might be a complicated task, but also one that is deeply significant and worthwhile.
23.12 Conclusion
Living together with resurging wolves in a cultural landscape can only be achieved if
we think of wolves not as merely vulnerable endangered species, but also recognize
them as sovereign beings that belong to a sovereign community. Recognizing their
sovereignty means accepting the legitimacy of their spatial claims, but that does not
have to imply we give up our own legitimate claims. The challenge of coexistence
however, is not a matter of finding a compromise between human interests and the
interests of wild animals. Rather the challenge is to find a new understanding of the
landscape as a multidimensional space inhabited by many parallel sovereignties. It
means that we have to realize the fact that we are always already communicating
with other beings, even if we are not always aware of it.
Our relation to these sovereign communities of wild animals will inevitably
contain tensions, and a need to keep distance from one another, despite the fact
we co-inhabit the landscape. Often we will be able to live next to each other in peace,
sometimes our relationship will be more challenging, and in those instances, our
respect for these sovereign beings will be the “respect” for a powerful opponent.
However, if we learn to appreciate the game, we can also learn to wish our opponent
all the best.
At the same time there is something to bewon, our world can become bigger, more
rewarding and more meaningful, knowing that we live in a landscape that is bigger
than us, knowing that we are not the only ones using, knowing and understanding
the land.
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Abstract Due to successful protection and restoration efforts, humans and wild
animals more and more often come to inhabit overlapping spaces. This is often
experienced by humans as problematic, as animals may cause material damages to
property and pose threats to humans and domesticated animals. These threats, as well
as normative beliefs about belonging and culturally-based prejudices, often provoke
distress or aggression towards animals.While philosophy has so far provided norma-
tive guidance as to what we should do in terms of developing proper relationships,
the actual tools designed to facilitate the development of more peaceful cohabita-
tion have been provided mostly by wildlife management and social sciences. In this
contribution, I propose that environmental philosophy can provide conceptual tools
easing the difficulties of cohabitation. One such tool is the practice of consolation.
I begin by drawing a distinction between the contemporary and traditional forms
of consolation. I further show that several common ethical arguments concerning
cohabitation with wildlife can be seen as following the ancient concept of consola-
tion. I close with some practical remarks regarding how environmental consolation
could be practiced today in the context of difficult cohabitation with wildlife.
‘Suppose that we are afraid, Socrates,’ he said, ‘and try to convince us. Or rather don’t
suppose that we are afraid. Probably even in us there is a little boy who has these childish
terrors.’
Plato, Phaedo
24.1 Introduction: The Difficult Coexistence
When it comes to human-animal relations, the Anthropocene is a time of paradoxes:
while biodiversity and population numbers plummet worldwide, in many places
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encounters between humans and wild animals are becoming more numerous; while
our understanding of animal agency deepens, technological and managerial manip-
ulations are ever more present; while ethical sensibilities are changing taking into
account animal interests, conflicts with wildlife are becoming increasingly common;
while natural ecosystems are being destroyed, anthropogenic environments popu-
lated by humans are being actively colonized by non-human animals. Considering
these tensions, the question ‘How to share this planet with other living creatures?’—
one of the central questions in environmental reflection—acquires new layers of
complexity and poses new challenges.
One of these challenges, which is also among the central tensions in all the above-
mentioned paradoxes, is that of respectfully accommodating animal agency in the
context of direct coexistence. The difficulty here arises, first of all, from the fact that
animal agency often proves undeniably troubling. This has to do with the material
threats posed by non-humans, such as direct attacks, damages to property and infras-
tructure, or risk of disease (respectively: Linnell et al. 2002; Gordon 2009; Anthony
et al. 2013). But no less important in determining attitudes to species living in prox-
imity to humans are the less material issues. These include primarily emotional
distress caused by fear of the animals (e.g. Flykt et al. 2013; Hiedanpää et al. 2016),
which is often aggravated by culturally-determined prejudices (Lopez 1978), and
symbolic issues linked to the experiences of transgressions and the unsettling of the
established order of things (Knight 2000; Skogen et al. 2008; Cassidy and Mills
2012).1
In the past, in the western world, such conflicts and negative impacts would
have been dealt with in a violent manner showing little recognition for animal well-
being and much concern for human interests. Today, however, the situation seems to
be changing. While the Anthropocene is marked by unprecedented human impacts
across the planet, we are at the same time moving away from considerations of
our Earth and its non-human inhabitants in terms of mere instrumentality. With
respect to animals this means, among other things, experiencing other living beings
as autonomous centers of life with their own sort of good. Consequently, while our
experience of coexistence with wildlife often involves harm or distress, at the same
time our changing moral sensitivity decries easy and violent solutions. As a result,
we are confronted with the challenge of developing new forms of coexistence with
animals—ones that would be respectful of their agency and at the same time would
introduceways enabling people to accommodate the destructive or distressing animal
ways of living. Thus, in some sense, to recognize the agency and moral status of
animals is not so much a solution to a problem (of past mistreatment of non-humans)
but a beginning of a new one: how to reconcile moral concern with experiences of
distress?
Several animal ethicists (for instance Michelfelder 2003; Acampora 2004;
Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011) have recognized this issue, yet, following the major
trends of environmentalist thinking, they largely focus on the threats that humans pose
1For an overview of research and a more extended discussion of these dimensions, including further
references, see Tokarski (2019).
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to animals. As such, the authors mostly limit themselves to arguing why we should
respectfully accept our new neighbors. The moral arguments vary from strongly
normative claims rooted in ethical theories, through instrumental considerations of
benefits that animals bring, to pragmatic acknowledgments that we simply cannot
get rid of wildlife spontaneously colonizing human-dominated spaces with the use
of reasonable means. While such arguments lay directions for what we should strive
for—a respectful cohabitation—and claim to determine what are the right things to
do, they do not address the problematic psychological and experiential aspects of
coexistence, and even less so the actual damages.
These latter two practical aspects are seen as primarily the tasks of environ-
mental andwildlifemanagement (which provides tools such as, e.g., fencing, culling,
vaccinating, providing incentives and disincentives for humans, designing and re-
designing infrastructure to take into account animals) (Woodroffe et al. 2005; Adams
2016). Common are also demands to change individual behaviors (animal-proofing
houses, locking rubbish bins, keeping pets at home, driving carefully in wooded
areas, etc.) and attempts to educate people for the new situation (how to act when
encountering wild animals, replacing hearsay by factual knowledge).
The above practices are commonly based on collaborations between managers,
who implement policies and use the tools, and social scientists, who study the human
dimensions of coexistence in order to assess the best ways to apply these tools and
measure their efficacy with respect to the changes in human behavior and attitudes
(Baruch-Mordo et al. 2009). While not once questioning the adequacy and efficacy
of such collaboration, in the following contribution I would like to focus on some
practical means provided by philosophical-ethical discourses that could be of help
in addressing the difficulties of coexistence with wildlife.
The kind of tools that I would like to focus on here are purely conceptual ones—
strategies that target the ways in which humans make sense of themselves and the
surrounding world, potentially altering those ways, and so consequently changing
the perceptions of the world and particular events. As such, philosophical discourse
would actually have a potential to address the negative psychological and experiential
dimensions of animal impacts.
The specific philosophical discourse I would like to focus on in this contribution is
the tradition of philosophical consolation. This is a type of philosophical discourse
with origins in ancient Greece and is characterized by a clearly defined practical
aim—that is of consoling those suffering. Given the distress experienced by many
of those who find themselves coexisting with wildlife, and the role that perceptions
of wildlife play in such distress, consolation seems strongly intuitively connected
to the issue. Yet, despite a long disciplinary tradition, it has not been so far—to
my knowledge—proposed explicitly as an approach by environmental or animal
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philosophers2 in the context of wildlife impacts.3 Therefore, I would like to make
the first step on the way to possible applications of this tradition in the context of
difficult coexistence with wildlife.
I will begin by presenting two concepts of consolation—first the dominant ideas
and practices rooted in modern psychological scholarship and next the philosoph-
ical version of consolation as it was practiced by the ancient writers and as it still
appears, albeit only rarely, in modern culture. I will then proceed to the discussion
of the ethically-grounded responses to the instances of negative animal impacts. I
will illustrate, firstly, how the philosophical-ethical discourses linked to the difficul-
ties of cohabitation with wildlife can be in fact seen as consolatory in nature and,
secondly, how we can only notice this potential if we refer to the ancient tradition of
consolation rather than to its modern common-sense and academic analogues. I will
conclude by providing some insights that arise from the confrontation of contem-
porary philosophical writings with the ancient practices, which, it is my hope, can
be of some practical relevance for addressing the difficulties we face presently in
attempting to develop new forms of human-animal coexistence.
24.2 The Dominant Concept of Consolation
While most commonly we associate consolation with the experience of grief after
the loss of loved ones, psychologists studying consolation are quick to note that it is a
much broader practice relevant inmany different areas of life and addressing “distress
caused by everything from daily hurts and hassles to major traumas” (Kunkel and
Dennis 2003, 4). This extends all the way to an existential level, where “consolation
is needed when a human being feels alienated from him or herself, from other people,
from the world and from his or her ultimate source of meaning” (Tornøe et al. 2015,
8; see also: Norberg et al. 2001). Any such difficulties might provoke a need for
consolation fromothers, and there is abundant evidence, both anecdotal and research-
based, that consolation is efficacious in helping individuals and groups cope with
challenging life situations (Kunkel and Dennis 2003, 4).
Consolation itself has been defined as “the type of communicative behavior having
the intended function of alleviating, moderating, or salving the distressed emotional
2We might connect this to the general absence of this tradition from the discipline of philosophy
throughout the modern period. And yet, despite the general falling out of favor of this tradition
within academic philosophy, there are indications that today, as in the past, there is a significant
demand for this sort of practice. One may mention the success of Alain de Botton’s book The
Consolations of Philosophy (2001) or the field of philosophical counseling (e.g. Schuster 1999).
3However, we must note that there is a significant number of texts on environmental losses which
focus on melancholia and mourning as responses to the loss of species or degradation of ecosystems
(e.g. Albrecht et al. 2007; Mortimer-Sandilands 2010; Lertzman 2015; Barnett 2019). While these
belong to the same conceptual field as the argument developed here, the crucial difference is that
while the aforementioned authors speak about losses of nature, I focus here on the losses to nature.
While the comparison of these two approaches would be extremely interesting, it would require
much more space than I have at my disposal here.
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states of others” (Burleson 1984, 64). This, of course, is rather open, as it leavesmuch
freedom with respect to the communicative means used and the ways of assessing
the success of alleviating the distress. The latter might be connected to fairly super-
ficial actions, as in the “modernist and medical concern to return the individual as
rapidly as possible to efficient and autonomous functioning” (Walter 1996, 2; see
also: Wambach 1985; Broadbent et al. 1990). When focused more on the individual
rather than on the efficient performance of social roles, consolation may change the
emotional states of the consoled: “The defining characteristic of solace is the sense of
soothing. To be consoled is to be comforted. Solace is pleasure, enjoyment, or delight
in the midst of sorrow’s hopelessness and despair” (Klass 2014, 6). But it might also
involve more fundamental, one could say existential, work, where it functions “as a
form of healing that involves a changed perception of the world in suffering persons.
This healing shift of perception enables suffering patients to set their suffering within
a new pattern of meaning, in a new transcendent light” (Tornøe et al. 2015, 8; see
also: Norberg et al. 2001).
The last point makes clear that consolation as a coping mechanism—in all its
guises—is not focused on removing the external causes of distress but rather on
attempts “to change what is perceived and how it is appraised” (Kunkel and Dennis
2003, 5).
Based on psychological research, several forms of emotional coping have been
characterized that can achieve the above-summarized aims, and these include:
(a) positive reappraisal (efforts to change, refocus, or reframe the meanings of an experience
or event so that they are more positive, and less threatening); (b) distancing (efforts to
detach oneself emotionally from themeanings of a stressful situation); (c) denial/suppression
(choosing not to openly acknowledge stressors); and (d) escape/avoidance (trying not to think
about what is troubling, and focusing instead on distractions). (Kunkel and Dennis 2003,
5–6)
Of course, not all of these coping mechanisms are deemed equally productive, and
when it comes to actual practice of consolation the latter two are rather discouraged
both for their lack of long-term efficacy and possibly problematic consequences
of ignoring the distress (Kunkel and Dennis 2003, 8). These two aspects might
be associated with the more informal, popular understanding of what consolation
involves: the search for distraction in the midst of anxiety or the common enough
assurances we hear that things ‘will sort themselves out.’
The second aspect, the distancing, often in common parlance referred to as the
‘letting go’ of the departed or anxieties, has also been recently questioned, even
though it forms the backbone of the traditional psychological means of coping with
grief (Kunkel and Dennis 2003, 6). Instead, the first of the mentioned approaches is
today deemed as the most adequate, and “proponents of the new paradigm of grief
theory have re-emphasized the role of cognitive processes in emotional adjustment
and recognized meaning reconstruction […] as the central mechanisms in grieving”
(Kunkel andDennis 2003, 6). This takes the formof re-narrating the relationships and
constructing new meanings, even as far as reshaping one’s relationship to the world
in such a way as to find a new place for the lost object of attachment (Neimeyer
2002, 302). This often involves “constructing a coherent narrative from a chaotic
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and troubling event” which makes the troubling situations “more accessible, more
understandable, and less foreign” (Kunkel and Dennis 2003, 5).
While the above seems to be mostly an individual task of the person in distress,
it can naturally be supported by others. Here we enter the intersubjective space of
consolation which has received much attention and has been foregrounded in recent
scholarship, at the same time being commonly underlined as important by those in
need of consolation. Some have pointed out that:
even etymologically consolation carries the sense [of] intersubjectivity. The word comfort is
from the Latin fortis, strong or powerful, and the prefix com, that is from the Latin cum, that
means with. To comfort means, then, to strengthen or find strength together. (Klass 2014, 6)
Much research on this dimension has been carried out in nursing studies, and here
it has been pointed out that:
spiritual and existential care interventions involve conveying empathy, active listening, being
present with patients, helping patients to accept their thoughts and feelings around death and
dying, showing respect and supporting patients’ dignity. They also emphasize the importance
of creating a compassionate and caring environment to bring hope, help patients to deal with
the reality of death and to support their spiritual well-being in the terminal stage of life.
(Tornøe et al. 2015, 2)
Thus, while the work of re-narrating relationships and searching for new meanings
can only be carried out by the individual in distress, there seems to be a need for
creating the environment supportive of such cognitive-narrative work, and this is
precisely the responsibility of the consoler. One of the important elements raised in
this context is for the consoler to open oneself to the pain of the other, and so to
experience the pain together without passing judgments (Klass 2014, 8).
To meet the other as another seems to indicate a vital aspect of what consolation is and what
it is not. To meet the other as another is to create space to allow the person to be who he/she
really is. This space includes the possibility to be able to suffer in one’s own way. (Roxberg
et al. 2008, 1085)
The last points, linked to the role of the consoler, underline that consolation is
concerned in a significant way precisely with being able to suffer, with enabling
one to suffer in one’s own way and for one’s own reasons, to acknowledge the right-
ness of this, and to open the space for the expression of grief and anxiety. Following
this, I will not perhaps be wrong to state that within the present western culture there
is a tendency to see distress over loss or troubling circumstances as something appro-
priate, even necessary. The strength of emotion is in some way seen as a corollary to
the importance of the thing/person lost or the distress suffered.
However, it is precisely this basic assumption and prescription that stands in stark
contrast to some of the most fundamental aspects of the philosophical tradition of
consolation. I will presently move to the discussion of this alternative understanding
of consolation, underlining the differences with the currently dominant ideas.
24 Consolations of Environmental Philosophy 451
24.3 Philosophical Tradition of Consolation
We can safely assume that consolation as a simple act of comforting has always been
a part of human relations.4
Under rhetorical and philosophical influences a specialized literature began to develop in
Greece, leading to the establishment of a tradition which persisted throughout Antiquity and
continued into the Middle Ages… What unites the works in these various categories [of
poetry, letters, philosophical treatises, funerary orations] is that they are all concerned, one
way or another, with the treatment of grief, and that they draw to a large extent on a common
stock of consolatory topics. (Scourfield 1993, 16)
Many of these stock tropes include ideas that we can easily recognize and even use
ourselves. These include such advises as: be strong, consider how much good the
other person has experienced, focus on the good memories, grief does not help
in anything, etc. But beyond those, there is one element that forms the core of
philosophical consolatory practice and which we may perhaps find rather surprising.
This is to chastise our grief as inappropriate and to provide a new horizon of thought
from which one can look at the world in such a way that the event which caused us
anxiety no longer appears as an occasion for distress.
This approach was motivated by one of the key aims of ancient philosophy, which
was to achieve a state of perfect calmness and satisfaction, a happiness that consisted
primarily in the state of ‘inner peace’ (Hadot 1995). And “Since grief was considered
an inconvenient and disruptive emotion, the rhetorical and philosophical methods,
like the traditional approaches before, aimed to reduce excessive grief and contain the
disruptive effects it had on family and society” (Baltussen 2013a, xiv–xv).As a conse-
quence of this aim, grief, anxiety, and distress, as deeply unsettling emotions, were
considered inappropriate in a strongly normative sense, even to the extent of being
considered a fault (Boys-Stones 2013). Thus, philosophical consolation5 became not
somuch a form of comforting but a way of eliciting amorally appropriate response to
the trials and tribulations of life (Vickers 1993). If consolation is linked in our minds
primarily with trying to cheer someone, to sympathize with them, acknowledge their
pain, perhaps to distract them, the ancient and medieval consolation has much more
to do with education, and even to some extent with chastising, admonishing, and
reprimanding.
TheGreekword isπαραμυθ…α, andπαραμυθ…αmeans somethingmuch less like comforting
and much more like encouragement. Specifically implied here is the idea that the addressee
is being helped to take charge of themself, to reassert control over an emotion that has run
away with them… What they do is to challenge the griever to reconceptualise their grief as
4Indeed, there is currently an abundant literature on consolation even among animals, particularly
primates (e.g. de Waal and Van Roosmalen 1979; Palagi et al. 2006; Fraser and Bugnyar 2010).
Research on non-human consolation is so common that as a matter of fact it may be easier to find
studies of animals than of human traditions.
5While this attitude and associated practices do not exhaust the content of actual extant consolatory
texts, for the sake of brevity I will refer to this concern and the textual forms it gave rise to as
philosophical consolations.
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a different sort of problem, a problem of emotional susceptibility. (The solution—‘getting a
grip’—is, then, not just theway to overcome grief; it is theway to greater all-round emotional
stability). (Boys-Stones 2013, 124)
While such control of emotions and passions is a paradigmatic Stoic strategy, it
was present in virtually all the ancient schools (Hadot 1995, 86–87). The way
this control of emotions is carried out is through rational work, that is through re-
conceptualization of the way in which the sufferer thinks of his situation by reference
to ethical or metaphysical theories. This is because the assumption is that grief is
caused not somuch by the situation inwhich one finds oneself but by awrong concep-
tualization of this situation, by a flaw of reasoning or inappropriate prejudices in light
of which the situation is considered. This is well summarized by Epictetus: “People
are not troubled by things, but by their judgments about things” (quoted in Hadot
1995, 193). Consequently, it is precisely the judgments that need to be changed,
not the events in the world, and this is achieved through an attainment of a new
perspective on things, a new theory of the world, which more adequately represents
what we can expect and what we should be concerned with. In proposing this way
of framing grief, ancient philosophers “broke new ground… in their effort to ratio-
nalize the cause of grief and give meaning to it by exhorting the addressee to redefine
or reconceptualize the event in order to enable him or her to move on” (Baltussen
2013a, xiv–xv).
While denying the adequacy of fear or sadness as a response to tragic events might
strike us as insensitive—to say the least—themotif of reconceptualizationmight bear
some resemblance to the cognitive-narrative work promoted in the contemporary
research on grief. While superficially there might be some similarity, in fact there is
a big difference. Presently, we are not dealing with a thorough reconstruction of the
intellectual horizon so that the grief does not arise—indeed, such an attitude could be
considered as callously insensitive—but with a reconstruction of the specific bond
with the lost object/person so that our relationship to it is changed.
Here we meet with another issue. While the current reshaping of the perception
of the situation relates to biographical re-narration and focuses on the subjective
meaning of the event, object, or person, the ancient consolation was thoroughly a
matter of a rational discourse which ultimately referred to theories about the nature
of the world. As such, it related to universal claims regarding the universe and not to
personal meanings and attachments. For Stoics, as well as for later Christian writers,
this was connected, among other things, to the belief in a rational logos that rules the
world, so that even the events experienced individually as tragic acquire a different
meaning in the context of this higher rationality or plan. For Epicureans, the case
was precisely the opposite—holding on to an atomistic view of the universe, they
saw the world as a meaningless chaos with no pre-determined structures. While
such a vision might seem to us like a source of anguish in itself, for Epicureans it
extinguishedmany common fears and anxieties: of divine punishment, of afterlife, of
not satisfying supposedly pre-existing social standards. At the same time, in such a
chaotic world anything encountered in life that possessed a concrete form appeared
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as “a kind of miracle, a gratuitous, unexpected gift of nature, and existence… a
wonderful celebration” (Hadot 1995, 209).
Another apparent similarity, shared between the classical and the modern idea
of consolation, involves the element of participation. Today, this is connected to
a revelation of vulnerability of both the consoler and the consoled and involves
expression of individual feelings. In the philosophical consolation, while it could
have involved expression of sympathy, the relationship between the two persons was
rather like that between a teacher and a student. Their interaction would not be that of
sharing experiences or feelings, as it is in modern practices, but rather would involve
a rational discussion, and it very often involved “an exhortatory style which may not
be palatable to modern sensitivity” (Baltussen 2013a, xvi).
All of these features (normativity, rationalization, and exhortation) are strikingly
present in Boethius’ Consolation of Philosophy, one of the most accomplished, if
slightly unconventional, works of the genre. The treatise was written by Boethius
in prison, where he was placed on false charges—an accusation which eventually
resulted in his execution. In his treatise, Philosophy, embodied in the character of
a woman, appears to a prisoner (whose situation is suspiciously similar to that of
Boethius himself) and immediately expresses her surprise at his fallen spirit:
‘Art thou that man,’ she cries, ‘who, erstwhile fed with the milk and reared upon the nour-
ishment which is mine to give, had grown up to the full vigour of a manly spirit? And yet I
had bestowed such armour on thee as would have proved an invincible defence, hadst thou
not first cast it away. Dost thou know me? Why art thou silent? Is it shame or amazement
that hath struck thee dumb? Would it were shame; but, as I see, a stupor hath seized upon
thee.’ (Boethius 2017, Prose II)
The defense of which she speaks is not that of any material means of protecting
against enemies but rather a way of securing the spirit against all possible trials of
fate through the appropriate understanding of the world. One of such shields was
precisely the belief in the existence of a higher rationality that rules the world, giving
meaning to even the most unjust actions. It is consequently not the imprisonment
that Philosophy bemoans but the fact that the prisoner feels sorry for himself, which
can only mean that he lacked the wisdom. Sometime later, rather than accusing his
captors, she again points at the prisoner as the one who brought himself into misery:
When I saw thee sorrowful, in tears, I straightway knew thee wretched and an exile. But
how far distant that exile I should not know, had not thine own speech revealed it. Yet how
far indeed from thy country hast thou, not been banished, but rather hast strayed; or, if thou
wilt have it banishment, hast banished thyself! For no one else could ever lawfully have had
this power over thee. (Boethius 2017, Prose V)
The true exile, in which the prisoner finds himself, is thus not from his family, home,
possessions, or titles but from his wisdom—and this abandoning of wisdom, of the
appropriate way of seeing the world, is what Philosophy bemoans:
At bottom, she regards the prisoner’s grief as the noxious exhaust of misguided belief about
life, death, and value. Once our thoughts have the unity of a sound syllogism, she thinks, we
can face the ravages of mortal existence with equanimity. (Campbell 2016, 449)
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This might seem rather insensitive, perhaps even cruel, of her, to speak so to aman
who had just been falsely accused, stripped of all his wealth, separated from family,
denied honor, and made to spend days in a dungeon. (We are speaking here about the
fictional prisoner, not Boethius himself, although it is difficult to stop oneself from
establishing an identity.) And yet, this is precisely the message of Philosophy and
the only true consolation she can grant—had his ideas about life and the universe
been correct, he would never grieve over his situation nor face any anxiety. What she
aims to do then, in the remaining part of the Consolation, following the process of
rational discussion, is to remind Boethius about the appropriate way of looking at
the situation in which he found himself.
We need not go into the details of the worldviews presented by the ancient conso-
lations. Many of those will no longer be of much practical help to a modern seeker of
consolation. The key observation at this junction concerns the structure of philosoph-
ical consolation: it is a process of rational reconstruction of the conceptual horizon of
the sufferer that is motivated by ethical theories about the good life and grounded in
metaphysical theories about the world. As a result of such reconstruction, one comes
to see the world in a different way, so that the cause of suffering no longer appears
as such. This is the philosophical process of consolation, and as such it might be
distinguished from a psychological or a popular one.
24.4 Environmental Philosophy on Ecological Discomforts
At this point we may return to the question posed at the beginning of the chapter—
how to live with wild animals taking into account their disruptive agency? Given my
discussion of consolations above, we may ask now more specifically—can consola-
tions be helpful in situations where we find ourselves distressed by the realities of
coexistence?
Below, I will briefly present some of the most common, ethically-grounded strate-
gies of engaging with cases of negative animal impacts, particularly in writings of
environmental philosophers. The sources of these ideas are ethical texts meant to
propose an appropriate way of engaging with wildlife. However, although they are
not written with the intention of being consolations, I want to suggest that they can
also be read and function as such. Consequently, they can perform a very important
role in addressing human anxieties linked to coexistence. Indeed, perhaps implicitly
they have already been performing this role.
Nevertheless, aswill soon become apparent, they can only be considered as conso-
lations if we make reference to the ancient philosophical strategies of consolation,
strategies that, far from offering emotional support and catalyzing narrative work,
engage in quite stern moral and rational argumentation. And just as the ancient
consolations, rather than offering an acknowledgment of our suffering, they open a
possibility of uprooting the very conceptual assumptions that are perceived as the
sources of our distress.
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These strategies can be divided into two broad groups. One of these combats
anxieties through the promotion of a rational attitude predicated upon amoral theory,
the other involves a perspectival shift away from the human point of view. Both of
these strategies, if successfully embraced, may erase the very conditions upon which
distress in the face of animal impacts is based.
With respect to the first group, the examples I will use come frommoral arguments
grounded in consequentialist-utilitarian and deontological theories.
Speaking about the former, even a cursory glance at the literature onhuman-animal
conflicts reveals that many instances of animal impacts are discussed within the
context of calculations of costs and benefits of coexistencewithwildlife. The negative
impacts (say, damaged crops or distress caused by a sense of threat) are tallied
on the side of costs of cohabitation and are balanced against the potential benefits
(for instance ecosystem services or the pleasure of watching wildlife). Thus, when
one makes note of the damages that wildlife causes and the negative psychological
effects this has, one is asked to take into account the fact that at the same time
the animals are bringing with them a lot of benefits. This is only rational—if we
already consider animal impacts in terms of their consequences, we should consider
all possible consequences. Such are the requirements of consistency. What is more,
following the principles of utilitarianism, we should consider the consequences of
some event not just for ourselves, but for all those beings that can experience suffering
or pleasure, and this, in more recent utilitarian accounts, should include also the costs
and benefits for the animals involved.
The question of what to do when confronted with animal impacts is presented
here as a matter of rational decision making based on an ethical theory that defines
good and bad in terms of perceived overall utility. But once this stance is adopted in
a consistent manner and internalized, it can also provide one with a way of freeing
oneself from anxieties. This is, first of all, because the argument presents a framework
which allows for tallying together all the individual values of particular experiences
into a cumulative evaluation treating all the aspects and participants in principle
equally (with such necessary corrections as intensity or quantity of effect). Given
that such a cumulative evaluation of the coexistence with wildlife is commonly
judged as good, from the perspective of such final evaluation it might be much easier
to suffer some particular discomfort when one knows that it is merely an unavoidable
element of an overall positive state of affairs.
A claim that bears some resemblance to this, is one often presented by the rights-
oriented animal ethicists working in the context of theories of justice:
At themoment, we are hypersensitive to any risk that liminal animalsmight pose to us getting
sucked into airplane engines, causing car accidents, chewing insulated electrical wires. Or
we wildly exaggerate threats, especially in the case of disease. Meanwhile, we ignore the
countless risks we impose on liminals—cars, electrical transformers, tall structures and
wires, window glass, backyard pools, pesticides, and many others. […] it is unfair to have a
zero-tolerance policy as regards animal risks to humans, while completely disregarding the
risks we impose on them. (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011, 244)
Here, justice is claimed to demand of us equality in the distribution of benefits as well
as threats. Any specific damage, threat, or distress is thus presented not in the context
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of our individual experience but rather as an element in the fair balancing of rights,
obligations, and harms. Once we internalize such an argument, our harm should
appear to us in a different light—that is as an element of just distribution. While we
might be personally to some extent disadvantaged, inconvenienced, or distressed,
this personal experience acquires its full significance only in the light of the broader
concern for distributive justice. And within the context of such framework, a loss or
hurt we suffer is a positive step towards the ideal of justice (although it might also be
an instance of injustice—as in the case of harms experienced by animals). While the
negative impacts of animals might thus persist and inconvenience me, I should not be
angered or frustrated by them because in fact they are an element of just distribution.
At the very least, this should make one tolerant of events experienced as hurtful.
In both of the examples discussed above (utilitarian and deontological) we are
asked to shape our attitude to negative animal impacts not following our emotional
reactions or personal narratives but by rational deliberation following moral princi-
ples grounded in ethical theories. At the same time, such rational attitude carries a
promise that when embraced it will provide us with a perspective from which what
we experience as distressing will no longer appear so. The latter part is not an explicit
element of philosophical argumentation as we presently encounter it in the writings
within the field. Indeed, for the ethical theories presented it does not matter how
we feel about the animal impacts. What matters is that we do the good/right thing.
However, implicitly, these theories carry a potential for a philosophical consolation.
This consolation functions not through the establishment of a personal narrative rela-
tionship to the situation but through the acceptance of a theory that claims to provide
not so much a meaningful but rather a right or true picture of the situation.
The emotional disturbances that are primarily targeted in both, I would argue, are
anger and frustration, which could then give rise to actions that seek retribution on
animals. This reveals to us an important transition from the ancient practice. While
traditionally philosophical consolations have been related primarily to the achieve-
ment of a right state of mind (that is ataraxia), and as such can be associated with
concerns over personal character and excellence relating to virtue ethics, here we
are focused on the right conduct towards others and the establishment of moral rela-
tions. Despite this important difference, the basic structure of grounding consolation
in ethical (rather than psychological) considerations is maintained.
The above presented arguments demand a transition from the frame of reference
of the individual experience to the consideration of rational, overarching principles
with a claim to universal applicability. Such shift is even more pronounced, and
more radical, in the second set of philosophical claims often presented in response
to unease over animal impacts. Here, the idea is no longer connected to grounding
our assessment of a situation in rational deliberation following ethical principles but
rather in a change of perspective that can be very well termed metaphysical.
Holmes Rolston is one of the scholars who early on noticed and addressed the
problem of ecological discomforts, developing a sort of ecological theodicy. The
essence of Rolston’s argument (Rolston 1983, 1992, 2015) is that while from an
individual perspective certain features of life in naturemight appear “evil” (suffering,
death, predation, etc.), from a systemic perspective of a whole ecosystem (or even
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the whole biosphere) all these individual harms contribute to the development and
flourishing of the system. More than that—from the perspective of that system the
individual wrongs can be transvaluated in such a way that they become goods.
Overall the myriad individual passages through life and death upgrade the system. Value
has to be something more, something opposed to what any individual actor likes or selects,
since even struggle and death which are never approved, are ingredients used instrumentally
to produce still higher intrinsic values…This can seem in morally wild disregard for their
individuality, treating each as a means to an end. But the whole system in turn generates
more and higher individuality. Problem solving is a function of the system too as it recycles,
pulls conflicts into harmony, and redeems life from an ever-pressing death. (Rolston 1983,
196–197)
It is important to understand in what way the reference to a system is introduced
here. Quite often “in sorrow many people find consolation in the sense that they
participate in something that transcends present space and time” (Klass 2014, 9). We
could also interpret the framework proposed byRolston as giving us a placewithin an
ecological community that transcends individuality. This might be the interpretation
embraced by many who come to see themselves as members of more-than-human
communities. But the main thrust of Rolston’s argument has to do with departing
from one’s individual perspective. One is not so much asked to see oneself as a
member of a community but rather to take the perspective of such a community—a
subtle but important difference—and only from ‘such great heights’ one can truly
appreciate that everything, in the end, acquires a positive value. This is reminiscent
of taking the “view from above,” which was such a characteristic element of spiritual
exercises of all the schools in ancient philosophy (Hadot 1995, 238–250) and is
further connected to the belief in a higher rationality that stands as a guarantee of
ultimate goodness of everything that happens in the world.6
To distinguish this from the shift involved in the previous two examples, we should
note that here such transition is not based on ethical theory that determines the rela-
tionships between sentient creatures but on a different perspective of what constitutes
the fundamental processes that organize the totality of life itself. The fundamental
conceptual switch that is required here is not linked to ethical concepts (such as
justice, good, or utility) but rather to metaphysical visions of what constitutes the
privileged level of existence: wholes rather than individuals, processes and qualities
rather than the separate entities they involve.
A similarly radical transformation of perspective can be found in Val Plumwood’s
writings motivated by her near-death encounter with a crocodile (Plumwood 2000,
2012). By trying to make sense of her experience, she arrived at an interpretation of
the crocodile attack as a revelation of a form of justice much different from the one
that is based on individual inviolability (like the one that is at work in Donaldson
and Kymlicka’s idea of justice) and that organizes exchanges between people.
This is the universe represented in the food chain whose logic confounds our sense of justice
because it presents a completely different sense of generosity. It is pervaded and organised
6It is perhaps not without significance that Rolston, among his titles, holds one in divinity and is an
ordained minister of the Presbyterian Church.
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by a generosity that takes a Heraclitean perspective, one in which our bodies flow with the
food chain. They do not belong to us; rather they belong to all. A different kind of justice
rules the food chain, one of sharing what has been provided by energy andmatter and passing
it on. (Plumwood 2012, 35)
The meaning of justice proposed here involves a completely different set of basic
assumptions about the identity of individuals and the rules that govern the interactions
between them. Here, there is no sense of individuality as a distinct identity separate
from other creatures and processes. The living world is presented rather as a constant
flux, and it is not without reason that Plumwood calls this a ‘Heraclitean’ world. In
this framework individual loss no longer appears to us as a wrong or a harm. Rather,
it becomes an appropriate way of existing, one which carries its own special sort of
goodness. As such, when fully internalized, at least in theory, it should provide us
with a way of assuaging the individual worries and anxieties, and that is because
within the perspective based on unconditional generosity there is no stable sense of
individuality which could experience the harm as a breach of its existence.7
On a smaller scale, though still following a similar principle, are the perspectival
transitions involved in the appreciation of the intrinsic worth of other creatures,
whether animals or plants, with their proper means of flourishing. For any entity we
can discern its species-specific possibility of flourishing and evaluate the activities
of the creature from that perspective rather than from the egocentric perspective of
human self-interest (Taylor 1986). Such change allows for disinterested admiration,
which in itself can become a sort of consolation. If we cease to look at the world
from the perspectives of our own interests and desires and instead ‘feel our way’
into the flourishing of another creature (perhaps one that is inconveniencing us), the
suffering, unease, or distress arising out of the confrontationwith that creature should
dissolve. This, I think, is the lifting of the curse of which John Muir spoke:
I cannot understand the nature of the curse, ‘Thorns and thistles shall it bring forth to thee’.
Is our world indeed the worse for this thistly curse? Are not all plants beautiful? Or in some
way useful? Would not the world suffer by the banishment of a single weed? The curse must
be within ourselves. (quoted in Norton 1994, 19)
To detach ourselves from our own judgments, cultural prejudices, and preferences
is to find peace—to leave behind the curse of egotism, and, following further the
biblical reference, to return to paradise. But we must remember it is not an earthly
paradise where the lion will lay with the lamb but rather a state of mind, a peace with
ourselves and the surrounding world.
The above-summarized ways of writing about ecological discomforts were not
intended as consolations. Neither do they qualify as such if we look at the ways that
consolation is commonly understood today. Indeed, in their focus on normativity,
7We must be careful here to note that Plumwood, while proposing this new framework of justice,
claimed emphatically that it is necessary to retain also the human sense of justice based on individual
inviolability. Unlike in Rolston, then, in her writings there is a continuing sense of tragic duality
and consequently the consolation remains incomplete. Still, the perspective of justice as generosity,
when viewed on its own, provides the sort of altered frame of reference in which individual loss no
longer appears as a cause of distress.
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impersonal principles, rationality, radical shift of perspective, and denial of appro-
priateness of grief and distress they may strike one as insensitive to the experiences
of individual suffering. This is particularly so with Rolston, who takes the idea of
systemic view of things to its logical consequence, something for which he has been
in fact strongly criticized (LeBlanc 2001;Holland 2009; Plumwood 2012). However,
if we look at the philosophical tradition of consolation, we can see striking affinities
between the ancient and contemporary texts.
First of all, both ancient and environmental philosophers acknowledge that distress
in face of difficult life experiences forms a problematic issue. For the ancients,
this was connected to the disruptive potential of emotions, which drive one away
from the ideal of serenity. Today, acknowledging troubling aspects of nature is often
perceived as potentially undermining the motivation to protect nature (Ouderkirk
1999). While psychological practice strives towards establishing a relationship of
sympathy and promotes emotional work, in ancient and environmental philosophy
we find rational discourses in asymmetrical relationships. While presently we focus
on assuaging of pain, the ancient philosophical consolation took diminishing of
pain as secondary to the illumination of truth and concerned itself with bringing the
individual back to the appropriate frame of mind—from which the diminishing of
pain would follow naturally. Suffering was, therefore, not so much a ‘disease’ that
needed treatment as a symptom of a deeper underlying problem—the falling away
from truth, virtue, or appropriate conduct. I would venture proposing that this is
what is also happening in environmental philosophy. The anxiety, fear, hatred, or
disgust with animals are not in themselves the problem or are so only secondarily.
These attitudes and emotions are rather symptoms of a fundamentally misguided
worldview, most commonly characterized as anthropocentrism. Consequently, what
is provided is a way to treat the actual problem, that is to propose an alternative
metaphysical and ethical horizon. Discomfort, then, is a symptom of a deeper issue
that needs to be treated; indeed, one that can only be treated not with sympathy but
with fundamental normative-conceptual work. Such work takes the form of rational
discourses and proposes a thorough transformation of the conceptual horizon from
which one looks at the world.
The point I am making here is that as a consequence of this reshaping one can
also expect the alleviation of grief, anxiety, or even the actual conflicts themselves—
indeed, that is what seems implicitly to be promised in many ethical arguments:
If we attempt to see animals apart from our anthropocentric projections and desires, might
we be able to see these animals with some sort of clarity? If we understand the animals on
their own terms, could we then minimize or end conflicts with problematic wildlife? (Nagy
and Johnson 2013, 10)
As such, animal ethics and environmental philosophy are practical not only in
providing directions for action, but also in that they provide conceptual tools for
addressing certain problematic aspects of cohabitation with wildlife. This opens up
an additional avenue for developing coexistence, one based not on material transfor-
mation of the environment or managerial regimes controlling the behavior of people
and animals but on “spiritual” transformations effected by consolatory work.
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Consequently, the analysis carried out here is not only an analytical framework,
useful in analysis of philosophical positions, or another interpretative key that can
be productively applied to nature writing. Indeed, the ancient examples show us
precisely how this approach can be used in practice and how standard tropes (and
we already have a number of those established in environmental thinking) can be
creatively made use of to discuss individual instances of hurt, grief, or anxiety.
Unfortunately, some aspects of philosophical consolation discussed above
might strike many modern-day readers as counter-intuitive. Moreover, the above-
summarized moral arguments are not explicitly framed as consolatory. For these
reasons, we might expect difficulties in the practical application of the discussed
philosophical approach. Consequently, below I will discuss some lessons that we
may derive from the ancient practice of philosophical consolation that may be of use
in our present predicament.
24.5 The Scope of Consolation Is a Total Transformation
Ancient consolations often did not limit themselves to an issue immediately at hand.
Because they touch thematter of despair and suffering, in many cases they eventually
fall back upon one of the most fundamental questions of ancient—if not of modern—
philosophy, that is what is happiness and how to attain it. Consequently, consolations
usually became discourses on the good life—what constitutes it and how it can be
achieved—and very often moved in the direction of basic metaphysical beliefs. The
consequence of consolation is then envisioned as a deep spiritual transformation:
“The ancient consolatio genre is a prime example ofwhat PierreHadot calls ‘spiritual
exercises,’ an engaged philosophy that seeks to form readers over an itinerarymapped
by its arguments, rather than simply informing them” (Campbell 2016, 447).
The point here is to realize that philosophical consolation should not be treated
merely instrumentally, as a sort of conceptual or symbolic analogue to more tradi-
tional means of wildlife management. We should also not expect that it simply aims
to treat some separate instance of distress, while the rest of our life remains intact.
Rather, this approach, far from being a mere tool, transforms the very situation in
which it is applied as well as the person undergoing consolation. Ultimately it trans-
forms us into people who think and act differently—as such it is existential rather
than instrumental.
So how exactly does such a transformation take place?
24.6 Gentle and Strong Remedies
It is important to notice that ancient authors recognize two stages of consolation.
Taking Boethius’ Consolation of Philosophy as an example, we can distinguish
‘gentler’ and ‘stronger’ remedies, which “mirrors the ancient physician’s approach to
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acclimate the patient to the medicines of increasing strength as one prepares oneself
slowly and by degrees for moving out of darkness into bright light” (Phillips 2002).
In the treatise, this means beginning from rhetorical arguments, poetry, and the kind
of claims that are readily acceptable to the one suffering, as they still fit within her
presentworldview: “The ‘gentler remedy’ is notmeant to cure but rather to strengthen
the patient…so that he can take the stronger medicine later” (ibid.). In a similar vein,
also Stoics underlined the importance of letting some time pass, and with it the worst
of the grief, before undertaking serious philosophical consolatory work (Baltussen
2013b).
This does not mean we have to immediately break into song or engage in the
kind of floral speeches we may encounter in, for instance, Cicero’s Tusculan Dispu-
tations. Rather, and taking to heart the insights of modern consolation studies, the
above drawn distinction would suggest beginning with the compassionate, narrative,
and emotional grief-work that is currently seen as both most adequate and most effi-
cacious. The first stage could be what we would commonly consider a consolation
in that it takes on various forms of soothing, sympathizing, and acknowledging. The
gentle means of compassion, such as encouraging expression and showing one’s own
vulnerability, might be the first step of assuaging grief and preparing the other to be
ready to be consoled in amore radical manner, with the use of conceptual consolation
that transforms the perspective on the situation. What is more, this initial step might
help build trust and rapport in the context of issues that provoke strong partisan divi-
sions. By encouraging expression it might also make the conceptual bases of anxiety
more visible, whichmight be helpful in the later work of reformulating those through
philosophical consolation.
While this might appear as contradictory—since it depends on confirming the
attachment to the worldview that gives rise to distress—it might nevertheless be
psychologically necessary. It is very difficult to enact a total transformation of a
worldview at a moment of crisis where people seem to require stability the most
and cling to the ideas that have so far organized their life. And since philosophical
consolation strives for achieving actual results, it cannot afford to disregard the
psychological structure of the experience it tries to address. Hence, to reach the
pre-determined normatively defined goal, it often has to be pragmatic in the choice
of means it employs. The writing cure of Cicero can be interpreted in this light
as such first stage on the way to complete consolation, which would later include
philosophical work that returns one to the appropriate way of perceiving the world.
In general, it shows that philosophical consolation is always a balancing act and an
art that requires sensitivity both to the psychological nature of the situation and the
ethical goals of the practice.
24.7 The Individual and Private Is Universal and Public
Another important feature of consolation as a practice was that it most commonly
took the form of a dialogue. The three great works of consolation: Plato’s Phaedo,
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Boethius’ConsolationofPhilosophy, andCicero’sTusculanDisputations, all take the
form of a dialogue. Consolations were also often part of epistolary exchanges—they
were extended dialogues. Authors were often quite aware that such private letters
would be made public; indeed, they often wrote with a larger audience in mind:
“Pieces such as these [private letters by Seneca], though directed to a particular
and personal situation, have the character rather of an essay than of a letter; here,
as elsewhere, the distinction between letter and treatise becomes hard to define”
(Scourfield 1993, 21).
This ambiguous status of consolatory texts connects the private and the public
sphere of both grief and consolation and this has two important consequences. On
the one hand, the texts needed to bemade very individual, so as to address the specific
suffering of the addressee. As such, the common tropes had to be adapted for the
specific situation and with a particular person in mind. On the other hand, given they
were meant for the greater public, they needed to provide consolation in a way that
others could identify with. This is of course no mean feat.
One way to address this tension was to depend on stock arguments that developed
together with the genre (Baltussen 2009, 71).
These stock examples, far from being anemic, standardized commonplaces, served the user
well in providing words at a time when many are at a loss for words. Rather than trivialize
these commonplaces as “mere platitudes,” we should acknowledge their power to express
an individual’s response to grief in a verbal form sanctioned by experience. (ibid., 91)
The skill of a consoler was visible precisely in the way that she managed to make
the traditional tropes applicable to the situation at hand.
In a similar waywe can endeavor to seewhether there are such stock approaches in
modern environmentalism. And indeedwe can find those—above I have summarized
severalmoral arguments that belong to the developing stock of tropes commonly used
in situations of animal impacts by philosophers and broader publics alike.While they
are ‘stock arguments,’ they can be at the same time transformed according to the need
to fit a specific situation, and the skill of a consoler is visible precisely in the way
that she can make the general, perhaps even universal, bear on the individual in a
unique way. Perhaps this is why the writings of Val Plumwood on her experience
with the crocodile are so powerful. She develops her philosophical ideas permanently
referring to her own personal experience while at the same time managing to touch
universal notes.
24.8 Conclusion—the Limits of Consolation
As any practice, also that of consolation has its limitations and it is important to be
aware of those. There are several problematic features that philosophical consolation
has struggled with from its very beginning.
While many philosophical works profess optimism as to the efficacy of this
approach in expelling anguish, this has not been a common cultural presumption. For
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once, even in ancient Greece, there was a strong sentiment against consolation, which
is visible inGreek tragedy that often underlines the impossibility of successful conso-
lation (Chong-Gossard 2013). Private writings of philosophers, for instance Cicero’s,
show a discrepancy between the publicly professed belief in philosophy and personal
experience. While he maintains that philosophical work has helped him show his
grief less, he acknowledges that the actual pain remained unchanged (Baltussen
2013b, 74). Even some works of consolation, like Boethius’ text, according to some
scholars express doubts regarding the capacity of philosophy to actually provide the
consolation it promises and can be read more as a satire (Relihan 1990, 2007).
The awareness of this limitation is important because it can also draw our attention
to the limitations of the philosophical and rhetorical strategies used by environmen-
talists addressing the problematic issues surrounding coexistence with wildlife. It
also opens the space for texts which, like ancient tragedies, directly address the
refusal or the impossibility of thorough consolation and instead focus on the irre-
ducibly tragic aspects of coexistence (Snyder 1990; Williams 1995; Steeves 1999;
Jordan 2003; Tokarski 2019). We can heed this warning and include it more openly
even in the philosophical, journalistic, and narrative texts which strive to address
ecological discomforts.
Acknowledgment of the limited efficacy of consolation also helps us realize how
immense work is asked of the grieving or distressed. Indeed, the consolations of the
past were written most commonly as reminders of what one already believed but
temporarily lost due to being overwhelmed by grief. They aimed to remind people
already steeped in philosophicalways of perceiving theworld how they should look at
the tragic events that befell them. In someway, it was then preaching to the converted.
In much of ancient consolation, one should have already been open to this way of
thinking to accept it.
With this in mind, one can perhaps go as far as to note the presence of a paradox in
the practice of consolation. Grief comes in amomentwhen ourworld is overturned by
some tragedy, which might unsettle the beliefs we have held so far. But consolation
in such instances might be nothing more than bringing back those beliefs to assuage
our grief.8 The very ideas and ideals that are put in question by a tragic event are
brought up to set us more fundamentally in these beliefs. Not only a paradox, then,
but even a circle. That this is not a vicious circle might be noted by observing that the
ideals are now scrutinized in a different light, in a context of a different situation. It
is significant in this context that most environmental philosophers do not bring new
frameworks or principles into the question of negative animal impacts; they rather
8Naturally, this is only so for those who already hold given beliefs, in this case environmental ones.
For those who do not, and who must be thoroughly transformed at the moment of tragedy, the work
needed is even greater and does not involve this sort of circularity. But even for environmentalists
there might be an element of transformation involved. This is well illustrated by the case of Val
Plumwood and her near-death encounter with a crocodile. Plumwood notes that through this tragic
even she came to realize how shallow her integration of the environmental beliefs actually was
(Plumwood 2012). Consequently, tragic events and subsequent consolation might be the moment
when the true internal transformation takes place, when one not only says the right things but also
sees the world in a different way.
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re-present their established theories by showing how they stand up to the challenge
of tragic encounters.
Consequently, discomforting encounters might form something of a test even for
professed environmentalists. Sometimes, as in the case of Val Plumwood, they may
reveal the shallowness of one’s own convictions and consequently lead to doubt. For
others, they might lead to the collapse of ideals. But in a like manner, they might be
a sort of trial-by-fire from which one emerges with a renewed conviction. They are
what philosopher Paul Tillich calls “extreme situations” (1951)—it is only when a
philosophical system can withstand such extreme situations that it is worth holding
on to and following.9 Belief and conversion at the time of crisis are perhaps a difficult
task, but every system of belief must possess resources that could be employed at a
time of a crisis—to provide guidance and consolation. Environmentalism and animal
ethics have been heavy on guidance. Based on the above, we can see they also have
much to offer in terms of consolation. This in turn can be of inestimable worth at
a time such as the Anthropocene, when most of the beliefs our culture held most
firmly are being overturned and challenged. If the Anthropocene requires radical
rethinking of our relationship to the world, it will be not enough to employ sophisti-
cated technologies and material tools provided by environmental management. We
need something that will guide us through the existential crises that go hand in hand
with fundamental conceptual transformations, and here the practice of philosophical
consolation with its rich tradition can prove an important supporting element.
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Chapter 25
On Hunting: Lions and Humans
as Hunters
Charles Foster
Abstract This is an interrogation of some commonly cited intuitions about killing
animals, enjoying killing animals, and enjoying eating animals. It concludes that
intuitions are the only possible philosophical guide through this territory. Accord-
ingly if intuitions cannot be trusted, moral arguments about the killing of animals
and related matters are likely to be fruitless.
25.1 Introduction
Lions hunt. Few would try to stop them doing so. But many try to stop humans
hunting.
Why this difference? There are several possible reasons:
a. It might be said that lions have to hunt, because if they do not, they will starve.
This is not true of most modern human hunters. I therefore exclude from this
discussion those human hunters who would starve if they did not kill animals,
simply noting as I exclude them that, by exempting such hunters from any blame,
we are accepting that the loss of an animal life is justified if the loss is necessary
in order to save a human life. At the start, then, we have a normative assumption,
which is almost universally shared, that humans are more valuable than non-
humans.
b. It might be said (and this is a point that relates closely and obviously to the first),
that hunting is of the essence of the lion, whereas it is not of the essence of the
hunter. One could not have a vegetarian lion, not only because a lion that ate only
vegetation would die, but because killing is so quintessentially part of a lion’s
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constitution that to make it vegetarian would be to un-wish it. A vegetarian lion
would not be a dead lion; it would not be a lion at all.
This (the argument would go) is not true of humans. All of us knowmany human
non-hunters, and they are not obviously non-human: it is not obvious that they
are not thriving in the way that humans are intended to thrive.
The hunter’s riposte would be simple contradiction. ‘You are wrong’, he (and
it usually is a ‘he’) would say. ‘Hunting and human identity are inextricably
connected, in exactly the same way as hunting and lion-identity are connected.
Excise the hunting from humans, and you will incurably damage human identity
– and hence the ability of humans to thrive.’
Both the hunter’s and the anti-hunter’s claims are essentially empirical, but of
course they are not the sort of empirical claims that can easily be empirically
investigated. That is the justification for the form of my argument in this chapter,
which is (unusually for a philosophy book) autobiographical and personally
reflective.
c. It might be said (and this is a point that relates closely and obviously to the
second) that the real moral offence in human hunting lies in two facts: (i) that the
human enjoys the process; and (ii) that the enjoyment is the primary reason that
the human hunts. Lions may enjoy the hunt, but that is not their main motivation.
It is more usual to see this argument as a slogan than a carefully examined
proposition. Rarely does the proponent of the argumentmean that they are against
human enjoyment per se. They would be perfectly content if the hunter gained
pleasure equal to that of hunting from simply going for a walk in the countryside.
The argument is instead that there is something illegitimate about the particular
type of pleasure that results from hunting. Here, of course, there is again an
empirical assumption about the type of pleasure that this is. And in the articulation
of that assumption (on the rare occasions when articulation is demanded), slogan
again often predominates. It is often argued, for instance, that it is obscene for
humans to get pleasure from any activity that involves the (avoidable) death of a
non-human animal. This argument can only consistently be maintained by those
who also argue for vegetarianism (and possibly veganism too), for the eating of
a steak is distinctly pleasurable to many, and yet involves the avoidable death of
a non-human animal. But a steak-eating objector to hunting might nonetheless
say that there is a particular form of obscenity involved in active participation in
killing, or at least in proximity with the death itself. This argument, in its simple
form, would seem to entail moral condemnation of slaughterhouse workers, but
not fix with vicarious moral condemnation those who enjoy the fruits of the
slaughter house. And that, surely, is problematic. But if we remember that the
real objection is to enjoyment of the process of killing, that problem at least
evaporates. Even if we enjoy steak, we would condemn a slaughterman who got
a thrill when he slit the cow’s throat. That kind of thrill, we would say, is not at all
the same as the kind of pleasure that we get when we eat a steak. Since it is not
the same kind of pleasure, it is not wrong on the grounds of commensurability
of pleasures for us to enjoy a steak. (It may well be wrong on other grounds).
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Note that the harm done to the cow by the thrill-seeking slaughterman is the same
as that done by a reluctant slaughterman. Philosophers might say that the cow
killed by the thrill-seeker has sustained a wrong in a way that the cow killed by
the reluctant slaughterman has not—since the first cow has been a vehicle for an
illegitimate pleasure. But this analysis—though traditional—takes us nowhere.
The real objection to the thrill-seeking slaughterman, as to the thrill-seeking
hunter, is one based squarely on another set of normative assumptions—this time
about the kind of character that decent humans should have, and hence the kind
of behaviour that they should demonstrate. Like most moral assertions, it rests on
an intuition. In this case the intuition is that decent humans should not enjoy the
process of killing another creature. It is hard to interrogate this intuition robustly
without making some assumptions (which are religious or anthropological or
both) about the sort of creatures that humans are and should be. And hence the
debate between the hunters and the anti-hunters becomes shrill and intellectually
uninteresting: there is simply a stand-off between those who insist that humans
shouldn’t enjoy the business of killing animals, and those who insist that there is
nothing wrong with that enjoyment. It is an argument of the ‘O yes it is’, ‘O no
it isn’t’, type.
To break out of this tedious and sterile debate it is necessary to look harder
at the underlying intuitions. I start by examining my own. I then move to a
consideration of the work of José Ortega y Gasset. He took more seriously than
any other modern philosopher the argument that the enjoyment of hunting might
be a reason to commend rather than condemn hunting. He alone, then, addressed
squarely the really problematic argument—my point (c).
I do not address here the argument that hunting, even if intrinsically morally
offensive, is justifiable on other grounds—for instance that culling is necessary
to ensure the health of an animal population or an ecosystem, or that it brings
much needed funds into an economy. Such arguments will turn on the facts
pertinent to the particular case being considered, on the philosophical worth that
one attributes to the relevant utilitarian calculation, and on the theory of value that
one uses in weighing the moral offence of the human hunter against the harms
or wrongs that may result if the hunting is not permitted. The most interesting
of these issues (the issue of the theory of value) is necessarily considered as I
address the issue of enjoyment. Whether or not some variant of utilitarianism
is the best way to approach these questions is a generic issue: hunting does not
raise any novel difficulty in relation to the way the issue should be approached.1
1For overviews of the arguments regarding the ethics of sport hunting, see Dickson, B. 2009. The
ethics of recreational hunting. Recreational hunting, conservation and rural livelihoods: Science
and Practice 59–72; Gunn, A. S. 2001. Environmental ethics and trophy hunting. Ethics and the
Environment 6 (1): 68–95; King, R.J. 1991. Environmental ethics and the case for hunting. Envi-
ronmental Ethics 13 (1): 59–85; Varner, G. 2011. Environmental ethics, hunting, and the place of
animals. InTheOxford handbook of animal ethics; Loftin, R.W. 1984. Themorality of hunting.Envi-
ronmental Ethics 6 (3): 241–250; Gibson, K. 2014. More than murder: Ethics and hunting in New
Zealand. Sociology of Sport Journal 31 (4): 455–474; Causey, A. S. 1989. On the morality of
hunting. Environmental Ethics 11 (4): 327–343.
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25.2 Confession and Reflection
I have killed many animals. I started when I was very young. As a boy I shot rabbits
and birds; I trapped, fished, and followed hunting hounds. I continued as an adult. I
am too ashamed now to want to give many details, and do not need to confess for
the sake of absolution. But I have ridden after foxhounds and staghounds, run after
hare-hunting beagles, crawled through the African bush in search of plains game,
shivered before dawn in trenches on the foreshore as I waited for the geese to come in
from the sea, wandered around the hedgerows in the evening in hope of a pigeon or
two, and (fanatically, year after year) stalked red deer in the highlands of Scotland. I
have spent many an evening in pubs in the Lake District after a day’s fell foxhunting,
singing songs about epic hunts of old, and cheering when the hounds in the song
caught up with their fox and ‘broke him up’ on the mountain side.
There are no doubt many levels of explanations for this behaviour, and probably
my own view about why I engaged in it is the least likely of all views to be accurate.
The more emphatic someone’s assertion about their motive, the less likely it is to be
credible. But it does seem to me that its root was a desire for an intimate connection
with the natural world, and for the self-knowledge that is impossible without that
connection.
This will sound perverted to many, and certainly there are perverted variants on
the theme. If I said, for instance, that the death of a creature was the most tectonic,
fundamental thing about its life apart from its birth, and thus to be an agent of its death
was to be involved with the creature more intimately than any animal apart from its
mother ever had been, I would rightly be characterised as a Nietzschean psychopath.
But it wasn’t that. It was a desire grounded in the basic Darwinian knowledge that
these creatures were my close cousins, and I therefore needed to know them in order
to know myself: to know what sort of creature I was, where I had come from, where
I would be going (the same way as all those dead animals, in fact) and hence where
my home really was. Only if I knew these things would real relationship be possible,
and relationships, I knew even (or particularly) as a very young child, were the whole
point of being alive. I hunted, therefore, to describe and to situate myself.
The suffering and death of sensate creaturesmight seem a high price to pay for this
self-knowledge. To kill something to know oneself sounds monstrous: on an obscene
par with Raskolnikov. I cannot pretend that it is not. All I can say is that that is how
it is, and that the fact that that is how it is is a consequence of the interconnectedness
of things.
No other way seemed possible. A man with binoculars isn’t as involved with the
deer he’s watching as the same man watching the same deer through the sights of
a loaded rifle. With the dreadful squeeze of the trigger finger comes the knowledge
of shared destiny: one day the trigger will be squeezed on me. No evasion is then
possible, either for the deer or for me: no physical or psychological evasion; no
pretentious philosophising. The bullet tells it the way it is.
I tried less violent ways of getting close to the wild. I watched, collected, swam,
crept, and slept out. I still do. My boyhood bedroom was full of skulls. Crudely
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stuffed birds, suspended on thread, hovered over my bed. I spent my pocket-money
on glass eyes and formaldehyde. But none of it worked. My incurably reductionist,
linguistically-tyrannised brain kept me from getting close to the sensory worlds
occupied by non-human animals. I couldn’t live in the same woods or rivers as they
did. We could only really meet in the killing fields. We shared DNA and death, and
not much else.
This all sounds dreadfully earnest: the stuff of morbid psychopathology. It was
indeed serious. Though not (though I would say that, wouldn’t I?) morbid. Partly the
earnestness was because I knew that unless I learned about myself and about how to
relate, I was done for. But there was a moral earnestness too, manifested in ceremony
and fastidiousness. Therewas noDionysiac revelling inmyhunts: theywere all sedate
andApolline. The deathwas always a source of real regret and remorse. I have always
thought obscene those triumphalist photos of smiling hunters crouching fatly behind
an animal, shot at no risk to them (cf. Kalof and Fritzgerald 2003). I can never quite
choke down the thought that the animal lived amuchmore satisfactory life than those
hunters ever could. I was not surprised to learn that many indigenous hunters pray
before a hunt for the animal to be delivered up to them, and afterwards for protection
from divine or ghostly anger. When, in Africa, I saw for the first time the Continental
practice of putting a respectful sprig of vegetation on the dead animal, I gratefully
recognised the sentiment. My childhood and adolescent hunting diaries are achingly
meticulous. Every detail is laboriously recorded: weather; how I got there and back;
which hounds made the running; even what was in my sandwiches. It seemed to me
that I owed this care to the animal. It was no small thing to take its life: the least I
could do was to document the death carefully.
I think that this ethos is unusual amongst modern western hunters. It is certainly
the norm for most indigenous hunters, and I suspect that it was the norm for most
of human history. If that suspicion is right it might be said to ground an ethical
argument.
The argument would go something like this: Suppose that we have been
behaviourally modern for around 40,000 years (which is more or less the consensus,
at least in relation to humans in Europe). Assuming that a generation is 20 years, that
is 2000 generations. Assume (wrongly, and over-generously to Neolithic people) that
the Neolithic revolution (which involved settlement, planting, and the domestication
of livestock) happened everywhere in theworld simultaneously 10,000 years ago, and
put an end to hunter-gatherer life styles then. There have, then, been 500 non-hunter-
gatherer generations out of the 2000 behaviourally modern human generations. We
spent our formative years as hunters. Our anatomy, physiology and psychology were
all designed to hunt and to survive being hunted ourselves. We are both predator and
prey. In our personal, modern, formative years we are hunters too: watch any child,
uninhibited by tyrannous education. Our behaviour recapitulates our evolutionary
history, just as Ernst Haeckel thought that embryos did. Since we are quintessen-
tially hunters, we will not be properly ourselves unless we hunt. Any scheme of
ethics has to deal with that inescapable fact. A scheme of ethics that presupposes
that we are something other than what we are is pointless: ethics must deal with the
facts as they are: with the world as it is; not with some pastiche. And therefore (goes
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the final step in the argument), no correct ethical code could unwish our predatory
instincts. To do so would be to unwish ourselves: to cause the subject of our ethical
deliberation to evaporate, making that deliberation pointless (cf. Cahoone 2009).
It follows that the ethics of hunting should be directed towards the regulation of
hunting, not its abolition.
I have some sympathy with this argument, but the sympathy does not (now)
amount to agreement. To say that something is atavistic is to describe its origins: to
give an account of origins says nothing necessarily about ethics: to explain is not
necessarily to excuse. To a first degree of approximation, the whole business of ethics
and law is about the reining in of tendencies, not their licensing. Unless it can be
established (and it plainly cannot), that the hunting instinct is a type of automatism,
then our biological history can only mitigate the moral offence of killing another
sensate creature, rather than constitute a defence to that offence.
If the argument worked, it would amount to a blanket defence for hunters. Even
those who hunted purely for enjoyment could avail themselves of it. But I do not
think that it works, and I am back where we started: hunters who need to hunt need
no defence, and hunters who hunt simply because they enjoy hunting need to look
elsewhere for their justification.
I no longer hunt. My reasons for stopping were not (or not mainly) philosophical.
Nor did I have an epiphany such as John Fowles had. Horrified by the suffering of a
broken-winged bird that he had shot, he hung up his guns there and then. I would like
to be able to claim such a conversion, but mine was less dramatic. I simply got tired
of killing things. I began to think I had killed enough, and I understood ‘enough’ to
mean that therewas a diminishing return from the deaths: I was not learning sufficient
new lessons from the deaths, or bolstering my knowledge of old lessons, to make
the deaths morally justifiable. This presupposes, of course, that I had concluded that
the deaths were morally significant. I had: and cannot remember a time when I did
not believe this. This was not based on any conviction about animal personhood.
I am now convinced that at least some animals should be regarded as persons, but
it is not necessary to believe this in order to believe that to kill an animal requires
moral justification. I have not been helped at any stage by the complex and tortured
philosophical literature on animal personhood: none of it does any real work for me.
All my reflection on the reasons for giving up hunting was ex post facto, after
I had given up. Perhaps this disqualifies me from commenting on the morality of
hunting. Nonetheless, and mainly because I have been asked to, rather than because
I feel any great psychological or intellectual imperative to do so, I will continue for
a while to comment.
Today my only hunting is vicarious. I get other people (other hunters, farmers,
and butchers) to do my killing for me. I try to eat the flesh only of animals that have
been happy, and have died well, and I only eat it in the context of a big celebration.
For a dead animal to be defensibly on the dinner table, there must be a great deal of
consequential human pleasure. Meat is for high days and holidays, not for a slumped
midweek dinner. Thatwould be disrespectful: not consonantwith the animal’s dignity
or mine.
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It follows that I have no Kantian qualms about using an animal as a means to an
end. My concern is to ensure that the end is proportionate to my valuation of the
animal’s life. Two things follow from this.
First: one justification of meat-eating (which I find convincing), and one justifica-
tion of some types of hunting (which,when it applies,may sometimes be convincing),
is that unless humans eatmeat‚ agricultural animals (for example)will not exist. Since
the lives of at least some of those animals have more pleasure in them than pain, their
deaths are justified, since without those deaths (and the agricultural system which
abets those deaths), there would be, net, less animal pleasure in the world.
Second: Hunting purely for fun isn’t necessarily unethical. To establish that it is
ethical the funwould (as inmy dinner party example) have to be very intense fun, of a
sort that itself increased the net amount of good/pleasure in the world (ruling out, for
instance, sadistic pleasure in killing or hurting). There are two notable philosophers
who have looked seriously at this possibilitywithout becomingmired in themorass of
animal personhood. They are Roger Scruton and Ortega y Gasset. Scruton’s work is,
to my eye, derivative fromOrtega y Gasset, and so rushed and superficial a derivation
that while it is eye-catching and useful for polemicists, it is unlikely to make many
vegetarians put on their red coats, or strengthen anything other than the ardour of
hunting’s apologists (Scruton 1998). Ortega y Gasset is a different matter. He deals
fearlessly and fundamentally with the suggestion that human pleasure in hunting
might be a sufficiently potent justification. I come to him in a moment. But first a
point must be made about herbivorous animals.
This is simply that, if the teleology can be forgiven, they exist for two purposes: to
unlock the energy of the sun that is trapped by plants, and to transmit that energy to
others. As to the first purpose, the energy is sequestered inside the cellulose walls of
plant cells: herbivore digestive systems can break down those cell walls and release
the energy. As to the second purpose, the digestive systems allow the energy to
be transmitted to the herbivore itself, and then on, up the food chain, to anything
that eats the herbivore. These two purposes have made herbivores what they are:
have conferred their shape, their speed, their cunning, and all other aspects of their
behaviour, their anatomy, and their physiology. Deer have been shaped by wolves
(and wolves by deer). If deer were not edible, they would not be the way they are.
They would not be deer at all. To unwish the teeth and the hunger of wolves is to
unwish deer. It is not so inaccurate to say that deer exist to be killed. This biological
fact (which turns out to be an ontological fact), is the hinterland from which Ortega
y Gasset’sMeditations on Hunting emerges.2
2Originally published as a Prologue to Veinte Anos de Caza Mayor (Edward, Count Yebes, Madrid,
1943) All citations here are from Ortega y Gasset 1972.
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25.3 On Ortega Y Gasset’s Meditations on Hunting
Ortega y Gasset refuses to embark on a systematic philosophical exploration of
the subject of hunting. This refusal gives me confidence that my own refusal is
intellectually reputable. Ortega y Gasset thinks that a rigorous exposition would
be impossible because hunting, at bottom, is concerned with two issues that are
definitively imponderable—death and Otherness: “…death is the least intelligible
fact that man stumbles upon. In the morality of hunting, the enigma of death is
multiplied by the enigma of the animal” (Ortega yGasset 1972, 103).Add agency into
the mix and the mystery becomes even more impenetrable: “…[D]eath is enigmatic
enough when it comes of itself – through sickness, old age, and debilitation. But it
is much more so when it does not come spontaneously, but instead is produced by
another being” (ibid.).
With one important caveat, he successfully resists the temptation to philosophise,
but he is clear about what needs to be defended—whether philosophically or in any
other way: it is the ecstasy that comes from hunting.
Dionysios is the hunting god: ‘skilled cynegetic’ Euripides calls him in the Bacchantes. ‘Yes,
yes’ answers the chorus, ‘the god is a hunter’. There is a universal vibration. Things that
before were inert and flaccid have suddenly grown nerves, and they gesticulate, announce,
foretell. There it is, there’s the pack! Thick saliva, panting, chorus of jaws, and the arcs of
tails excitedly whipping the countryside. (pp. 89–90)
This ecstasy is only possible if humans are they they are meant to be, and do what
they are meant to do: they are meant to be fit, brave, resolute, and principled–even
out in the wilderness where no one can see if they are adhering to the hunters’ code
of honour (p. 35).
It entails energetic commitment to an act, which Aristotle and all happiness theo-
rists since have insisted is essential to human thriving. But the ecstasy does not consist
of fitness, bravery, and so on. It consists instead in immersion in a hot numinous bath.
Its effect is to put man in his place: to restore his relationship with the natural world:
to truncate his hubris. It is, ironically, a cure for the presumption that can flow from
Genesis 1’s urge to dominate and subdue. The Dionysiac ecstasy is ecstasy in the
literal sense: standing outside oneself–a process that diminishes self-obsession and
increases a sense of connectedness with the rest of the world.
Strictly speaking, the essence of sportive hunting is not raising the animal to the level of man,
but something much more spiritual than that: a conscious and almost religious humbling of
man which limits his superiority and lowers him towards the animal. (p. 111)
If hunting really produces this sort of ecologically realistic humility, there would
be a compelling case for it. It would save many animals, many habitats, and many
human souls. Itwould inhibit the drive tomastery: the hunter’s natural placewouldnot
be astride a horse, but on his knees. If Ortega y Gasset’s prescription works, it may be
because (as my own experience sometimes suggested) there is in hunting a constant
reminder ofMortality—and hence of one’s ownmortality. “Life is a terrible conflict”,
writes Ortega y Gasset, “a grandiose and atrocious confluence. Hunting submerges
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man deliberately in that formidable mystery and therefore contains something of
religious rite and emotion in which homage is paid to what is divine, transcendent,
in the laws of Nature” (p. 112).
It is easy to parody this. Indeed it is not easy, when one is attempting to argue
rigorously, not to do so. It is also hard not to compare it unfavourably with the reality
of many hunts: with the snobbery, the fat red faces, the big lunches, the screaming
dismemberment, the broken-winged bird crouched in the bracken. Both the parody
and the comparison should be resisted. There is a serious point being made here,
about serious hunts by serious people. It is the red faces and the picnic basket that
are the distortions (or so Ortega y Gasset would say).
Perhaps all this is not so far frommy own speculation about humans as quintessen-
tial Upper Palaeolithic hunters, and hunting necessary as an expression of that nature,
and an expression of that nature as necessary for personal integration and hence
personal and corporate morality. I don’t know, because Ortega y Gasset’s formu-
lation is by definition inaccessible to this (or any) sort of interrogation. It may be
contemptibly weak as a result. It may also be indestructibly strong. How could we
know?
There is one point at which Ortega y Gasset, neglecting his own injunction to
himself not to philosophise, does move into territory where he is vulnerable to the
ordinary dialectical weapons. In a passage reminiscent of C.S. Lewis’s (1940) spec-
ulations about animal suffering, he asks: “…is it so certain that the beast is afraid?
At least his fear is not at all like fear in man. In the animal fear is permanent; it is
his way of life, his occupation. We are talking, then, about a professional fear, and
when something becomes professional it is quite different.” (pp. 90–91; cf. Scruton
2002).
One might have thought it tactically unwise for Ortega y Gasset to have exposed
himself in this one place, since to be humiliatingly contradicted there might impeach
the rest of his case, which otherwise would have remained subject to the absolute
immunity to emphatic contradiction enjoyed by all metaphysics. But in fact it was
shrewd, for his argument is surely both right in fact (it is, in essence, the same point
that I have made above: herbivores are professional die-ers), and necessary to his
frankly religious case—since in order to establish that his religion is good and not
evil, and since nothing can be said about the goodness or evil of death, something
has to be said about the magnitude of the animal suffering that has to be offset in the
ethical calculus against the goods that result from the Dionysiac ecstasy.
Ortega y Gasset’s non-argument is, it seems to me, the only argument that can be
made for the ethics of sport-hunting. Yet the uncertainties inherent in it (indeedwhich
are necessary to it) leave me queasily unconvinced. Ortega y Gasset himself seems
to acknowledge that this will be (indeed probably should be) the case. “Every good
hunter is uneasy in the depths of his conscience…He does not have the final and firm
conviction that his conduct is correct. But neither…is he certain of the opposite…”
(p. 102).
The precautionary principle does not help us out of this bind, sincewe do not know
what is at stake. Perhaps by choosing not to hunt we are endangering ourselves and
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countless non-human animals. Perhaps by choosing to hunt we are killing persons
who will revenge themselves eternally.
On the question of the ethics of enjoying hunting, then, we are no further forward.
Argument tells us much less than our intuitions.
We shouldn’t dismiss or denigrate our intuitions. They are ancient, and informed
by a great multitude of sources. When assessing the value of an intuitive moral
hunch, it is reassuring if the hunch is shared by others whose values and behaviour
are generally commendable and have stood the test of time. Which takes me back to
lions.
25.4 Another Look at Whether Lions Should Be Allowed
to Hunt
If it is wrong for lions to hunt, even if they have been designed by Darwin to do so,
and would die if they didn’t, it seems probable that it is wrong for human hunters to
hunt for mere fun.
There is an ancient and venerable line of authority that suggests that lions are
not meant to hunt, that teeth are not meant to be sharp, and that co-operation and
altruism, rather than competition, suffering, death, and waste, are the main fuel of
the complexity-generating machine that is evolution. It is in the first of the two
Hebrew creation stories in the book of Genesis. Genesis 1: 20–27 tells how all living
things, including man, were created. In verse 18, man is given dominion. But very
plainly this dominion does not include killing animals, for at this point all creatures
are vegetarian. “And God said, ‘Behold, I have given you every plant yielding seed
which is upon the face of all the earth, and every tree with seed in its fruit; you shall
have them for food. And to every beast of the earth, and to every bird of the air, and
to everything that creeps on the earth, everything that has the breath of life, I have
given every green plant for food.’ And it was so” (Genesis 1: 29–30 [RSV]). In verse
31 God surveys everything that he has done, and concludes that ‘it was very good’.
What is ‘very good’ is a regime in which there is no predation, and where the only
food is plants.3
But it all goes catastrophically wrong. Adam and Eve eat the forbidden fruit, and
are expelled from the garden. The whole of the created order is warped by their
disobedience. But this does not cause a fundamental change in the divine mind. It is
not until Genesis 9 that Noah is told that he can eat flesh as well as plants, but this
is by way of a rather grudging dispensation (Genesis 9:3). It is not the way things
are meant to be. The old intention is remembered in solemn edicts about the value
of life and the shedding of blood: “Only you shall not eat flesh with its life, that
is, its blood. For your lifeblood I will surely require a reckoning; of every beast I
will require it and of man; of every man’s brother I will require the life of man.”
(Genesis 9: 4–5). Blood taboos are prominent in subsequent biblical edicts. They are
3The second of the two creation stories is silent on this issue: see Genesis 2: 4–25.
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meant to be intrusive and inconvenient. Their purpose is to remind humans that the
state of affairs in which blood is shed was not the original plan. No blood is to be
eaten (Leviticus 17: 10–14); there are laws dealing with menstruation (Leviticus 15:
19–30) and peri-parturient bleeding (Leviticus 12: 1–8). Predation itself was never
part of the plan, and the Hebrews are reminded of this by the prohibition on eating
birds of prey (Leviticus 11: 13–19).
Far from teeth and claws being of the essence of lions, teeth and claws diminish
them: de-lion them. How much more, if that’s right, must a Parker Hale .308 de-
humanise and diminish an omnivorous human.
I can’t liftmyownmorality direct from these verses. They are too strange.Nor have
they consciously informed my own thinking. But I am reassured by the concurrence
ofmy intuition and the tradition. I note that theNoahide dispensation has never, in any
of the subsequent Talmudic disputation, been thought to accommodate recreational
hunting.
25.5 Hunting and the Anthropocene
Nobody denies that we are in a historically unprecedented and vertiginous age (‘the
Anthropocene’), characterised by anthropogenic ecocide, which (since the gods tend
to punish hubris very ruthlessly and efficiently) may well lead to our own extinction.
There is much discussion about when the Anthropocene started. The least popular
suggestion is William Ruddiman’s (2003): the Anthropocene started sometime in
the Neolithic. The broad consensus is represented by the Anthropocene Working
Group (AWG) of the Subcommission onQuaternary Stratigraphy of the International
Commission on Stratigraphy, which voted for an as-yet-unspecified start date in the
middle of the twentieth century (Subramanian 2019). Ruddiman is surely the nearest.
Yet even his date is too late.
When Homo sapiens first arrived in South America and Australia (the dates are
contested, but the date is almost certainly prior to Ruddiman’s Anthropocene date)
large animals were quickly decimated. The men were intoxicated by the sight and
the taste of all that easy, lumbering flesh: the animals (unlike those of Africa and
Eurasia who had known for millennia the sorts of creatures we are), were fatally
naïve (Tudge 1999). If you were large and edible in late Pleistocene Argentina you
would disagree with the AWG. The AWG’s date seems to be a symptom of shifting
baseline syndrome. The right baseline is not the already devastated world of the
twentieth century, but the world of the Upper Palaeolithic, when you could have
walked between Pacific islands using the backs of turtles as stepping stones.
The speed and size of those early American and Australian killings mark three
massive and repercussive changes in human hunting history. First: The human popu-
lations concernedweren’t large, and killings on that scalewere unnecessary. Previous
killings had been necessary. Second: because of the naivety of the animal popula-
tions, the killings were easy. Previous killings had been hard. And third (a guess):
the killings (unlike the previous killings) weren’t reverential, fearful, or sacramental.
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There weren’t prayers over the corpses, or oblations or sleepless nights. There were
just too many dead animals for that sort of cult to be sustainable. Since cult sustains
ethos and mindset, humans became casual killers. You can only kill casually some-
thing of which one is not a part, and so the casualness prised humans out of their
place in the natural world. Now they stood outside it, arrogant and cruel. The Upper
Palaeolithic hunters became petroleum executives, and the Anthropocene had begun.
It might be said that good, respectful, quaking, humble hunting might help to turn
back the clock; to re-educate us; to re-forge proper relationships with the non-human
world. And for some individuals it might. But it is too risky to advocate this as a
strategy. Blood is heady stuff. It does unpredictable things to humans.
25.6 Conclusion
I agree with Ortega y Gasset: There can be no firm philosophical conclusion.
I disagree with y Gasset: sport hunting is not acceptable. I cannot demonstrate
this conclusion: I can only give an account of the intuitions which tend towards it,
and some of the arguments that, while not capable in themselves of making out the
conclusion, might be said to buttress the intuitions.
I am uncomfortable about killing animals. I have sold my guns. This makes me
feel better. It makes me feel more myself, not less. I can say little more than this.
References
Cahoone, L. 2009. Hunting as a moral good. Environmental Values 18 (1): 67–89.
Kalof, L., and A. Fitzgerald. 2003. Reading the trophy: Exploring the display of dead animals in
hunting magazines. Visual Studies 18 (2): 112–122.
Lewis, C.S. 1940. The problem of pain. London: Centenary Press.
Ortega yGasset, J. 1972.Meditations on hunting, trans H. B.Wescott. NewYork: Charles Scribner’s
Sons.
Ruddiman, W.F. 2003. The anthropogenic greenhouse era began thousands of years ago. Climatic
Change 61 (3): 261–293.
Scruton, R. 1998. On hunting. London: Yellow Jersey Press.
Scruton, R. 2002. Ethics and welfare: The case of hunting. Philosophy 77 (4): 543–564.
Subramanian, M. 2019. Anthropocene now: Influential panel votes to recognise earth’s new epoch.
Nature, May 21. https://doi.org/10.1038/d41586-019-01641-5.
Tudge, C. 1999. Neanderthals, bandits and farmers: How agriculture really began. Connecticut,
CT: Yale University Press.
Charles Foster is a Fellow of Green Templeton College, University of Oxford, and a Visiting
Professor at the Faculty of Law, University of Oxford. He holds a PhD in Medical Law and Ethics
from the University of Cambridge. He is the author of numerous books, including Human Thriving
and the Law, Identity and Personhood in the Law, Altruism, Welfare and the Law, Human Dignity
in Bioethics and Law, and Being a Beast.’
25 On Hunting: Lions and Humans as Hunters 481
Open Access This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0
International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing,
adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate
credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons license and
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the chapter’s Creative
Commons license, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not
included in the chapter’s Creative Commons license and your intended use is not permitted by
statutory regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from
the copyright holder.
Chapter 26
Comment: Sharing Our World with Wild
Animals
J. A. A. Swart
26.1 Wild Animals in the Anthropocene
The contributions of the authors in this section address some of the ethical, soci-
etal, philosophical, and ecological challenges of the Anthropocene with respect to
wild animals. As explained in the introduction to this volume, animal habitats are
becoming increasingly fragmented, polluted and disrupted by human activities such
as transport, urbanization, agriculture, and overfishing. Climatewarming is one of the
most threatening aspects of the Anthropocene, as climate zones are moving towards
the poles and upmountain slopes.Wild species that depend on the conditions in these
zones must follow in order to survive. However, many cannot follow fast enough,
or are hindered by agricultural lands, cities, industries, or roads. Some habitats may
even disappear. For example, Clare Palmer describes in her contribution the sad case
of the polar bear, a species that is threatened by melting ice sheets in the Arctic.
By contrast, some other species are doing relatively well, as they are able to adapt
and exploit the opportunities of climate change, or to benefit from conservation
and restoration efforts. For example, the wolf is recolonizing areas in Europe in
which it has not been seen for hundreds of years. Martin Drenthen describes in
his contribution the re-entrance of the wolf in the Netherlands. The beaver and the
gray and common seal are also successful species in this country, as are storks and
cormorants. A recent report lists nearly 40mammal and bird species whose European
populations are increasing, in particular in Northwestern Europe, due to successful
nature conservation measures in recent decades (Deinet et al. 2013).
As well as reappearing native species, we are also seeing the establishment of new
species in human landscapes. Some have come on their own, such as the Western
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Great Egret and the wildcat in the Netherlands, whereas others have been introduced
deliberately or accidentally, such as the musk rat, the Egyptian goose, and more
recently the raccoon dog. As argued by Ned Hettinger in his contribution, species
introduced by humans have a much greater chance of threatening endemic species
and disrupting existing ecosystems.
The appearance, or reappearance, of new animals in our landscapes, whether it is
the result of successful conservation and restoration, the introduction by humans, or
a consequence of climate warming, may meet resistance among the general public.
This is described by Mateusz Tokarski and Martin Drenthen in their contributions.
For example, Dutch sheep farmers fear the wolf, water managers are concerned
about beavers disrupting watercourses, and garden owners get upset because wild
boars plow their flower and vegetable beds. It is not just large mammals that cause
unrest. Not so long ago, Dutch newspapers reported on fieldmice that were damaging
farmer’s gazing fields, and we have known of the problems caused by geese grazing
the nutrient-rich grasslands of those same farmers for many years.
Not only vertebrate species concern us. The dramatic decline of some insect
populations may disrupt ecosystems (Sanchez-Bayo and Wyckhuys 2019), while
other insect species flourish and even turn into threatening invasive species, such
as the oak processionary caterpillars that cause a severe skin irritation and asthma
(Pieters 2019). Even more serious is the emergence of mosquito-borne infectious
diseases such as Zika, malaria and dengue in moderate climate zones as a result of
climate warming (Ryan et al. 2019).
The decline and emergence of populations of wild species have always played a
role in human history, but this seems to be much more dramatic in the Anthropocene,
a period that, according to most authors, began during the industrial revolution of the
eighteenth century and accelerated in the middle of the twentieth century (Steffen
et al. 2011). Charles Foster, however, argues in his contribution that theAnthropocene
started as early as the Upper Paleocene, with the massive but unnecessary killing of
large animals in Australia and America by our ancestors. His view implies that the
Anthropocene, seen as the result of the human inclination to kill and take as much
as possible from the earth’s resources, is a condition humaine.
Charles Foster is right to stress the huge and early impact of modern man on
biodiversity and its role in the irreversible loss of megafauna. However, we are
currently crossing planetary limits within which humanity and countless other living
creatures can safely exist (Steffen et al. 2018). According to some authors, we may
have already gone beyond these limits (Rockström et al. 2009). These developments
force us to answer a fundamental question: what kind of world do we want to live in,
and how can we co-exist with other living creatures with whom we share the same
earth?
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26.2 Towards an Anthropocenic Animal Ethics
The contributions by the authors in this sectionmaybe regarded as attempts to address
those questions, in particular by rethinkingbasic concepts relating to our relationships
with wild animals. In this context, Clare Palmer demonstrates, using the case of the
polar bear, that subjectivewelfare-oriented approaches fail to provide clear directions
for coping with the challenge of climate warming with respect to wild animals.
She therefore proposes conducting experiments to test intervention options such as
supplementary food. These kinds of experiments are wild experiments, meaning that
they are carried out in the real world to learn how to deal with actual challenges in
the Anthropocene (see for example Lorrimer 2015).
Martin Drenthen’s suggestion, which is to manage the human landscape and
design artifacts such as fences so that they function as a means of communication to
wolves, may also be considered a wild experiment. Of course, most species do not
have the communicative skills of wolves, or they require quite different conditions
for their subsistence, but his suggestion may be interpreted as a call to listen to what
wild animals, as cohabitants of the world, are telling and asking us. These two cases
also demonstrate the broad spectrum of anthropogenic effects in the Anthropocene,
which range from threatening conditions for some wild species on the one hand, to
favorable conditions for other species on the other.
The pleas for interventions to support threatened wild animals, and especially the
appearance of wild animals in the human landscape, challenge the traditional vision
of the nature-culture divide, between the human and the wild world, and between
domesticated andwild animals. This calls into question the traditional viewon animal
ethics, which is that we should not interfere with the lives of wild animals, a view
concisely worded by Tom Regan in 1983: “Let them be”. Clare Palmer (2010) calls
this “laissez faire intuition”, which means that we do not have a duty to take care of
animals in nature, unless we are responsible for their deteriorating circumstances.
Similarly, it is argued that if we recognize the ethical value of wild animals and
their populations in their natural habitats, we must provide these natural habitats
(for example through nature protection measures) so that they can flourish as wild
animals. This latter type of care is defined as non-specific care, to distinguish it from
specific care, which relates to the individual needs of domestic animals that we keep
in human society (Swart 2005; Keulartz and Swart 2012).
There are, however, a lot of wild animal species that do not fall into the categories
of fullywild or domesticated animals, but instead somewhere in between (Klaver et al.
2002). We may think of hemerophiles (opportunistic human culture followers, e.g.
many garden birds), feral animals (e.g. free roaming cats), and increasingly animals
that appear in human landscapes as a consequence of the changing conditions in the
Anthropocene. Such animals may be considered to be “semi-wild” (Swart 2005), as
falling in the “contact zone” (Clare Palmer 2010), or as “liminal animals” (Donaldson
and Kymlicka 2011). The presence of wild animals in the human landscape, whether
due to climate change or other anthropogenic phenomena, is not expected to be
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temporary. We need animal ethics that recognize and explicate the moral standing of
this group of animals.
In this context, Donaldson and Kymlicka (2011) have further elaborated the
distinction between domestic, wild and liminal animals with the help of a polit-
ical framework. Domestic animals are considered by them as fellow citizens in the
human community with basically the same rights as humans. Wild animals, on the
other hand, not being influenced by humans and living in the wild, are seen as
members of sovereign communities that must be respected. People should in prin-
ciple not be allowed to intervene in their communities, as if these communities were
other nations. Liminal animals have a position in between. The authors compare them
with denizens in human society such as refugees or immigrants who have certain
basic rights but, for example, no voting rights in political matters. Similarly, liminal
animals have a basic right not to be harmed or killed, but we do not have to feed
them or provide housing as they are still wild animals. We should tolerate nuisance
to a certain extent, but we may protect ourselves from serious damage, while still
respecting their basic rights.
This approach is well-suited to the challenge of the Anthropocene, as it acknowl-
edges the different relationships between humans and animals, ranging from domes-
ticated animals in human society to wild animals living in their natural habitat, and
it provides us with an underlying justification of different treatments of animals in
different environments. It justifies the negative right of animals living in the wild not
to be disturbed, but it also acknowledges positive rights, not only of domesticated
animals kept by humans, but also of wild animals living in the human landscape.
This is relevant because, as Donaldson and Kymlicka (2016) also indicate, count-
less wild species live in and are dependent on our rural and urban areas. This is
especially true in the Netherlands and many other Western European countries with
intensive agriculture and strong urbanization. For example, Dutch godwits breed in
the spring on the Frisian meadows and spend the winter in West African rice fields,
and barnacle geese overwinter in the humanized landscapes around the North Sea
but breed around the Arctic Circle (Swart 2016).
26.3 A Heterogeneous, Coercive, Socioecological Network
However,wemaywonderwhether the concept of sovereignwild animal communities
is an appropriate term to characterize animal communities in the wild. After all,
it implies a human, sociological perspective of wild animals since it stems from a
political theory.But, there are no sovereign rulers or institutions in thewild, nor shared
objectives and values. As far aswe can speak of a community, it is only “governed” by
the behaviors of and interactions (e.g. predation, migration, reproduction) between
members of multiple populations and species under particular biotic and abiotic
circumstances such as climate, vegetation, soil composition, and so on. However,
this is also the case for wild animal populations in man-dominated landscapes, where
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people and their artifacts belong to the biotic and abiotic conditions that animals have
to deal with.
Wild animals, whether living in natural or human landscapes, often make oppor-
tunistic use of available and accessible natural, agricultural or urban resources, based
on their species’ characteristics. If biotic and abiotic conditions change, whether by
natural or man-made causes, animals must develop new interactions with the new
situation, for example through a change in food sources or by migration to another
area, including human landscapes. Animals that are able to cope with such a hetero-
geneous and dynamic environment, including man-dominated landscapes, have a
greater chance of survival.
Therefore, instead of considering wild animals as members of autonomous,
sovereign communities and liminal animals as denizens in the human society and
human landscapes, I prefer to consider both of them as nodes in a dynamic, hetero-
geneous, coercive, socioecological network of dependency relationships between
abiotic and biotic factors which, in the Anthropocene, increasingly includes human
society and its institutions (see for example Coeckelbergh 2012). Despite the exis-
tence of animal agency, i.e. ability of the animal to act in accordance with its species-
specific drives, desires or will (see Meijer and Bovenkerk, this volume) and animal
autonomy, i.e. the ability to put that agency into practice, wild animals, will never-
theless be strongly affected in their choices by the compelling circumstances of the
biotic and abiotic environments, regardless of whether they live in natural or human
landscapes (Swart 2005, 2016).
Recognizing the presence of wild animals in the human or humanized natural
landscape, whether we call them wild, semi-wild, liminal, or contact-zone animals,
and recognizing that they have certain negative and positive rights, raises the question
of howwe can live together andwhat thismeans. This is a difficult question to answer,
because these animals, as explained above, form a highly heterogeneous group due to
differences between species and their niches, and due to varying levels of adaptation
to the human environment. The concepts of specific and non-specific care are not
only very general, but also not aimed at this group of animals, except that they may
apply to them to some extent. Neither does the approach of Donaldson and Kymlicka
(2011) offer us clear suggestions, except that liminal animals’ basic rights must be
taken into account.
A more categorizing characterization of these animals may help. In this context,
Swart and Keulartz (2011) distinguish two dimensions that relate to biological and
sociological approaches of domestication. The first dimension is adaptability. This
refers to the extent to which an animal has adapted or is able to adapt to humans
or their environment. This is often evidenced by certain biological and behavioral
characteristics, as ismost visible in pets. The secondone isdependency, a sociological
dimensionwhich is related to the extent towhich an animal is dependent on the human
system for its subsistence. Most pets are both strongly adapted to and dependent on
humans, while wild animals living in undisturbed nature are not. However, wild
animals that live in a human or humanized landscape may be characterized by these
two dimensions to a certain extent. For example, some zoo animals can still be
considered wild according to the first dimension, but are nevertheless completely
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Fig. 26.1 A tentative scheme of adaptation to and dependency of animals on the human system
dependent on humans and domesticated in that sense. Many garden birds and feral
animals often take an intermediate position in both dimensions (see Fig. 26.1).
Applying these dimensions to the case described by Clare Palmer suggests that
the polar bear is in the lower right corner of Fig. 26.1. The population is seriously
affected by receding ice sheets in the Arctic, a situation to which polar bears cannot
adapt very well, so that they can become highly dependent on human interventions.
On the other hand, the recolonizing wolf, as described by Martin Drenthen, can be
placed in the upper left corner of Fig. 26.1 because these animals are well adapted to
the human landscapes of Europe while they still exist quite independently of humans.
The dimensions in Fig. 26.1 are not completely independent of each other, as
adaptation may lead to dependency and dependency may initiate a process of adap-
tation. Adaptation is anchored primarily in biology and is not easy to influence, or
only very slowly. On the other hand, dependency is a social dimension that we have
better control of. Most of the measures that we can take to influence the fate of
endangered animals or animals that live in the human landscape are therefore in this
dimension. For example, we should take measures to move animals from the lower
right-hand position of Fig. 26.1, which is a particularly undesirable situation, to the
left. On the other hand, if we want to prevent the further domestication of animals in
the upper left corner, we must take measures that keep them on the left and therefore
independent.
Ned Hettinger’s concept of native and non-native animals seems to fit into this
gradual and two-dimensional perspective on wildness and domestication. He claims
that being native, which is a matter of degree, means that a species “has significantly
adapted to or interacted with the local biota and abiota (and vice versa). Non-natives
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are species that have not significantly adapted to or interacted with the local inhab-
itants or abiota”. His definition turns the concept of what a native species is from a
historic into a contextual one, as whether or not a particular species can be consid-
ered native depends on the level of adaptation to the current set of biotic and abiotic
conditions. Thus, from this perspective, the polar bear in the Arctic case has become
less native as it is not well adapted to the new conditions, whereas the wolf in western
Europe has become more native as it seems to be rather well adapted to that specific
environment.
26.4 Non-Specific Care for Wild Animals in a Humanized
World
In the Anthropocene, our expansive behavior means that human and animal worlds
are increasinglymerging andwild animals are becomingmore andmoredependent on
human society. The contact zone is widening. Given this merging and our increasing
dominance, we have strong obligations regarding the fate of wild animals, not only
towards threatened animals in remote natural areas as the Arctic with its disappearing
ice caps, but also towards wild animals that live in human landscapes.
We therefore need to adapt our basic attitudes towild animals, asMateuszTokarski
argues in his contribution. According to him, anxiety, fear, disgust or even hatredwith
regard to animals showing up in our humanized landscapes are actually “symptoms
of a fundamentally misguided worldview, most commonly characterized as anthro-
pocentrism”. Making use of the stoic tradition, he argues that we need an environ-
mental philosophy to develop an impersonal and rationalized worldview that may
function as a source of consolation to such discomforts, and that we need to consider
these discomforts as inevitable and acceptable in the context of our co-existence with
wild animals. However, I doubt whether such a universal and impersonal worldview
is practically feasible in our current world and I also wonder whether a stoic way
of thinking can lead to disinterest or even apathy with regard to the dramatic fate of
wild animals in the Anthropocene. Nevertheless, I agree that we need to adjust our
basic attitudes to wild animals, an adjustment that may enrich our existence through
a better understanding of the interconnectedness and interdependencies of all forms
of life, including ourselves. Charles Foster’s desire for an intimate connection with
the natural world to acquire self-knowledge fits into this perspective, although in my
opinion it contradicts his defense of hunting.
I believe that we do not have exclusive rights to the earth and that we should
recognize and respect wild animals as fellow-earthlings. Because of our impact,
this implies an empathic, nonspecific care perspective towards wild animals. I have
previously described non-specific care as interventions focusing on the natural envi-
ronment of animals so that they can live their natural lives. Unfortunately, this is
no longer enough. In the Anthropocene, such non-specific care should also focus
on the conditions for wild animals in the human world so that they can live there
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according to their capabilities as much as possible. As the authors in this section
show, this means giving space to the wild animals that appear in the human land-
scape, and taking measures to restore natural areas and adjust our landscapes and
infrastructures to make their lives here possible. It requires wild experiments but also
a reconsideration of our ethics, philosophies, culture, institutions, and politics.
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De-extinction and Gene Drives: The
Engineering of Anthropocene Organisms
Christopher J. Preston
Abstract Advances in gene reading, gene synthesis, and genome editing aremaking
possible a number of radical new practices for transforming animal futures in the
Anthropocene. De-extinction may make it possible to bring back lost species. Gene
drives may enable the sending of desirable traits through wild populations of organ-
isms. The hype accompanying these promises can make each of them look ethically
irresistible. This chapter investigates the ‘speculative ethics’ that has arisen around
these technologies, asking questions about both their viability and the approach to
animals they contain.Reductive andnon-relational thinking is identified as one poten-
tial problem with the thinking behind these techniques. The neglect of non-human
agency is identified as another. After indicating some of the problems these twoways
of conceptualizing an animal and its genome can create, a brief suggestion is made
about how to better conceptualize animal futures in the Anthropocene.
27.1 Synthetic Animal Futures
From the perspective of evolutionary biology, we live in radical times. Since the
conclusion of the Human Genome Project in 2003, a formidable toolbox has been
assembled for reworking the products of Darwinian evolution. The powerful trio of
gene sequencing, gene synthesis, and gene editing together appear to make possible
the genomic reconstruction of any biological lifeform. Genotypes are becoming
moldable in ways that were inconceivable just a few years ago. From Mycoplasma
mycoides to Homo sapiens, what you find at the genetic level no longer has to be
what you keep.
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Today genomicists don’t just sequence genomes, they build them. The turn of
the century project known as “Human Genome Read” has given way to “Human
GenomeWrite.” The genomes of entirely new organisms are being built from scratch
in labs. The genomes of existing ones are being significantly tweaked for traits
deemed necessary by human designers. Reductions in costs have outpaced Moore’s
law (more than halving every two years). The possibilities, say the advocates, are
endless. Never before has such a responsibility for the shape of the biological world
fallen so completely into one species’ hands.
These are head-spinning times for bio-ethicists and particularly challenging times
for environmental ethicists. Some of the bedrock positions in the field are being
thrown into question. The idea that there is moral significance to longstanding evolu-
tionary processes (Rolston III 1988; Leopold 1949) is having to confront the fact that
the independence of these processes from human design is becoming increasingly
rare. It is not just that we are in the Anthropocene, the epoch in which unplanned
human impacts have undeniably become global. Even more than entering an Anthro-
pocene, the planet is running at some speed towards a biological “synthetic age”
(Preston 2018). Thanks to these new tools in biotechnology, unthinkable prospects
like the de-extinction of lost species and the re-engineering of wild animal popula-
tions are moving towards the realm of possibility. Before long, the ecologies within
which our species dwells may be populated by a host of synthetic organisms and
carefully re-engineered life forms.
To dismiss these deep technological changes solely on the basis that they replace
natural organisms with synthetic ones (Lee 1999) is clearly unacceptable. At a
conceptual level, the complexity and ambiguity of a term like ‘natural organism’
makes such a blanket condemnation philosophically dubious (Siipi 2008; Lie 2016).
At a practical level, a position resting on hard-to-defend metaphysical commitments
like ‘naturalness’ looks like a poor basis for policy (Kaebnick 2009). Rhetorically,
there is a risk of appearing like a troll or a luddite.
Furthermore, even if there once was an intuitive preference for the natural over
synthetic organisms this preference may no longer be determinative. One of the most
striking things about these developments in biotechnology from an ethical point
of view is how the arguments in favor of deploying them to solve difficult prob-
lems in conservation and public health look incredibly compelling. De-extinction,
for example, offers the tantalizing promise of returning a number of charismatic
and ecologically important animals to the planet’s roster of species. Gene drives
dangle the carrot of a vast reduction in human suffering in the face of diseases like
malaria, dengue fever, and zika. Gene drives are also claimed to offer the possibility
of eradicating invasive mammals from island ecosystems without poisons, traps, and
the accompanying suffering to animals these methods cause. The moral arguments
in favor of the new techniques can look unimpeachable. From a consequentialist
standpoint, who would question such desirable outcomes?
What even a cursory inspection reveals, however, is that the promises driving some
of these research trajectories rest on what Alfred Nordmann has called in a different
technological domain “a speculative ethics” (Nordmann 2007). A speculative ethics
is one in which a hypothetical prospect is floated in front of decision-makers and
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their publics in such a way that “an imagined future overwhelms the present” (Nord-
mann 2007, 32). Speculative thinking expresses confidence that if a certain futuristic
research trajectory is followed, then a highly desirable result will follow. “What looks
like an improbable, merely possible future in the first half of the [if-then] sentence,
appears in the second half as something inevitable” (ibid.).
In the case of animals, a speculative biotechnological ethics appears to be creating
a misleading mandate for humans to reconstruct the life forms that surround them.
In the following pages, I show how the discourse around both de-extinction and gene
drives is creating a harmful speculative ethics of animal biotechnology. I put part
of the blame for this harmful direction on two types of faulty thinking. One is the
methodological problem of non-relational and reductive thinking. The other is the
ethical problem of the neglect of non-human agency. In identifying this second fault,
I float the possibility of expanding the idea of agency in organisms to include the
agency of the genome. I conclude by pointing briefly to a couple of the costs of this
inappropriately speculative ethics in two arenas in which its applications are most
often touted.
27.2 Speculations About de-Extinction
De-extinction demands the careful application of all three of the powerful tools
gilding today’s biotechnology toolbox. In order to de-extinct a lost species, a
researcher would need an accurate account of the genome of the absent organism.
The sequencing techniques perfected during the Human Genome Project, pioneered
by Craig Venter’s ‘shotgun approach,’ have pushed the door open to this possibility
(Venter et al. 1998).
Inmanycases, sequencing requires analysis of actual tissue fromanextinct animal.
Sometimes this is surprisingly easy to find. Wooly mammoth tusks, bones, hair, and
even whole flanks of their frozen flesh have been dug up in various locations across
northern Europe and the Arctic. Numerous passenger pigeon specimens exist in
U.S. natural history museums. Stellar sea cow bones are regularly being freed from
sea ice to wash up on northern shores. Thirteen different thylacine fetuses (known as
‘joeys’) sit preserved in bottles of ethanol in zoos andmuseums inHobart,Melbourne,
Sydney, and Prague.1 As a result of these existing DNA fragments, wooly mammoth,
passenger pigeon, and thylacine genomes have all already been sequenced.
Once an accurate read of the genome is available, this read can be compared to
the genome of a closely related species. A wooly mammoth, for example, can be
compared to an Asian elephant, a Pyrenean ibex to a domestic goat, a passenger
pigeon to a band-tailed pigeon. In many of these cases, the gene sequences will
have an overlap in the high ninety percent range. An Asian elephant, for example,
1In future the task of gathering threatened or extinct animal DNA may be much easier. A number
of “Frozen Zoos” have been set up to deliberately preserve cellular tissues so DNA is available for
future research needs.
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is already 99.96% wooly mammoth (Revive & Restore 2018). This considerable
overlap, however, does not make things altogether easy. In mammoths, even this
small difference amounts to approximately 1.4million different nucleotides (Shapiro
2017). But when the main genetic differences between the living and the extinct
species have been identified, gene synthesis and gene editing come into play.
Gene synthesis techniques allow genes and genome sequences to be engineered
in a laboratory out of their constituent chemicals (a nucleobase, phosphate, and
sugar). Although the history of gene synthesis dates back to 1955 and the work of Sir
Alexander Todd, it is only recently that computerized sequencing tools and plunging
costs have turned a technique that earned its creators Nobel Prizes into a something
you can practice in your garage. Synthetically made nucleotides have already been
stitched together to form a whole bacterial genome with more than a million base
pairs (Gibson et al. 2010) and the construction of the much larger genome of the
first eukaryote is in process (Richardson et al. 2017). With typical animal genes
possessing anything from a few hundred to a couple of million bases, the individual
genes responsible for the defining characteristics of an extinct animal are within the
grasp of today’s gene synthesis experts.
With the critical genes synthesized, the third technique required for de-extinction
is a reliable gene editing mechanism that can be used to transform the genome of the
living species into something that resembles the genome of the extinct species. Since
2012, the CRISPR Cas9 editing system has been available to cut living genomes at
precisely targeted places. The editing system uses RNA guide molecules to identify
the spot and a ‘CRISPRpackage’ can remove the targeted genes from the genome and
insert new, extinct-animal-genes in their place. A Harvard lab run by George Church
has already used these techniques to insert several of the genes that create charac-
teristic wooly mammoth traits—hairiness, cold resistance, and copious quantities of
subcutaneous fat—into an Asian elephant genome (Lewis 2015).2
At a future time, improved versions of these techniques might allow de-extinct
animal embryos to be created by combining gene synthesis and gene editing with
somatic cell nuclear transfer, stem cell embryogenesis, or germ line transmission.
Resulting embryos could be implanted into surrogate mothers or placed into artificial
wombs for the gestation period. The resulting organisms would be close approxi-
mations of extinct animals. These could be hybridized or further edited to become
more accurate reproductions. Using Asian elephant eggs, some synthesized genetic
material, an accurate gene editing system, and a surrogate mother, these techniques
might soon allow a newborn wooly mammoth to roam the earth for the first time in
four thousand years (Shapiro 2015).
2At this stage, none of the editing has resulted in living animals. Rather, the researchers are using
Asian elephant tissue cultures sustained in a petri dish to experiment on. These modified cultures
have been induced to grow into various tissue types allowing the study of the effects of the gene
editing on cell characteristics.
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27.3 Speculations About Gene Drives
Gene drives use the same sequencing, synthesis, and editing techniques to shape wild
populations of fast-breeding sexually-reproducing animals. A significant practical
barrier to altering wild populations has always been the inability of a scientist to ever
reach all themembers of the population shewanted to change.An evolutionary barrier
has been the fact that traits chosen by scientists are unlikely to be naturally selected
for in wild animals. Evolution, as co-discoverer of DNA Francis Crick pointed out, is
much smarter than we are. Even if a deliberately selected trait did, against all odds,
turn out to be neutral for an organism, the laws of Mendelian inheritance would
ensure the trait is only passed on fifty percent of the time. With these odds it is
almost impossible for the inserted gene to become prevalent in a population.
Gene drives work by imitating selfish mechanisms occasionally found in nature
which provide genes a better than average chance of being inherited (Burt 2003). A
CRISPR Cas9 package can be placed into an organism’s germ cells so that a trait
selected by the scientist is edited into both chromosomes. When the chromosomes
split duringmeiosis, each chromosomewill contain a copy of the selected trait. In this
way, after fertilization with the germ cell of the other parent, the zygote is guaranteed
to possess the gene in at least one of its chromosomes. Since the editing takes place in
the germline the whole editing package is carried into the next generation to perform
the same trick again (Esvelt et al. 2014). Recent tests in contained populations of
mosquitoes have demonstrated the ability to spread a trait through a population in as
few as seven to eleven generations (Kyrou et al. 2018). Such an effective upending of
Mendelian rules could theoretically allow for the propagation of any chosen genetic
construct through a wild population of organisms even thoughmost of the population
never set foot anywhere near the lab.
There are a number of reasons why it might be desirable to drive such a change.
One of them is to knock down the numbers of a population of a species using
what has been called a “suppression drive.” A suppression drive could progressively
alter the sex ratio of multiple generations of mosquito until the population crashed
(Kyrou et al. 2018). Alternatively, a suppression drive could be used to make one
sex of a troublesome population sterile (Zhuo et al. 2018). These technique have the
potential to reduce—or even eliminate—particular species of mosquitoes that serve
as disease vectors (e.g. Aedes aegypti, Aedes gambiae). There is also speculation that
similar suppression driveswill prove capable of extinguishing populations of invasive
rodents from island ecosystems. An organization called Predator Free 2050 together
with the New Zealand Department of Conservation are supporting the testing and
field assessment of gene drives to eliminate a range of introduced predators from the
country within three decades (New Zealand Department of Conservation 2019).
Different forms of gene drive could be inserted with the intention not of
suppressing a population but of simply sending a particular non-lethal trait through it.
These so-called ‘replacement’ drives would remake the existing genome sequence of
the targeted organism into something that suits a particular human purpose (National
Academies of Sciences 2016, 16). Replacement drives could potentially change the
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genotypes of wild animals to prevent them from being disease vectors. They could
make anorganism susceptible to a particular chemical.More speculatively, they could
change an organism’s taste for a particular prey or make it smarter at evading preda-
tors. Because both suppression and replacement drives would be self-propagating,
they would allow the human reach to extend further out from the lab and into the
wild than it has ever extended before.
27.4 The Problem with Promising Big
In recent years, numerous problems have emerged with the idea of using CRISPR
Cas9 to edit genomes, problems that will plague gene drives, de-extinction, and
numerous other gene editing ambitions for public health, conservation, and agricul-
ture. The CRISPR Cas9 gene editing system has been found to sometimes create
unpredicted changes both at the cut site and at other parts of the genome far away
from where the editing is taking place. Studies have found CRISPR Cas9 causing
“large deletions and more complex genomic rearrangements at the targeted sites” as
well as completely unintended “lesions distal to the cut site” (Kosicki et al. 2018)
(see also Shin et al. 2017; Mou et al. 2017). “We have been lulled into the view that
editing is small and local and controllable,” says a co-author of one of these studies,
“but the reality of DNA repair in a cell is much more complex” (Rusk 2018, 569).3
Further problemswithCRISPRhave been appearingwith alarming regularity. The
Wall Street Journal reports that gene edits carried out in China to promote muscle
growth in pigs resulted in the appearance of extra vertebrae, while similar edits on
rabbits created disproportionately large tongues. Goats edited to produce longer wool
grew too large during fetal development to undergo natural childbirth (WSJ 2018).
When gene drives using the CRISPR Cas9 were inserted into mice by a different
research group to see if they could spread a certain coat color, researchers found to
their surprise that the drives only worked on female mice. They also found that the
DNA break caused by CRISPR was not always repaired correctly, and it affected
genomes at a much lower percentage than predicted (Grunwald et al. 2018). Overall,
the predictability of the effects of using CRISPR Cas9 appears to be much lower
today than researchers originally thought it would be. According to development
geneticist Paul Thomas, enthusiasts for CRISPR Cas9 should find all of these results
both “sobering” and “a reality check” (Callaway 2018).
To add to the list of complications, CRISPR has also been found towork best when
a tumor suppressing protein named p53 is absent (Ihry et al. 2018; Haapaniemi et al.
2018). Having CRISPR work only when p53 is absent is highly inconvenient. The
absence of this protein could lead to increased occurrence of cancers in organisms
whose genomes are successfully edited, creating a potential problem for the goal of
3According to one researcher from Imperial College London, these problems are not as widespread
in mosquitoes (personal communication, June 2019).
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de-extinction (and for a gene drive if it is designed to replace but not eliminate a
population).
Even if the technology worked as hoped, the idea that you can remove or replace
one gene and then predictably change a phenotype in a replacement drive can also be
overstated. Individual genes often work only against a background of other genetic
elements, which may be comprised of hundreds of other genes. In many cases, the
absence of this background will prevent the change from having the desired effect
(Lehner 2013). Many traits are also ‘polygenic,’ requiring a number of genes to be
actualized before the trait is displayed.
Other complications abound. ‘Pleiotropic effects’ occur when single gene creates
more than one unrelated effect. Researchers using CRISPR Cas9 to make an edit
to change the pigmentation of a butterfly’s wing were surprised to find that the
edit changed both the color and the structure of the wing’s scales (Matsuoka and
Monteiro 2018). Even if a researcher could reach a degree of confidence about the
effect of an edit, uncertainty would still be present about the future stability of the
edited genome (Shapiro 2017). While it may be possible to swap out a gene under
laboratory conditions, it is not known what the consequences of this tinkering may
be over the full lifetime of an organism, especially one living not in the controlled
conditions of the lab but under the vicissitudes of a wild environment.
In the case of gene drives, the uncertainties are not only about the phenotype
produced after using CRISPR Cas9. Above the genetic and organismic level, a
great deal remains unclear about how effectively a gene drive would work in the
wild. Organisms exist in complex ecological and species relationships. Whether the
drive would spread as predicted, whether a natural resistance would evolve, whether
hybridization between target and non-target populations might occur, whether hori-
zontal transfer of altered genes to other species might ensue, and whether gene drives
could be limited to the environment in which they were designed to operate are all
unanswered questions (Biotecknologiradet 2017).
Population dynamics are almost certain to impede howagene driveworks.A study
done by the US National Academies of Science expressed caution, concluding that
there are “considerable gaps in knowledge regarding the implications of gene drives
for an organism’s fitness, gene flow in and among populations, and the dispersal of
individuals, and how factors such as mating behavior, population sub-structure, and
generation time might influence a gene drive’s effectiveness” (National Academies
of Sciences 2016, 42). Research about how to effect the required molecular changes
is where most of the attention has been placed thus far. Far less research has been
done on its operation at the population and ecosystem level.
Even before these surprises about CRISPR Cas9 had started to appear, those
looking closely at de-extinction were already clued into some of the problems
attending the whole idea of recreating lost species. From the very start, a certain
amount of doubt had circulated about whether de-extinction was even the right label
to use to motivate the research program. In April 2014, a de-extinction task force was
created by the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) under its
Species Survival Commission. The task force examined both the promises and the
risks created by thinking about de-extinction for conservation purposes.
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As soon as the task force began its work, it recognized that any ‘extinct’ species
brought back to life through biotechnology would be only an approximation of the
species that humans had previously wiped out. The technical difficulties of recreating
an exact replica of an extinct species’ genome, the effects of missing mitochondrial
DNAon fetal development, the lack of the original microbiome of the extinct species,
the absence of appropriate ecosystemic conditions, and the lack of an extant animal
culture from which a de-extincted individual could learn appropriate behavior meant
the organisms recreated would at best be only approximations of the missing animal
and not the missing animal itself. As a result, the report decided to characterize
the whole endeavor not as an attempt to bring back lost species but as an attempt
to create populations of organisms resembling extinct species for the purpose of
serving important ecological functions. De-extinction then became “a conservation
translocation issue that seeks to re-establish populations of proxy species in suitable
areas of habitat to achieve ecosystem conservation benefits” (IUCN/SSC 2016, 5)
(emphasis added). To reflect this retreat from the idea of de-extinction, the report was
titled ‘Guiding Principles on Creating Proxies of Extinct Species for Conservation
Benefit.’ The report urged readers to be clear on its starting assumption that “none
of the current [technological] pathways will result in a faithful replica of any extinct
species, due to genetic, epigenetic, behavioural, physiological, and other differences”
(IUCN/SSC 2016, 5).
What this quick survey of the problems attending the use of CRISPR Cas9 and
the difficulties of recreating extinct organisms reveal is that both gene drives and de-
extinction remain highly speculative prospects. DNA appears to be neither manipu-
lable enough nor determinative enough to be confident either de-extinction or gene
drives can deliver on their promises. Genomes can certainly be edited using CRISPR
Cas9 with remarkable accuracy. The resulting organism, however, together with its
effect on the population in which it resides, will have a lot about it that we do not
know. The lesson, perhaps, is that animals may not be reducible to chemistry of their
genomes.
27.5 Reductionism and Thinking Relationally
Oneway to characterize doubts and uncertainties about de-extinction and gene drives
revealed above would be to suggest that not enough research has been done and
the genetic mechanisms at work are not yet fully understood. The genome is a
complicated machine. Perhaps we simply don’t yet fully understand it. More work
must be needed to iron out the remaining uncertainties.
A slightly different way to characterize the doubts is to suggest the whole picture
about the relationship between genes and their expression in an organism is faulty. As
the discussion above illustrates, a key part of the problem appears to be the reductive
approach to genomes that gene editing and gene synthesis assume. The properties
of genetic parts cannot be so easily isolated from the larger contexts in which they
operate. Context will determine the appropriateness of connecting a certain genomic
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rearrangement to a predicted behavior. Reducing a genome to its constituent parts
may be a useful exercise when trying to draw correlations between individual genes
and diseases. Reading a genome can indeed make it possible to offer statistical
predictions about the likelihood of certain diseases appearing in individuals.4 But it
looks like reductionism and non-relational thinking about genomes can be seriously
misleading when used as the grounds on which to try de-extincting whole organisms
or introducing selected traits across wild populations.
The recent surprises that have emerged around CRISPR gene editing make it clear
that the larger genetic, organismic, and ecosystemic contexts in which a single gene
operates all affect the phenotype displayed. The broader genetic context can create
unexpected deletions attending CRISPR gene edits, both at the targeted editing site
and locations on the genomedistal to it. The genetic contextmightmean tumor growth
if p53 is absent. It might involve additional unknown effects on the phenotype if the
gene is pleiotropic. It might also mean the impotence of the gene drive if resistance
to the drive evolves within the genome.
The whole organism context is also relevant. This context might lead to the gene
edit not having the desired effect if the typical microbiome, and other epigenetic
factors, are not present (Morris 2012). The sex of the organism might impact the
effectiveness of the gene drive edit. The stage of development of the organism might
also change the likelihood of a gene drive working.
The ecosystemic context can also not be ignored. This context, external to
the organism itself, might mean the gene drive not spreading as anticipated if
the surrounding population dynamics change. The gene drive might be deployed
in an ecosystem that allows it to move into non-target populations of the target
species. It might also affect non-target sub-species if the organism with the gene
drive hybridizes. Genomic, organismic, and ecosystemic contexts all influence the
consequences of a CRISPR gene edit.
The many layers of context that influence how information encoded in a gene gets
expressed in a fully-fledged organism make genome editing into a tricky proposi-
tion at the best of times. To make matters worse for gene drives and de-extinction,
many of these essential contexts are fluid and dynamic. The minute alterations to
the organism’s genome constantly taking place through mutations as the generations
proceed, the organism’s constantly shifting microbiome, and the roving populations
of surrounding symbionts and competitors are all dynamic factors influencing both
genome expression and the genome’s prospects in the future. In the case of gene
drives, each of these shifting contexts will influence the way the drive spreads—or
fails to spread—across the wild world. A non-relational, reductive approach that
considers the different chemical structures contained within an organism’s genome
as interchangeable parts to be engineered at will seems ill-suited for thinking about
whole organisms operating in larger ecosystemic contexts.
Themultiple contexts influencing the organismpoint to the importance of thinking
about the ontology of a gene in more relational terms. With a relational approach to
4Several thousand “single gene” diseases have been identified.
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ontology, an entity becomes what it is through the relationships in which it partic-
ipates. In relational worldviews, organisms, processes, or individual genes operate
through a multitude of networks, interconnections, and feedback loops. Thinking
about them in isolation from their relationships leads to a flawed understanding not
only of what they are, but also of how they work.
In a relational approach to genomes, efforts to isolate genetic information and
transpose it into completely different genomic, cellular, organismal, and ecolog-
ical environments will create unpredictable effects. Genes express themselves only
through highly specific interactions between various elements foundwithin themany
different layers of a given system. Altering the relational context creates different
results. This is not simply because the gene now undergoes a different set of interac-
tions. There is a deeper point to be made. When the relational network is changed, so
is the gene itself. The gene is constituted by its relations as much as by its chemistry.
A subscriber to a relational approach to genes would chuckle at the idea that the
chemical components of a living organisms’ genome can be edited and exchanged
at will with predictable results.
27.6 Genomes and Non-human Agencies
If a reductive, non-relational approach to genes is one part of the problem, another
part is the neglect of genomic, organismic, and ecosystemic agency. At a very basic
level, gene drives and de-extinction are each an attempt to impose human agency
onto the world through deliberate changes to an organism’s genome. Since genomes
are chemical structures made of up nitrogenous bases, phosphates, and sugars, it
appears reasonable to suppose it might be possible to excise selected portions of
their molecular structure, rebuild others, and swap out undesirable sequences for
desirable ones.
The idea of isolating properties of the material world in order to understand
how they function before imposing a change upon them is, of course, a central
and important part of established scientific and technological practice. In numerous
contexts, the approach works. However, in order to ensure that enough predictability
and control follow from any imposition of human will, a key assumption must be
made. While agency is ascribed to the scientist who is instigating the intervention, it
must be assumed the material she is manipulating is in relevant respects passive (or
at least passive enough not to thwart the engineer’s plans). Once the intervention has
occurred, the behavior of the manipulated material must follow linear and known
laws.5 If predictability is to be possible, any independent agency in the manipulated
5Engineering does not always require the produced object to exist in stasis. While engineers who
create autonomous vehicles do not know everything about the future states and positions of the
engineered object, they rely on the belief that the machine they have intentionally designed or
modified will behave as they anticipated.
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material must fall below a threshold that would allow a future to unfold contrary to
the engineer’s designs. If it didn’t, it would not be engineering but a game of chance.
The idea of using CRISPR Cas9 to engineer biological forms appears to fall short
in this regard. There are several different forms of agency that a genetic construct
inserted into a genome for gene drives or de-extinction has to encounter. Bacterial
agency in the microbiome, the agency of members of the same species in its popula-
tion, and agency in any symbionts, competitors, or hybrids the organism encounters
are all possible disruptors. These dynamic factors influence genome expression as
well as the genome’s future prospects. Each of these shifting contexts will influence
how the gene drive spreads—or fails to spread—across the wild world. For poten-
tially de-extincted animals such as the northern white rhino, the agency within the
social and cultural structures leading to the organisms’ extinction in the first place
remains highly relevant.
In addition to the agency surrounding the altered genome, it is also possible
to talk about agency within the genome itself. Although typically thought of as a
property of individual organisms and larger collectives, genomes themselves are
frequently thought of in agential terms. Dawkins calls them “selfish,” Thaler calls
them “intelligent,” Wills calls them “wise,” and Rolston calls them “smart” (Thaler
1994; Wills 1989; Rolston III 2012; Dawkins 2006). While some of these uses are
deliberately metaphorical, the problems attending CRISPR Cas9 raise a new set of
questions concerning how to think about genetic agency.
It is clear there is spontaneous behavior in the genome that is not the result of linear
causes. Before, after, and during both meiosis and mitosis, a range of mutations can
occur. Themutations can involve insertions or deletions of geneticmaterial, inversion
or translocation of a segment of DNA within a chromosome, duplications of a DNA
sequence, changes in individual nucleobases, and other types of unscripted event. In
the long run, of course, it is a good thing that these mutations occur. Without them,
evolution would never take place. Random changes in the genome are what create
the selective advantages (as well as disadvantages) which shape all ecologies.
Mutation can be viewed as a form of spontaneous agency in a genome. Some
mutations are caused by external factors or mutagens such as chemicals or radiation.
These ones are traceable to external causal factors and are non-agential as far as
the genome itself is concerned. Others simply appear during cell division when the
chromosomes do not replicate perfectly orwhen the inherently instability of the bases
causes, for example, a cytosine base to become uracil. These latter sorts of changes
are entirely spontaneous and unpredictable. They are not traceable to a proximate
cause but emerge out of the genome itself. If agency is defined broadly in terms of
the capacity for spontaneous and unpredictable action, then mutations will count as
a form of agency and this agency clearly belongs to the genome itself.
Even though the notion of genomic agency may be counter-intuitive, the idea
of agency existing below the level of the complete organism should not come as
a complete surprise. Somewhere between the chemistry of the nucleobases and the
complexwhole that is the living organism, agency in themore familiar sense emerges.
Properties emerging at higher levels can have precursors at lower ones. A variety of
forms of agency may be present at levels beneath the whole organism. If random
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mutation is a minimal form of agency, one should perhaps regard the unpredictable
insertions and deletions following fromCRISPRCas9 gene edits as forms of genomic
agency. It is certainly clear the genome will not behave as the entirely passive recip-
ient of an inserted gene. The genome responds spontaneously and, in some cases,
unpredictably to the new material.
The neglect of agency thus appears alongside non-relational thinking as a second
form of faulty philosophy often accompanying the discussion of gene editing for de-
extinction and for gene drives. The kind of passivity required for precise engineering
of organisms in order that they perform designated roles in an environment is simply
not there in biology. To think this way incorrectly creates the impression that the
research scientist is the only active agent in the gene editing process, while the
chemical structures on which she operates are entirely passive. Yet it is clear that the
scientist is not the only element of the system whose spontaneous agency influences
the outcome. These two forms of faulty thinking are part of the reason why the
discussion of gene drives and de-extinction lends itself to a misleading speculative
ethics.
27.7 Speculative Biotechnology and Anthropocene
Organisms
When Alfred Nordmann warned of the dangers of a speculative ethics with powerful
emerging technologies, hewas concerned about unrealistic projections ofwhat a tech-
nology can accomplish having unfortunate consequences. One of the most obvious
of these is that a speculative ethics can funnel both funding and enthusiasm towards a
research direction that may not in the end deserve it. Over-eager researchers employ
a speculative ethics “to invent a mandate for action” (Nordmann 2007, 33). So desir-
able (and inevitable) does a consequence of a particular technology appear that it
becomes morally problematic, and perhaps even inhumane, to even consider not
pursuing it. Arguably the current speculations about ending malaria with gene drives
or eradicating invasive mammals from island ecosystems fall into this camp. The
promise of moral restitution or of huge benefits for conservation by reintroducing
de-extincted species (or their proxies) comes not far behind.
Nordmann adds to his argument that speculative ethics can also be damaging
because of the opportunity costs it engenders. An over-eager pursuit of speculative
silver bullets in the face of complicated environmental and public health challenges
creates real dangers. These dangers arise when speculative ethics “squanders the
scarce and valuable resource of ethical concern…and deflects consideration from
the transformative technologies of the present” (Nordmann 2007, 31).
In cases of public health, there may be less risky interventions with considerable
power to curtail the spread of diseases than a speculative gene drive. Without dimin-
ishing in any way the substantial challenges still posed by diseases spread through
insect vectors, traditional and emerging approaches to control can have promising
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results.6 On the island of Zanzibar, symptomatic malaria cases reported at health
clinics decreased 94% from 2003–2015 (Björkman et al. 2019). India has reduced
its malaria deaths by two thirds since 2000 with a 24% drop in cases between 2016
and 2017 (World Health Organization 2018). The Indian government maintains its
goal of complete malaria eradication by 2030.
While these numbers in no way suggest that malaria is not still a significant and
tragic public health issue, they might provide a reason to pause before the premature
embrace of a highly speculative technology such as a gene drive. In situations where
the traditional methods involve dramatic improvements in public health facilities,
education, and funding, there might also be a broad range of co-benefits to pursuing
the technologically less flashy solution over the more risky, speculative one.
Similarly in cases of conservation, devoting resources to the proximate causes of
a species becoming endangered or extinct may be more beneficial in the end than
devoting resources to a technologically speculative one. Even if there is no reason
to believe it is a zero sum game, strategies such as the protection of good habitat,
the provision of economic security for local populations, and improved attention to
the international forces contributing to the original extinction threat may provide
more lasting benefits than spending considerable amounts of money attempting to
recreate an extinct animal through a speculative technology. Without the needed
social, economic, and cultural changes, the de-extincted animal is unlikely to face
any better a fate than its predecessors. Furthermore, implementing these traditional
strategies will usually provide benefits for other organisms who share the habitat of
the endangered or extinct one. In each of these cases, the speculative ethics may be
creating the distraction Nordmann warns about.
∗ ∗ ∗
Synthetic biology—the discipline within which gene reading, gene synthesis, and
gene editing operate—is often characterized as “an engineer’s approach to biology”
(Breithaupt 2006).De-extinction andgenedrives lookverymuch like the transference
of the techniques of mechanical engineering from physics over into to biology. If
developed successfully, their proponents argue, they will not only solve some major
public health and conservation problems, theymight also remove someof themystery
that surrounds the concept of life by reducing it to its constituent parts. For some,
these developments are both inevitable and desirable. Yuval Harari describes gene
editing as playing a key role in the next revolution in human history, one in which
“intelligent design becomes the basic principle of life” (Harari 2015, timeline).
The breakthroughs that have taken place in gene reading, synthesis, and editing
in the last decade and a half certainly represent a remarkable scientific achieve-
ment. A great deal of good is likely to come from their careful application in appro-
priate domains. The moral benefit of solving some of the problems they seek to
address would undoubtedly be high. What recent findings about gene editing reveal,
6Climate change may intensify these challenges.
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however, is that approaching the genome with an engineer’s mentality has a number
of shortcomings.
When it comes to building or amending whole organisms, treating life as modular
at the genetic level may in the end prove to be highly misguided. Organisms have
always existed in highly complex genomic and ecological contexts that present signif-
icant barriers to the engineering approach. Plants and animals are boundup inmultiple
layers of constitutive relationships. Their lives are also entangledwithmultiple forms
of agency that lend them their shape. At a time when new research paradigms such as
multi-species studies are starting to highlight the significance of these relationships
and agencies (Haraway 2016; Tsing 2015; Van Dooren 2016), attempts to engineer
biology with gene synthesis and gene editing risk neglecting these provocative new
insights. A speculative ethics of biotechnology consistently risks steering the conver-
sation about de-extinction and gene drives away from contemporary understandings
about the embeddedness of all animals in multiple human and non-human contexts.
This non-relational thinking has certainly pushed the conversation about these new
techniques far ahead of where it currently deserves to be.
The presence of lively, spontaneous animals with whom our species shares this
planet has providedmystery, challenge, and inspiration throughout the two and a half
million year history of our kind. In an increasingly crowded Anthropocene world,
the presence of independent animals will provide a vital counterpoint to a harmful
‘species narcissism’ as ever more of the earth’s surface becomes stamped by human
designs (Mark 2015). Some forms of biotechnology appear to express this narcissism
by being blind to the relationships and agencies of the animal others with whom all
of our lives are entwined.
The linking of biology with engineering is symptomatic of this attitude. This
linking may not simply be a rhetorical mistake. As National Medal of Science and
Crafoord Prize winner Carl Woese suggested, “a society that permits biology to
become an engineering discipline, that allows science to slip into the role of changing
the living world without trying to understand it, is a danger to itself” (Woese 2004,
173).
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Chapter 28
Does Justice Require De-extinction
of the Heath Hen?
Jennifer Welchman
Abstract It is often argued that we “owe it” to species driven to extinction “to
bring them back.” Can justice really require us to make restitution for anthropogenic
extinctions? Can it require de-extinction? And if so, can justice require us to attempt
the North American Heath Hen’s de-extinction? I will first review the types of de-
extinction technologies currently available. I will then discuss the criteria used to
determine when restitution is owed for injuries as well as the special challenges
arising when (i) victims are wild animals and (ii) are extinct. After arguing that
restitution may be due for some extinctions and that de-extinction would sometimes
be an appropriate means, I apply these arguments to the case of the Heath Hen.
28.1 Introduction
By all means, bring the Heath Hen back and undo the horrible mistake of letting this animal
go extinct in the first place. We caused its extinction; we are responsible for bringing it back.
(Dan 2014)
Human beings are responsible for many species’ extinctions since our own first
appeared on the planet. However, it was not until the late eighteenth century that
scientists realized that species could become globally extinct (Barrow 2009). It was
another century before the possibility of anthropogenic extinctions was recognized
(Cowles 2012). After the disappearance of the Dodo and the Great Auk, events
in which humans were clearly implicated, government regulations to control over-
hunting and fishing of game birds and animals were expanded in many European
countries and extended to their colonies abroad but did little to diminish the impact
of habitat disruption and over-hunting on many species. By the end of the nine-
teenth century, societies for the protection of wildlife, especially birds, began to
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form in Europe and North America. Great Britain’s Society for the Protection of
Birds (later the Royal Society for Protection of Birds) began in 1892, followed by
the Vogelbescherming Nederland (1899), the Audubon Society (1905), and La Ligue
pour la protection des oiseaux (1912) (Boardman 2006).
In 1908, the United States began one of its first serious attempts to prevent an
extinctionwith the creation of a sanctuary for theHeathHen on the island ofMartha’s
Vineyard (Massachusetts). The Heath Hen, a ground-dwelling bird, related to Prairie
Chickens, had been extirpated from the mainland in the 1870s. Predictions for the
remnant population on Martha’s Vineyard were so dire that a sanctuary was created
to reduce the pressure of hunting and habitat disturbance. The sanctuary reduced
these pressures but only within its 612 acres. In the 1920s, the Heath Hen population
went into a decline from which it never recovered. The last Heath Hen, Booming
Ben, disappeared in 1932. Henry Hough, editor of a local newspaper, blamed human
chauvinism for the bird’s demise.
The gospel of conservation, it is said, has won the day. We know this is not true…Is nothing
to follow the extinction of this bird except one more lesson in conservation for school books
and a sentimental mourning? (Hough 1933; see Barrow 2009)
The Revive & Restore Organization has been investigating an alternative: de-
extinction, the genetic engineering of an approximation of theHeathHen for eventual
release onto islands around Martha’s Vineyard (Revive and Restore).
Revive and Restore’s Heath Hen Project is one of several “de-extinction” ventures
whose goal is the replication of extinct species. Supporters argue that they offer
many potential benefits. First, conservationists could have new tools for slowing or
reversing biodiversity losses. Second, de-extinct Ivory-Billed Woodpeckers, Moa,
and Tasmanian Tigers would stimulate eco-tourism whose profits could bankroll
protections for endangered species. Third, improvements in gene-editing techniques
could have spillover benefits for human health, boosting the development of gene
therapies. Supporters have also argued that de-extinction is worth pursuing for
another kind of reason, as a means to right historical wrongs. As Dr. Jeffrey Johnson,
a Heath Hen Project advisor put it, “These species have either gone extinct, locally
extinct, or on the verge of extinction primarily due to the actions of man, so I feel
obligated that we should try to do whatever we can to prevent further extinction, and
now with this technology maybe even bring back a species” (Brown 2015b).
This last argument is different in kind from the other three. The first three appeal
to our desires for the future outcomes de-extinction is said to offer. Their persua-
siveness is dependent upon our desiring those outcomes (and believing that de-
extinction can achieve them). By contrast, the last argument is “backward-looking”.
It invites conscientious reflection on our past actions from a moral point of view.
If some anthropogenic extinctions morally wronged their victims or third parties,
justice might demand restitution for them. And if de-extinction was an effective
means of doing so in some cases, justice might require us to embrace de-extinction,
independent of any desires we might have for the future.
Backward-looking appeals to restitutive justice are commonlymadeby champions
of de-extinction projects. “If we can retrieve the animals or retrieve at least the
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appearance of the quagga,” says a director of a South African effort to replicate this
extinct zebra, “then we can say we’ve righted a wrong” (Page and Hancock 2016).1
The Australian Lazarus Project, whose founders hope to clone the extinct Gastric
Brooding Frog, has been characterized as fulfilling “an ethical responsibility…to
undo the harm that we have done in contributing to its extinction” (Smith 2017).
Reversal of the anthropogenic extinctions of Tasmanian Tiger (or thylacine) and
Passenger Pigeon have likewise been justified in moral terms: “Having hunted the
thylacine to extinction, we owe it to the species to bring it back” and “we caused the
extinction of the species…Now we have a moral obligation to bring [the Passenger
Pigeon] back” (Pickrell 2018; Bethge 2013).2 Increasingly, these appeals are drawing
attention from environmental philosophers.3 One of de-extinction’s most persistent
philosophical critics, BenMinteer, has described it as “the most powerful” argument
in favor of de-extinction offered by its proponents (Minteer 2014).
Minteer’s claim is surprisingwhen considered in light of recent debates in contem-
porary intergenerational ethics. Arguments for restitution to victims of historical
injustices are always highly contentious when all the victims are dead (even when
the victims are human beings). It is not clear howwe canmake restitution to the dead.
Sometimes thevictimsof historical injustices havedescendants. In these cases, claims
for restitution, though politically controversial, are at least taken seriously. But while
some extinct species have living relatives, few have any direct descendants. Is it
plausible that we could have duties of justice to make restitution for anthropogenic
extinctions? Would they require de-extinction? More specifically, might we have
such a duty to the Heath Hen and, if so, would it require us to attempt the Heath
Hen’s de-extinction? These are the questions I will try to answer in this chapter.
First, I will briefly review the three families of de-extinction techniques currently
available. Next I will discuss the criteria used to determine when and to whom resti-
tution is owed for injuries done to others, and the special challenges that arise when
(i) victims are members of wild species and (ii) there are no living survivors. After
arguing that restitution may be due for some kinds of anthropogenic extinctions and
when de-extinction technologies might be the best means to employ, I will consider
whether the Heath Hen’s extinction is such a case.
The focus of this chapter throughout will be on the backward looking reparations
argument for de-extinction as a duty of justice. So I shall not discuss forward-looking
rationales, such as the potential to preserve biodiversity, stimulate eco-tourism, or
improve human health. Nor shall I discuss the usual objections to them; that a de-
extinct species might threaten those which have inherited its former territory or that
de-extinction projects may siphon public funding away from traditional conservation
1For information about the Quagga Project, visit: https://quaggaproject.org/.
2Interestingly, Ben Novak, the Passenger Pigeon Project scientist quoted in Bethge (2013), has been
more hesitant about the application of this reasoning to other species. See Mitchell (2018).
3Most discussions ultimately conclude reparations arguments for de-extinction face insurmountable
challenges of the sort to be discussed below, but not all. Pessimistic assessments include Rohwer
and Marris (2018), Sandler (2014), Palmer (2012), Cohen (2014), Diehm (2015), Campbell and
Whittle (2017), and Minteer (2014, 2015, 2019). A more optimistic assessment is offered in Jebari
(2016).
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efforts. Focusing on the Heath Hen project will help avoid distraction by these kinds
of concerns.No candidate for de-extinction has less potential to become an ecological
pest. The birds produced by the Heath Hen project would be non-migratory, ground-
dwelling birds initially restricted to barrier islands off the coast ofMartha’s Vineyard,
islands free of any related species with which they might compete. Reintroduction
in the species’ historical range on the island of Martha’s Vineyard would follow only
after sufficient habitat was prepared. Currently, the project is privately funded. Were
any public funds spent later to restore habitat for their reintroduction on Martha’s
Vineyard, traditional conservation goals would not suffer.4
28.2 De-Extinction Techniques
Modernmedical technology is sometimes creditedwith restoring the ‘clinically dead’
back to life.What is actually reversed is a dying process, not death.Modernmedicine
can sometimes bring the dying back from death’s door but cannot restore those who
have already passed through it. Press reports sometimes describe de-extinction tech-
niques as if they literally restored extinct animal species to life. As we will see, they
too may sometimes help bring dying species back from extinction’s door (no mean
feat in itself) but cannot restore those which have already passed through it.5 “De-
extinction” is an umbrella term which covers three families of breeding techniques
developed to replicate the phenotype (form and appearance) and/or genotype of an
extinct animal population. These include (i) back-breeding, (ii) cloning, and (iii)
genome editing (Shapiro 2016).
Back-breeding is possible when members of a living species can trace their
ancestry in part to an extinct species. Back-breeding projects try to replicate the
phenotype of lost species by cross-breeding their hybrid descendants. The South
African Quagga Project is one example. Its goal is to replicate the Quagga, an extinct
subspecies of Plains Zebra, by cross-breeding hybrid Plains Zebra who retain traits
from their distant Quagga ancestors. Back breeding has also been proposed to repli-
cate the Pinta Island Tortoise, known internationally for its last survivor, “Lonesome
George”. Hybrid tortoises have recently been discovered on Floreana Island with
Pinta Island Tortoise genes. Cross-breeding over several generations could produce
offspring that closely replicate their Pinta Island ancestors (Beeler 2015).
Cloning projects try to replicate the genotype of a lost species by implanting the
nucleus of a preserved cell from an extinct species into the egg cell of a related species
(a process known as somatic cell nuclear transfer or SCNT). If the reconfigured egg
cell begins dividing and develops into an embryo, the embryo can then implanted
4To prevent further distraction, I will also assume that the welfare interests of all the birds involved
in the research are adequately met.
5I will use the term ‘species’ interchangeably with ‘population’ through out this paper as collective
nouns for a group of closely genetically related animals that can interbreed. I shall not assume
‘species’ as wholes have interests or welfare distinct from that of their members.
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in the uterus of a related species for gestation. Cloning has been tried on a few
occasions, with only partial success. An embryo was developed from preserved cells
of the extinct Pyrenean Ibex but the clone died from congenital abnormalities shortly
after birth (Kupferschmidt 2014). The Lazarus Project created living embryos from
preserved tissue of extinct Gastric-Brooding Frogs, but none developed into adult
frogs (Smith 2017).
Genome editing is a third technique that might be used in cases where there are no
living hybrid descendants to be back-bred, no specimens sufficiently well preserved
to make cloning possible, and/or, as in birds, where the target species’ eggs are not
amenable to SCNT. Scientists would edit the genome of a close living relative in
order to replicate sequences distinctive of the extinct species they hoped to replicate.
The edited cells would later be used to produce viable embryos. This is the method
being researched by Revive & Restore for the de-extinction of the Heath Hen.
Each method would replicate the extinct species’ phenotype and/or genotype to
some extent, but in no case would the offspring possess all and only the traits of
the extinct species. Back-breeding hybrid Pinta Island tortoises cannot fully erase
the genetic signature of their Floreana ancestors.6 The complexity of gene editing
suggests that offspring would at best approximate the genomes of the target species.
Heath Hens produced by editing the genome of Prairie Chickens would possess
the traits of a Heath Hen–Prairie Chicken hybrid rather than all and only those of
historical Heath Hens. Even cloned animals will have hybrid traits, as they would
inherit maternal mitochondria from the eggs used in the SCNT process.
Critics of de-extinction projects have argued that for this reason, de-extinct
animals are unworthy for release into natural environments. De-extinct animals are
variously described as hybrids, inauthentic, and worse: “engineered dopplegangers”,
“franken species and eco-zombies” and “technological artefacts, not members of any
natural species” (Minteer 2015; Shultz 2016; Campbell 2017). We should not allow
ourselves to be influenced by this sort of language. First, it is rooted in outdated ideas
about species that have underwritten racist ideologies for centuries. The assumption
that “miscegenation”, the mixing of different species or races of beings, including
human beings, results in unnatural or inferior “mongrel” offspring is a survival of
pre-Darwinian essentialist ideas about the nature of species—which sadly persisted
in Darwin’s own work, where hybrids are described as outcomes of “illegitimate
unions” and “unnatural crossing” (Darwin 1896). On this view, any so-called “human
being” who has inherited Neanderthal genes is actually an impure hybrid who ought
not be allow to procreate with purer, more authentic, human beings.
Second, it relies on equally questionable assumptions about the value of the “nat-
ural” versus the “artificial”. If de-extinct Heath Hens are technological artefacts,
what then are the thousands of children born every year from in vitro fertilized donor
eggs? Pseudo-human franken-children who should be kept apart from their more
authentic, naturally-conceived counterparts?Of coursewe should be concerned about
6Humans have not had Neanderthal reproductive partners in over 30,000 years, yet from 1 to 4% of
the genetic material of their hybrid human descendants remains Neanderthal (Sánchez-Quinto and
Lalueza-Fox 2015).
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the potential consequences of releasing replicated Heath Hens into natural areas.
From an ecological perspective, it matters enormously whether they can behave as
good ecological citizens. However, the purity of their lineage and the manner of
their conception have no comparable significance. Thus for current purposes, I will
assume that at least some replicas of extinct species would be good environmental
citizens and that a de-extinct Heath Hen could be one of them.
28.3 Can Restitutive Justice Be Extended to Wild Animals?
Common sense conceptions of justice require that those responsible for causing
avoidable and unjustifiable harm to others’ welfare offer restitution. If the injury
took the form of misappropriation of material goods, the person responsible should
restore those goods to the individuals entitled to them. If, on the other hand, direct
restoration is impossible, then the person responsible should offer reparations to
compensate the victim by other means. Material reparations are not due unless four
criteria are met: the perpetrator was a competent moral agent, the injury could have
been avoided, the victim was an individual capable of suffering, and making mate-
rial reparations is possible. Wild deer do not owe farmers reparations for the field
crops they damage because wild deer are not moral agents. If the farmers’ employees
could not have prevented the deer from entering those fields, they do not owe their
employers reparations. The damaged crops are owed nothing because they are inca-
pable of suffering. And finally, because ‘ought’ implies ‘can’, material reparations
are not owed if they cannot be made.
Most now agree that if an animal is capable of suffering, we have a moral duty to
avoid causing it to suffer. Many go further, arguing that animals have rights not to be
made to suffer or be confined by human beings. However, most of these discussions
focus on domesticated animals. Sentient wild animals possess the same claims to
moral standing as their domestic counterparts. But some doubt that we can extend
these duties to wild animals without contradiction. Many wild animals suffer from
illness and predation, conditions that could be mitigated if we forced sick animals to
accept medical treatment or confined and/or exterminated predators. In other words,
as Martha Nussbaum points out, when it comes to wild animals, acting for the good
of one species often entails acting against the good of another. She asks:
Should humans police the animal world, protecting vulnerable animals from predators? …
The death of a gazelle after painful torture is just as bad for the gazelle when torture is
inflicted by a tiger as when it is done by a human being. That does not mean that death by
tiger is as blameworthy; obviously it is not. But it does suggest that we have similar reasons
to prevent it, if we can do so without doing greater harms…The problem is that the needs of
the predatory animal must also be considered, and we do not have the option of giving the
tiger in the wild a nice ball on a string to play with. (Nussbaum 2006, 379)
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Clare Palmer argues this is just one of “a number of difficulties raised by the
importing of claims about justice from human/human to human/animal relations”.7
Our concepts of justice arose in response to our need to manage human social rela-
tionships. Many domestic animals have roles in those relationships, and to the extent
they do, she argues, their roles entitle them to consideration. This is not the case with
wild animals. Palmer (2010, 89) writes:
Fully wild animals…do not have such relations with humans; so duties to assist them are
not generated on these grounds. There is no analogy to current or historical unfairness
or injustice (or, indeed, fairness or justice) about the states in which wild animals find
themselves. Inasmuch as they live without human contact, they are outside the realm of
justice altogether. (Palmer 2010, 87)
Since wild animals fall outside the scope of our concepts of justice, Palmer suggests
that human beings do not owe wild animals reparations either for harms inflicted
by other wildlife or by human interventions in their environments. In her view,
talk of human beings owing reparations to wild animals is confused or metaphoric.
She argues that at most we can have “reparation-like special obligations” to act
benevolently towards those animals, chiefly domesticated, whom we have made
vulnerable through our interventions in their lives (Palmer 2010, 96).
However, as Palmer notes, “justice” is used to refer to a host of related princi-
ples: economic, distributive, retributive, restorative, social and political. There would
be enormous difficulties in trying to extend all of these many principles of justice
to animals generally, let alone wild animals specifically. The basic common-sense
principle of restitutive justice seems another matter. Meeting the criteria for claims
of restitutive justice on sentient animals’ behalf does not seem inherently prob-
lematic – at least not in cases where their injuries were avoidable, no overriding
moral reasons compelled the acts responsible, and there was some practical means
of making restitution to the animals concerned.
Palmer might reply that this is an exaggeration. Meeting all four criteria when the
“victim” is a wild animal is not as simple as I have made it appear. In most cases, we
face huge epistemic challenges in determining whether and to what extent our avoid-
able interactions with wild animals harm them. Most wild creatures’ vulnerability to
suffering is consequence of life in the wild, not their interactions with human beings.
Premature death from illness, injuries, and predation is a norm in the wild. As Mark
Sagoff famously remarked:
The principle of natural selection is not obviously a humanitarian principle; the predator-prey
relation does not depend on moral empathy. Nature ruthlessly limits animal populations by
doing violence to virtually every individual before it reaches maturity. (Sagoff 1984, 299)
Some of the animals pursued by hunters and anglers may go on to lead long, reason-
ably healthy, and enjoyable lives if not captured and killed. Others would not. They
would die soon anyway from any of a myriad of causes, many of them painful.
In shooting a deer, a hunter may regrettably shorten a life worth continuing or,
7See also a related argument in Anderson (2004).
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alternately, mercifully end its suffering from disease, injuries, or parasites. The well-
intentioned angler who throws a trout back into a stream has no real way of knowing
if she has spared its life or thrown it into the mouth of a predator.
There are two ways one might respond to the issues Nussbaum and Palmer raise.
Onewould be to argue thatwe cannot have the same sorts ofmoral duties towardswild
animals that we have towards domesticated animals, becausewe know too little of the
circumstances of any particular wild creature to determine whether our interventions
in its affairs would be helpful or harmful overall. ‘Ought’ implies ‘can’. If we can
never be sure that any given act will actually injure a wild animal’s life prospects
overall, we cannot be obliged to avoid harming them nor owe them restitution if we
do. The other would be to argue that the epistemic challenges wild animals present
do not change the kinds of duties we have to them, vis a vis domesticated animals. It
simply changes the methods we are warranted in using to evaluate harms we cause.
Our familiarity with and control over the lives of domesticated and captive animals
usually ensures we can estimate how any particular action is likely to affect them.
Our lack of knowledge about or control over fully wild animals routinely ensures we
cannot. But this do not mean there are no measures available to us to evaluate our
conduct towards wild animals. Population measures can provide a proxy by which
to make rough estimations of whether particular practices are harmful to wildlife.
Different measures of harm can be used to determine what justice requires when
we injure others. Thesemeasures fall into two broad categories: comparative and non-
comparative. Comparative measures determine how much worse off an individual
is after an injurious event, either by comparing that individual’s condition prior to
and following the event (a historical comparison) or by comparing her condition
after the event with how it would have been had the event not occurred (a counter-
factual comparison).8 Provided one has sufficient information about an individual’s
circumstances to make comparisons of either type, one can arrive at fine-grained
analyses of the degree of harm a party has suffered from another’s intentional or
negligent actions. When the victims are individuals or members of groups about
whose prior histories and particular circumstances we know little, historical and
counter-factual comparisons become impractical. In these cases, we turn to non-
comparative measures. We assume that certain states are intrinsically bad states for
individuals (e.g., physical debilitation, mental suffering, loss of autonomy) and if the
intentional or negligent act has imposed such states on those affected, they are said to
be harmed. (Shiffrin 2012; Harman 2009; Hanser 2008) Because non-comparative
measures rely on pre-determined lists of intrinsically bad states and do not measure
ancillary harms victims may undergo, their results are less fine-grained than compar-
ative measures. To do victims full justice in assessing claims for restitution, compar-
ative measures are preferable. But when we lack the information required to employ
them, non-comparative measures become an alternate if cruder means of proceeding.
We rarely know enough about the lives of wild species to measure the effects
of our acts upon individual animals comparatively, even those which have received
8For background, see Perry (2003). For criticism and defense of comparative accounts of harm, see,
respectively, Norcross (2005) and Klocksiem (2012).
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scientific study. Often our only basis for determining the effects of human activity
upon them are rough estimates of population trends.9 But this kind of information
does provide a non-comparative means by which to gage statistically whether our
interventions are imposing intrinsic evils on a species’ members. Inability to obtain
sufficient food, water, and shelter to grow to a reproductively viable age is surely an
intrinsically bad state for any sentient being, human or nonhuman. Whenever it is
evident that human practices are preventing a population from sustaining its numbers,
we can be sure we are harming them in a non-comparative sense by denying its
members, on average, access to the basic goods necessary to sustain their numbers.
If those practices are avoidable, not required by overriding moral considerations, and
mitigatable, I would argue all four criteria for a duty of restitutive justice to sentient
species of wild animals can be met.
Using the effects of human activity on population numbers means that we will not
owe reparations for every act that kills or displaces an individual animal, provided
it is a member of a species whose individual welfare we cannot accurately assess. It
will be the effects of our practices on that species’ population levels that determine
whether reparations can reasonably be claimed on that species’ behalf. So it would
seem that if a restricted season for hunting or angling did not diminish populations
of the target species, restricted hunting and angling would not warrant reparations.
Similarly, if human development of a natural area does not diminish populations
of any wildlife displaced, then the displacement would not warrant restitution or
reparations. However, if hunting, fishing, and development practices evidently do
deny a population the means to sustain itself, those practices are harmful and may
warrant reparations.
So we need not wait until a species becomes extinct to demand restitutive justice
on its behalf. Extinction is not itself a kind of harm. Extinction is an indicator that a
wild population has been harmed; i.e., suffered intrinsically bad states through denial
of the basic natural goods by which it sustained itself. Conservation advocates have
prima facie grounds for demanding restorative justice on a species’ behalf as soon as
(i) the population’s numbers are shrinking and (ii) its losses are traceable to culpable
human activity.
Restitutive justice claims become more urgent as a species’ numbers shrink to
levels below statistical norms for survival, especially when its genetic diversity has
shrunk along with its numbers.10 Such a species is at risk of entering an extinction
vortex; a state in which “an insidious mutual reinforcement can occur among biotic
and abiotic processes such as environmental stochasticity, demographic stochasticity,
inbreeding, andbehavioural failures, drivingpopulation size downward to extinction”
(Fagan and Holmes, 2006). If this harm is traceable to avoidable human behavior, to
do justice to the victims, action should be taken to restore the basic natural goods to
9For an extended argument to this effect, see Delon and Purves (2018). See also Johanssen’s 2019
discussion. I am prepared to grant that there are some species about which we have sufficient
information to be sure that particular kinds of human interventions are directly harmful, but these
are exceptions not the rule when it comes to the totality of sentient wild species on this planet.
10For an overview of the history and current methods of developing minimum viability population
measures, including the “50/500” rule, see Stephens (2016).
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levels sufficient to allow the survivors to recover and sustain their typical numbers. In
rare cases, justice might even require us to use de-extinction technologies to rescue
a species already entering an extinction vortex.
One basic good essential for sexually reproducing species to sustain their numbers
are viable reproductive partners. Currently neither of the two surviving female
Northern White Rhinos has access to a viable breeding partner because no males
exist. As this state is a direct result of culpable human action, some believe that frozen
tissue from Northern White Rhinos should be used to clone replacement breeding
stock sufficient for the population to recover to sustainable levels.11 A similar argu-
ment has been made regarding Black-footed Ferrets. As all surviving Black-footed
Ferrets are descended from just seven survivors, it is feared that their low numbers
and diminished genetic diversity put them at imminent risk of inbreeding depression
and reproductive failure. In other words, they may be on the brink of an “extinc-
tion vortex”, even while their needs for other basic natural goods are being met.
This might be forestalled by providing Black-Footed Ferrets with the genetically
diverse reproductive partners they currently lack, if it becomes possible to produce
offspring by cloning the tissue of preserved ferrets. Another candidate might be the
Ivory-Billed Woodpecker. Unconfirmed observations have persuaded some that the
species may persist but in numbers so low, extinction must be imminent. Were it
possible to edit the genome of a related species of woodpecker in order to provide
surviving Ivory-Billed Woodpeckers with viable partners, their extinction might be
forestalled. Had these technologies been available in the late 1920s, we might have
used them to provide reproductive partners for the last three Heath Hens, all male.
As we were responsible for their plight, we would have owed it to them to make the
attempt. Might we owe it them now?
28.4 Special Challenges Posed by Historical Injustices
Prior to the Heath Hen’s extinction, our duties of restitutive justice might have been
fulfilled by restoring the basic goods denied thembyhumandevelopment onMartha’s
Vineyard, such as food, shelter from predation, reproductive partners, and the like. As
simple restoration of these goods is no longer possible, the question of compensatory
reparations arises. Whether reparations could be due in this case is complicated by
the fact that the injustice done is ‘historical’, i.e., the injustice occurred so long ago
none of the parties directly involved remain alive. As with other cases of historical
injustice, it may not be clear that all four criteria for material reparations can be met.
Who can be obliged to offer reparations and towhomwould they be due? If we cannot
11“They are at the brink of extinction only due to human activity,” says Jan Stejskal, director of
communication and international projects at the Dvůr Králové Zoo in the Czech Republic, where
Sudan lived from 1975 until 2009. “If we have the techniques or methods to assist them to survive,
I think it is our responsibility to utilize them” (quoted in Potenza 2018).
28 Does Justice Require De-extinction of the Heath Hen? 523
provide adequate solutions to these challenges, attempts to provide reparations for
anthropogenic extinctions would be purely symbolic.12
Consider the loosely analogous case of the injustices perpetrated by the Euro-
pean colonizers of another island, Newfoundland, north of Martha’s Vineyard, off
Canada’s Atlantic coast. European settlement of Newfoundland in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries harmed the indigenous Beothuk community by displacing
them from fishing grounds on which they depended for their survival, competing
with them for forest resources, and introducing diseases to which the Beothuk had
no resistance. Shanawdithit, the last known survivor of Beothuk island community
died in 1829. Some would argue that any attempt to make reparations to the Beothuk
community now would be merely symbolic. The Beothuk community is gone as are
those responsible for the injuries that caused the community’s dissolution. The dead
no longer exist. To extract reparations from the colonists and transfer them to the
victims, would involve “backward causation”. In other words, we would have to be
able to go back in time and change the past. As this is impossible, no agent, individual
or collective, owes material reparations to the Beothuk. By the same logic, one might
argue, no one is now obliged to make material reparations for the wrongs done the
Heath Hen by the European colonizers of Martha’s Vineyard.
The developing literature on intergenerational ethics suggests that these are not
insurmountable challenges. Consider the claim that no one is now responsible for the
wrongs done the Beothuk. This might seem correct regarding infractions committed
by deceased individuals acting alone. It is not so obviously correctwhen those respon-
sible acted on behalf of, at the behest of, and/or with the consent of transgenerational
collective agents, such as corporations, societies, and political states. These kinds
of collectives are not ‘natural’ persons and so do not naturally possess either moral
agency or rights. Nevertheless many are granted artificial agency and rights, by legis-
lation or regulation, to facilitate their provision of valuable services and to ensure
accountability for injuries they cause. The agency granted is moreover often trans-
generational, a long standing legal and social practice which we have good reason
to support (Thompson 2009). Were there no institutions whose agency did not tran-
scend generational change, the force of treaties, bequests, and corporate and other
contracts would not survive the lives of their signatories.
This means that if a historical injustice is traceable to members of transgener-
ational institutions who were acting in accordance with that institution’s policies
or directives and that transgenerational institution still exists, then there will be no
difficulty in determining who owes reparations in that case. Applied to the case
of historical injustice done the Beothuk, the responsible party would be Canada.
Even though Canada did not exist in its current political form until 1867 or include
Newfoundland until 1949, the nationwas created by and from transgenerational insti-
tutions responsible for colonizingNewfoundland.Aswell as inheriting various rights,
12This does not entail that symbolic reparations could not or should not be made. The symbolic
benefits of governmental apologies for past injustices, even those leaving no survivors, can have
enormous social benefits. However, symbolic gestures are not meaningful for animals, so I shall
not discuss them further here.
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possessions, and territories of its predecessors, it also inherited certain obligations.
As Tracy Isaacs (2014) argues:
Canada is an enduring and identifiable collective entity, causally connected to the history
of wrongdoing against First Nations. For these reasons, Canada and its [non-indigenous]
citizens share in blame for past wrongs.
If we apply the same reasoning to the Heath Hen, then the State of Massachusetts
and the local governments of Martha’s Vineyard, are the transgenerational agents
responsible both for the harms leading to the Heath Hen’s demise and any reparations
owed.
A second challenge in cases of historical injustice is determining who is entitled
to claim reparations after the original victims are dead. In some cases, the original
victims were themselves members of transgenerational collectives that still exist.
In these cases, the recipients to whom reparations should be paid are easily identi-
fied. For example the indigenous residents of Martha’s Vineyard, the Wampanoag
Tribe of Gay Head (Aquinnah), is such a collective. In 1987, the Wampanoag won
a settlement from the United States government for historical injustices done their
ancestors, including wrongful appropriation of territory by earlier generations of
non-indigenous settlers. As the Heath Hen played a role in the traditional diet of
the Wampanoag, arguably the United States government’s failure to preserve the
Heath Hen was a further wrong for which the Wampanoag should receive compen-
sation. Unfortunately, we cannot use this approach to establish a duty of reparations
to the Heath Hen themselves (as opposed to a duty to the Wampanoag community
regarding the Heath Hen.) Populations of wild animals are not organized collectives
or institutions able to exercise transgenerational agency.
Living descendants of the victims of historical injustices (including descendants
of indirect victims who suffered collateral damages) are another potential source of
legitimate claimants to reparations. For example, the United Nations 2005 resolu-
tion, “Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for
Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Viola-
tions of International Humanitarian Law”, states that “where appropriate, and in
accordance with domestic law, the term ‘victim’ also includes the immediate family
or dependants of the direct victim” (United Nations 2005). In practice, legal enforce-
ment is piecemeal and highly variable, however the principle that descendants have
legitimate moral claims for reparations for wrongs done their predecessors is widely
accepted. There are at least two ways one might apply this principle to the case of
the Beothuk. First one could follow up reports from the coastal Mi’kmaq that many
Beothuk fled Newfoundland before the final dissolution of their community. It may
yet be possible to identify descendants of these refugees who would have a moral
claim to reparations. Second, one could follow up on the effects of the dissolution of
the Beothuk community on itsMi’kmaq neighbors. Losing access to a former trading
partner very likely had negative consequences for neighboring Mi’kmaq communi-
ties, undermining their welfare and social and economic independence. If so, then in
virtue of this collateral damage, descendants of these Mi’kmaq families would have
a moral claim to material reparations.
28 Does Justice Require De-extinction of the Heath Hen? 525
Clearly we cannot use the first of these two strategies to generate reparations
claims on behalf of extinct species, such as the Heath Hen, which have no descen-
dants. Nevertheless, the second could potentially warrant moral claims for some
non-human species affected by the anthropogenic extinctions of others. Imagine
the human practices responsible for the Heath Hen’s demise inadvertently harmed
other sentient species in ways that continue to depress their descendants’ abilities to
maintain their populations. Alternately, imagine the Heath Hen provided ecosystem
services important to a second species whose numbers have been depressed ever
since the Heath Hen disappeared. In each scenario, there would be descendants of
individuals who had suffered collateral damages, directly or indirectly, from the
culpable harm done the Heath Hen.
Some critics of reparations arguments for historical injustices have worried that
these strategies are undermined by the infamous “non-identity problem”.Derek Parfit
(1987) has shown that whenwe use comparative conceptions of harm, trying to estab-
lish that individuals were harmed by events responsible for those individuals being
bornmay be difficult or impossible. On the comparativemeasures of harmwe employ
for most human interactions, a person is harmed if she is made worse off than she
was—or worse off than she would have been—had the harmful event not occurred.
If we apply a comparative measures of harm to the situations of surviving descen-
dants of Beothuk or to descendants of the Mi’kmaq affected by the dissolution of the
Beothuk community, it might be impossible to establish that any were made worse
off comparatively speaking. These individuals would probably never have been born
had European settlers not driven the last Beothuk from Newfoundland. Their ances-
tors’ lives would have been sufficiently different to ensure that most would have
had children with different reproductive partners in each of the intervening genera-
tions. By this time, very probably, none of their descendants would ever have existed
but for the wrongs done the Beothuk. So unless their lives are so bad as to be not
worth living at all, it would seem that they cannot be said to be worse off compara-
tively speaking.13 Critics of reparations claims for anthropogenic extinctions believe
the same is true for descendants of non-human species impacted by anthropogenic
extinctions. If their identities were fixed by the events leading to those extinctions,
we could not now claim those individuals were worse off comparatively speaking,
unless their lives were so bad as not to be worth living at all (Palmer 2010, 2012;
Rohwer and Marris 2018).
The non-identity problem does pose a challenge to some kinds of repara-
tions claims involving human beings, specifically those which rely on comparative
measures of harm. However, this problem rarely arises with historical injustices to
wild animals. As noted above, with most wild animal populations, the only measures
available to us are non-comparative. On non-comparative measures, all we need to
determine is whether there is statistical evidence that themembers of an animal popu-
lation have been subjected to intrinsically harmful states. Population numbers are
13We are, of course, not restricted to using comparative measures even with human beings. When
paradoxical conclusions like this result from employing comparative measures, others should be
adopted.
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used for this purpose. If human practices are causing a population of wild animals to
shrink, we have evidence that its members, by and large, are being denied access to
vital basic goods. And if this harm could have been avoided, and was not compelled
by overriding moral considerations, we also have grounds for claiming reparations
on those animals’ behalf.
28.5 De-Extinction, Reparations, and the Heath Hen
The efforts made to save the Heath Hen were piecemeal and inadequate. Hunting
was never banned outside the grasslands refuge created in 1908. Ill-advised fire
suppression reduced the quality of the habitat the refuge provided. Feral cats were
allowed to roam freely, preying on fledglings. Chickens and introduced game birds
competed for resources.
Other native ground dwelling birds, such as the Ruffed Grouse, have also dimin-
ished in numbers. Bobwhite Quail numbers have been maintained but only by
restocking with captive reared birds. As the human practices that caused the Heath
Hen’s demise are evidently also harming descendants of these other species, then we
appear to havegrounds for recognizing aduty tomake reparations to them; controlling
feral cats for example, eliminating hunting perhaps, and improving fire management.
At the same time, we have reason to dismiss this rationale as irrelevant. Our obliga-
tions to reform our practices are over-determined. If existing wildlife populations are
struggling because of harmful human practices, we already have sufficient reason
for concluding we should reform them; the fact that they are harmful now. We would
have exactly the same reason, even if our practices had not caused the Heath Hen’s
extinction. These reasons suggest we have obligations to restore habitat, control feral
cats, improve fire suppression techniques and reduce human development in areas
critical to these species’ survival, rather than recreating the Heath Hen.
De-extinction could be morally obligatory if it turned out that Heath Hens were a
foundational species for the grassland ecosystems on which the Heath Hen and other
species depended. Jeffrey Yule has argued that in cases where no other species is able
to fill the ecological gap left following an extinction, we may have an obligation to
provide the ecological communities impactedwith “a sort of ecological artificial limb
or prosthesis… to replace the amputated original” (Yule 2002).When we think of de-
extinction as a means to provide damaged ecological communities and co-dependent
species with a prosthesis, “the quality of the replacement in duplicating the missing
original would likely be a key consideration” (ibid.). That said, authenticity matters
less than functionality. So it would not matter that recreated Heath Hens did not
perfectly replicate their extinct “ancestors”, provided they behaved in substantially
similar ways. As he notes, “ecosystems, like people, are arguably far better off
with prosthetics, particularly high quality prosthetics, than without them” (ibid.).
Currently there is no other related species that can thrive in the conditions that suited
the Heath Hen. This suggests that if replacing the Heath Hen’s ecological function is
essential to right wrongs done to other species on Martha’s Vineyard, we might owe
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it to them (albeit not to Heath Hens themselves) to genetically recreate the Heath
Hen. As it happens, there is no evidence that the Heath Hen played a foundational
role in the grassland ecology of Martha’s Vineyard.
That would seem to spell an end to the possibility of justifying its replication as an
act of reparation. On closer examination, there is another party to whom reparations
might be owed: the human residents of Martha’s Vineyard. It is a standing grief
to many that they will never enjoy the sight or sound of Heath Hens strutting and
booming on their breeding grounds as earlier generations did. It is likewise a standing
grief to others that they will never see a living Tasmanian Tiger, Passenger Pigeon,
or Gastric Brooding Frog. Commenting on the Heath Hen Project, a local naturalist,
TomChase confessed, “The truth is thatmy reasons for supporting this are completely
emotional and value based” (Brown 2015b). Chase mourned the steady decline in
avian biodiversity since his childhood:
Kestrels were so abundant on Martha’s Vineyard one flew in my house once and perched at
the end of my bed,” he said. “It was a time, like my father’s time, of freedom and abundance.
So when I see a project like this,” Chase remarked, “as a conservationist I’m tired of fighting
for things and always losing. I want to get on the proactive side and not the reactive side.
(Brown 2015b)
Chase is just one of hundreds of thousands of people around the world who mourn
the aesthetic, cultural, emotional, and material losses that avoidable anthropogenic
extinctions have caused them. That means that he and the others like him can claim
to beworse-off than they would have been had their predecessors passed on the same
natural legacy of biodiversity they themselves had received from earlier generations.
When extinctions are as recent as the Heath Hen’s, the non-identity problem is not
an issue. There is little likelihood that all those mourning the heath Hen’s extinction
would not have been born had its extinction not occurred.
There may be species whose cultural importance is so great as to warrant repara-
tions claims against any transgenerational agencies responsible for their (avoidable)
extinction. And in some of these cases, replicating the lost species might be the most
effective means of righting the wrongs done. There is little reason to think the Heath
Hen played such a role in the lives of residents of Martha’s Vineyard. The people
most likely to have formed such a relationship with the bird are those who co-existed
with it the longest, i.e., the Wampanoag. Had the Heath Hen played a particularly
significant role in their culture, Massachusetts might owe it to them to support the
Heath Hen project. As the Wampanoag have never made such claims, I take it that
the Heath Hen’s loss was not so culturally injurious as to warrant de-extinction in
reparation.
In a letter to the Vineyard Gazette, which Minteer discusses, Stephen Kellert
provides a different moral defense for the Heath Hen Project:
Restoring the heath hen offers us the chance for a moral reawakening. It provides us with an
affirmative opportunity to restore our connection to the earth and contribute to the healing
and beauty of the land. It offers Martha’s Vineyard the extraordinary opportunity to lead as
an inspiring example to America of how by living in right relation to nature we may flourish
and achieve an ineffable and deepening connection to the larger community of life. (2014)
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Minteer is dismissive because he thinks Kellert is recommending the Heath Hen
Project as a techno-fix, i.e., a technological ‘bandage’ that mitigates symptoms of
a social problem but does not address its cause. Thus he fears that Kellert’s recom-
mendation may reinforce rather than correct the vices responsible for anthropogenic
extinctions and environmental degradation. Minteer writes:
In fomenting the fantasy that we can erase the environmental abuses of the past by
pursuing high-tech species revival technologies, promoters of de-extinction are inadvertently
undermining the responsibility to learn the lessons of our environmental history. (2015, 15)
Minteer’s point is well-taken but I think he is missing Kellert’s. Kellert does
not present Heath Hen replication as a techno-fix that would make atoning for
and reforming long-standing vicious attitudes towards nature unnecessary. What
Kellert sees as an affirmative opportunity for a moral reawakening is what would
happen afterwards: learning to live with Heath Hens. To live with Heath Hens, non-
indigenous islanders would have to develop new virtues of care for this species and
its environment. Virtuous dispositions cannot be created by mental fiat. It takes time
and practice to cultivate new virtues and to express them effectively. Means of iden-
tifying one’s blind spots and positive reinforcement for correcting them are both
important for success. The project of learning to live with Heath Hens might be an
excellent way of going about this. Gaps in community caring would be visible to
all. Backsliding could not be hidden. Success would likewise be visible and a point
of pride for the community, reinforcing their commitment to self-reform. Learning
to live with Heath Hens could indeed be morally, culturally, and indeed spiritually
transformative.
Some fear that such projects will prove morally hazardous by inducing public
apathy towards rising rates of species extinctions from the mistaken belief that
extinctions are always reversible. There is no empirical evidence to support this.
By contrast, there is a great deal of evidence to support worries about the effects on
public attitudes of feeling powerless in the face of large-scale environmental prob-
lems, which include apathy, disengagement, and denial (Moser 2008; Moser and
Dilling 2012). Anthropogenic extinction is this kind of problem. What can I do to
prevent mass extinction? Which alterations in my character or behavior would make
a difference? How could I know if I was succeeding? If the residents of Martha’s
Vineyard were to commit themselves to learning to live with Heath Hens, they would
have concrete answers to these questions. They would have to learn to treat these
birds as fellow residents of the Martha’s Vineyard, entitled, as human residents are,
to respect for their ways of life, fair shares in the natural goods the island affords,
and community support in times of need. Were the communities of Martha’s Vine-
yard to succeed, the Heath Hen would be a source of pride that could sustain them
in other conservation endeavors. Perhaps then, Hough would feel that the gospel of
conservation was finally winning the day on Martha’s Vineyard.
Kellert might be right. Perhaps the best way to find out is to give it try. If the
Heath Hen project has the benefits he suggests, de-extinction could be well worth
the effort. But as we are now in the terrain of forward-looking reasons for replicating
species, I will leave such questions to others.
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28.6 Conclusion
I have argued that that we can have basic duties of restitutive justice to wild animals
and that in some cases, these duties might require us to make reparations for harming
them. The harms for which we can be morally liable are those we could predict
before (and so avoid) or after the fact (and so make reparations). These include the
imposition of states intrinsically bad for any sentient creature, caused by the denial of
basic natural goods essential for life, as revealed by statistical measures of population
trends. If a population is not succeeding in maintaining its numbers over time, and
human practices are responsible, we have a prima facie case that our practices are
causing that population harm. If it turns out that our practices were avoidable and
not excusable in light of other more pressing moral claims, then there is a prima
facie case for judging the harm caused as morally culpable and warranting material
reparations.
As we cannot make material reparations to the dead, we do not owe reparations
directly to extinct animals. We can make reparations to descendants of human and
wild animal populations indirectly harmed by a culpable anthropogenic extinctions,
so we may sometimes have an obligation to do so. In two kinds of cases, our obliga-
tionsmight require employing de-extinction techniques to generate replicas of extinct
species if adequately developed techniques are available: cases in which recreating
a species is the only way to make reparations for harm to another species of wildlife
and cases in which recreating a species is the only way tomake reparations for under-
mining a human culture. In both sorts of cases, duties to recreate extinct species are
owed to the living members of other species, not the extinct species itself.
In only one case in which we could owe it directly to a species itself to ‘bring
it back’. When we are responsible for driving a species into an extinction vortex
for lack of viable reproductive partners, we could in principle owe it to that species
to ‘bring it back’—albeit from extinction’s door rather than extinction proper. In
this rather small subset of cases, the reparations argument for using de-extinction
techniques has real teeth.
Regrettably, the Heath Hen’s extinction falls into none of these categories. No
species on Martha’s Vineyard will become extinct if we do not breed a new variety
of Heath Hen. No human culture will fail. Genetic engineering cannot now rescue
the Heath Hen from extinction. This does not mean that there are no good forward-
looking consequentialist arguments for breeding a new variety of Heath Hen. There
may be many. What it does mean is that we are under absolutely no moral obligation
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of Disenhancement as Applied
to Nonhuman Animals
Adam Shriver
Abstract I criticize the current usage of the terms “enhancement” and “disenhance-
ment” in the debate over the genetic modification of animals and propose an alter-
native definition of these terms based on how modifications affect animals’ welfare
in particular contexts. The critique largely follows a similar criticism of the use of
the term “enhancements” in the human bioethics literature. I first describe how the
term “disenhancement” has been used in debates thus far, and argue that the present
lack of a shared definition is problematic. I then consider some potential defini-
tions of “disenhancement” that can be adapted from the human bioethics literature
and argue that most of these uses are flawed for the purposes of using the term in
current ethical debates. Finally, I elaborate on thewelfarist conception of disenhance-
ment and consider some potential objections, using examples from the literature to
illustrate key points.
29.1 Introduction
Consider the following scenarios from the ethics literature about genetically
modifying animals:
Football Birds: Using gene-editing, chicken DNA is altered so radically that it
results in headless (football-shaped) “birds” that are merely fed nutrients through
tubes and produce edible eggs. The organisms completely lack anything resembling
a brain and are completely insentient (Comstock 2000, 152).
LiveFast,DieYoung: In order to avoid the act of killing livestock, certain animals’
genes are altered such that they die painlessly shortly after reaching adulthood
(McMahan 2008).
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Polled Cattle: Cows are genetically modified to lack horns. This eliminates
the practice of painful dehorning surgery. This could be accomplished via selec-
tive breeding over many decades at great expense, but using genetic technology
dramatically speeds up the process (McConnachie et al. 2019).
Dino-Chickens: Scientists insert DNA into modern chicken eggs to reproduce
their ancient evolutionary ancestors, which happen to resemble dinosaurs because
they possess snouts rather than beaks. The lack of beaks results in decreased welfare
problems from pecking or debeaking (Shriver and McConnachie 2018).
Painless: Pigs are modified to not feel the unpleasantness of pains by eliminating
a particular neurotransmitter in part of their brains. They are still able to reflexively
respond to pains (Shriver 2009).
Blind Chickens: Chickens are modified so that they are blind, which results in
decreased welfare problems from pecking or debeaking (Sandøe et al. 1999; Ali and
Cheng 1985).
Eachof these scenarios raises slightly different ethical issues.But all of the animals
involved would, in contemporary debates, be described by many authors as “disen-
hanced” animals. Use of the term “disenhancements” isn’t intended to settle debates
definitively aboutwhether particular practices are right orwrong.Rather, disenhance-
ments was introduced into the discussion of animal ethics in order to connect these
debates to those in human bioethics about using technologies (genetic, pharmaceu-
tical, bionic) to “enhance” humans by making them smarter, stronger, more loyal,
etc. But just as in the human bioethics debate one might claim that enhancement
can be impermissible or permissible depending upon circumstances, in the debate
about animal ethics, one might believe that a particular modification is a disen-
hancement but nevertheless hold that it is permissible, or perhaps even obligatory
in some circumstances while impermissible in others. Nevertheless, the words we
use are important, and the term disenhancements implies that we are taking some-
thing away that would otherwise be present. For this reason, applying the term to
describe changes to animals carries a strong connotation that such practices ought to
be avoided, all else being equal, at least for those who think that animals’ interests
ought to be taken into consideration.
In what follows, I criticize the current usage of the terms “enhancement” and
“disenhancement” in the debate over the geneticmodification of animals and propose
an alternative definition of the terms based on how modifications affect animals’
welfare in particular contexts. My critique will largely follow a similar criticism of
the use of the term “enhancements” in the human bioethics literature. The strategy
will be as follows: I first describe how the term disenhancement has been used in
debates thus far, and argue that the present lack of a shared definition is problematic.
I then consider some potential definitions of “disenhancement” that can be adapted
from the human bioethics literature and argue that most of these uses are flawed
for the purposes of using the term in ethical discussions. Finally, I elaborate on
the welfarist conception of disenhancement and consider some potential objections,
using the scenarios above to illustrate key points.
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29.2 The “Opposite of Enhancement”
The term disenhancement has become ubiquitous in discussions of gene editing
animals over the past decade, largely popularized by a 2008 article by Paul Thompson
entitled “The opposite of human enhancement” and a series of responses published in
the journalNanoethics. The term has become a useful shorthand for what seems to be
an intuitively graspable concept relating tomodifying an animal by “taking something
away.” Early examples included the idea of breeding blind chickens to reducewelfare
problems that result fromcannibalism in confined quarters, or creating the completely
insentient “football birds” described above. However, there has not been much of
an attempt in the literature to rigorously define the term “disenhancement” as it
applies to animals. Perhaps this is due to authors being largely content to rely on
what they perceive to be a shared folk understanding of enhancement, or perhaps the
assumption is that the term “enhancement” has been sufficiently defined in the human
literature such that disenhancement can simply be characterized as the opposite of
enhancement. However, I will argue that both of these assumptions are flawed.
Regarding reliance on folk conceptions for key ethical terms, we might surmise
that the assumption is that there is sufficient agreement on the reference of the
term “enhancement” among the population or some particular fixed group in the
population such that the term can be used to refer to uncontroversial cases in the
ethics literature. But proceeding without a definition of a key term is generally
speaking contrary to contemporary analytic philosophical practices, and for good
reason. For one thing, it provides no methodology for deciding on controversial
cases. Perhaps technological modifications that simultaneously result in loss of a
function, decreased fitness, and decreased welfare can easily be considered disen-
hancements, but what about mixed cases where different dimensions are varied in
opposite directions (e.g. increased fitness but decreased welfare)? Relying on folk
intuitions about uncontroversial cases leaves us without a good sorting mechanism
for more difficult cases.
Moreover, we should not merely assume widespread agreement even on the cases
philosophers believe are uncontroversial. The experimental philosophy movement,
despite its flaws, has shown fairly conclusively that philosophers often assume that
“the folk” agree on certain concepts or intuitionswithout sufficient evidence. Philoso-
phers’ assumptions about “the folk conception of X” are often mistaken. Moreover,
even if the assumptions are correct for a certain population, there might be cultural,
economic, or gender differences in application. As such, it is risky to base arguments
or claims on unverified assumptions about the folk conception of enhancement in
the absence of empirical research.
And finally, it often turns out that the way the general population uses certain
terms is inconsistent and even incoherent and therefore is not well-suited for use
in philosophical arguments. The general population might for example believe both
that pains are “mental events” and that pains are located in body parts, despite the
fact that these two beliefs cannot be easily reconciled. Similarly, folk conceptions
of something like disenhancement might sometimes link it to evolutionary fitness,
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sometimes to what is “species typical,” and sometimes to welfare, shifting their
reference point in response to different salient features. But clearly these different
conceptions come apart: a given change might result in any combination of increases
or decreases along those dimensions, so a definition that lumps them all together will
not be able to handle cases that diverge along these dimensions.
The upshot of these problems is that (1) we should not assume, in the absence
of empirical evidence, that philosophers can accurately capture the folk definition
of disenhancement in a single definition and (2) that it’s extremely unlikely that the
folk definition, assumed to represent an approximate agreement across the entire
population, will be able to play the role it needs to in a proper philosophical analysis.
To say something meaningful about enhancement in the context of ethical debate,
we need a term that reliably and meaningfully captures a set of shared properties.
This leaves uswith the definitions of enhancement provided in the humanbioethics
literature. However, the situation in the bioethics literature is anything but settled.
Savulescu et al. (2011, 3) write, “Although there is much debate about the ethical
implications of new technologies, only a few authors have attempted to provide an
explicit definition of enhancement.” Moreover, they have pointed out a number of
flaws in the definitions on offer, which led them to propose a welfarist conception of
enhancement.
In making their argument, Savulescu et al. (2011) usefully divide definitions
of enhancements into two categories which they describe as functional enhance-
ments and human enhancements. Functional enhancements refer to enhancements
of particular capacities, capacities such as strength, intelligence, or memory. Thus,
for example, taking certain medications such as Adderall might be a functional
enhancer of attention, and anabolic steroidsmight be functional enhancers of strength
or endurance. But some changes might enhance certain functional capacities while
detracting from more holistic measures of the flourishing of the organism. We can
think of cases where increases in particular capacities actually leads to negative
consequences for the human or animal (Earp et al. 2014). This is why we need
a second category, human enhancement, to capture changes related to the overall
performance of the organism. Examples of this type of enhancement could be the
person’s health or well-being. Savulescu et al. (2011) use “human enhancement” to
describe these changes, but I think differentiating “domain-specific enhancements”
from “holistic enhancements” more accurately captures the relevant difference and
does so in a waywhere the terminology can be easily extended to nonhuman animals.
One seemingly straightforwardway of connecting domain-specific enhancements
to holistic enhancements would be to define the latter as follows: A holistic enhance-
ment is just any instance where an organism has one or more domain-specific
enhancements. Similarly, we could say that a holistic disenhancement is just any
instance where an organism has one or more domain-specific disenhancements.
The problem, however, is that we can imagine cases where the same changes are
enhancements in relation to one domain but disenhancements in regards to a different
domain. Consider, for example, a change that resulted in greater strength but less fine
motor control. Since at the holistic level we presumably don’t want it to be the case
that particular changes are both enhancements and disenhancements simultaneously,
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the move from domain-specific to holistic enhancements won’t serve the purposes
ethicists need in having a clear definition of disenhancement.
Among the holistic definitions of enhancement, there are several possible concep-
tions that can be sussed from the literature. The first is the “not medicine” or “more
than treatment” approach. This approach, coming from a specific history in the
bioethics literature that was preoccupied with questions about over-prescription of
psychiatric medication, defines enhancement as improvements to human form or
functioning that go beyond what is necessary to “sustain or restore good health.”
Thus, on this usage, taking Adderall to counteract attention deficit hyperactivity
disorder is treatment; taking it to study for a test is enhancement. Similarly, using
transcranial direct-current stimulation to treat depression would count as a treatment,
but tDCS to provide relaxation would be enhancement.
One of the challenges of the “more than treatment” approach is the requirement of
coming up with additional definitions for arguably equally contentious ideas such as
“good health” and “disease” (Zohny 2014). And this challenge is exacerbated when
we try to use the definition of enhancement to create a definition of disenhancement.
In the case of defining an enhancement according to performance along one particular
domain, it’s easy to get “results in a decrease in performance along domain X”
as a definition of disenhancement if your definition of enhancement is “results in
an increase in performance along one particular domain.” But if your definition of
enhancement is “increases performance beyondwhat is necessary to sustain or restore
good health,” then additional questions arise. Should disenhancement be regarded
as anything that impairs health back down to average good health, or anything that
drops an organism below good health, both, or something else entirely?
Oneway of answering this complicationwould be to utilize the definition provided
by Sabin and Daniels (1994), which defines enhancement roughly as follows:
Normal species-functioning definition of enhancement: Any change in the biology or
psychology of an organism which increases species typical normal functioning above some
statistically defined level.
Correspondingly, we can define the opposite of enhancement as:
Normal species-functioning definition of disenhancement: Any change in the biology or
psychology of an organism which decreases species typical normal functioning below some
statistically defined level.
Of course, deciding exactly where we set these statistically defined levels raises its
own challenges, but hopefully the idea at least is clear enough for present purposes.
Finally, I will consider two other potential definitions of holistic enhancement.
These types of measures define enhancement and disenhancement in reference to a
single property, but a property that applies to the organism as a whole rather than to a
specific capacity. The property Savulescu et al. (2011) propose in regards to humans,
and that I will be advocating for in regards to nonhuman animals, is well-being or
welfare. They propose the following definition of enhancement:
Welfarist definition of enhancement: Any change in the biology or psychology of an [animal]
which increases the chance of leading a good life in the relevant set of circumstances.
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And thus we can also propose:
Welfarist definition of disenhancement: Any change in the biology or psychology of an
animal which decreases the chance of leading a good life in the relevant set of circumstances.
However, there are other possible candidates which become especially salient when
we think about nonhuman animals. In particular, though we generally don’t think of
evolutionary fitness as a measure for the flourishing of modern humans, this is a term
that is more easily applied to nonhuman animals, particularly for animals living in
the wild, outside of direct human influence. This would look something like this:
Evolutionary fitness definition of disenhancement: Any change in the biology or psychology
of an organism which decreases the organism’s evolutionary fitness.
Thus, for example, taking the “Blind Chicken” example from above, it seems rela-
tively straightforward to see how one might intuitively consider this change a disen-
hancement insofar as it deprives the chickens of a capacity that was important for
their survival in the past.
29.3 Normal Species Functioning and Fitness Are
Irrelevant for Animals Under Human Supervision
Thus far, I’ve argued that we can’t defer to presumed folk intuitions in place of a
definition of disenhancement and also cannot extend the domain-specific definition
of enhancement into a makeshift holistic version. That leaves us with the following
possible contenders for a definition of holistic disenhancement: the normal species-
functioning definition, the welfarist definition, and an evolutionary fitness definition.
In this section, I argue that both the normal species functioning and fitness definitions
are irrelevant for key areas of discussion in the animal ethics literature.
First, consider evolutionary fitness. There is of course considerable debate as to
whether evolutionaryfitness has anyultimate intrinsic normative valuewith, I believe,
most ethicists opposing the idea. However, in circumstances where animals are under
direct human supervision, the notion of fitness seems especially irrelevant. In cases
like the keeping of companion animals, or livestock, or animals put to use for labour,
animals’ health and opportunities for reproduction are almost entirely controlled
by humans. Many traits that would lead to greater ability to survive or reproduce
in wilder environments are irrelevant for animals under the direct supervision (and
control) of humans.
Consider a trait like aggression in animals such as chickens or pigs. In more
naturalistic environments, such a trait obviously would play a role in fighting over
resources or protecting territory. However, in many modern confined feeding opera-
tions these traits aren’t’ helpful: at least inwell-designed systems, the animals are just
as likely (or unlikely, as it were) to survive and have their genes passed on whether
or not they are aggressive. So it would be bizarre to label hyper-aggressive animals
“enhanced” and passive animals “disenhanced” in a confined feeding operation based
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on the fact that these traits might benefit the fitness of their wild counterparts in
particular circumstances.
Wemight, alternatively, think that the traits that enhance fitness are now traits that
make humans more likely to try to pass on the genes of particular animals. In other
words, for livestock, we could describe traits such as passivity, decreased aggression
towards humans, cuteness, fast growth, etc., as “fitness enhancements” since people
may intentionally select for these traits in animals for their own benefit. But this
seems like a distortion of the term; the “Football Chickens,” for example, would
count not only as “not disenhanced” but would in fact be “enhanced animals”, since
humans would likely be all-too-happy to keep these genes in circulation.
Similarly, “normal species functioning” seems like a challenging idea to apply to
the lives of contemporary livestock. First, there’s a question of how “normalcy” is
determined; are we using an average based on what the lives of most current animals
look like, in which case it would be heavily skewed towards the lives of animals
already in confinement for most species used as livestock, or are we using a version
of “normality” linked to what some earlier wild version of the animals would have
looked like?Using the former seems bizarre: imagine trying to define “normal species
functioning” of humans based on averages derived entirely from prison populations.
But the lives of “normal” evolutionary predecessors again seem far removed from
the modern context. Traits that were presumably helpful in flourishing outside of
captivity, such as the ability to detect predators (increased vigilance), fight off rivals
(aggression), and reproduce (high sex drive) can all be plausibly imagined to be
detrimental for the animals in extreme confinement. Does it make any sense to call an
animal modified to have less anxiety in an environment where it will never encounter
a predator or non-human threat a “disenhanced” animal?
Unlike these criteria, the welfarist conception of enhancement and disenhance-
ment is relevant in both relatively natural environments and in manmade and highly
controlled environments. We can talk plausibly about changes that increase or
decrease the welfare of wild animals and of animals in highly artificial environ-
ments. And in both cases we have reason to think that these changes matter morally.
I’ll consider some possible counterexamples below, but I hope it is clear that welfare
continues to matter in artificial environments in a way that the other holistic criteria
do not.
29.4 Elaborating the Welfarist Conception
of Disenhancement and Responding to Objections
As noted above, the welfarist definition of disenhancement is as follows: Any change
in the biology or psychology of an animal which decreases the chance of leading
a good life in the relevant set of circumstances. Before discussing the virtues and
vices of this definition in more detail, it’s worth highlighting a particularly crucial
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component of the definition. Namely, in order to be successful, welfare must be
defined in relation to a particular set of circumstances.
To see why, consider the Polled Cattle example in two different environments. In
both cases, assume that the horns possible role in temperature regulation does not
sufficiently influence welfare (we can assume both environments have consistently
mild weather). However, in one environment, there exists a particular type of parasite
that is completely absent in the other environment. The horns both of the animals
themselves and of conspecifics are remarkably effective at limiting the pervasive-
ness of this parasite, which in turn prevents unpleasant itching sensation and possible
infections from wounds. In such cases, would we consider using genetic technology
to create a polled variant of cattle to be an example of disenhancement? It seems clear
that taking away horns can count as a disenhancement in the parasite environment,
since the change would result in decreased welfare, but not in the parasite-free envi-
ronment, since the changewould there bewelfare-neutral. It is a virtue of thewelfarist
conception that it can capture this divergence. As such, the welfarist definition of
disenhancement is necessarily tied to particular sorts of circumstances.
Returning to the examples from the beginning can help illustrate some of the
features of how the welfarist conception works. The Football Birds, contrary to
current usage, would not count as “disenhanced” animals on thewelfarist conception.
But they also would not be “enhanced.” Since they have no welfare at all, these terms
do not apply to them. For almost all of the other cases, the answer as to whether or
not they are enhanced or disenhanced is “it depends.” Is the lack of an ability to
feel pain an enhancement or disenhancement? It depends on whether the animal is
in circumstances where avoiding certain normally pain-inducing features can help
prevent further states of negative welfare. If they simply don’t feel pain in some
situations but don’t suffer any further negative consequences as a result, this would
count as an enhancement on the welfarist view.
Even the Live Fast Die Young example wouldn’t necessarily be considered a
disenhancement on this account. If the animalswere living lives thatwere, on balance,
full of positivewell-being, then causing them to die earlywould be a disenhancement.
However, if their liveswere unhappy or evenwelfare neutral, then dying youngwould
not be a “disenhancement.”
I’m sure there is disagreement about whether it truly makes sense to call a pain-
free or short-lived animal “enhanced.” But hopefully it is reasonably close enough to
common usage, or at least easy enough to fit to modern usage with some argumenta-
tion and clarification.Nevertheless, there are some additionally fairly counterintuitive
implications of the welfarist view that need to be acknowledged, and these come out
in some of the potential objections to welfarist views. One objection is that welfarist
definitions make enhancement and disenhancement too ubiquitous, as they seem to
apply to an extremely wide class of changes. Taking antibiotics to treat a disease?
That meets the welfarist definition of enhancement. Breaking a leg in a fight? Disen-
hancement. Even, say, exercising to improve physical fitness could be regarded as
a form of enhancement. The terms would no longer pick out only a very small and
specific type of proposed changes to animals but would instead refer to a wide class
of changes.
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But this is a problem only if the original usage was picking out changes that are
genuinely qualitatively different from those in the expansive definition and which
thereby need to be treated separately. As Zohny 2014 has detailed, many different
ideas have been proposed to distinguish enhancements from “natural changes,” such
as suggesting that the latter require more work or concentration, but none of the
suggestions put forward thus far ultimately hold up against scrutiny. In any event, it
remains for proponents of other uses of enhancement to suggest why other types of
changes should be regarded as qualitatively different from changes that are brought
about through drugs, neurointerventions, or genetic modification, and this would
require a more thorough attempt at providing a clear definition.
Another potential criticism considered in the human bioethics literature is that
using a welfarist conception of “disenhancement” prematurely settles the moral
debate. By linking enhancement with improvement to well-being and disenhance-
ment to decreased well-being, the terminology is such that all enhancements are
regarded as permissible and all disenchantments as impermissible.
While it certainly seems true that using the welfarist definition would establish,
for many, a presumption in favour of enhancement and against disenhancement, the
new terminology in no way should be seen as settling the question of whether a given
disenhancement is permissible or not. There might be some enhancements that cause
harm to others or to the natural environment, that reflect badly on our character, or that
make us complicit in regards to an unjust practice. In all such cases, changes might
be deemed “enhancements” but nevertheless considered morally wrong. Similarly,
there may be cases where a particular “disenhancement” is dramatically outweighed
by other benefits that result, such as a case where a particular change is very good for
the environment but results in mild decrease in welfare. The term disenhancement
has a negative connotation; however, unlike alternative definitions including current
usage, the welfarist definition of disenhancement has connotations that actually
track something of (dis)value in a way that provides a useful, though not definitive,
assessment.
One final criticism from debates in the human bioethics literature I will consider
is that this definition of disenhancement is too dependent upon contested notions
of well-being. The philosophy literature has numerous competing accounts of well-
being, generally grouped into hedonistic, desire fulfilment, and objective list theories.
How can we apply a welfarist definition to enhancement if we haven’t reached agree-
ment among philosophers as towhich theory is preferable?AsZohny (2014) says, the
differences between these views can be exaggerated…often certain changes count as
obvious increases or losses to welfare on any of the types of theories. But, perhaps
even more clearly in the case of animals than with humans (where other consid-
erations such as autonomy, rights, or justice are often centred in moral debates),
challenges with evaluating welfare in animals will inevitably need to be addressed
in a thorough moral debate. Assessing welfare will always be a crucial part of eval-
uating the morality of policies and practices that involve animals; as such, avoiding
questions about characterizing well-being in regards to enhancement simply pushes
those questions to a different stage of the debate. In other words, deciding upon the
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best conception of welfare is certainly challenging, but the difficultly doesn’t allow
us to avoid the questions when aiming for the best actions.
29.5 Agency and Disenhancement
Mydiscussion thus far has been largely consequentialist, focusing on particular states
of the altered animals as the only relevant possible criteria for definitions of enhance-
ment and disenhancement. However, considering an agency-centred approach raises
additional questions.1 First, one might suggest that particular technological changes
can impair or improve the agency of the altered animals and that these changes are
relevant to whether the changes count as enhancements or disenhancements. For
example: creating “football birds” deprives organisms of any ability to make deci-
sions or to choose to interact with the environment in particular ways, and we may
think that in losing those things the chickens have lost something of value.
However, even if one believes this is an important consideration, onmany accounts
this notion of agency can simply be incorporated into the notion of welfare at stake.
One can claim that it is good for an organism to have agency, and that decreasing
agency thereby lowers welfare and hence can count as a disenhancement, all things
being equal. A crude way of making this argument might simply state that having
agency feels good. Other views hold that agency can contribute to well-being inde-
pendently of how it makes one feel. But the important thing, for my purposes, is that
the value of agency can still be included in a welfarist conception of disenhance-
ment. It is true that some may hold that depriving animals of agency is bad even if
doing so is not bad for the animals, but these views can be classified as instances of
impermissible enhancements without jeopardizing the utility of a welfarist definition
of the term.
A very different sort of agent-centred concern has to do not with the agency of
the altered animal, but of the individual or group doing the altering. On this type of
account, what matters are the intentions behind the changes; if one intends to benefit
an organism in a particular way, then we call it an enhancement. On the other hand, if
the intentions behind a particular change, like the Dino-Chicken, are simply to save
expenses and increase the efficiency of an operation, it might seem strange to call
it an “enhancement” simply because it happened to improve welfare by accident.
Surely we shouldn’t reward exploitative practices that have no concern for animals
by calling them “enhancements” simply because they had unintended benefits!
Though such an approach has a certain intuitive appeal, there are simply too
many complications with relying on presumed motivations to determine whether
changes count as enhancements or disenhancements. First, people are notoriously
bad at determining the motivations of others, and political allegiances would likely
play a large role in determining whether or not the stated intentions of a particular
change are believed. But even putting aside the possibility of dishonest statements of
1The following discussion is based on helpful suggestions from Christopher Preston.
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intentions, people are also notoriously bad at identifying even our own motivations
for particular actions and have a strong tendency to create self-serving narratives.
As such, relying on the intent of technological changes rather than the actual effect
would be epistemologically infeasible and could also lend itself to distortion through
self-serving motivations. And finally, though wemight imagine an intention-focused
criteria allowing for cases of enhancement by those trying to improve the lives of
animals, it seems extremely unlikely that anything would count as a disenhancement
if it were required that the change was made with the intention of depriving an
organism of some beneficial capacity. Any negative changes are most likely to be
side-effects of attempts to increase profit, or benefit human health, etc. and so relying
on the primary intention to determine the definition would mean that almost no
proposed changes would count as disenhancements.
29.6 Conclusion: Why a Welfarist Account?
As technology advances, humans are increasingly proposing modifications to
nonhuman animals. This is perhaps most prevalent in the realm of agriculture, but
proposals have also been made to use genetic technology to stop disease-carrying
species from reproducing or to alter the balance of specific ecosystems. And if past
behaviour is any guide, humans unfortunately are likely to also attempt to use tech-
nology to change companion animals or to design new roles for altered animals in
military engagements. Ethical debates about such uses of animals are at an early
stage, and have not yet caught up to the technological possibilities. But in order to
have a robust debate, it is important that key terms are clearly defined.
The term disenhancement has been increasingly used to describe potential modi-
fications of nonhuman animals across a range of contexts. However, the term has not
been clearly defined and the corresponding human bioethics literature has also strug-
gled to come up with a widely accepted definition of enhancement. Given that we
need a clear definition in order to properly frame and discuss philosophical debates
about human interactions with animals, I have attempted to outline a case for using
a welfarist definition of enhancement. This choice of terminology, of course, does
not settle any ethical debates, but it does imply that some cases such as creating
animals incapable of suffering might be better regarded as enhancement rather than
disenhancement.
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Chapter 30
How to Save Cultured Meat
from Ecomodernism? Selective Attention
and the Art of Dealing with Ambivalence
Cor van der Weele
Abstract As a highly technological innovation, cultured meat is the subject of
techno-optimistic as well as techno-sceptical evaluations. The chapter discusses this
opposition and connects it with arguments about seeing the world in the right way.
Both sides not only call upon us to see the world in a very particular light, but also
point to mechanisms of selective attention in order to explain how others can be so
biased. I will argue that attention mechanisms are indeed relevant for dealing with
the Anthropocene, but that dualism has paralysing effects. In a dualistic framework,
cultured meat is associated with ecomodernist optimism, bold technological control
over nature and alienation from animals. But interested citizens and farmers in focus
groups rather envisioned the future of cultured meat through small scale production
on farms combined with intensive relations with animals. Such scenarios, involving
elements from both sides of the dualistic gap, depend on constructive ways of dealing
with dualisms and ambivalence.
30.1 Intro: Wizards and Prophets
We need to eat less meat. Although the urgency is growing, the call is not new. One
starting point is Ruth Harrison, who published Animal machines (1964) in protest
against the thenupcoming factory farming.A fewyears later, inDiet for a small planet
(1971), Frances Moore Lappé stressed how inefficient meat is for feeding the world.
The book is full of recipes illustrating how the combination of pulses and grains is a
wholesome alternative for meat. Yet beans and lentils did not take over the world. On
the contrary: global meat consumption kept rising, global pulse consumption kept
falling, andplant-basedmeat-imitations did not take off either; consumers found them
too different from meat (Hoek 2010). This is why the idea of cultured meat—an idea
that had been lingering in the sidewings ever since tissue culturing technology came
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up in the beginning of the twentieth century—could suddenly look so promising
when it was rediscovered around the turn of the century. It was going to be made of
animal cells, it would (‘really’) be meat but without its downsides. This might finally
help.
As a highly technological option, cultured meat was an immediate subject for
discussions on the pros and cons of technofixes.1 Will this technology open up new
directions of socio-technical change (Driessen and Korthals 2012), or is it rather a
narrowly framed pseudo-solution that distracts from the need for fundamental shifts
in our lifestyles? While quite a few animal protection organizations, after some hesi-
tation, pragmatically embraced it as a more hopeful strategy for improving the fate
of animals than raising public awareness,2 others, including many who campaigned
for more natural food, were skeptical. Simon Fairlie was one of them. He not only
criticized the technological character of cultured meat but also how this fitted in with
vegan perspectives bound to further alienate us from nature. In his book Meat, a
benign extravagance (2010), Fairlie starts out by rejecting the view that veganism is
the best ethical response to the problems of meat. Environmentally speaking, eating
small amounts of meat is actually more sustainable than eating no meat at all, he
argued, because some of our resources (some types of grassland, some forms of
waste), are best used by raising animals (in animal-friendly ways).3 So the vegan
solution is simplistic, but apart from that it will lead us to artificial food and estrange-
ment from nature. While the organic sector is campaigning for “slow food, real meat
and fresh local produce”, he wrote, vegans and vegetarians are pointing in “the oppo-
site direction”, namely of *factory food, and cultured meat lies at the end of that road
(Fairlie 2010, 228). In his view, this technological enthusiasm additionally includes
attempts to genetically engineer factory-farmed livestock without the capacity to
suffer. In fact, he suspects, we might be seeing the first signs of “a convergence of
interests between factory farming, veganism and genetic engineering” which will
lead us to the “brave new world of transhumanists”. Against the dominant trends of
urbanization, Fairlie argues for ruralization, for small scale human settlements and
1Including skepticism about unrealistic expectations raised by technologists. However, cultured
meatwas atypical in this respect. The enthusiasmwasmore amatter of ethical pull than of technology
push.At a timewhen no researcherswere asking formoney (there had been aNASAproject focusing
on goldfish, but it was terminated), the first lobby organization for cultured meat, New Harvest, was
founded by the American student Jason Matheny. He had been so shocked by the industrial chicken
breeding he had witnessed that he decided something must be done and that cultured meat—he
read about the NASA project—looked like a promising idea. When visiting the Netherlands, he
met with protein researchers, with the Minister of agriculture and with businessman and long term
cultured meat promotor Willem van Eelen. Cultured meat research in the Netherlands began with
the funding of three PhD projects. See https://www.new-harvest.org/about.
2The American organization PETA, for example, discussed whether or not an organization that
included many vegans should support something that made use of animal cells. The outcome was
that PETA embraced cultured meat as the most promising quick road to a better future for animals
and announced a $1 million prize to the first laboratory to create commercially viable test-tube
chicken.
3This view has been corroborated by more recent research at Wageningen University. See e.g. Van
Kernebeek et al. (2016), Van Zanten et al. (2018).
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permaculture, with people living closer to nature and closer to the sources of their
food.
Fairlie’s way of picturing a diametrical opposition between rural sustainable
farming and urban estrangement from nature has been affirmed and strengthened
by later discussions, especially since the appearance of the Ecomodernist Manifesto
(Asafu-Adjaye et al. 2015). This manifesto stated that many human activities need to
be intensified with the help of technology, in order to “decouple” human well-being
from environmental destruction. Ecomodernism comes with a plea for urbanization,
under the assumption that this is more sustainable: “cities both drive and symbolize
the decoupling of humanity from nature.” When Chris Smaje responded on the
website of Dark Mountain, a movement with a somewhat older manifesto of its own
to which I will return, he concludes that the ecomodernist decoupling of human well-
being from natural impacts also implies a physical decoupling of people from nature.
In his summary: “to us the city and the minimum amount of farmland necessary to
support it, to the rest of creation the wilderness” (Smaje 2015). He could not disagree
more.
Does this debate have a deep or essential core? Charles Mann’s recent anal-
ysis certainly suggests so. Under the title The Wizard and the Prophet (2018),
he focuses on the opposition between “techno-optimist” Norman Borlaug, a hero
of eco-modernists who believed in human ingenuity for solving all problems, and
“green luddite” or “catastrophic environmentalist” William Vogt, who believed in
living more sustainable lives and eating lower down the food chain. Mann describes
how Borlaug’s path leads to urbanization and labor-extensive industrialized farming,
while the prophets strive for small scale labor-intensive agriculture that takes care
of the earth and the soil. In Mann’s analysis, they appear as fundamentally and
unchangeably different views of how to deal with the future of our planet. So perhaps
it need not surprise that they now also serve as opposing perspectives on climate
change and the Anthropocene: technology versus lifestyle as the way forward.
This dualism clearly comes with an emphasis on opposed strategies in agricul-
tural thinking and research, while detracting from examples that might undermine
the divide, such as the use of GPS and drones in organic arable farming, or the use of
milking robots in nature-oriented animal farming. Below, I will explore how cultured
meat could strategically be developed in a way that undermines rather than rein-
forces the seemingly cast-in-stone dichotomy between techno-optimists and green
luddites. But let me first focus on one additional aspect of the dualism, namely how
both sides call upon us to pay attention to the world in very specific ways. While
wizards/ecomodernists encourage us to see hopeful developments all around and a
bright future on thehorizon, their prophet-opponents,withDarkMountaineers promi-
nently among them, want us to open our eyes to the things that go wrong and that
will lead to inevitable collapse. Both sides regard their own way of seeing the world
as an accomplishment that takes effort and courage, and both point to mechanisms
of selective attention that explain why others have such a biased perspective.
Arguments about selective attention and perception are prominent in both camps.
Directing the spotlight on this difference will first seem to enlarge the gap, but it will
548 C. van der Weele
then also afford leads for dealing with it differently, namely by taking a closer look
at attention mechanisms and how to deal with them in more constructive ways.
30.2 Selective Attention
Ecomodernists propose that if human wellbeing is decoupled from environ-
mental impacts, technology—with a focus on energy technology—will keep human
consumption going: “meaningful climate mitigation is fundamentally a technolog-
ical challenge” (Asafu-Adjaye et al. 2015). We can live in the cities, decrease the
burden on environments and regreen the earth by such processes as urbanization,
agricultural intensification, genetic engineering, nuclear power and desalination; as
the examples show, they derive hope from the prospect of bold frontier technologies.
They explicitly embrace an optimistic view towards the future,which received a boost
by what is now called the “new optimist” movement, with authors such as Pinker,
Norberg, Ridley and Roser (Nisbet 2018). New optimists, including the ecomod-
ernists, have been inspired by Hans Rosling, whose 2006-TED talk The best stats
you’ve ever seen has been designated as the birth of the new optimism (Burkeman
2017). Rosling devoted the last part of his life to making facts about global improve-
ment more accessible through a form of visual statistics calledGapminder. The book
that appeared in 2018, after his death, is titled Factfulness; ten reasons why you are
wrong about the world and why things are better than you think. It explains that
we tend to severely underestimate for example how many children in the world are
vaccinated or howmany years of school education girls on average receive, globally.
The book discusses ten ‘instincts’ that explain why our view of the world tends to be
far too pessimistic. Several of them are closely related to the character of the news,
with its strong focus on what goes wrong. This selective focus can be explained by
seeing how we have evolved as beings who need to be on the lookout for things that
threaten us. Things that are going well or that slowly become better are not news-
worthy, while in reality many things go well or are slowly but steadily getting better.
Slow change is hard to see at any specific moment. Yet time makes it visible: our
world is completely different form that of our grandparents.
The world also faces real threats, Rosling acknowledges. Climate change is one
and we need to be deeply concerned. But it won’t help to focus on worst case
scenarios; we need to quickly move on from fear and endless talking and use that
energy to solve the problem. “So,what’s the solution?Well it’s easy. Anyone emitting
lots of greenhouse gas must stop doing that as soon as possible.” (Rosling 2018,
231). He adds that although the planet’s common resources can only be governed by
a globally respected authority (the United Nations), it can be done: we already did it
with ozone depletion and with lead in gasoline (ibid., 239).
His overall advice is not to count on journalists for a good view of the world, since
they are caught in the attention-grabbing drama business. Rather than burdening them
with unrealistic expectations, let us realize that the news fits in with our evolved habit
to automatically look for threats, and that it is simplynot very useful for understanding
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the world. Instead, we’d better learn to attend to the facts. This is also what optimists
inspired by Hans Rosling hope to teach us: evolution has not built us to pay attention
to what goes well or is slowly improving, but we can train ourselves to embrace
a fact-based worldview. When it comes to climate change, ecomodernists and new
optimists add that the development of helpful technology is not inevitable; it will
require effort, as the ecomodernist manifesto states, from both states and the private
sector.
While ecomodernists tend to see optimism as amoral duty, its opposite is now also
propagated as the most responsible way forward; let me turn to this very different
view of the world.
Climate change can be described as a super wicked problem (Levin et al. 2012),
since time is running out, many parties still have an interest in the status quo and
there is no central authority for effective interference. Now that climate change is
increasingly experienced as a reality, emotions such as fear, grief and despair are on
the rise. Apart from being psychological phenomena, pessimism and depression have
also become starting points of new forms of activism, for example by environmental
activists and journalists Paul Kingsnorth and Dougald Hine, who lost belief in effec-
tive change and together founded the Dark Mountain project. The name is derived
from a line by Robinson Jeffers (1887–1962), a Californian poet who withdrew from
civilization in order to seek harmony with nature.
The Dark Mountain Manifesto (Kingsnorth and Hine 2009) starts by explaining
that all civilizations must go under, and that this is hard to see or predict from the
inside, since “the pattern of ordinary life, in which so much stays the same from one
day to the next, disguises the fragility of its fabric”. Civilizations are held together
by belief. But once such belief starts to crumble, collapse may become unstoppable.
The dark mountaineers have given up belief in our civilization. They see what
they say most of us are “unable to see”—since we have all been trained not to pay
attention to basic things about our civilization: “its fundamental destructive features”:
its myths of progress, of human centrality and of our separation from nature. The
problem is not one of outright and explicit denial. Yes there are some remaining
climate skeptics, but focusing on them distracts from a far larger and more important
form of denial, which is about the emotional inability to really connect to what we
know about ecological unravelling and to take it seriously. “Ecological and economic
collapse unfold before us and, if we acknowledge them at all, we act as if this were
a temporary problem, a technical glitch.”
Yet these uncanny signs are not technical glitches, but inherent to our civilization.
In order to find responses—for when the world as we know it no longer exists—the
writers think that science and technology are not going to be helpful and neither are
politics, ideology or activism. What we need instead is art. They are especially inter-
ested in new storytelling in the genre ofUncivilized writing. Such writing attempts to
shift our worldview and find a position outside the bubble of civilization, a position
at which we can carefully pay attention to the nonhuman world and re-engage with
it, grounded in a sense of place and time.
Dark mountaineers try to teach us that because we cling to the false safety of our
belief in day-to-day existence in a civilization that is built on destructive attitudes
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to nature, we are heading for collapse. The courage we need is to really look the
painful facts in the face, accept grief and despair, and from there on search for new
beginnings.
In the next section I will go into somewhat more detail into the mechanisms of
selective attention sketched by both sides of the dualism. While such mechanisms
are real, they are just a small subset of potentially relevant mechanisms. Dualistic
framing is itself an attention mechanism, and in the paragraph after the next I will
focus on its power and some of its dangers. My overall suggestion is that we need
more awareness of attention mechanisms in general and of their pitfalls, in order to
find ways of dealing with them more imaginatively.
30.3 How Daily Life Blinds Us in Different Ways
My experience is what I agree to attend to, William James famously said. Though
such ‘agreement’ will often not be conscious, the implications that attention is neces-
sarily selective and that it determines how we experience the world seem right. Both
ecomodernists and dark mountaineers argue that the seemingly self-evident nature of
daily life blinds us to what is really going on. Ecomodernists think that because we
have evolved to selectively attend to what goes wrong, we fail to see how good our
daily life really is. DarkMountaineers think that because of our emotional rootedness
in our seemingly safe routines we fail to see their fragility as well as their destructive
externalities. Daily life is apparently able to blind us in different ways: it makes us
neglect slow changes in the good direction, it also makes us resist unwelcome facts.
Both types of bias have also been noted by philosophers and social scientists
studying patterns of attention, though typically in less absolutist ways. Analyses of
the selective focus of the news and the media tend to note similar things as Rosling:
the news, depending as it is on triggering our attention, is a biased way of learning
about what happens in the world (e.g. Wijnberg 2018; De Botton 2014). News tends
to focus on incidents, while it is generally silent on what goes well or what is slowly
changing, because that is not newsworthy. What the optimistic account seems to
miss, meanwhile, is that slow change can also be for the worse.
The type of neglect observed by Dark Mountain too is the object of study and
reflection, and increasingly so in the context of climate change. In the book Living
in denial; climate change, emotions and everyday life, Kari Norgaard (2011) called
attention to mechanisms of everyday denial. She sets out noting that the idea that we
would respond more adequately to climate change ‘if only we knew’ (the idea that
knowing the facts will make us act rightly) cannot explain the finding that people’s
interest may decline as more information becomes available; people have been found
to stop paying attention to climate changewhen they realized there is no easy solution
(Norgaard 2011, 2). Not paying attention is different from climate skepticism in that
it is not a denial of climate change as such but a way to protect daily life, in a situation
in which we feel powerless or confused, by avoiding the issue. The book documents
the social organization of such protection mechanisms in Norway. Information is not
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the key variable; emotions of helplessness and guilt are key, and they estrange us
from the realities of our lives, argues Norgaard. Getting or remaining in touch with
such disturbing realities is a real struggle.
Similar analyses abound. It has amply been documented howcognitive dissonance
leads to coping mechanisms in which people adapt their beliefs, for example about
the cognitive abilities of the animals they eat (Bastian et al. 2012). I have beenwriting
about a related way of evasive coping in the context of meat consumption, ‘strategic
ignorance’: not wanting to know too much about meat and the way it is produced
in order to avoid awkward choices. Strategic ignorance has long been confused with
indifference, because on the level of behavior it looks the same. However, strategic
ignorance is in fact based on ambivalence rather than indifference (Onwezen and
Van der Weele 2016); it is a mechanism of coping with the psychological unrest and
indecisiveness of great tensions. In a psychoanalytically inspired study of climate
apathy, Renée Lertzman (2015) likewise challenges the view that apathy and denial
typically result from a lack of concern; instead of a lack, she observes a surplus
of concern or affect. In her interviews in the vicinity of an industry that was both
good for employment and disastrous for the environment, she encountered much
ambivalence (both love and hate) towards this industry. Suppression of the hate-
aspect led to unresolved mourning and apathy. These findings evidently have much
in common with what Dark Mountaineers describe.
Such studies confirm that phenomena of selective attention that ecomodernist
wizards and dark prophets talk about are real and troubling. We tend to ignore slow
and unspectacular progress because of our habitual dependence on the news.We tend
to ignore things that go wrong when they are too emotionally uncomfortable. And
daily life gives rise to more mechanisms of selective attention, partly intertwined
with the ones just discussed. Not only the news, but habits and routines too blind us
to the conditions of normal life; we tend to only pause and reflect, often reluctantly,
when things go wrong, disappear or otherwise change. From Plato onward, waking
up in wonder to our self-evidences has been seen as the beginning of philosophy.
But what do we see when we wake up and reflect—may we perhaps be unhealthily
attracted to dualism?
30.4 Dualisms as Paralyzing Attention Tools
Apart from being aworld-makingmechanism, attention has also become a scarce and
valuable commodity in our age of social acceleration and exploding digital informa-
tion. Business models in the attention economy, centring on harvesting our attention
and then selling it, are not only extremely profitable, they have also increasingly been
criticized as turning customers at least partly into products. In his book The atten-
tion merchants, Tim Wu (2016) traces this business model back to the nineteenth
century, when newspapers started to make money by selling their readers’ attention
to advertisers. He also notes that since the model completely depends on gaining and
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holding attention, it strongly encourages extreme content, as this is likely to engage
‘automatic’ attention.
Even though ‘dichotomous thinking’ is known as a personality disorder,
presenting the availabilities as two options that look like polar opposites is in
fact an eternally tempting model of thought, which creates order in a simple way.
Think of black and white, all or nothing, hate or love, nature versus nurture, male
and female, technological solutions versus lifestyle solutions or optimism versus
pessimism—dualistic and polarizing ways of thinking are forceful tools of attracting
and selectively framing attention and creating meaning and order.
Dualism has also been discovered as an attention mechanism by tech compa-
nies. Roger McNamee (2019) has documented how the battle for attention put tech
companies in Silicon valley on that track; extreme views have been discovered and
strategically used as attention capturing devices, as they stir emotion and keep people
engaged. They are part of what Tim Harris (2019) calls the ‘extractive attention
economy’. Worrisome levels of polarization result from this race to the bottom.
Because selective attention creates our realities, attention tools deserve philosoph-
ical as well as psychological scrutiny. This has become more urgent in the era of the
attention economy, with tech companies putting much effort in manipulating our
attention. ‘When tech knows you better than you know yourself’ (Thompson 2018),
the challenge is to understand and face what makes us so vulnerable. The Anthro-
pocene and its debates likewise illustrate the urgency of becoming acquainted with
attention mechanisms, including the role played by emotions and dualistic distinc-
tions. How we are being misled by the news, how people are prone to resist painful
subjects by avoiding them if they can, how emerging patterns of attention are socially
organized, or how dualisms encourage us to think that we should choose between
tech solutions and lifestyle changes or between pessimism and optimism.
This takes us back to the dualism that towers over environmental and Anthro-
pocene debates as described byCharlesMann. How canwe choose between the poles
of such dualisms? Mann himself illustrates how hard this is, saying that he oscillates
between the stances: “On Monday, Wednesday and Friday I think Vogt was correct,
On Tuesday, Thursday and Saturday, I go for Borlaug. And on Sunday, I don’t know.”
(Mann 2018, 13). Mann’s wavering ambivalence seems to lead to a kind of paralysis,
quite comparable to the proverbial indecisiveness of Buridan’s ass—the donkey that
dies from hunger and thirst between a pile of hay and a pail of water, because it is
equally hungry and thirsty and cannot choose between the two. Ambivalence noto-
riously undermines our ability to choose and it perhaps need not surprise that it has
received a bad press in both philosophy and psychology. Psychologically, ambiva-
lence is often extremely uncomfortable. In philosophy, Harry Frankfurt (1988) has
influentially argued that ambivalence stands in the way of being a wholehearted and
free person. This perhaps helps to explain why Mann thinks that in the end we will
have to answer the question who is right, wizard or prophet; “our children will have
to answer it” (Mann 2018, 9).
Yet ambivalence is a normal and ubiquitous aspect of life, especially in times
of change. From this perspective, we might need better options to deal with it than
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making a forced choice, being stuck in paralysis or trying to avoid the subject alto-
gether (Rorty 2009; Razinsky 2017; Van der Weele and Driessen 2019). One impor-
tant starting point formore constructive attitudes towards ambivalence is that the need
to make an either-or choice between precisely two (opposed) options may actually
be a very rare phenomenon. Take optimism and pessimism, for example: we can be
partly or moderately optimistic or pessimistic, alternately pessimistic and optimistic,
or perhaps live with being ambivalently optimistic and pessimistic at the same time.
In the final paragraph, I will now return to meat and cultured meat. Both abundantly
give rise to ambivalence, and I will argue that constructive skills for dealing with
ambivalence can help to avoid dichotomous stalemates and find more constructive
solutions.
30.5 Cultured Meat and the Pig in the Backyard
In dichotomic terms, cultured meat seems to clearly belong to the wizard or ecomod-
ernism pole, as has indeed been argued repeatedly. Fairlie’s book, in which cultured
meat is portrayed as an urban technological strategy that will estrange us from nature,
already did so avant la lettre, and similar analyses abound. Wyatt Galusky (2014,
945) writes that cultured meat as a technological solution will lead to the disappear-
ance and invisibility of the animal, and that “rather than confront the ethical questions
of engaging animals and humans and ecologies in the context of meat, we turn those
questions into engineering ones.” Valan Anthos (2018) explicitly associates cultured
meat with ecomodernism; it does not focus on lifestyle change but on its alterna-
tive: fulfilling the demand for meat, with the aim of technologically decoupling meat
from its harmful consequences.” They do not like this alternative. Modern industrial
farming already exemplifies an approach in which our relations to the nonhuman
world are viewed in terms of control, efficiency and usefulness, according to both
Galusky and Anthos. Cultured meat obeys to the same logic, exerting even deeper
control over nonhuman nature, even fostering the unhealthy illusion of total control
over a nonhuman world. Our relations with animals, which should be “on the fore-
front of our confrontations with meat” (Anthos 2018, 46), meanwhile fade into the
background: cultured meat sidesteps crucial underlying questions about our rela-
tions to animals, because there no longer is any relation with animals to consider.
The assumption, clearly, is that culturedmeatwillmake human relationswith animals
disappear. And this, Fairlie could have added, is precisely the wrongheaded aim of
many vegans.
Most people probably prefer better relations with animals to the absence of
animals, and will find this prospect scary. But is it indeed the only or the most plau-
sible prospect? This suggestion depends on picturing cultured meat in the framework
of the dualism of technological control-cum-alienation versus lifestyle changes; we
have either technology to replace animals or moral reflection on our relations with
animals, not both. Already in 2008, Hopkins and Dacey responded to such dichoto-
mous thinking in a paper on the ethics of culturedmeat, noticing not only that cultured
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meat is informed by moral considerations, but also that technology and morality do
not represent separate but interactive roads to change. They speculated that cultured
meat may change our relations with animals so that “people in the future find eating
meat from living animals unbearably barbaric” (Hopkins and Dacey 2008, 589).
The question also rises whether this dichotomic way of thinking produces the
only or most plausible scenario for cultured meat. It is certainly not the only one, as
a very different scenario has been emerging within my own research, at least partly
in response to fears of alienation. In that scenario, our relations with animals do not
disappear, on the contrary: cultured meat finally enables us to develop loving rela-
tions with the animals we eat. Through focus groups, Clemens Driessen and I have
been exploring responses to cultured meat and its relations with meat (Van derWeele
and Driessen 2013, 2019). We always found much ambivalence, both about cultured
meat and aboutmeat. The remark that culturedmeat is unnatural, for example, always
made someone else wonder how natural our ordinarymeat actually is—from animals
kept in confinement, and/or containing added water, preservatives, antibiotics etc.
Both factory farmed meat and cultured meat were in fact associated with unnatural-
ness, technology, and alienation from our food. But concerning cultured meat, such
downsides vanished completely with a scenario that spontaneously emerged from
one discussion and that we termed ‘the pig in the backyard’. Participants who had
started out being quite hesitant about the idea of cultured meat at some point started
to envision its production through a local and small scale industry: cells from free
ranging pigs, in backyards or urban farms, would be taken through biopsies every
now and then and cultured intomeat in neighborhood factories. The idea immediately
warmed the participants to cultured meat. The scenario integrated ideas of local and
urban food production, good relations with (farm) animals, and a neighborhood scale
combination of production and consumption. The idea of cultured meat being unnat-
ural, alienating or too technological had vanished completely; in fact, this scenario
seemed almost too good to be true (Van der Weele and Driessen 2013).
In later groups, this scenario was welcomed as very sympathetic (“in this way you
can experience the animal as a living being and love it”) but also often as more or
less implausible, unrealistic, and going against rules and regulations (Van der Weele
and Driessen 2019). Perhaps, some participants wondered, doing it on small farms
instead of backyards would already be somewhat more realistic.
In a follow up project, this idea of small scale cultured meat production on farms
has taken the form of the question whether cultured meat might perhaps be an oppor-
tunity, instead of a mere threat, for farmers. In the first part of this project, we
held focus groups with farmers. The project is still ongoing, but some results already
emerged beforehand, for example about the interest of farmers for this subject. Many
farmerswere skeptical, so that it was not easy to find enough participants for the focus
groups. But there were also a few farmers who were eager not just to participate but
to be involved in cultured meat production as soon as possible. Apart from a chance
of contributing to circular agriculture, these farmers saw cultured meat as an oppor-
tunity to foster new and better connections with consumers, with animals, and with
society in general. The combination that attracts them is keeping free-range animals,
producing local kinds of cultured meat and invite consumers to come and visit. A
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few of them did not wait for the outcomes of the project to already take further
initiatives by seeking connections with start-up companies and find out more about
technological possibilities.
It remains to be seen what comes of famer-scale cultured meat production. The
important point for this chapter is that the activities in this direction do not conform
to the either-or schema that dominates so many discussions. Envision a farm with
relatively small (e.g. 2000 L) cultured meat bioreactors. It might be a farm that keeps
animals of special breeds in free-range conditions. While the animals live their good
lives, biopsies are taken from them now and then, to make cultured meat that is then
branded as a specialty from this farm and/or from these special breed animals. Other
activities on the farm might include elements from a wide range of other options,
varying from very technological (milking robots, scanning drones) to very traditional
(a small shop, care activities) or new and experimental (a food forest, recycling dung,
pixel farming).4
Such activities are neither purely ecomodernist nor the opposite, and possible
attempts to ‘disambiguate’ (Chiles 2013) and reinterpret them in terms of pure posi-
tions seem to be beside the point. Rather, the pure positions themselves have to
give way to activities which—just as in the pig in the backyard scenario—combine
very traditional elementswith new technological options. Such a ‘tinkering’ approach
starts from the tension and ambivalences between different values, wishes, and avail-
able options, and looks for ways that sidestep or go beyond paralyzing oppositions,
thus undermining the dualistic framing. This more generally illustrates that doing
and trying need not conform to the dividing lines set out in societal and academic
debates, and that progress can be a matter of making new combinations rather than
drastic choices.
One obstacle for such small scale initiatives is that they may go at least partly
against dominant economic rationality. Yet the dominance of dichotomous thinking
may be an at least as powerful obstacle, as it takes attention away from working with
the tensions in more constructive ways. While debates between ecomodernists and
Dark Mountaineers rage on, some farmers are constructing quite different options,
and their efforts deserve more conceptual as well as practical attention. As I have
been suggesting in the last paragraph, one attention skill that we urgently need for
avoiding dualistic stalemates, is the art of dealing with dualistic ambivalence through
imaginative tinkering instead of choosing.
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CRISPR-Cas9 was only discovered in 2012, but this new genome editing tool imme-
diately raised high expectations about the virtually unlimited range of applications
it brought into view as it turned previously remote possibilities into realistic options.
Apart from applications in human medicine and industrial biotechnology, its most
obvious uses are in the genetic improvement of crops and domestic animals, where
it can replace the older, more cumbersome and less versatile techniques of genetic
modification (aka recombinant-DNA technology). But CRISPR also aims at applica-
tions beyond conventional agriculture. It makes the prospect of reconstructing extinct
species (‘de-extinction’) as a new approach to conservation seem more feasible and
also lies at the basis of the ingenious ‘gene drive’ technique, which enables us to
quickly spread desired traits through wild populations. As co-discoverer Jennifer
Doudna declares with no false modesty: “CRISPR gives us the power to radically
and irreversibly alter the biosphere that we inhabit by providing a way to rewrite the
very molecules of life any way we wish” (Doudna and Sternberg 2017, 119).
Environmental philosopher Christopher Preston considers de-extinction and
gene drives, alongside nanotechnology, synthetic biology, geo-engineering and the
creation of so-called novel ecosystems, as pre-eminent technologies of the Anthro-
pocene or Synthetic Age, as he prefers to call the new era (Preston 2018). What these
technologies have in common is that they all reach very deeply into the ‘metabolism’
between man and nature: processes that are basic to the functioning of terrestrial
systems are increasingly replacedbyprocesses that are directly controlled byhumans.
Evolution, for instance, is no longer left to the blind process of randommutation and
natural selection but becomes an object of deliberate ‘evolutionary engineering’
through synthetic biology, de-extinction efforts and gene drives; the earthly climate
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is no longer exclusively determined by the amount of solar irradiation but becomes
an object of direct manipulation through geo-engineering.
Standing at the threshold of these unprecedented possibilities, many would
counsel caution and urge to pause for reflection before rushing headlong into the
brave new world of Synthetic Age technologies. However, there is also a very influ-
ential group of technology optimists known as ecomodernists who eagerly embrace
the ‘good Anthropocene’ and cannot wait to go full speed ahead with the new tech-
nologies, as these in their view hold out the promise of continued increase in human
wellbeing while simultaneously addressing environmental problems like climate
change and biodiversity loss. Given its prominence in contemporary debates, it is not
surprising that all chapters in this section engage with and confront ecomodernism
in one way or another, even if only implicitly. This engagement will also provide the
red thread in my commentary to connect the various themes discussed in the chapters
under consideration.
31.1 Gene Editing, Gene Drives and De-extinction
In his contribution to this volume Preston has chosen a different approach than
in The Synthetic Age. In his book he attempted to define the epochal significance
of the new technologies that might enable us to take over some of Nature’s most
basic operations, accepting the sweeping claims made by the protagonists of those
technologies and their ecomodernist supporters more or less at face value. Now he
takes a different tack. Following Alfred Nordmann’s criticism of ‘speculative ethics’,
he focuses on the credibility and tenability of the claims made with regard to the
potential performance of de-extinction and gene drives, concluding that these claims
are overblown and that “the discourse around gene drives and de-extinction is creating
a harmful speculative ethics”. Such a discourse might lead to a premature fixation on
highly speculative technologies, thereby obscuring alternative, less glamorous but
ultimately more promising approaches from view.
Preston explains that the success of de-extinction and gene drives in actual prac-
tice crucially depends on a key assumption of reductionist molecular science, to
wit, that it is possible to obtain predictable effects on the level of the behaviour
of organisms within their natural environments by intervening on the level of their
genomes. He adducesmany findings from biological researchwhich indicate that this
assumption of control and predictability may not actually hold. Although CRISPR
has been advertised as an extremely accurate and precise gene editing tool, in prac-
tice researchers have meanwhile been confronted with many unpleasant surprises
like off-target effects, unforeseen genomic deletions and rearrangements, and other
unpredicted changes in the genome. It is also well-known that there is no one-to-one
correspondence between genotype en phenotype; a single genetic alterationmay have
more than one phenotypic effect. Preston mentions a Chinese attempt to use gene
editing for promoting muscle growth in pigs, which also resulted in the unforeseen
appearance of extra vertebrae. Furthermore, the stability of the altered genome may
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also be problematic. Neither should we forget that constructed life forms, despite
their man-made origin, become subject to the Darwinian pressures of mutation and
selection after environmental release. There is also no guarantee that a gene drive can
be confined to the target population, as hybridization with related species remains a
realistic possibility. For all these and other reasons, Preston holds that gene drives and
de-extinction (and also gene editing in general) are far more questionable than they
are usually held to be. He gleefully cites the sobering conclusion of the IUCN ‘de-
extinction taskforce’ of 2014 that modern biotechnology cannot actually bring back
a faithful replica of a lost species but at best only a ‘proxy species’ or approximation.
The main problem behind the enthusiasm for gene drives and de-extinction as
conservation tools, Preston suggests in his chapter, is the delusion of predictability
and control to which their protagonists and supporters fall so easily prey, and the
pretence that agency is exclusively located on the side of humans and that the rest of
living nature constitutes no more than passive matter. This emphasis on epistemo-
logical (and also ontological) criticism is slightly at odds with the thrust of Preston’s
earlier analysis in his book. There he was mainly concerned about the potential
loss of the ‘otherness’ of Nature (or her genuine ‘wildness’) as a consequence of
our unremitting attempts to impose our own designs on her workings. In the end,
however, there is no real contradiction, as wildness not only refers to the autonomy
of animals and landscapes beyond human endeavours, but also connotes an essential
lack of predictability:
In its fickleness, its unpredictability, and its capacity continually to exceed our expectations,
wildness will ensure that remaking the earth will always remain a game of high chance.
When we insert ourselves so deeply into the workings of a planet, we are unlikely to be able
to predict all of the consequences of our actions. There are serious risks to letting ourselves
be seduced by the sublime beauties of technology. (Preston 2018, 178)
31.2 Resurrecting the Heath Hen
In her contribution Jennifer Welchman offers a detailed scrutiny of the so-called
reparations argument in favour of de-extinction by extensively considering the case
of the heath hen, a ground-dwelling bird that went extinct in 1932. The heath hen
has been adopted by the Revive and Restore organization as a candidate for a de-
extinction project onMartha’s Vineyard, an island before the coast ofMassachusetts.
Revive and Restore was founded in 2012 by the self-declared ecomodernists Stewart
Brand and Ryan Phelan as a nonprofit organization for the “genetic rescue” of endan-
gered and extinct species. The name of the organization suggests that it is actually
possible to “revive” an extinct species. As it explains on its website, “the trick [with
de-extinction] will be to transfer the genes that define the extinct species into the
genome of the related species, effectively converting it into a living version of the
extinct creature” (Revive and Restore, n.d.). The fact that a “revived” species can at
best be only a proxy or approximation but not a faithful replica of the extinct animal is
somewhat downplayed here. Various rationales are invoked to justify de-extinction
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projects, among which we can also recognize the reparations argument: “to undo
harm that humans have caused” (Brand 2014). However, this argument is just briefly
mentioned but not further elaborated and expanded upon.
Welchman rightly notes that the reparations argument, unlike many of the
other, mostly utilitarian or consequentialist reasons invoked for de-extinction, is not
forward-looking but backward-looking. In fact there is something odd about the fact
that de-extinction has been embraced as a worthy ‘conservation’ goal by ecomod-
ernists, because the aim of bringing back extinct species from the dead looks itself
extremely backward-looking. It appears to run counter to the usual ecomodernists’
appeal to the Anthropocene as a new dispensation that precludes any possibility of
returning to the ecological past. Yet, as Ronald Sandler duly observes, “de-extinction
aims to recapture something lost and […] is highly nostalgic” (Sandler 2017). Thus
we find Stewart Brand feeling thrilled by the prospect of recreating themajestic spec-
tacle of “clouds of passenger pigeons once again darkening the sun” (Brand 2014)—a
spectacle famously evoked earlier by conservationist Aldo Leopold tomourn the loss
of this characteristic American bird (Leopold 1947). But we may wonder whether
the thrill is really about the possible return of a scene of natural sublimity or rather
about the technological marvels of human ingenuity. The new ‘resurrectionists’ seem
intent on stealing the thunder from the old conservation movement and turning the
unceasing succession of sad news stories on the loss of one species after another
into some kind of good news show. Indeed, Brand sees huge strategic advantage in
a more positive approach to conservation: “The conservation story could shift from
negative to positive, from constant whining and guilt-tripping to high fives and new
excitement” (Brand 2014).
More traditional conservationists like Paul Ehrlich are understandably worried
that an emphasis on de-extinction will create a moral hazard leading to diminished
public support for conventional efforts to prevent extinction: “The problem is that
if people begin to take a ‘Jurassic Park’ future seriously, they will do even less
to stem the building sixth great mass extinction event” (Ehrlich 2014). This moral
hazard would be another illustration of Alfred Nordmann’s speculative ethics that
was discussed by Preston. Environmental philosopher Ben Minteer maintains that
‘resurrectionists’ refuse to accept natural limits and that their projects reflect “a new
kind of Promethean spirit that attempts to leverage our boundless cleverness and
powerful tools for conservation” (Minteer 2014).
In her chapter Welchman touches only indirectly on these ‘ideological’ back-
ground disputes. Her focus is on the reparations argument and her main aim is to
constructively elaborate the rather rudimentary version of this argument as it is found
in the literature into amore full-fledged and defensible form, so as to provide a norma-
tive standard bywhich to judge the particular case of the de-extinction project around
the heath hen. The argument that ‘we’—or in practice some collective agency like
the United States or the State of Massachusetts—have a moral duty of (restitutive)
justice to undo the harm of anthropogenic extinction by creating a replica of the
extinct species, though often invoked, is much more difficult and problematic than
might appear at first sight. Even if it is granted (against Clare Palmer) that humans
can have duties of justice vis-à-vis wild animals, the reparations argument is still
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confronted with many challenges. A key question is who could be owed reparations.
In comparable cases of historical injustice inflicted on certain human populations
(e.g. colonialism and slavery), it is in principle possible to right such wrongs by
compensating the descendants of the dead victims. But extinct animals are all dead
and have no living descendants. However, reparations might also be owed to the few
remaining members of a severely endangered species, e.g. when the breeding popu-
lation size is no longer viable. Thus in the case of the northern white rhino and of the
black-footed ferret, it would be appropriate (or perhaps even morally obligatory) to
create additional mating partners by using cloning techniques (which are also used
in de-extinction programs). Strictly speaking, of course, this is not an instance of
de-extinction. As Welchman writes, “when we are responsible for driving a species
into an extinction vortex for lack of viable reproductve partners, we could in principle
owe it to that species to ‘bring it back’ – albeit from extinction’s door rather than
extinction proper.” She holds that the reparations argument most suitably applies to
such rare and somewhat atypical cases.
Interestingly, Welchman also contemplates the possibility that the duty to undo
the harm of extinction might be owed to humans who mourn the loss of extinct
animals: “It is a standing grief to many that they will never enjoy the sight or sound
of Heath Hens strutting and booming on their breeding grounds as earlier genera-
tions did.” Welchman cites the views of a local naturalist from Martha’s Vineyard,
Tom Chase, who mourns the progressive loss of a rich bird life since his early child-
hood and is enthusiastic about the prospect of genetically replicating the heath hen:
“[A]s a conservatonist, I’m tired of fighting for things and always losing. I want
to get on the proactive side and not on the reactive side” (quoted in Welchman).
Another local naturalist, Stephen Kellert, sees in the heath hen de-extinction project
an extraordinary opportunity for the communities on Martha’s Vineyard to restore
their connection to nature and to deepen their relation with the larger community of
life.
Such views have been severely criticized by Ben Minteer. He condemns de-
extinction as a technological fix that cannot “atone” for the harm that has been done
by driving the heath hen to extinction. It is, in his judgment, a Promethean celebration
of human technological prowess. By pursuing high-tech species revival technologies,
the protagonists and supporters of de-extinction undermine our responsibility for
preventing mass extinction by promoting the dangerous illusion that any harms we
might have inflicted and are still inflicting can ultimately be fixed again.
Welchman holds that Minteer’s criticism is unduly dismissive and also based on a
misinterpretation. The replication of the heath hen as a technical achievement would
not as such “atone” for past abuses. Rather, it is seen as providing an opportunity
for the communities on Martha’s Vineyard to reconnect with nature; the focus is on
what would happen after successful replication, when the islanders must learn to live
with (replicas of) heath hens. To succeed, they “would have to develop new virtues
of care for this species and its environment”.
Welchman is also sceptical of the moral hazard argument. She claims that there is
no empirical evidence for the expectation that the public would become indifferent to
the continuing loss of biodiversity because of the erroneous belief that extinctions can
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always be remedied.By contrast, she points out that there is strong evidence to suggest
that the public’s feeling of powerlessness in the face of large-scale environmental
problems (such as anthropogenic extinction) can easily lead to apathy, disengagement
and denial. Thus she cautiously and partly subscribes to the ecomodernists’ stress
on the need for some positive message. For her, however, the focus is not primarily
on the technical achievement of replication. De-extinction of the heath hen would
enable the residents of Martha’s Vineyard to find out what they can do themselves in
concrete ways to mitigate, if ever so slightly, the colossal problem of anthropogenic
extinction. If they succeed in learning to live with heath hens and to grant these
fellow creatures the chance to flourish on their island, this example might stimulate
other de-extinction and conservation efforts. Perhaps the best thing the islanders can
do is simply give it a try. But here Welchman notices that she has moved beyond
the reparations argument and entered the domain of forward-looking reasons for
replicating extinct species.
31.3 Cultured Meat
Cor van derWeele’s chapter is about culturedmeat (or ‘cleanmeat’, as it is sometimes
labelled). It is proposed as a technological solution for the huge environmental and
animal welfare problems created by our current mode of meat production through the
raising and slaughtering of livestock. If successfully rolled out on a global scale, it
would fundamentally alter the human-animal relationship. Van der Weele points out
that the impetus to the development of cultured meat is more a matter of ‘ethical pull’
than of ‘technology push’. However, it would also neatly fit the tenets of ecomod-
ernism: “Cultured meat is a clear example of decoupling [as favoured by ecomod-
erists] since it attempts to employ technology to produce the same vast amounts of
meat with significantly less environmental damage” (Anthos 2018, 20). According
to some early estimates, the potential for reduced resource use is enormous, allegedly
allowing 7–45% lower energy use, 78–96% lower greenhouse gas emissions, 99%
lower land use, and 82–96% lower water use (Tuomisto and Texeira deMattos 2011).
Another key ethical argument for cultured meat is that it would put an end to the
massive suffering of livestock on ‘factory farms’.
The current scale of ‘industrialized’ farming can itself be seen as indicative of
the Anthropocene epoch: “Livestock now constitute 60% of the mammalian biomass
and humans another 36%. Only 4% remains for the more than 5000 species of wild
mammals” (Baillie and Zhang 2018). In terms of avian biomass, poultry currently
makes up 70% of all birds on earth, leaving only 30% for wild birds (Carrington
2018). These incredible percentages show the inordinate size of human claims on
the biosphere. It is important to point out that the present size of the human footprint
has been made possible only through a whole series of scientific and technological
advances in the areas of animal and plant breeding, nutrition science, microbiology,
antibiotics, etcetera (Boyd 2001). One important aspect is the immensely increased
use of nirtogen fertilizer to grow feed crops, enabled by the fixation of nitrogen
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through the Haber-Bosch process, which led to a huge rechanneling of the nitrogen
cycle on planet Earth—itself a major indicator of the Anthropocene (Elser 2011).
It is clear that animal farming in its current size and form, the end result of a
long process of technological advance and modernization, is simply unsustainable.
Ecomodernists, however, hold that we need more technology to solve the problems
created by earlier technology. Thus Nordhaus and Shellenberger declare: “The solu-
tion to the unintended consequences of modernity is, and has always been, more
modernity – just as the solution to the unintended consequences of our technologies
has always been more technology” (Nordhaus and Shellenberger 2012). Cultured
meat seems to ideally fit the ecomodernists’ bill. No wonder, then, that commercial
projections optimistically forecast that by 2040 some 35% of the demand for ‘meat’
will be covered by cultured meat (and 25% by plant-based vegan replacements)
(Carrington 2019).
One may wonder whether the technology of ‘culturing’ meat can be considered
a Synthetic Age technology in Christopher Preston’s sense insofar as it entails a
fundamental change in the ‘metabolism’ between humans and nonhuman nature.
Compared to more conventional animal husbandry, it surely involves a radically new
step by taking control down to the cellular level, virtually amounting to a “second
domestication” (Shapiro 2017). However, it can also be seen as a further contin-
uation of the ongoing industrialization of animal farming, culminating finally in
a Hegelian sublation and negation of the animal itself. While in current systems of
factory farming, animals are increasingly reduced to living protein machines in order
to maximize the production of edible meat, ‘culturing’ meat would take this devel-
opment to its ultimate conclusion of “just a protein machine, without the animal”
(Galusky 2014, 932). For Simon Fairly, an advocate of sustainable (andmodest) meat
consumption, cultured meat also lies at the end of a road to factory food and human
alineation from nature, away from the trend in the organic sector towards “slow food,
real meat and fresh local produce” (quoted by Van der Weele).
Critics likeAnthos andGalusky questionwhether the expected benefits of cultured
meat will ultimately be realized and also point out that this new technology requires
an extreme level of human control over the biological processes of muscle tissue
growth—a level of control that might well be illusionary (compare Preston’s critique
of gene editing and gene drives). Somewhat paradoxically, however, their biggest fear
seems to be that this technology might nonetheless ultimately prove feasible. For this
would mean that we could ‘solve’ our problematic relationship with animals and the
natural environment by a simple ‘technofix’, without changing our lifestyle. In that
case, Galusky holds, “the ethical questions surrounding eating meat are not so much
engaged as eliminated” (Galusky 2014, 937). Anthos similarly remarks that “[o]ut of
concern for the animals, the relationship to the farm animal disappears, reduced to a
more abstract idea that sentient beings are no longer sufferng for this meat” (Anthos
2018, 38). The disappearance of our relationship with farm animals would in his
view amount to a further stage in the alienation of humans from nonhuman nature.
In her contribution, Cor van der Weele aims to save cultured meat from ecomod-
ernism (as the title of her chapter indicates), but also from its detractors. She very
much deplores the dualistic way of thinking that appears to hold sway whenever
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we reflect on the future of agriculture and humanity’s relation to nature, as mani-
fested, for instance, in the polarization between ‘wizards’ and ‘prophets’ described
by Charles Mann. This characteristic opposition of views, pitting optimistic faith
in technological progress against an emphasis on lifestyle changes, is also found in
the polarization between the ecomodernists, on the one hand, and the subscribers
to the Dark Mountain Manifesto, on the other. Van der Weele points out that both
parties have their own accounts of mechanisms of selective attention, which are held
to explain why the other party is seemingly blind to the obvious truth. These two
accounts are almost each other’s mirror image and they are used in a rather self-
serving way to bolster belief in one’s own view of the world (illustrating the biblical
saying that you look at the speck in your brother’s eye but fail to notice the beam in
your own eye). Van der Weele holds that selective attention is indeed an extremely
important phenomenon and that its underlying mechanisms are worthy of in-depth
study. However, this study should be done in a more impartial and less asymmetric
way. She also emphasizes that a dualistic way of thinking is itself a very influential
mechanism of selective attention, which may have paralysing effects.
To criticize the dualism between technology and lifestyle, Van der Weele argues
against the ecomodernist framing of cultured meat as the only plausible scenario of
the future. In her research with focus groups, an interesting alternative scenario has
been suggested by one of those groups, dubbed “the pig in the backyard”. In this
scenario, humans would still have relations with farm animals: “Participants who had
started out being quite hesitant about the idea of cultured meat at some point started
to envision its production through a local and small scale industry: cells from free
ranging pigs, in backyards or urban farms,would be taken through biopsies every now
and then and cultured into meat in neighbourhood factories. The idea immediately
warmed the participants to cultured meat.” In an ongoing follow-up project, Van der
Weele further elaborates this scenario with farmers who see opportunities to combine
small-scale farming with free-ranging animals, better connections with consumers
and society, and production of local kinds of cultured meat.
Van der Weele is far from claiming that these alternative scenarios necessarily
point the way to the future. They are rather inspiring images of a desirable future that
in the end may still flounder on the dominant constraints of economic efficiency. But
meanwhile they can break the hold that the ecomodernist framing of cultured meat
has on our minds.
31.4 Enhancement, Disenhancement and Animal Welfare
Adam Shriver does not explicitly engage with ecomodernism, but the topic of his
chapter is very relevant given the increasing levels of technological control humans
exercise over ever more animal lives, especially through new technologies of gene
editing. With much analytical finesse, Shriver attempts to develop a rigorous account
of animal (dis)enhancement. He argues that popular intuitions about what constitues
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animal disenhancement—e.g. the widespread view that it involves taking some-
thing away from the animal that would otherwise be present—are unreliable and
misleading. Such notions are invoked, for instance, in ethical debates about blind
chickens and polled cattle and about more futuristic examples like ‘dino-chickens’
and ‘football birds’. Shriver holds that we need a holistic rather than domain-specific
conception of (dis)enhancement and that at first sight there are three possible candi-
dates for such a conception, to wit, the evolutionary fitness, the normal species
functioning and the welfarist account. He dismisses the former two accounts rather
unceremoniously as irrelevant for dealing with animals under direct human super-
vision, thus leaving the welfarist definition of (dis)enhancement as the only tenable
option.
It is not hard to see why evolutionary fitness is deemed irrelevant for domesti-
cated animals held in controlled environments. While a trait like aggression may
once have been conducive to the survival of their wild ancestors, it no longer is for
animals living under conditions determined by humans. It would therefore make
no sense, Shriver claims, to call an unusually aggressive animal ‘enhanced’ or an
unusually passive animal ‘disenhanced’. Similar considerations pertain to the normal
species functioning definition, which obviously begs the question to which popula-
tion the standard of normalcy applies. Shriver’s reasoning thus looks unobjectionable.
However, by rejecting the two alternative accounts of animal (dis)enhancement, he
thereby also declares the evolutionary past of kept animals to be radically irrelevant
for judging their present situation. Or so it seems. Is this apparent breakwith previous
evolutionary history just another manifestation of the advent of the Anthropocene?
Take the well-known example of the chickens that have been genetically modified
tomake themblind, so as tomitigate problems resulting frompecking and debeaking.
One might perhaps concede that under confined conditions such an intervention
would increase chicken welfare, but still hold that it shows little respect for the
(evolved) ‘nature of the beast’ and not hesitate to use the term ‘disenhancement’
in this conncection. But, of course, it is precisely this usage that is proscribed by
Shriver’s reasoning, which seems to justify any further technological erasure of the
genetic heritage passed down to our domesticated animals.
Shriver’s welfarist account of animal (dis)enhancement is not without its own
problems, some of which he duly mentions. His definition of disenhancement is as
follows: “Any change in the biology or psychology of an animal which decreases the
chance of leading a good life in the relevant set of circumstances”. The reference to
the relevant set of circumstances constitutes, in his view, an essential component of
the definition. However, it also illustrates a crucial weakness of Shriver’s welfarist
approach, beyond the problems he himself signals. In searching for a proper account
of (dis)enhancement that is relevant for the situation of domesticated animals, he
apparently accepts the actual conditions in which animals are held simply as given,
or as “the relevant set of circumstances”. In this way, it would seem, he robs the
concept of animal welfare of its normative bite, as the inserted clause ensures that
it can no longer function as an independent basis from which to criticize actually
existing husbandry conditions.
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It is significant that in 5 of the 6 concrete cases of more or less radically changed
animals discussed by Shriver, the answer whether the change under consideration
amounts to an enhancement or a disenhancement is: “It depends”. Indeed, the answers
vary, depending on what particular circumstances are assumed. But this shows that
his conception lacks the normative power to judge the circumstances themseves.
Only in the extreme case of the ‘football birds’ is there a definite answer. This
case would neither count as an example of enhancement nor of disenhancement,
simply because these hypothetical ‘birds’ would by definition be completely insen-
tient and thus have no welfare at all. (One might consider them as a logically tran-
sitional stage toward cultured meat, although the actual development looks bound
to skip this transitional stage.) But even this clear answer is later qualified. Taking
up Preston’s suggestion that the creation of ‘football birds’ might involve a loss of
agency on the part of the animal and therefore still constitute a case of disenhance-
ment, Shriver appears ultimately willing to accept this conclusion by incorporating
agency into his concept of welfare. By considering such remote futuristic cases as
serious possibilities, however, we are indulging in speculative ethics.
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